

Nigeria: Good governance as a tool for combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period

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Abstract: The ongoing insurgency in Nigeria's north east region bears features of violent extremism. Though, the conflict has not ended but the role good governance is expected to play in combating violent extremism when the insurgency comes to end is very significant. This study examined good governance as a tool for combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in north east Nigeria. It was conducted with the used of both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection. The study found out that violent extremism in post-insurgency period in north-east Nigeria can be combated using good governance. It also recommended the promotion of good governance through the provision of employment opportunities, effective poverty reduction programs, encouraging sustainable post-insurgency peace building through multi-track diplomacies and unbiased social, economic and political rehabilitation projects.

Keywords: Combating, Extremism, Good-Governance, Post-Insurgency, Tool and Violent.

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Introduction

Good governance penciled on the ability of political leaders to impact positively on the life of citizens especially in the areas of social and basic amenity provision as well as developing and implementing public policies with maximum positive impact on the living condition of people (Almond, 2006). Society depends largely on the mannerism of its leader to achieve success. Therefore, the result of corrupt leadership in Africa is embodied as poor governance manifested in consistent political crisis, insecurity, new

conflicts, extreme poverty among the citizens, debilitating miasma of corruption and rising unemployment indices (Imhonopi and Ugochukwu, 2013). It is obvious that people in Nigeria's north-east region have experienced several forms of deprivation of rights in social, economic and political aspects of lives since insurgency started in the region and to address these, good governance is needed as a working tool for achieving durable and sustainable peace especially in the area of combating violent extremism in the post-insurgency period in the region. Good governance leads to the establishment of a responsive regime suitable for utilizing the public commonwealth in the development of persons and infrastructures so as to further the growth of social, economic and political indices of the state.

Insurgency in northeastern Nigeria started in 2009 when the Jihadist rebel group Boko Haram started an armed rebellion against the Nigerian government. The group was led by Abubakar Shekau until August 2016 when he was succeeded by Abu Musab al-Barnawi. Of 2.3 million people displaced by the insurgency since May 2013, at least 250,000 have left Nigeria and fled into Cameroun, Chad or Niger. Boko Haram killed over 6,600 in 2014. The group have carried out mass abduction, including the kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok in April 2014. The violence escalated dramatically in 2014 with 10, 849 deaths in addition to initially 1,000 reported death cases in 2013. The insurgency spread in 2014 to neighboring Cameroun, Chad and Niger thus making the conflict a regional battle. Boko Haram has been called the world's deadliest terrorist group, in terms of the number of people it has killed in the ongoing insurgency (Vanguard, 2016; BBC, 2016; Windsor, 2015; Buchanan, 2015). The replacement of Abubakar Shekau with Abu Musab-al-Barnawi happened after the battle for Konduga in which the Nigerian government forces forcefully pushed Boko Haram out of Konduga to recaptured the town back. It was announced that Shekau had been killed as the government forces displayed the picture of an insurgent killed in the battle as the dead body of Shekau. Shortly afterward, Shekau bounces back in his usual way and manner of sending messages to the Nigeria Government through the internet and announced that he was not killed in the battle for Konduga and that he still remains the leader of Boko Haram. It was later confirmed by the government forces that the insurgent killed was not actually Shekau. And that Shekau is still alive (Baba & Sheriff, 2018).

Nigerian government's establishment of a state of emergency at the beginning of 2012, extended in the following year to cover the entire north-east Nigeria, led to an increase in both security force abuses and militant attacks (Nicholas, 2015). This, in turn, instead of arresting the insurgency, culminated in its severity than the pre-state of emergency period. The confusion and controversial conditions created under the state of emergency rule have not yet been addressed. Killings rose than before, brutality grew higher, civilians became helpless as some of the attacks on highways are done by people one cannot

ascertain whether they are Insurgents of Nigerian government forces. The security scenario in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states became undefined as the demarcation between those fighting in defense of national interest and those killing in the name of God became relatively narrowed. Insurgents devised several strategies with which they countered government forces tactics to contain them. Anxiety rose ever than before, military transfer of aggression on innocent civilians grew with time and as such several citizens fled their homes in anticipation of possible aggressive military raiding. This also contribute in building up the number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) by the insurgency (Baba, 2018; Baba & Sambo, 2016).

The declaration of a state of emergency rule in northeastern Nigeria by the federal government of Nigeria has failed in ending the insurgency the region is suffering from. Military alleged taking over of the Sambisa forest and its establishment of camp zero there in has also not ended attacks across the region. Insurgency at initial stage may be possibly contained but once extended, fire power hardly ends it. In some cases, insurgency live longer than expectation. It does not end easily overnight and military power has not successfully crushed it to end anywhere in the world. It ends itself for natural reasons like the death of its sponsors and strategists; in other, it melted and subdue itself into bodies of factions with several leaders fighting a common cause; at times, it broke into groups with different lords fighting against themselves for lack of unify aim of struggling thus, reducing their engagement of government forces. Dialogue rather than military power has subdued it in some cases but with resurgence witnessed in the advent of violation of agreement reached by parties involved in the conflict. In north eastern Nigeria, insurgency is still on but with reduction in waves of attacks and rise in military successes in neutralizing attacks and dislodging insurgents, it is expected that the conflict which many believed had lasted longer will soon come to end. And, the role of good governance in combating violent extremism in the post-insurgency period becomes sensitive.

Statement of the problem

Empirical studies on insurgency in north eastern Nigeria like Baba (2018) and Baba and Sambo (2017) have pointed out issues related with humanitarian crises amounting from the conflict. Nicholas (2015), Windsor (2015), Buchanan (2015), Baba and Sheriff (2018) offered a historical analysis of causes, effects and possible questions that may arise demanding answers in the post-insurgency period in north eastern Nigeria. But they were unable to identify and examine the role bad governance played in the promotion of the conflict.

A study by Joseph (2013) examined bad governance as a contributing factor to internal conflicts and good governance as its necessary solution. But no attention was paid to insurgency in Nigeria`s North-East region by him. His analysis pointed most at leader-

ship failure in governance with attention to Africa as a whole. He has not pointed at the age long insurgency troubling Nigeria especially in its northeastern region.

Studies by Ebegbulem (2009) or Imhonopi and Ugochukwu (2013) have not also been able to examine the role good governance is expected to play as a tool in combating violent extremism in northeastern Nigeria in post-insurgency period. Their analysis centered most on corruption's effect on good governance. Little attention was paid by the scholars to governance and conflicts as well as ways through which good governance can be used to promote sustainable peace and discouraged violent extremism in post conflict period.

Baba (2018), Baba and Sheriff (2018) and Baba and Sambo (2017) adopted the primary method of data collection in their studies on the ongoing insurgency in northeastern Nigeria while studies by Nicholas (2015), Mark (2015), Akimbi (2015), More (2015), Karimi and Abubakar (2015) on the insurgency were conducted using secondary method of data collection. The adoption of both methods of analysis has not been witnessed or done in available studies on insurgency in Nigeria's northeastern region.

However, it is in order to bridge up the above identified research gaps that this study was necessitated.

Objective of the study

The general objective of the study is to examine good governance as a tool for combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria. Its specific objectives include;

1. To find out the possible composites of good governance in northeastern Nigeria.
2. To investigate the relationship between good governance and combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria.
3. To identify ways through which good governance can be used to combat violent extremism in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria.

Research question

The questions of the study are:

1. What are the possible composites of good governance in northeastern Nigeria?
2. How will good governance relate with combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria?
3. What are the ways through which good governance can be used to combat violent extremism in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria?

Hypothesis

In pursuance of the objectives stated and the questions raised, the following hypotheses are made:

Ho; Good governance is a tool for combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria.

1. H1; Good governance has possible composites in northeastern Nigeria.
2. H2; Good governance will relate with combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria.
3. H3; Good governance can be used to combat violent extremism in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria.

Literature review

Insurgency in Nigeria's north-east region is still ongoing with pocket of attacks and resurgence of the conflict occasionally witnessed in communities across the region especially in the most vulnerable states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. The ability to manage conflict conditions properly is an alternative measure towards the establishment and promotion of quality governance. Under the condition of peace and stability, infrastructural development is highly guaranteed. The development of infrastructure and sustainable peaceful condition for life improvement activities translate in good governance. Considering the destruction amounting from insurgency, the northeastern region of Nigeria need a bureaucratic system that encourages infrastructural development. This can successfully be achieved with effective and accountable governance system in place in the region. Core infrastructural development has atrophied with bureaucracies designed through good governance. Although, Joseph (2013) observed that the general low quality of governance in Sub-Saharan African countries is correlated to their level of economic development. This implies that the economy of the northeastern region of Nigeria is a sensitive factor in the security situation the area found itself in.

Good governance is an effective tool for combating violent extremism which may likely come up in the post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria. The need for economic and political development in north-east Nigeria make the desire for entrenching good governance and combating violent extremism an important issue. Ardo (2013) submitted that globalization has imposed on Africa, the dire need for good governance as the prerequisite to her economic and political development. But then, in Nigeria's northeastern region, the dire need for good governance is first to combat violent extremism in the post-insurgency period leading to economic and political development of the region. Considering the security situation in this region, it is apparent that good governance is the most required tool for combating insecurity. Allence (2004), in a similar reaction, stated that "political institutions and governance are leading items

on African development agenda". The north eastern Nigeria is not an exception in this case. As insurgency in the region extended beyond expectation, people's attention was drawn to political institutions, those heading them and their governing style thus making governance an important matter in post-insurgency peace building and rehabilitation in the region.

More (2015) reported that the insurgency in north eastern Nigeria "took place within the context of long-standing religious violence between Nigeria's Muslim and Christian communities". Though, Boko Haram consistently claimed it is fighting to establish Islamic state and law in Nigeria. But then, the reasons why more Muslims are attacked and killed in the conflict than people from any other religion is enough reason to argue the basis that the group is fighting for the sake of Islam. Most of the communities attacked and persons displaced in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states which are the battle fronts had more Muslims than Christians. Suicide bombings that took place in most of the soft spots across Nigeria have claimed the lives of more Muslims than Christians. Several Muslim Ulemas in Major towns, especially in Borno and Yobe states, have been attacked while few others have been killed especially in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital (Karimi & Abubakar, 2015). In most of the camps, if not all where Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) are settled, there is hardly one without Muslims. This implies that the insurgency was affiliated with Islam by Boko Haram in order to deceive ignorant young ones who were ever willing to fight and die in the name of God into joining the group and build up more combatants needed to take up arms against the Nigerian state and authority (Baba & Sheriff, 2018).

In mid-2014, the insurgents gained control of swathes of territory in and around their home states of Borno, estimated at 50,000 square kilometers (20,000sq mi) and hold tight to this territory up to January 2015, but did not capture the state capital Maiduguri where the group was originally based (Akimbi, 2015). But the Nigerian Armed Forces DHQ (2015) shortly revealed that "Nigerian Troops Have Destroyed All Boko Haram Camps". The contradicting observation in this revelation as Baba and Sambo (2017) posited is the point that if all Boko Haram camps have been destroyed, then conquered territories have been liberated. If conquered territories have actually been liberated then there is no need to continue accommodating Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) in the various camps where hardships due to shortage of amenities is the order of the day. We may accept the fact that repairs especially reconstruction of facilities damaged need to be done before IDP's can be returned to their various communities. But then, the problem as Mark (2015) earlier pointed out is the basic question of how long or soon it is going to take the Nigerian government in doing this so that the IDP's most of whom are already hopeless of the possibility of starting a new life all over again can be given the hope of starting a life with prospect of achieving higher level and standard than before.

By May 2013 Boko Haram controlled large areas of territory in Borno State, including much of northern and central Borno and Damboa in southern Borno. The Nigerian military were already in Borno and Yobe States fighting a counter-insurgency campaign, as part of a Joint Task Force (JTF) that also includes the mobile police (MOPOL or riot police) and the department of state services (the domestic intelligence agency or state security service). However, Borno and Yobe are big states and the JTF were not able to patrol the whole region – they were more focused on the larger towns, including Maiduguri, and around their barracks. Boko Haram, therefore entrenched themselves in areas where there was a lighter military presence and also established ‘camps’ in the extensive savanna forest that extends across much of southern Borno and into parts of Yobe. From mid-May military reinforcements arrived in Borno and dislodged Boko Haram from some of these areas, even bombing them from the air. The military operation in north-east Nigeria is ongoing but although some information on the situation in Borno is filtering out, we still lack a detailed general picture because all of the mobile phone networks have been switched off in the three states under emergency rule. Information is mainly coming from press reports in Maiduguri, the state capital, from people in areas bordering Cameroun who can cross the border and make calls from there and from people leaving Borno State – including those who are relocating to other parts of the country.

On 14 May 2013, the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in three northeastern states of the federation: Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. This was in response to growing violence by the militants operating under the rubric of Jama’atulahl al-sunnah li’l-da’wahwa’l-jihad (JASDJ) – ‘The Association of the People of the Sunna for Proselytization and Armed Struggle’. The group is popularly known by the nickname ‘Boko Haram’, due to its opposition to secular and westernizing influences. Boko Haram emerged after breaking away from the reformist Salafi/Wahhabi groups in northern Nigeria that since the late 1970s have been challenging the established sufi orders, the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya. The ideology of Boko Haram draws selectively on Salafi ideas – which are diverse but hold that Muslims should live according to the rules and modes of conduct established by the Prophet Muhammad and the first three generations of his followers, the ‘pious predecessors (al-salaf al-salih). Salafis emphasize the ‘restoration of Islamic doctrines to a pure form’, but the founding ideas of the Salafiyya movement in the early twentieth century also had a strong modernist streak encouraging educational reform and the acquisition of scientific and technological knowledge. The Boko Haram ideology, condemning secular education and any government or civil service work, deviates from Salafi doctrine. But Boko Haram do use technology, including the internet and mobile phones, and members of the group have acquired technical expertise to make explosives, including car bombs. It seems that as long as the knowledge helps their religious/political struggle, they are willing to utilize it (Iweze, 2014).

What is clear is that as Boko Haram fighters have been dislodged from some of the areas they were controlling or camped in, they have moved into more peripheral parts of Borno and over the borders into neighboring countries. Villages in the Gwoza Hills – the north-east extension of the Mandara Mountains that straddle north-east Nigeria and the far north of Cameroun – have been particularly badly affected as a result of militants relocating from the forested bush, including the Sambisa Forest Reserve and surrounding areas, into the mountains. Christians have been attacked by suspected Boko Haram militants in several villages in the Gwoza Hills and in Gwoza town, where some prominent local pastors and church members have been assassinated. There are also reports of opposing Muslim clerics and at least one traditional leader in the Gwoza area being killed – as has also been common practice by Boko Haram in other areas of the north. Most of the Christians have now left Gwoza town, mainly relocating to the vicinity of northern Adamawa but some have moved further, such as to Jos. Meanwhile, soldiers have been deployed into the Gwoza Hills and have been searching for guerrilla fighters in the caves (Nossiter, 2015). The military has carried out some aerial bombing and there has been a movement of refugees across the Mandara Mountains over the border from Nigeria into the far north of Cameroun. The northern and central areas of Borno have also seen military activity, with refugees and Boko Haram fighters moving across the border into southern Niger, especially to Diffa. Hostilities are reducing with time and attention in the north eastern region is drifting towards using good governance in combating violent extremism when the insurgency ends.

Methodology

The study was conducted with the use of secondary and primary methods. Secondary data were sourced through the use of journal articles, text books, magazines, newspapers, bulletins, diaries, conference and working papers as well as electronic materials. Primary data were obtained through the administration of structured interview on 30 respondents selected from a population of experts in governance and conflict studies in universities across north eastern Nigeria as the sample of the study using the stratified sampling technique. Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states because of their vulnerability to the insurgency were represented by 6 respondents each while Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba states were represented by 4 respondents each. Figure 1 below showed the location of north eastern Nigeria on map.

The instrument was administered by the researcher personally at different time in each of the 6 states. Primary data collected were analyzed using the frequency percentage (descriptive) with Correlation Analysis (CA) where statistical correlation was measured by coefficient correlation in which numerical values ranges from H_0 to -1.0 gave the indication of the strength of relationship. Such as:

- $r > 0$ indicated positive relationship
- $r < 0$ indicated negative relationship




Figure 1: Map of North Eastern Nigeria showing areas of study marked with star

Source: <http://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Screen-Shot-2013-12-12-at-02.29.10.png>

$r = +1.0$ described a perfect positive correlation

$r = 0.1$ or -1.0 described a perfect negative correlation

The closer the coefficients are to $+1.0$ the greater the strength of relationship as specified below:

Value or r Strength of relationship

- 1.0 to -0.5 or 1.0 to 0.5-----Strong
- 0.5 to -0.3 or 0.3 to 0.5-----Moderate
- 0.3 to -0.1 or 0.1 to 0.3-----Weak
- 0.1 to 0.1-----Non-or very weak

The choice of this analytical tool has shown greater reliability as the correlation between good governance and combating violent extremism was confirmed by it. Furthermore, the frequency/percentage mean and standard deviation analytical tool was also adopted in testing the hypotheses formulated for the study and, it also showed greater reliability in confirming the correlation between good governance and combating violent extremism post-insurgency period in north eastern Nigeria.

Presentation and analysis of data

Below is the presentation and analysis of data:

Table 1: Combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in north eastern Nigeria through good governance

S/No	Addressing the research questions	1.0 SR	0.5 MR	0.3 WR	0.1 VWR
Q1	Good governance is an effective tool for combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in north eastern Nigeria.	21 70%	6 20%	2 6.67%	1 3.33%
Q2	Provision of employment opportunities, effective poverty reduction programs, encouraging post-insurgency peace building, provision of adequate social and basic amenities, unbiased social, economic and political rehabilitation projects are not the possible composites of good governance in post-insurgency period in north eastern Nigeria.	2 6.67%	3 10%	5 16.66%	20 66.67%
Q3	There is a positive correlation between good governance and combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in north eastern Nigeria.	24 80%	3 10%	1 3.33%	2 6.67%
Q4	Through the provision of the composites of good governance, violent extremism cannot be combated in north eastern Nigeria.	2 6.67%	4 13.33%	6 20%	18 60%

Q-Question, **PR**-Positive Relationship, **MR**-Moderate Relationship, **WR**-Weak Relationship and **VWR**-Very Weak Relationship.

Source: Author`s field survey (2020)

Table 1 shows a strong relationship between Q1 and good governance as an effective tool for combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in north eastern Nigeria. This is demonstrated by $r > 0$ which is also $r = +1.0$ meaning perfect positive correlation. In Q2, table 1 shows a very weak relationship on provision of employment opportunities, effective poverty reduction programs, encouraging post-insurgency peace building, provision of adequate social and basic amenities, unbiased social, economic and political rehabilitation projects not been the composites of good governance in post-insurgency period in north eastern Nigeria. This negative pattern of relationship is demonstrated by $r < 0$ which is $r = 0.1$. Table 1 also shows a strong relationship on Q3 and there is positive correlation between good governance and combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in north eastern Nigeria. This is reflected by 1.0 which is $r > 0$ where $r = 1.0$ stands for perfect positive correlation. The correlation on Q3 on through the provision of the composites of good governance, violent extremism cannot be combated in north eastern Nigeria is a perfect negative correlation as 0.1 which is also $r < 0$ and $r = 0.1$ refers to a very weak relationship.




Figure 2: Combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria through good governance

Source: Author’s field survey (2020)

Table 2: Testing the Hypotheses

Hypotheses	Frequency/Percentage						
	M	SD	SD	D	N	A	SA
H0; Good governance is a tool for combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in North eastern Nigeria.	2 6.67%	1 3.33%	2 6.67%	4 13.33%	21 70%	6	57.2
H1; Good governance has possible composites in north eastern Nigeria in the post-insurgency period.	1 3.33%	2 6.67%	1 3.33%	6 20%	20 66.67%	6	52.4
H2; Good governance will relate with combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in north eastern Nigeria.	2 6.67%	1 3.33%	2 6.67%	4 13.33%	21 70%	6	57.2
H3; Good governance can be used to combat violent extremism in post-insurgency period in north eastern Nigeria.	2 6.67%	2 6.67%	1 3.33%	4 13.33%	21 70%	6	57.2

SD-Strongly Disagreed, **D**-Disagreed, **N**-Neutral, **A**-Agreed, **SA**-Strongly Agreed, **M**-Mean, **SD**-Standard Deviation

Table 2 tested the hypotheses formulated in pursuance of the objectives of the study. It shows the frequency percentage, mean and standard deviation scores for the 4 items on which hypotheses were formulated. The table (2) shows that all the hypotheses

have equal mean score of **M**=6. As hypothesis **H1** recorded a standard deviation score of **SD**=52.4 which is the lowest, table 2 shows that hypotheses **H1**, **H2** and **H3** recorded equal standard deviation score of **SD**=57.2. It was observed that frequency percentage (**FP**) average shows that 14.96% of the respondents chooses to agree (**A**) and 69.16% of them chooses to strongly agree (**SA**) with the items and hypotheses tested for the study.

Discussion of results

Though, the insurgency in Nigeria's north-east region has not ended. But when it does, good governance will serve as an effective tool for combating violent extremism in the post insurgency period in the region. The post-insurgency period is expected to be accompanied with several challenges of peace building and sustainability and these, good governance can very well have addressed. Bad governance amounting from leadership inability to improve the living conditions of people in the region contributed in the first place to the deterioration of security situation the region is suffering from. Therefore, good governance in the post-conflict era will not only restore the hope of security stability but also culminated in the development of services and facilities aimed at improving the living condition of people in the region. Leadership pattern where employment opportunities are available for the jobless youths in the region to be engaged with doing job is a necessary condition of good governance. Effective poverty reduction program that empower youths to become job giver than seekers counts as part of good governance. Idleness has created job to some of the insurgents because they had no support from the government to find one. Poverty alleviation scheme that shares money rather empowering youths in skill acquisition is better than sharing money on monthly basis thus leading to its politicization and exclusion of non-ruling party's loyalists from benefiting from the scheme.

The provision of adequate social and basic amenities such as water, electricity or power, medical or health facilities, schools to promote growth in literacy level and rate so as to reduced illiteracy, roads, effective housing system among others are part of good governance. In the post-insurgency period in north eastern Nigeria, it will be appreciative that unbiased social, economic and political rehabilitation projects count as composites of good governance. Rehabilitation project with inclusive dimension in which both victims and all other persons affected directly and indirectly by the insurgency are supported to have a second chance of living a descent life in the post-conflict era are part of good governance.

There is a positive correlation between good governance and combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria. The argument is that bad governance leads to frustration and grievances which culminated in the aggrieved taking arms against the state and government. Corruption is high among political leaders and poverty is high among the citizens. People's life is married by severe hardship and

pathetic condition occasioned by low financial capability to afford the basic needs of life. Primary or physiological needs are beyond the affordable reach of most citizens while leaders wallow in flamboyancy with their spouses and kids to the admiration of the common citizens. These do not predict a stable security situation in the region but good governance does. The correlation between good governance and combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in north eastern Nigeria is a positive one. It shows the connectivity of governance with security situation in the region. The region will be stable security wise if good governance and all its provides are delivered. But, short of these, instable security situation will for long torment the region as the correlation between bad governance and combating violent extremism is a negative one.

Major findings

As a result of the data collected, presented, analyzed and results discussed, the following major findings were made:

1. Good governance is an effective tool for combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria.
2. Good governance comprises providing employment opportunities, reducing poverty among the citizens, providing adequate social and basic amenities.
3. Bad governance breeds violent extremism leading to insurgency in this part of Nigeria.
4. Positive correlation exists between good governance and combating violent extremism in northeastern Nigeria.
5. Unbiased social, economic and political rehabilitation projects are likely to come up possibly as part of the composites of good governance in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria.
6. Through the delivering of good governance, violent extremism can be combated in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria.

Conclusion and recommendations

Due to the major findings made, the study arrived at the conclusion that good governance is a tool for combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria. It also reached the conclusion that the provision of employment opportunities as well as adequate social and basic amenities with effective poverty reduction programs are composites of good governance. The study also concluded that bad governance breeds violent extremism which culminated in insurgency in the north eastern region of Nigeria and that the correlation between good governance and combating violent extremism in the region is a positive one. It further concluded that in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria unbiased social. Economic and political rehabilitation projects are likely to come up possibly as part of the composites of good governance. The

study therefore, drew the conclusion that through the delivering of good governance, violent extremism can be combated in post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria.

Based on the conclusion drawn, the study recommended that:

1. Modalities for the promotion of good governance in the northeastern Nigeria should be started now and unto the post-insurgency period. This can be done through the provision of employment opportunities to engaged the idle youths as idleness has led some into taking job as insurgents. Employment opportunities can be created through the adoption of effective poverty reduction scheme in which jobless youth should be trained in skill acquisition rather than sitting at home and collecting monthly stipends. Empowering them through skill acquisition will make them job givers than seekers. Poverty reduction schemes in north eastern Nigeria like other regions of the country these days do not pay more attention to youths' empowerment. This should be discontinued or revived in north east Nigeria as the post-insurgency period is expected to be married by several challenges among which youth joblessness is tougher. Politicization of consideration of persons for placement in poverty alleviation scheme should also be discouraged. As a region just out of insurgency, the northeastern Nigeria in post-insurgency period will need a fair and equal opportunity to all irrespective of party affiliation for consideration in poverty reduction program.

2. Social and basic amenities should be adequately provided to the people in north eastern Nigeria to ameliorate the hardship promoted by inadequacy on one hand and bad governance on the other. Age-long insurgency had resulted in the destruction of several amenities and infrastructures in the region leading to hardship experienced by people in the area. Infrastructural development to ameliorate this hardship in necessary as part of entrenching good governance to avoid violent extremism in the post-insurgency period. An independent development commission empowered and charged with the responsibility of rebuilding destroyed infrastructures recorded by insurgency is required in northeastern Nigeria. A development commission to this effect had been established by the federal government of Nigeria but the sluggish nature of rebuilding infrastructures in the region make the capability of the commission in achieving this objective doubtful. Although, attacks are still on. Therefore, the incapability of the commission in rebuilding the region cannot be challengeable for now because rebuild facilities can again be destroyed resulting in work done equal to zero. But then, supports from Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International financial bodies like the World Bank, African Development Bank (ADB), among others should be solicited to come up as counterpart funders in the development project. More schools than those destroyed by the insurgency should be built. Affected schools should be renovated. Hospitals affected should be rebuilt. Bridges and culvert destroyed should be reconstructed. Water points affected should be repaired. And other civic institutions that render vital public services should be renovated and brought back to use. These will

make the post-insurgency period free from threat of violent extremism and possible resurgence of the insurgency it came out from.

3. Sustainable post-insurgency peace building mechanisms must be put in place as a precaution against violent extremism in the post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria. A multi-track diplomatic measures must be entrenched to ensure that aggrieved persons grievances are managed. Sustainable diplomatic mechanisms to harmonize persons in the region through persistent settlement of differences among them are needed. Stake holders in conflict management must take post-insurgency settlement as a unifying object of promoting sustainable peace in the region. Sustainable peace building and promotion must incorporate in itself, unbiased social, economic and political integration of persons irrespective of tribe, religion and other differences among people in the region. It should also be connected with rehabilitation of persons through sustainable rehabilitation projects the promote the social, economic and political well-being of people in the region. Those internally displaced should be rehabilitated. Recorded cases of abuse in the form of human rights violation during the conflict should be settled and victims duly compensated.

4. Durable and effective rule of law accompanied with active justice system should be entrenched and promoted in the post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria. Rule of law to which all as subjects are equal before it and which reign supreme above all is necessary. Justice system that dispense justice without fear or favor is also a necessary measure of avoiding a return to violent extremism and possible resurgence of insurgency in the region. Statements promoting hatred and encouraging disunity among people in the region should be thwarted using legal mechanisms and those promoting unity should be encouraged.

5. Post-insurgency forums for educating people on the need for peace and its advantages should be encouraged in north eastern Nigeria. The forums should bring the people of the region together in exchanging views and ideas on the need for sustainable peace in the region and how they can be partners to sustainable peace building in the region. Religion groups, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other humanitarian and charity groups can be useful in this aspect. People should be educated on the need for tolerance and forgiveness as well as be ready to harmonize with amicably with themselves despite their differences.

6. Political leaders in northeastern Nigeria should accept the challenges of delivering good governance to their people in post-insurgency period as a precaution against the rise of violent extremism and possible resurgence of insurgency. They should be willing to shun corruption in the administration of state and public affairs. Their attention should have shifted from amassing public wealth for personal gratification of senses to using it in the provision and delivering of the common public goods to their people. Accountability, prudence and commitment to utilizing the common public

wealth in providing the composites of good governance should reflect in their attitudes. Politicization of service provision and delivering should also be avoided by them. They should move closer to their people especially at the grassroots level periodically with a view to understanding their immediate problems and needs as well as how to improve their living conditions as good governance implies.

7. To also make the post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria free from violent extremism and return to insurgency, political leaders in the region should avoid the use of political thugs. Drop aside and abandoned political thugs haven groomed in violent can come up as a group to promote violent extremism and security instability in the post-insurgency period; development that will make peace far from achieving in the north eastern region of Nigeria. With jobs available, education affordable and poverty level reduced in north eastern Nigeria by political leaders, there will be no grouping of youth ganging up to destabilized peace and applicants for possible recruitment as combatants will not be available to violent groups. Therefore, leaders are expected to show much commitment through good governance in combating violent extremism in post-insurgency period in north east Nigeria.

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