

Sub-Saharan Africa: Societal Reintegration of Ex-Militant Youths

Jude Kenechi ONYIMA

Abstract: *This is a study of how militant youths in Sub-Saharan African conflict areas reintegrated into civilian life after they were granted Amnesty. Specifically, the study explored what reintegration means to different segments of the society and how the amnesty programs fit these descriptions, the extent to which the ex-militants are reintegrated into civilian life socially, economically and politically, the contextual factors that make reintegration difficult and how the different forms of capital acquired by the ex-militants during and after the crisis have transformed. The area of study was the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria where sixty ex-militants and eighteen community leaders from Ijaw, Urhobo and Itshekiri ethnic groups were selected for the study. Questionnaire, interviews and focus group discussions were employed to generate the needed data. Findings revealed that the way the reintegration package was carried out fell short of what the ex-militants and the communities perceive reintegration to be. As a result, the ex-militants have not been effectively reintegrated into civilian life. Factors such as failure to address the cause and effects of the conflict, alienation of the communities in the amnesty program and inability to find substitutes for the ex-militants hindered effective reintegration. Meanwhile, the different forms of capital acquired by the ex-militants have undergone some transformation much of which was used for clandestine activities. The study recommends that reintegration exercise should be based on the context that produced the conflict and that communities should be directly involved in its design and implementation.*

Keywords: *Reintegration, Niger Delta, ex-militants, Amnesty.*

INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian Niger Delta, a home of about 30million people with over 63% youth population, encompasses about 60 of Africa's largest mangrove forests and stretches over 20,000km² swamps of the littoral fringes of Nigeria (Afinotan&Ojakorotu, 2009; Chukezi, 2009; Azaike, 2007). In spite of the huge oil revenue derived from the region, the region has become a place of frustrated expectation. This has inevitably transferred

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a siege mentality among youths who feel condemned to a future without hope. As a reaction to widespread poverty and deprivation, the youths adopted confrontational strategies to addressing the problem. This action resulted in the emergence of several militant groups who resorted to the use of sophisticated arms to draw the attention of the multinational oil companies and government to their collective travails. For more than four years, the region was known for high profile kidnapping of expatriates and their family members, destruction of oil facilities, oil bunkering, hostage taking, shoot-out with police, armed attacks, bio-chemical attacks, assassination, sabotage and extortion (Ajayi, 2010; Okonmah, 2010; Akinwale, 2010). The fertile ground for these clandestine activities was laid by the activities of foreign oil multinational companies and government insensitivity since 1956. To address this militancy and its attendant consequences, the Nigerian government initiated an amnesty program.

According to Hernrad (1999), amnesty is defined as a strategic state policy which takes the form of executive or legislative clemency in which offenders or those involved in illegal activities are formally pardoned and all records of their trials, accusations, convictions and imprisonment cast into oblivion. At the end of the amnesty offer made by the federal government, over 30,000 militants 'repented', surrendered their arms and ammunitions, pledge full allegiance to the government and submitted to the demands of the amnesty program. The Amnesty Program, which commenced in 2009, is meant to last till 2015 when the repented militant must have been effectively reintegrated into their communities. The first phase of the program was disarmament, the second phase was rehabilitation and the third phase is reintegration into community life. Relative peace has returned to the region and militancy has been reduced to the barest minimum. Oil production has peaked to 10 years high and rate of crime has gone under control.

However, it is not yet time for celebration as majority of the ex-militants are returning home from rehabilitation and the Amnesty program is winding up. The ex-militants need to get employment, get married, contribute their quota to economic development and become part of their community. But to what extent are they willing and able to reintegrate into community life after living for years in the creeks (forest) and how willing are their communities to reintegrate them after causing them so much pain. This circumstance raises a number of questions because the ex-militants have come of age, they need to assume responsibility, serve in various leadership positions and contribute to community life.

Indeed, these youths have been used by politicians for their selfish motives, they have rich contacts, possess different political alliances (godfathers), perceived to be criminals by some segments of the community and have made much money from illegal oil bunkering (Okonmah, 2010; Olukunle, 2010; Ikelegbe, 2014). How has things changed after five years? Has there been any change in the way the ex-militants are perceived by their communities? To what extent are employers of labor willing to give them jobs,

knowing their past records? Would parents be able to allow them marry their children? Would they be allowed leadership roles in their community? Would the ex-militant be willing to accept the paltry salary from employers in place of huge revenue they make from oil bunkering? How would non militant youths relate with ex-militant youth within the same community?.

Providing answers to these questions is germane for some important reasons. Firstly, the monthly stipend paid to the ex-militants as part of the amnesty program will soon come to an end and many of the ex-militant who depended on it will experience socio-economic shocks. Secondly, ineffective reintegration/alienation could make the ex-militants to go back to their former lives. The situation will be worse owing to the fact that majority of non-militant youths now feel that 'crime pays' since they were not given the same privileges the ex-militants enjoy.

In this study, the researcher examined the interface between indigenous reintegration logic and state-centric reintegration process. He explored the indigenous logic from the perspectives of cultural ways of reintegrating offenders, the views of warlords and their subjects, the views of non-militant youths, community perception of the ex-militant after the amnesty (possible stigma) and the new dynamics in elites pacts. The state-centric process was questioned in terms of the how the ex-militants were able to reintegrate socially, economically and socially, the meeting point or the missing link between the indigenous and state-centric reintegration logics and the nature of transformation that has happened to the different forms of capital the ex-militants acquired during the period. Four research questions guided the study: (1) What does reintegration mean to different segments of the society and how did the state-version of reintegration fit these descriptions? (2) Are the ex-militant actually reintegrated into civilian lives socially, economically, politically, in practice, in habits, in connections and in networks/pacts? (3) What are the contextual factors that make reintegration difficult? and (4) How has different forms of capital acquired by the ex-militants during and after the crisis transformed?

The study has theoretical and practical relevance especially in the area of theory building in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). Despite the growing attention given to DDR process in the last 15 years, understanding of the problem is still limited (Nilsson, 2005; Rugumire-Makuza, 2013). There is no acceptable theory on reintegration presently, except some assumptions from various studies about why reintegration process succeeded or failed. This study will contribute in the area of non-state mechanism for reintegration and strengthen the missing link between the state and non-state reintegration mechanism. It will reveal contextual factors that make reintegration difficult as well as increase understanding of critical fabrics of reintegration from a bottom-up approach unlike top-down approach that is popular in many African countries (Rhea, 2014, Kigma, 2000). Generally, reintegration is seen from socio-political

and economic perspectives. This study, as in Kaplan and Nussio (2012), will explore the relevance of anthropological perspective in understanding reintegration and resettlement. There is a growing literature on clientele and political patronage but little attention has been paid to informal patronage arrangement that characterize resource based economies (Richards, 1999; Bjorgo, 2009). This study will contribute to understanding how informal pacts between elites and preliterate, warlords and subjects, host communities and militants are formed and maintained overtime as well as how they react to externalities such as government intervention.

CONCEPTUAL REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The Concept of Post Conflict Transition

This period after the end of hostility, popularly regarded as a post-conflict transition in the literature, is a very sensitive, delicate and complex in terms of expectations and activities. It is very significant not only because of peacebuilding implications but also because it determines the extent of progress towards sustainable peace. Post-conflict situation is usually characterized by volatility, diverse power struggles, plural but conflicting interests and instability (Ikelegbe & Umukoro, 2014). It is associated with discrimination, marginality, neglect, deprivation, disintegration and disempowerment which could generate poverty, frustration, alienation, powerlessness and anger that trigger social tensions, violent conflicts and threats to sustainable peace. Restoration of positive peace after violent conflict usually involves a multi-staged transition process that ranges from political settlement, peace agreements, disarming and rehabilitating ex-combatants. It includes processes of reconstruction and economic recovery, restoration of institutions of democratic governments and justice and processes of reconciliation and peacebuilding (United Nations, 2007). The task of packaging diverse actors with often conflicting interests, some of which may have been antagonists and battle field opponents, to agree to and sustain peace agreements, requires very delicate management that could be threatened at any moment with emergent incidents, information and fears. This is perhaps why many post-conflict transition periods have short lifecycles.

Post-conflict transition programs consist of sets of activities that are undertaken during and after cessation of violent conflicts to prepare the ground for recovery and peacebuilding. It involves physical reconstruction of basic infrastructures and basic social services that were destroyed during the war or armed resistance, societal rehabilitation which includes the resettlement of displaced persons, assistance and support to victims of violence and reintegration of ex-combatants into the society. This may include political reforms and new structures for democratic governance and new development (Nillson, 2005).

In recent times, DDR programs have assumed the center stage in post-conflict transition. It has become a key component of national and international efforts in the facilitation of

transition from war to peace. DDR assists fighters, among others, to gain a foothold in civil society so as to prevent them from returning to combat and hence avoid a resumption of hostilities (Banholzer, 2014). Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) are three terms which mostly stand for one joint process. DDR contributes to achieving a lasting peace process where those involved directly in the conflict can break with the past (Gamba, 2003). It creates a “transitional safety net” to ensure that combatants do not need to return to war in order to survive. DDR is usually viewed in the context of peacekeeping and peacebuilding and is often actually embedded in broader peace operations. DDR has gained prominence because it contributes to state-building, post conflict recovery and reconstruction. It leads to a shift from the formal and informal rules of militant groups to the laws defined by the state (Ikelegbe & Umukoro, 2014).

According to Macartan & Weinsten, (2007), *Disarmament*, the first phase of the DDR process, is the collection, verification of usability, documentation, control (storage) and disposal (disabling and destruction) of small arms, ammunitions, explosives, light and heavy weapons of combatants and, sometimes, of the civilian population. It entails the physical removal of instruments of combat and symbolically shows the end of hostility and transition from military to civilian life. (United Nations, 2007). It also enables a secure environment where demobilization and reintegration can take place. *Demobilization*, on the other hand, is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups and disbanding of armed groups. Demobilization involves the assembly of ex-combatants, processing of individual combatants in temporary centers, the massing of troops in camps designated for the purpose, orientation programs and transportation to the communities of destination. *Reintegration*, the last phase in the DDR program, is the process by which ex-combatants acquire full civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income (Knight & Özerdem, 2004). It is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame that primarily takes place in communities at local level. Reintegration programs are not only geared to ex-combatants and their civilian associates but also to the development of civil communities to which combatants will return, as well as the needs of victims of war and IDPs.

Youth Militancy: Recruitment and Disengagement

A number of disengagement programs from violence and radical gangs failed to achieve their target because of poor understanding of group dynamics of youth gangs (Klien, 1995). Various studies have focused on the processes of recruitment, radicalization and disengagement of youth militants (Bjorgo, 2009; Wright, 1987). There is a form of consensus that young people join militant groups for reasons such as ideology and politics, provocation and rage, protection, drifting, thrill seeking, attraction to weapon/uniform, search for a father figure, substitute community/friend, excitement, search for identity and status. The process of socialization and radicalization, although plural in approach, has been very critical to the survival of militant groups. As Bjorgo

and Horgan (2009) observed, newcomers in the groups undergo a process of socialization. They learn from others how to behave. New members are not always trusted; they are treated with distrust until they prove their trustworthiness and dedication before they could be introduced into more sensitive activities. Achieving a position of authority depends on important factors such as time, seniority and acumen. Those who show stamina and hang on after various ordeals and confrontations are respected and 'promoted'. Ordeals and confrontation can result in arrest, victory or defeat. To most militant groups, victories are sources of shared pride while defeat increases bitterness and hatred against the common enemy. Bitter defeats strengthen group cohesion and that is how they build bond and attachment to the family. As Bjorgo (2009) observed, becoming socialized into a new community and building bond of loyalty to the new community represents a fundamental process of initiation. Another form of initiation involves rituals, oath taking and series of teaching on new ideology and beliefs.

Disengagement on the other hand has been discussed extensively in literature. Horgan (2006) discussed not only what disengagement means but also why people disengage, what happens to people when they disengage and how to know if someone is truly disengaged. Disengagement, as agreed by many authors, is a cognitive and social change, in terms of leaving behind shared social norms, values, attitudes, relationships and social networks so carefully forged when the individual was still a member of a violent group. Evidence from former members of terrorist groups reveals that some members may have disengaged but not totally left the group. They left a specific role but still participate in some activities that benefit the movement. Vigil (1988) observed that the process through which militant members are recruited is not the same as the process of disengagement. Entering is a gradual step but leaving is more difficult because it seems like turning back on close family. Some literature show that militancy is a temporal experience for most youths and that the duration of time spent with the group determine how easy or hard reintegration can be. Findings from a number of researches suggest that age is the most important determinant of disengagement (Crenchaw, 2001). Militancy peaks during late teens and early twenties and then decline with age. It was argued that physical ageing and maturity that comes with parenting, employment, education and geographical mobility make people to leave militancy. Garfinkel (2007), in a study of former militant groups in Nigeria, Israel and Lebanon, argued that most transformation took place against a backdrop of vulnerability, crises and trauma. He also reaffirmed the important role of relationship, such as friend, mentor and wife, in the disengagement process. Indeed, a change in association from criminal peers to law abiding spouses and workmates contributes to disengagement. Ebaugh (1988) identified exit processes of ex-militants to include disillusion with the individual's current identity, an attempt to identify and locate a more alternative satisfactory role, the presence of a triggering factor and the creation of a new identity as an 'ex'.

Bjorgo (2009) classified reasons for disengagement into push and pull factors. Push factors include negative social sanctions, loss of faith in the ideology and politics of the group and delusions with the inner working of the group. Pull factors include longing for freedom of a normal life, age, career prospects and new responsibilities. However, some group members do not want to disengage because of the positive characteristics of the group as well as other reasons that make disengagement costly. Bjorgo discovered that positive characteristics of the group, such as security, identity, community, adventure and excitement, could inhibit disengagement. Other factors that make disengagement costly also include negative sanction from the group, impaired relationship with the community, lack of moral support, loss of protection against the enemy and negative sanction from the state justice system.

Ex-militants in post-conflict environment

Demobilization of militants produces a number of unwanted situations. Firstly, ex-militants often pose a threat to post conflict communities. Secondly, the atrocities that ex-combatants may have committed can create conflict-generating rifts and thirdly, certain groups of weak and marginalized ex-militants may need special assistance and care. From the point of view of the communities, ex-militants pose security threat to social order. It is a common phenomenon for ex-militants to rearm themselves in order to further their demands (Alden, 2002; Gamba, 2003; Spear, 2002). The main reason why ex-combatants so often end up in organized crime is the ease with which clandestine military structures are transformed into self-sustaining, criminal organizations (Call & Stanley, 2003).

After demobilization, some categories of ex-militants constitute a weak and marginalized group in need of economic, psychological and social assistance in order to survive. This is especially true for child soldiers and female and disabled ex-militant. Since ex-militants foremost have been trained to fight, most ex-militants lack relevant job skills. The skills that they obtained during their stay in the armed groups are seldom in demand on the job market. Furthermore, the majority has little or no formal education. This makes it difficult for ex-militants to find employment in the short-term difficult (Kigma, 2000; Nübler, 2000). The fact that demobilized militants often acquire families and dependents during the war, adds to their strain (Collier, 1999). Wartime experiences naturally also affect the health of ex-militants. In both Uganda and Ethiopia, a large portion of the demobilised combatants were HIV/AIDS positive (Kigma, 2000). Ex-militants also commonly suffer from psychological stress due to war trauma. As militants, they may have carried out, suffered from, or witnessed terrible violence that left deep psychological scars and which must be dealt with (Preston, 1997). Because of the stress associated with participating in fighting, many militants begin using alcohol and drugs. Once peace arrives, it is estimated that as many as 25%-30% of all militants are serious drug abus-

ers (Mueller, 2003). It is the existence of these challenges that provides the rationale for giving targeted reintegration assistance to ex-militants.

In the views of Nilsson (2005), there are four main ways in which being a militant can be empowering: it enhances one's own security, it gives economic and political benefits and it gives societal prestige. However, being a militant naturally also has drawbacks, such as the social and psychological effects of participating in warfare. Just like soldiers, militants who engage in violence against the civilian population may become tainted socially once peace arrives. With demobilization, ex-militants risk losing the empowerment gained during the fighting. Because most demobilized militants lack higher education and job skills and may not be welcome in their home communities, they are easily marginalized in the society (Utas, 2003). This is especially true for former militants suffering from grave psychological distress. After demobilization, it is therefore necessary to do two things. First, it is imperative to find peaceful substitutes for their loss of economic, political and social empowerment and the possibility to fend for their own security. Second, it is essential that there is societal and individual healing (Ikelegbe & Umukoro, 2014). The failure to find peaceful substitutes and address this aspect of healing in the post-demobilization phase can give ex-militants the incentive to engage in different forms of violence. These incentives are further strengthened by the high expectations ex-militants have of the civilian life awaiting them. During the struggle, leaders often promise their subordinates access to education, work and land. When peace arrives, ex-militants expect to receive the benefits they were promised. These promises and expectations are, however, seldom met, which tends to create a sense of bitterness among ex-militants. That such grievances often result in collective action, is probably due to the strong bond of loyalty and friendship that exist between ex-militants who have served in the same military units (Preston, 1997). Such networks can easily be used to make collective demands.

Nilsson (2005) enumerated four main forms of substitutes. Firstly, when handing in their weapons, ex-militants lose the ability to fend for their own security, whereby it is imperative to find ways to ensure their physical security. Secondly, the economic survival of ex-militants and their families' must be ensured. Thirdly, there needs to be mechanisms that allow ex-militants to channel their political demands peacefully. Finally, it is important to find ways to safeguard the societal prestige of ex-militants.

Efforts to enable ex-militants and their families to support themselves can be divided into three phases. The first phase aims at securing their immediate survival until they can provide for themselves. This is followed by an intermediate period that seeks to give ex-militants the skills, knowledge and information to enable them to support themselves. The final stage is achieving economic self-sufficiency through production or gainful employment (Ikelegbe & Umukoro, 2014). Lacking income and employment, ex-combatants and their dependents are often unable to support themselves after demobilization. This

necessitates the creation of so-called reinsertion packages that can help them overcome the difficult period between demobilization and full economic assimilation into civil society. Reinsertion packages can include anything from cash payments, clothing, food, medicine, tools and cooking utensils to housing, building materials, seeds and animals. After the immediate survival of ex-combatants is ensured, it is necessary to find ways to give them the skills, knowledge and information that allows them to support themselves in a sustainable manner.

Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Security: the Nexus

Both peacekeeping and peacebuilding are critical in maintaining security in many post conflict regions. Peacekeeping operations are aimed at creating and maintaining environment for peacebuilding while ensuring that warring parties do not continue hostilities during peacebuilding. Traditional peacekeeping focuses on providing the security umbrella under which peacekeeping actors can function. However, its current portfolio includes advancing the political objective of the peace process as well as laying the foundation for long term institution building. As Carvelho and Ettang (2011) observed, peacekeeping has changed from traditional ceasefire operations to complex scenario where wider response is required such as early peacebuilding initiatives. As a result, peacekeepers are no longer seen as troops but early peacebuilders. This realization made the United Nations to insist that all peacekeeping mandates must have elements of peacebuilding; coated in coordinated and practical approach to institution and capacity building. Peacebuilding on the other hand entail range of activities undertaking in post conflict areas aimed at making peace self-sustaining as well as reducing relapse into conflict (Hazen, 2007). The end of hostility does not signal beginning of development; this is because institutions and capacities are usually weak in post conflict areas and these conditions are conducive for crime and violence. Peacebuilding is the overall framework in which external assistance is provided to post conflict regions including reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and development. From Chad experience to Liberia and Sudan experiences, peacekeeping has become an integral part of peacebuilding focusing on institution building. As Smith (2015) observed, institution building in the areas of border control, rule of law, human right reforms, electoral reforms, resource administration and resettlements have become core mandates of most United Nations peacekeeping missions. The nexus between these three concepts is that to achieve security in post-conflict regions, strong and effective institutions should exist and it is through peacekeeping that the environment could be created for peacebuilding which in turn will usher in the needed security and development. Societies with effective, inclusive and accountable institutions are likely to withstand crises and peacefully manage disputes. Warring parties are unlikely to move into peacebuilding directly without peacekeeping initiative since it is an asset for implementing peace agreement and fostering stability. Carvelho and Ettang (2011) identified that effective

peacekeeping/peacebuilding initiative should have features of local ownership, wider engagement especially of host communities, relying on external actors to manage the process and strong element of institution building.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Building the theory of Reintegration

There is a consensus that DDR is a theory less field. There is no generally acceptable theory of DDR. This is because of the nature of the process and complexities it presents. However, a number of studies have revealed what makes reintegration effective or less effective. Originally, reintegration mainly referred to as programs dealing with the economic assimilation of demobilized militants through training and employment so that they will not go back to violence. Buxton (2008) defined reintegration as a multi-dimensional, complex long-term process by which ex-militants and their families are assisted to settle in a post war community (social), to be part of decision making (political) and engage in a sustainable civilian employment (economic), as well as adapt to the attitudes and expectations of their communities and dealing with their psychosocial trauma resulting from their war experience. However, over time, more emphasis has been placed on the social aspects of reintegration. Knight and Özerdem (2004) argued that societal reintegration is the most important aspect of the DDR process and that any reintegration program should be informed by the context that gave birth to the conflict. Ikelegbe and Umukoro (2014) buttressing this point observed that every activity in the DDR process shall aim at strengthening social capital, participation, inclusion, restoration of confidence, acceptance and other economic aspect to provide means to survival. Nilsson (2005) sees reintegration wholly as a societal process of economic and political assimilation of ex-combatant into civil society, involving many stakeholders and relying on the social action of the community. He argued that reintegration must take shape and reflect human and non-human components of relationships in terms of customs, social conventions, value systems and power relationships in the community. Discourses on reintegration show that lack of social interaction and community acceptance of demobilized militants have grave consequence for both the ex-militants and the community, while their presence build self-esteem and sense of commitment. Rugumire-Makuza (2013) suggests that to ensure effective reintegration, a long-term approach that takes into account the recovery and reconstruction of post conflict society, in terms of social cohesion, networks and integrated community development approach, is a necessity. From the foregoing, sustainable reintegration is more than economic reinsertion as seen previously but also on the willingness to understand community dynamics. A narrow perspective of seeing reintegration as a social contract that pays combatants to stop fighting is not sustainable. Strategy should be put in place for monitoring socio-economic risks and opportunities together with other activities that can facilitate the renewal of social fabric. Many argue that it is not enough to hin-

der ex-militants from engaging in violence. It is just as important to make them part of local civil society, which, among other things, necessitates efforts at reconciliation (Lundin, 1998). The need to facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants has resulted in other groups receiving reintegration assistance. The main reason has been to avoid tensions between ex-militants and other weak groups in society, who may resent ex-militants receiving special treatment. This development has resulted in a widening of the concept of reintegration, blurring the meaning of the term.

In various African societies, traditional cleansing rituals have been used to reconcile former combatants with their receptor communities, as in the case of Mozambique (Granjo, 2007; Schafer, 2001) or in Sierra Leone (Stovel, 2008; Buxton, 2008). These rituals expurgate the individual ex-combatant both from danger and from being considered dangerous to the community, freeing them from stigma. In Rwanda, more institutionalized reconciliation was instituted in the form of the community Gacaca courts after the genocide in 1994, although with mixed results (Brounéus, 2010). NATO's Joint Task Force 435 has held many reintegration *shuras*, or tribal council meetings, where community leaders and members welcome former (suspected) Taliban militants back to their communities and all sign pledges with the NATO forces vouching for these returnees and guaranteeing that they will not turn back to the conflict.

Different definitions argue that reintegration should be seen as a societal process aiming at the economic, political and social assimilation of ex-militants and their families into civil society (Torjesen, 2013; Bowd & Özerdem, 2013; Nilsson, 2005). This shows that reintegration not only has economic and social dimensions, it also has political ones. Donors should, therefore, also seek to assimilate ex-combatants politically. Reintegration should not be equated with programs planned and funded by donors. It is instead a broad societal process involving many actors, especially local ones. The ex-combatants, their families and local communities are the ones who do most of the reintegration work. If donors do not take this into account the result may be that external programs do not support local reintegration processes. The target group should exclusively be ex-combatants and their families (United Nations, 2007). Other groups, such as refugees, sex slaves or women who have been forcibly married to guerrilla fighters, have their own needs and specific reintegration package must be crafted for them. Including these other groups in the process will make reintegration more difficult. This does not preclude reintegration programs for ex-combatants from also giving assistance to receiving communities or refugees returning to the same areas in order to prevent societal tension and increase the capacity of local communities to reintegrate ex-combatants. However, in these situations, ex-combatants are still the target group since the purpose of assistance is to facilitate their assimilation (Ikelegbe & Umukoro, 2014). It is important to remember that reintegration is an integral part of DDR and cannot be planned or carried out in isolation. There must be some flexibility in the sequencing of DDR process, as a strict adherence to the tradition of disarmament followed

by demobilization and reintegration may be inappropriate. It might be necessary to launch disarmament drives after the completion of demobilization and groups that previously stood outside the peace process may need to be demobilized during the reintegration phase. Launching DDR processes without first finding a political solution to the conflict should be avoided.

The reintegration process of ex-militants is a complex program, having economic, humanitarian, political and cultural faces. According to Rhea (2014), effective reintegration should have the following elements: Firstly, it should be a part of other post conflict stabilization package and therefore linked to other reconstruction and peace building interventions in planning and in coordination. It should be a subset of broader processes of national reconstruction and development. Secondly, security reform and proper management of arms shall be put in place in order to achieve long term stability. Indeed, poor arms management will make it easy for the ex-militants to resort to violence, making the transition process cumbersome. Effective weapon control, although taken care of in the disarmament program, impact significantly on the success of the reintegration effort. Thirdly, it should support the process of turning combatants into productive citizens. This process starts in the demobilization phase during which the structures of armed forces and groups are broken down and combatants formally acquire civilian status. Fourthly, the ultimate aim of reintegration is to prevent a return to violent conflict and to make peace irreversible. To achieve this, the package should encourage trust and confidence and deal with the root causes of conflict. Finally, as Torjesen (2013) observed, reintegration is a flexible and unique process that should be adapted to the culture, needs and peculiarity of the environment where it takes place.

HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

The Presidential Amnesty Program for the ex-militants

The amnesty for the militants in the Niger Delta was announced by Nigeria's former President Late Umaru Musa Yar' Adua, on June 25, 2009. The amnesty was granted in accordance with section 175 of the 1999 Constitution which provides that 'the President may grant any person concerned with or convicted of any offence created by an Act of the National Assembly a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions'. It was generally agreed that the failure of military solution by the government and the subsequent militant attacks on the oil infrastructure, which brought down crude oil production drastically to its lowest level of below 900,000 by mid-2009, necessitated a strategic rethink of government approach to the region's agitation and militancy. The strategic rethink following the massive threat of the activities of militant groups to the nation's economy and security, moved government to urgently differentiate between the criminal elements and those who had genuine issues in the region (Ikelegbe & Umukoro, 2014). Although militancy and armed resistance, which began between 1998 and 1999, was

ostensibly a part of the struggle for fairer distribution of thenation's oil wealth in favor of the impoverished people of the Niger Delta, the government believed that "criminals" have hijacked genuine agitations in the region and constituted themselves into very real threat to Nigeria's national security and economic survival.

The Amnesty program is based on the need to achieve sustainable development, peace, human and environmental security in the Niger Delta region. The goal of the amnesty program was to achieve peace, reconciliation, reintegration, healing and sustainable development (Ajayi, 2010). Thus, the relationship assumed by government between it and the Niger Delta militants is juridical; the militants are pardoned instead of being punished for engaging in criminal activities in order to foster peace and progress. In other words, the Amnesty is an explicit or implicit acceptance by the government that militant activities in the Niger Delta is a product of neglect and underdevelopment which can be attributed to corruption and lack of political will of governments. A Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament of Militants in the Niger Delta was set up to manage the process. Militants were expected to embrace the Amnesty within a 60 day moratorium between 6th August and 4th October 2009. The militants were expected to surrender their arms at designated centers to pave way for rehabilitation and reintegration. At the expiration of the 60-day grace period on October 4, 2009, a total of 20,192 militants surrendered their arms and ammunition to the Federal Government and accepted the offer of amnesty. Another 6,166 were demobilized and added in November 2010 to constitute a second phase of the program, while another 3,642 were added in the third phase, thus bringing the total number to 30,000.

The disarmament component of the Amnesty program was essentially a military exercise conducted by the Nigerian Armed forces. During the disarmament stage, huge caches of arms and ammunitions were submitted by the militants prior to their being enlisted into the amnesty Program. Disarmament was concluded in December 2009 while the arms and ammunitions collected were completely destroyed by the Nigerian Army in Lokpanta, under the watch of the Amnesty Office (Ikelegbe & Umukoro, 2014).

Demobilization and Rehabilitation

The rehabilitation of the ex-militants began in June, 2010 at the Obubra camp in Cross River State. The program entailed biometric documentation, wellness check, nonviolence transformational training and series of counseling and career classification for the ex-militants. The transformational and reorientation activities in the Camp were tailored to extinguish the belief of the ex-militants in violence and provide them a more powerful alternative – nonviolence. The Federal Government engaged experts on non-violence from Nigeria, South Africa and the United States of America.

Reintegration

The reintegration program was expected to train and build capacity in technical and vocational skills and entrepreneurial development and facilitate employment placements and identification of employment opportunities. Advisers and counselors determined individual militant's profile, skills, vocations and education and ascertained reintegration requirements in terms of further education, skills, vocational development and employment. The amnesty program has successfully placed some of the former Niger Delta militants in skills acquisition/training centers, as well as in formal education institutions within and outside the country (Akinwale, 2010). Reintegration trainings have taken place in Ghana, Russia, Ukraine, USA, South Africa, Israel, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Poland and India in vocational skills such as ICT, pipeline welding, ocean diving, air piloting, boat building and sea faring. About 834 were placed in about 100 universities at home and abroad in 2013 and 459 in private universities in Nigeria. In 2013, 2,400 were deployed to vocational training centers at home and as at September 2013, 16,683 ex-militants had been sent for training while 6,000 were trained in 2014 and another 6,000 in 2015. The rehabilitated ex-militants were paid reinsertion stipend since 2009 till date.

A considerable number of the ex-militants have already graduated from their training programs. Over 9,192 have graduated from the skills program in various fields majorly welding and fabrication. About 2,204 have graduated from entrepreneurship training, 2,798 from oil drilling and 916 from marine courses. The graduates from crane and heavy duty were 1030; boat building 299 and agriculture, 239. The Amnesty program, as at June 2014, has produced 66 airplane and helicopter pilots and 61 aviation maintenance engineers trained in United Kingdom, South Africa, UAE, Jordan and Greece. In 2014, the Amnesty office began a pilot scheme for post-training employment and start up business packs and funds in which about 300 were provided support for specialized businesses such as welding, fish farming and retail business (Scent, 2014). Employment generation has remained an issue in the program. Of the over 11,700 graduates of trainee programs, the Nigerian Custom Service is reported to have employed six, the Nigerian Army enlisted 10 out of 40 that indicated interest and applied, while in response to recruitment advertisement in the Petroleum and Energy Sector, 40 were employed by Century Energy Group and five by SAP Drilling Oil and Gas Limited. A few former trainees have been offered appointment abroad such as five (5) welders & fabricators in South Africa and 30 in United Arab Emirates. Altogether, the Amnesty office has facilitated employment of 113 former militants.

METHODOLOGY

Three communities from different ethnic groups (Ijaw, Urhobo and Itshekiri) in Delta and Rivers states were selected for the study. The choice of different ethnic groups was to have a richer perspective. These communities have large number of ex-militants and

have been hot spots for militant activities. With the assistance of the Amnesty Program office, 60 ex-militants were selected and studied, including their warlords and their proxies. The warlords were selected not only for interview but also to get their permission and 'blessing' before interacting with their 'subjects'. 18 community leaders that consisted of traditional chiefs, Christian leaders, leaders of non-militant youths and other elites in the community whose words are respected and whose understanding of the community dynamics were insightful were also included in the sample.

Questionnaires were distributed to the ex-militants in order to get general information about their lives, before, during and after the amnesty program. This was followed up by interviews in order to understand the extent to which they have reintegrated economically, socially and politically, possible stigma if any they have faced in finding jobs, marriage, leadership and access to opportunities, as well as what has happened to their social, human and economic capital during and after the reintegration. Narratives and interpretation of symbols were also used to generate information on indigenous mechanism for reintegration as well as the meeting point/missing link between the amnesty version of reintegration and indigenous reintegration mechanism. Focus group discussion was conducted for community leaders, elites and youth leaders to generate data on their contextual meanings of reintegration, contextual factors hindering effective reintegration, if any, and the new elites pact between the community, the government and the ex-militant youths.

Characteristics of the ex-militants selected for the study

Ninety seven percent of the sixty ex-militants included in the sample were male while three percent were female. The sixty ex-militants consist of two warlords, sixteen middle level officers and forty-two ordinary officers. Majority of them (43%) were 26-35 year old. Thirty percent of the former militants were 36-45 year old, while eighteen percent were less than 25 years. Only 5% were above 45 year old. In terms of their marital status, seventy percent were single compared to thirty percent who were married and divorced. Only twenty-five percent of the ex-militants possess post-secondary education. Twelve percent did not have any formal education while the majority (63%) attempted basic education. Descriptive statistics of the ex-militants' profile revealed that sixty-eight percent of the ex-militants were still unemployed. Thirteen percent were self-employed, while nineteen percent work in both private and public sector. Thirty-five percent live in urban area compared to sixty-five percent that live in rural areas. They were drawn from three ethnic groups: Ijaw (62%), Urhobo (22%) and Itshekiri (16%). Capacity building package enjoyed by the ex-militants were classified into academic-related (15%), vocational/craft (30%), entrepreneurship related (20%) and oil and gas/marine (35%).

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

What does integration mean to different segments of the community and how does amnesty program fit into their description? Findings revealed that reintegration has different meaning to different people. The Nigerian government in action and attitude treated the reintegration program as a package introduced to buy peace in the region so that oil exploration and export could continue. It was a way to assuage the anger and restiveness in the region and weaken the resolve of the youth and agitators. In the way the program is initiated and executed, government sees reintegration as a means of taming the rising wave of cultism and clashes among youths in the region, a way to dilute the territorial control of waterways and oil facilities exercised by the militants. To the militants, reintegration means giving the community power over their mineral resources, job opportunities in the multinational oil firms, power to parade and act without police/military molestation, improved environmental management and freedom from community and government sanctions from evil committed. Non-militants youths who refused to pick up arms were indignant with the reintegration program. According to them, it is legalization of criminality, rewarding violence, glorifying recklessness, giving criminals power, wealth and opportunity to grow where innocent ones suffer. Reintegration ought to be a process of community empowerment, healing the wounds of war, addressing inequality created by conflict, assisting victims of conflict, reconciling aggrieved groups and ensuring effective control of arms, Tamuno, a youth leader explained, and the way government executed her reintegration plan shows that crime pays and that your voice can only be heard when you have instrument of violence.

Traditional Chiefs sees reintegration as a process involving rituals, reconciliation and healing through which a community punishes offenses, cleanses the land and welcomes the offender back into the community. It takes place according to local custom in the house of the eldest person. The offender who wishes to be reintegrated is brought to the people where he is cautioned, flogged, advised and if he shows remorse, such person is forgiven and reintegrated back into the community. The importance of cleansing the land is significant especially when murder, rape and blood oath is involved. The amnesty program of the Federal government, however, disregarded the roles of the community. No ritual or reconciliation was made. Victims of the conflict who suffered in the hands of the militants were not assisted in any way and the offenders did not show any remorse. As a result, the influence of the elders over them is broken. "they are criminals" one traditional chiefs said "and the stigma this community attached to them cannot be lifted. The gods of the land will make them restless until they ask for forgiveness". To the community elites, reintegration involves getting the ex-militants off the creeks and giving them means of livelihood. It entails addressing the root cause of the conflict, healing the wounds of war and achieving sustainable peace and development. The extent to which the realities in the amnesty program fit into people's expectation of effective reintegration is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Measuring the performance of the Amnesty Program against components of effective Reintegration Package

Bedrock of effective Reintegration	Realities in the Niger Delta
Total disarmament and surrender of all arms and weaponry.	Only about 40% of weapons were surrendered. The ex-militants had even acquired some weapons after their rehabilitation.
Security reform and control of access to arms.	It was poor, there was no conscious security reform and flow of arms have not been consciously tackled as ex-militants acquire arms with ease.
Generally Acceptable standard for inclusion into the reintegration program	The number of people included in the DDR program was exaggerated, discretionary and qualification for inclusion was vague. In most cases, war lords were given quota and asked to submit names which were verified by the amnesty office. There have been agitations of exclusion by many militants especially from some ethnic groups.
Moderate Reintegration Stipend (Usually less than 12 months)	The stipend was higher than the national minimum wage and was prolonged to about six years.
Local Ownership of the reintegration process	The communities were not involved in the design and implementation of the package. There was deliberate exclusion of community reintegration rights. Healing, reconciliation and rituals.
Inclusion of healing and recovery package/assistant to the communities	There was no package for community recovery and healing apart from the creation a Federal Ministry of the Niger Delta to coordinate development efforts in the region.
Special attention to affected families and disabled militants.	Assistance of any kind was not provided for families of ex-militants, victims of the militants activities, female ex-militants, child soldiers and disabled militants.
Effective rehabilitation package for psychological and attitudinal change	The 2-week rehabilitation program was inadequate and the facilitators had little understanding on the mindset of the ex-militants. As a result there was little or no attitudinal change.
Inclusive planning, stakeholders involvement and establishment of agreement by all the parties involved	The amnesty program was anchored on the promise of the federal government to restore peace to the region and not based on any agreement. There were also cases of non-inclusion of some stakeholders such that some state governments threatened to pull away from the program.
General objective should be to end hostility, heal the wounds of conflict and achieve security, peace and development	The government key objective was to eliminate crises such that oil business will flourish while the key objective of the ex-militants is to look leeway to avoid punishment for their activities and also to secure a dependable source of livelihood.
Demobilization of the militants including their organizational hierarchy and allegiance to the war lords	The war lords have become demi-gods, the militants' hierarchy is still intact and their allegiance to the warlords remains undiluted. Even the amnesty stipend at some point was paid through the war lords.
End to jungle justice, rivalry and retaliatory attacks	There is increased rivalry among the militant groups for territory control. This has resulted in death and incessant fear among the ex-militants and host communities.
Effective monitoring of the reintegration process and timely correction of anomalies	There was poor monitoring and top down control. Bottom-up leadership was not encouraged and there were complaints that anomalies identified by people at the bottom of the pyramid were not considered.

Source: Field Survey, 2015

To a large extent, the amnesty program fell short of expectation of what an effective reintegration package should be. Apart from being alienated from the communities, important elements of effective reintegration were not addressed. As a result, some of the ex-militants have gone back to their illegal business. Their attachment to the warlords and their hierarchies is still strong. The root of the conflict has not been adequately addressed. There are fears that worst will happen if the government terminates the payment of stipend to the ex-militants.

Extent of ex-militants’ reintegration

Findings from the study revealed that the ex-militants have not been effectively reintegrated into their communities. A number of contextual factors as well as the way the amnesty program was designed and implemented inhibited the attainment of effective reintegration. The ex-militants consist of both genuine agitators for development of the region and cult groups who waded into the struggle to further their interests and ambitions. The agitators (especially in Delta State) were more refined in their approach and were able to achieve more success in their reintegration. Some of them were seen as heroes and nationalists. However, cult groups and fraternities (especially in Rivers and Bayelsa States) were more violent in their approach and found it more difficult to reintegrate into the society. Table 2 revealed the extent to which the ex-militants studied were able to reintegrate economically, socially and politically.

Table 2

Components of Effective Reintegration	Realities in the Niger Delta
Attitudinal change towards violence	Their attitude towards violence has not changed. They still have access to arms and majority has not shown remorse. Their attitude towards violence has not changed.
Peaceful coexistence between the communities and the ex-militants.	Pronounced fear exists in the community because the ex-militants intimidate, oppress and undermine civil rules.
Employment of the ex-militants and possession of sustainable means of livelihood.	Over 60% of them are currently unemployed. There was no job opportunity for them because of the unemployment situation in the country and also because of their poor work attitude. Many of them have sold the start-up kits provided for them. They are used to quick money and majority found it difficult to work in civil environment.
End to informal patronage	Collection of informal patronage has not ended. Some ex-militants still engage in illegal sale of crude oil and collection of informal patronage from vessel owners, multinational companies, government officials and the general population under different guise.
Community Acceptance of the ex-militants	Majority of them forced themselves on their communities and intimidated the elders and communities into marriages, civic positions and respect.
Reintegration into community politics and structure	They usurped the roles of youth bodies, serving as self-styled vigilante groups, arrogating community powers to themselves using their economic resources and arms.

Components of Effective Reintegration	Realities in the Niger Delta
Community perspective of the ex-militants after the amnesty program	The communities still see them as criminals, rapists and robbers. They are perceived as people who have no regard for rules, intimidate elders, steal from the fishermen, sabotage the good intentions of the communities and pollute the environment due to their illegal oil refining.
Ability to live civilian life and contribute to community development	Bad habits acquired during the crises have become difficult to maintain. Some have giving in to addictions and the community could not entrust them with responsibilities.
Resettlement into agriculture	Non existent
Effective political participation	The ex-militants have become politically active. However, their machinery is oftentimes employed by politicians to gain advantage over their opponents.
Freedom to participate in community activities	Majority prefer to live in cities other than their communities. Others prefer to live in the communities because of threat from rival groups and also for the fear of losing their territory.
Peacekeeping and peace building initiatives	Large number of troops encamped in the region with many records of human right violations; these troops rarely exhibit peace building mandate. Significant efforts were not made to build capacities of local institutions.

Source: Field survey, 2015.

Forms of Capital acquired by the ex-militants and their transformation

Various forms of capital acquired by the ex-militants during and after the amnesty have undergone some transformation. Table 3 revealed the life of the ex-militants, before and after the amnesty.

Apart from few of the ex-militants who are known for genuine agitation, majority of them are currently seen as criminals, opportunists, saboteurs, a lost generation that disrespect culture, intimidate civilians and pollute the environment. Communities avoid them because of their expensive lifestyle, attitude to violence and a number of addictions that have become expensive to maintain. Their relationship with the community can be described in terms of fear, distrust, intimidation, avoidance, hate, suspicion and revenge. There is also an ongoing hostility and rivalry among different militant groups for territorial control and revenge. Most of them are spiritually fortified; guns do not penetrate them. Their warlords have accumulated much wealth and influence and use their hierarchy to achieve political and economic objectives.

Contextual factors that hinder effective reintegration

Literature on DDR identified the following factors as hindrances to effective reintegration: the existence of armed groups standing outside the peace process, access to natural resources that are easily looted – so-called spoils, and the availability of arms in society. Other contextual factors observed in the Niger Delta contexts include: Firstly,

Table 3. Forms of capital acquired by the ex-militants before and after the Amnesty program

Items	Before the Amnesty Program	After the Amnesty Program
Education	40% could not read or write fluently	Only those with some level of education got some improvement.
Economic Skills	About 80% are deficient in valuable economic skills	About 60% now possess skills in oil and gas, entrepreneurship, sea faring, fabrication, aviation and crafts.
Allegiance to and influence of the war lords	The warlords were 100% authoritative and strong. They have the power of life and death over their members.	Influence and allegiance to the war lords have decreased to about 85%.
Network/Connection to influential people	Very strong	Very Strong
Political awareness	Fair, except that some were used as political thugs	Very strong. They participated actively in election. Some have even found their ways into public offices.
Civil Leadership Skills	Poor	Poor
Employment	None	Only few of them are gainfully employed.
Community Perception	Negatively perceived as "criminals"	Community perception has not changed. It is even worse because it seems that the amnesty program legalized their erstwhile 'criminal' activities.
Marital relationship	Only few were married. Parents were skeptical about giving their daughters hand in marriage to them.	The situation has not changed especially now that people have seen that there was no attitudinal change in most of them.
Source of livelihood	Unstable, majority depends on illegal activities such as oil bunkering and collection of informal patronage	Unstable due to inability to find employment. Majority depend on the reinsertion stipend and other casual works.
Prestige/Respect from people	None, except the one obtained by intimidation and coercion	None except some respect gained through coercion, intimidation and fear.
Possible Stigma	Yes, They lived in the creeks and wreck havoc on the civil population and multinational corporations.	The stigma still exists. Their lifestyle is different from the community. Their communities avoid them due to violent attitude and habits that are expensive to maintain such as drug and alcohol addiction.
Relationship between the community elites and the ex-militants	They lived in the creeks, alienated from the people, not willing to come in contact with community leaders	They now live with the community but the relationship is weak, rooted in fear, suspicion and intimidation.

Source: Field survey, 2015

poor understanding the causes of conflict in resource rich regions (there is high level of economic crimes in conflict regions). Conflict in many ways enriches warlords, rulers and combatants. As Mair (2003) observed, conflict in the Niger Delta, as in most African resource rich regions, is a mixture of rebellion, warlordism and organized crime. Trans-border smuggling, trafficking in exportable items, oil bunkering, piracy, arms and drug trafficking and organized crime syndicates thrive in these areas. Secondly, absence of economic substitutes for the ex-militants: Over 70% of the ex-militants do not have sustainable means of livelihood. Even those who have graduated from school could not find employment. This is due to the unemployment situation in the country, the poor work attitude of the ex-militants and fear of employing ex-militants which exist in the mind of employers of labor. Indeed, a large number of the ex-militant who were trained on vocational skills have sold their start-up kits and gone into drug peddling and other illicit businesses. Another factor is the alienation of the community in the process: the Amnesty program was not rooted in the community. It was a top-down DDR approach, planned in Abuja without community involvement. Traditional rituals, healing, reconciliation and the voices of the host communities were not considered in the design and implementation. As a result, societal reintegration was difficult. Failure to empower and reconstruct the communities who suffer greatly during the conflict was another challenge. The amnesty program exclusively targets the militant youths whereas the victims were left without any assistance. Non militant youths, rape survivors and large number of the community see the program as a slap on justice. Apart from that, the ex-militants were treated as a homogeneous group. Special needs of child militants, female ex-militants and disabled combatants were not considered. Ex militants who were minors during the conflict have become a lost generation that lack etiquette, networks, education, attitude and survival skills. Also, there was unfair determination of eligibility. There were widespread allegations that the warlords who were allocated quota included the names of their friends and cronies while true militants who were not in their good books were excluded. It was alleged also that selection of participants had ethnic bias since militants from ethnic groups that do not have strong influence in government were excluded.

CONCLUSION

A number of studies that assessed reintegration exercise in many conflict regions produced mixed result. Many of them reported absolute failure while some reported part failure. This has increased the difficulty in developing acceptable theory on reintegration. Presently, there is no consensus among researchers on how to determine excellent reintegration. However, many of the studies have identified basic components of an effective reintegration package. Reintegration needs to be an inclusive exercise that is community driven and geared towards sustainable peace and development. Its goals, content, benefits, structure and breath should be such that is germane to post conflict

transformation and peacebuilding. It should be part of a wider program of economic recovery, transformation, transitional justice, reparation and resettlement and linked to a comprehensive program for addressing the grievances of the region and transforming the conflict situation. Effective reintegration package should contain a concrete program of peace-building with focus on rebuilding broken relations, social capital and mechanisms of peace and conflict prevention. The issues of exclusion should be avoided and benefits should move beyond ex-militants to youths, women, vulnerable groups, and communities affected by the conflict. Reconciling with militants, disarming and paying them to maintain peace, is not tantamount to peace building nor equivalent to conflict reconciliation and transformation which are more permanent platforms for sustainable peace and security. As noted in the study, the amnesty being rooted in a tiny minority to the exclusion of the larger population has not removed the sense of deprivation, frustration and anger that boiled over into the general restiveness and agitation. There is general uncertainty as to what will happen if the amnesty stipend is terminated.

79 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings made in the study, the researcher recommends that:

- **Local ownership of the process and greater role for the communities.** The sociological elements of reintegration need to be emphasized over political and economic elements. Donors should, therefore, take measures to ensure that all stakeholders are included. Local communities and the ex-combatants themselves should be given important stake in the design and implementation of the package. The program shall be community driven and means of maintain social capital and reconciliation should be incorporated. The role of government and her agencies will be more of assisting in the planning, monitoring, co-ordination, and implementation of reintegration programs.
- **Contextual factors that drive or hinder reintegration need to be considered.** Factors such as spoils that can be easily looted, availability of arms, local customs and tradition, prevailing economic climate and the nature of conflict should influence the timing, structure and methodology of reintegration package.
- **Provision of peacetime substitutes:** ex-combatants will have fewer incentives to engage in violence if they are meaningfully engaged in one employment or the other. Migration to new cities, resettlement into agriculture and engagement in construction jobs are important means of reprogramming them to settle effectively into civilian life.
- **Sincerity of stakeholders and transparency of the reintegration process:** Whenever allegation of exclusion, misappropriation, favoritism and corruption plague the reintegration process, parties involved will begin to look for personal interest. Efforts shall be made to monitor the process and entrench transparency in the process.

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