

# Tanzania: Small Arms Proliferation in East Africa and National Security

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## Abstract.

*This article examines the effects of the proliferation of small arms on Tanzania's national security. Engaging the security dilemma theory, regional security complex theory and ideas about state weakness, the paper argues that the prevalence of small arms in Tanzania negatively shape the social, economic and political milieu with profound consequences for the stability and security of the country and region both in the short and long-term. While Tanzania continues to be relatively stable, it suffers from the proliferation of small arms. This may erode its long observed image as the anchor of East African stability if not urgently addressed. The paper concludes that Tanzania has both strengths or successes and weaknesses in its efforts to mitigate the small arms challenge in which the former need to be strengthened to avert the country's image of peace and stability in East Africa from becoming an illusion.*

**Keywords:** national security, small arms, East Africa, Tanzania, state weakness, peace and stability.

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## Introduction

The end of the Cold War generated global optimism regarding global peace and security because of the shift from super-power-initiated proxy wars in developing countries towards the seemingly viable project of social and economic growth. These hopes were shattered by the outbreak of many civil wars during the post-Cold War era (Kingazi, 2006, p. 3; Solomon, 1996, p. 1). The post-Cold War era compounded the proliferation of small arms<sup>1</sup> because many of the weapons were sold at very cheap prices by the major military powers in the world as they reduced their Cold War stockpiles and/or modernised their armed forces (Stohl & Hogendoorn, 2010, p. 6). Instead of realising sustainable security and development, dangerous civil wars, crimes, terrorist activities and gross human rights violations have been witnessed at a disturbing rate. In many of the brutal conflicts (including Angola in the early 1990s, Central African Republic, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia in the late 1990s, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Libya 2011 to the present, Mozambique in the 1980s, Nigeria, Sierra-Leone in the early 2000s, Somalia and Sri Lanka just to mention but just a few) and crimes, small arms and light weapons (SALW) are used and their sources vary but many are sourced from the industrialised world, particularly the United States of America (Stohl & Hogendoorn, 2010, p. 3).

The proliferation of SALW is a global problem. Over 875 million small arms are in circulation worldwide with many of them illegally in the hands of non-state actors and civilians (Stohl & Hogendoorn, 2010, p. 1). About 100 million small arms are in circulation in Africa causing huge problems for the continent and its people (Ngboawaji, 2011, p. 1). It is considered to be the hardest hit in the world (AWEPA, 2006, p. 7). The proliferation of small arms causes immediate security challenges to many facets of humanity including at the individual, society and state levels. The link between security and development especially in the post-Cold War era has been well observed (Chandler, 2007; Hillier, 2007; Ngboawaji, 2011). Among other things, the proliferation of small arms prevents

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1 Small arms and light weapons are defined as a sub-category of conventional weapons that are easy to carry, use and inexpensive. They include pistols, rifles (the most common being the AK 47 assault rifle and its associated models), mortars, man-portable air defence systems and rocket-propelled grenades. The weapons can either be carried by one person or a group of people. Small arms, according to the United Nations (UN) include revolvers, self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, submachine guns and light machine guns. They can be carried and used by one person. On the other hand, the UN defines light weapons as including heavy machine guns, portable antitank and antiaircraft guns, portable launchers of antitank and antiaircraft missiles, hand-held under barrel and mounted grenade launchers and mortars of less than 100 mm calibre. They can be carried and used by two to three people either on the back of an animal or a truck. For details, see Ayuba & Okafor, 2015, p. 77. In this study, small arms and light weapons are simply referred to as small arms in reference to and acknowledgement of the UN definition since the small arms are the ones prevalent in the country with negligible cases of light weapons.

the realisation of sustainable security and development. This is because “small arms fuel civil wars, organised criminal violence, and terrorist activities” undermining development assistance to fragile states and if unchecked threatening to destabilize whole regions (Ngboawaji, 2011, p. 1; Stohl & Hogendoorn, 2010, p. 1). The availability of small arms also weakens the ability and capacity of the state by nurturing a culture of impunity and criminality as easy access to weapons make difficult central government efforts to establish and maintain public order, rule of law, supply relief, pursue development goals and deliver essential social services (Patrick, 2006).

The link between the proliferation of small arms and the outbreak of violent conflicts, particularly in Africa in the post-Cold war era, has been established (Ayuba & Okafor, 2015; Patrick, 2006). The national and regional security implications due to small arms proliferation are evident in Libya. The rampant flow of weapons in that country has negatively affected its neighbours and destabilising the whole Middle East and North African region (Hove, 2017; Hove & Ndawana, 2017; Zambakari, 2016). The large scale intra-state conflicts in East Africa have fed the ready availability of small arms to pastoral communities in the region. The prevalence of small arms protracted these groups’ conflicts and complicated and rendered irrelevant the old methods of peaceful conflict resolution (Bevan, 2008, p. 2). This negates the view that easy access to small arms actually increases security at the personal level thereby reducing crimes at the interpersonal level (Stohl & Hogendoorn, 2010, p. 9). While the causes of violence and armed conflict are complex and many, the presence of arms spur, intensify and prolong armed violence in many cases in Africa and controlling them will also go a long way in limiting such violence (Hillier, 2007, p. 4). Against this background, this study discusses the implications of the proliferation of small arms on national security in Tanzania.

National security threats to the Republic of Tanzania include small arms proliferation. It is one among many other threats including refugees, religious and political fundamentalism, terrorism, HIV/AIDS, drug trafficking, environmental degradation and poaching (Kingazi, 2006, pp. 11-18). The broadened concept of national security is used in this article. It includes military, political, economic, societal, environmental, individual and informational security. This can be universalised under the term human security where security entails a public good and is the foundation of human well-being (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 1994, p. 23). It denotes a shift from the traditional belief whereby national security was largely viewed as the ability of a country to defend itself from external aggression, that is, an attribute of the state meaning absence of military conflict - military security (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p. 1). This is so because a secure state does not automatically make secure people (Hove, Ngwerume & Muchemwa, 2013, p. 3). In fact, the end of the Cold War ushered in the “consideration of non-state actors such as individuals, society and the global systems as alternative objectives (referents) of security” (Mogire, 2003, p. 5). Linked to this, Riedel (2010: 99) asserts that security is simultaneously a state, process, need and value.

In light of the above, sustainable national security and development in Tanzania cannot be realised without putting a stop to the proliferation of small arms which is likely to threaten the security of individuals, society and the state with high possibilities of destabilising the whole region through spill over effects. We demonstrate that while Tanzania continues to be relatively stable, it suffers from the proliferation of SALW. This may erode its long observed image as the anchor of East African stability if not urgently addressed. Tanzania has both strengths or successes and weaknesses in its efforts to mitigate the SALW challenge. Consequently, unravelling the impact of small arms on Tanzanian citizens, society and the state is vital to sensitise and guarantee the preparedness of the Tanzanian security sector as it will be equipped with the knowledge and how to deal with the menace of the proliferation of small arms. This is because the proliferation of small arms poses serious national security threats to countries as well as destabilising whole regions and disturbing international relations, peace and security. Overall, this study augments the literature on arms control, disarmament, security and development.

The article proceeds as follows: Section two discusses the methodology used while section three provides the conceptual framework guiding the study. Section four discusses the findings of the study revealing the causes and scale of the problem of small arms proliferation, and the magnitude of their consequences. Section five presents a discussion contributing to a profound understanding of the serious negative implications on national security of the prevalence of small arms in Tanzania and at the regional level through spill over effects. Section six presents the conclusion and way forward.

### **Methodology**

This is a qualitative study of SALW in Tanzania. It used a combination of primary and secondary sources. The research engaged direct semi-structured interviews in Dar es Salaam to gather data wherein one of the researchers (Ghuliku, a Tanzanian) was the main research instrument. Research guide questions were used just as a guide as opposed to a prescriptive device. This permitted the carrying out of conversations with key informants and understanding what is happening from their viewpoint. Interviews were conducted between January and February 2016 with three key informants from relevant security sector departments namely, home affairs (with Charles Ulaya, Head of Department, Assistant Commissioner of Police, the Department of Arms Management and Control, Police Headquarters, and Haji Y. Janabi, Director of Policy and Planning-Ministry of Home Affairs) and border management (with Moses Ismael Malisa, Border Management and Control Division of the Tanzania Immigration Service Department). These individuals were selected via purposive (judgmental) sampling because they appear to have expertise of the implications of the proliferation of small arms on the national security of Tanzania. Key informants are engaged, "as a result of their personal skills, or position within a society, are able to provide more information and a deeper

insight into what is going on around them” (Marshall, 1996, p. 92). Besides, the informants in this study also fulfilled all the five identified features of an ideal key informant namely, role in community, knowledge, willingness, communicability and impartiality (Marshall, 1996, p. 92). Consequently, the authors felt that the chosen individuals provide valid and reliable information in the context of the SALW trade. The purpose of the interviews were to identify the challenges posed by the proliferation of small arms in Tanzania and bring to the fore details of the security challenges imposed on the people (individually), society and ultimately the state.

Additionally, documentary analysis was used in this study. The authors made use of reading and analysing relevant literature on the topic under study (including newspaper articles, peer-reviewed works and books) in order to establish the gaps, giving the background and comparison of what other published works on the topic and related topics say (Yin, 1994, p. 85). Documentary analysis also permitted us to gather data beyond Tanzania, the geographical area of study. The information gathered through documentary analysis was crucial because it provided important insights for the generation of interview questions without unnecessarily replicating what is already known, corroborating and augmenting the data gathered from interviews. More so, documentary analysis served to verify the exact spellings of names and titles of places and organisations among others (Yin, 1994, p. 85). The collected data was thematically analysed and presented.

This study’s use of three key informants means a very small sample and comprises a major limitation in its findings. This is because the small sample could not represent all the views and experiences of the Tanzanians with regards to SALW. However, this study’s conclusions reflect what the key informants observe and know about how SALW have threatened national security in the country. This is because a qualitative case study approach permits the exploration of a phenomenon in its context using different sources of data (Baxter & Jack, 2008, pp. 544-559; Yin, 1994, p. 94). Consequently, the case study approach in this case immensely benefited from the use of more than a single source of evidence. It ensured that the findings of the study were based on the convergence of data from various sources, thereby enhancing the credibility and validity of its findings as articulated by Yin (1994: 93). Thus the weaknesses inherent in the small sample made of the key informants were minimised (to the extent possible) by the use of documentary analysis. This implies that for future research, scholars may need to at least widen the base of their informants to avoid similar weaknesses which may be gleaned from this study.

### **Conceptual Framework**

The authors argue that the prevalence of small arms in Tanzania negatively affects the social, economic and political milieu with profound consequences for the stability and security of the country and region both in the short and long-term. We draw on the

security dilemma theory to articulate how small arms and their proliferation threaten peace and security through their destabilising and conflict inducing consequences including reciprocated fear and hostility between groups within states or outside states. Security dilemma denotes a process in which a concern of one's security prompts an overall waning in security of the other. The need to be ready for the worst-case scenario emanates from the "unresolvable uncertainty" which shows a sense of uncertainty on the part of the actors about the present and future intentions of who might harm them, including both friends and enemies (Booth & Wheeler, 2013, p. 138). As a result, the threat posed by one's security leads others to also increase their security. The need to keep the same level of security empowers one to keep pace with their rival's by increasing their arms to the level of their rivals (Roe, 1999, p. 186). This mutually reinforcing process has been well observed between states and their rivals. However, this can also happen in intrastate conflicts where the disintegrating state and ethnic hostilities may aggravate the situation motivating groups to exploit other groups' relative weakness to fill the vacuum created by the state (Jeong, 2008, pp. 138-139). To this end, any weapon has both defensive and offensive capabilities and can be used for any of the purposes. Clearly, small arms can be intended for diverse purposes besides direct violence and the unintended signals and consequences they provoke.

The security dilemma concept has been successfully applied in intrastate conflict situations. Posen (1993) applied the operation of security dilemma in the post-Cold War era intrastate conflicts. He asserts that the way anarchy promotes security dilemma dynamics in the international arena is the same way it is relevant to intrastate conflicts. An "emerging anarchy" grows within the state putting sub-state factions in the same dilemma as states in the international system and are subjected to similar fear and uncertainty of other groups and ought to secure their own security. Hill (2004, p. 14) further argues that the anarchical intrastate milieu can probably be even more delicate than in the international one because individuals are more susceptible in relation to states. This points to the fact that even the influx of small arms at a small scale may incite dramatic results with a potential of leading to the outbreak of a civil war among other insecurities. Given that arms are a key factor in the security dilemma, arms control efforts are therefore seen as a preventive factor if not a promising solution to the security dilemma (Croft, 1996, p. 14). Again, security dilemma theorists describe another beneficial factor of the security dilemma. This comes in the form of the effects of the arms control system in reducing the mutual hostility caused by the security dilemma and generating alternatives for cooperation as opposed to competition in the anarchic milieu (Wendt, 2008, pp. 105-106). This makes the security dilemma theory useful to explain the implications on national security of the proliferation of small arms in Tanzania.

On the other hand, the regional security complex theory (first developed by Barry Buzan) highlight the existence of regional sub-systems as objects of security analysis and presents a methodical framework for dealing with such systems. Defining secu-

curity complex, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) note that it is “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (p. 11). The theory was originally propounded primarily focusing on the state as the key unit of analysis plus the military and political sectors. It has now been broadened to be applied on various units of analysis beyond the state including on non-traditional sectors such as environmental and societal sectors among others. It offsets the underplaying of the importance of the regional level by power theorists in understanding international security situations (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, pp. 16-17).

The regional security complex concept deals with how security is grouped in geographically fashioned regions. It holds the notion that security concerns usually travel well over short distances as opposed to long ones and security threats are thus most probably to take place in the region due to proximity. Each regional actor interacts with the security of the other actors in the region thereby affecting the region's security. Regional security becomes an interesting area of study due to the fact that there is habitually strong security interdependence within a region as opposed to between regions thereby defining a region (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 11). Furthermore,

security complex theory also links studies of internal conditions in states, relations among states of the region, relations among regions, and relations between regions and globally acting great powers ... as well as predictions about, possibilities for stability and change (Buzan *et al.*, 1998, p. 11).

Here regions become mini-systems where all other international relations theories including but not limited to balance of power, interdependence and alliance systems can be applied. As such, Tanzania's security or insecurity is linked with the East African region's security or insecurity. As a result, the insecurity brought by the proliferation of small arms in the East African region on Tanzania's national security by way of spill over effects coming from those countries in conflict is feeding into the insecurity of Tanzania. Tanzania will also be the source of insecurity in the region if the proliferation of small arms in the country is not addressed.

The paper also draws on the general ideas of weak states in which it reveals that Tanzania possesses not only weaknesses in its efforts to control the flow of weapons, but there are also strengths or successes. The characteristics of weak states include that they are incapable of guaranteeing security, obtaining legitimacy and providing basic services to their citizens (Hove & Ndawana, 2017, p. 18). They are also typified by:

Weak institutions, bad governance, legitimacy crisis, divided community, neo-patrimonialism, corruption and varieties of personalistic and clientelistic politics ... considered to be dangerous for their own people and the international community due to their proneness to conflict, instability, terrorism, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and dangerous diseases (Ababu, 2013, p. 3).

While some of these generalisations relatively apply in Tanzania, others do not. This makes it important to explain what makes Tanzania, a weak state, continue to be different, that is, being more stable and its reputation somehow still suggesting that.

## **The Role of Small Arms in Threatening National Security in Tanzania**

### ***The Causes and Scale of the Problem of Small Arms Proliferation***

The long and porous borders of Tanzania have contributed to the proliferation of small arms. Tanzania, while hailed for political stability since its independence, free of civil wars, coups and violence which are a typical feature of the post-independence history of many African countries (Grossman-Vermaas, Huber & Kapitanskaya, 2010, p. 16), is bordered by eight African countries (Burundi, DRC, Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique Rwanda, Zambia and Uganda) and has a coastline over 1 400 kilometres long (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], 2005, p. iii). This makes it difficult for the country to ensure border security and illegal small arms easily find their way into the country (Janabi, personal communication, 5 February 2016). For instance, the Kagera region was made unsafe in 1994 when Rwandan refugees numbering more than a million largely comprising the Interahamwe militias fled to this part of Tanzania with their arms which they intended to attack and destabilise Rwanda from (Shyaka, 2006, p. 14). In this regard, the porous, far-stretched, isolated and least monitored borders of Tanzania with its neighbours with conflicts or in immediate post-conflict situations expose it to small arms trafficking (Gichane, 2015, p. 54).

Although Tanzania has proved different, as discussed below, because it did not witness widespread violence of the magnitude experienced in some of its neighbours it was all the same affected. The refugee crisis from Rwanda led Tanzania to face:

Environmental degradation, rapid depletion of water resources, water pollution, the difficulty of digging pit latrines in the rocky soil around the camps and therefore the overflow problem, diverting road construction equipment to camp construction, extra wear and tear on the poorly developed regional road system, criminals in the camps, and marauding among local residents in the vicinity of the camps, fears that the violence of the Rwandan situation would spread beyond the camps and lead to more violence among Tanzanian neighbors, increased prices in basic goods and food security threats in the border villages, for example, in the Ngara District there are three refugees for every Tanzanian (Smith, 1995, p. 55).

The regions sharing common borders with civil war and conflict-ridden countries are the ones also experiencing rampant illegal trade in small arms. These include Kagera, Kigoma, Rukwa and Katavi. The illegal possessors of the firearms find their way to large cities and towns such as Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Mwanza and Mbeya with ease (Rugonzibwa, 2014). As a result, "Tanzania's long and porous borders makes it difficult

to prevent the passage of destabilizing influences that are prevalent in the region such as drugs, small arms, and people” (Kessler, 2006, p. 3). Similarly, in light of human security concerns, it has been noted that many violent cases witnessed in Sub-Saharan Africa due to small arms are as a result of the prevalence of “weak states”, large number of rebel movements and the increase in brutal incidents among civilians due to poverty and violent struggle for inadequate resources (AWEPA, 2006, p. 7). However, as discussed below Tanzania so far seems to negate the generalizations regarding the link between state weakness and conflict.

Further evidence of the prevalence of small arms proliferation because of the porosity of Tanzania’s borders was found. According to Jacob (2014), “Kigoma region and the neighbouring Kenya are reportedly said to be the major gate ways for illegal fire arms and bullets entering the lake zone of Mara”. Again, the boundary between Mozambique and Tanzania is a case in point where Pams Foundation, a Tanzanian-based conservation organisation has been patrolling the Rovuma River arresting people caught with SALW. In a single patrol they usually get 10 firearms. The firearms are being used by poachers on wildlife. In its August 2013 report, the organisation recorded seizure of 473 firearms, and 1 138 rounds of ammunition over a period of 12 months (Doshi, 2013). An anti-poaching campaign in Tundura, Ruvuma region launched by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism special joint task force in July 2012 “impounded 297 firearms, 370 rounds of ammunition and 150 shell castings. The type of firearms seized included 47 submachine guns, 225 homemade guns (gobole), 23 rifles, two SARs, one SMG, and one Egyptian G3” and seized government trophies valued at Sh618.4million (Athumani, 2012). Border guards (on both the Tanzanian and Mozambican border side) have been accused of complicity in the smuggling operations in both firearms and ivory (Doshi, 2013). This indicates that it is not only the porosity of borders enabling the proliferation of small arms but corrupt tendencies as well.

The laxity of security at the border and port areas also contributes in the proliferation of small arms. It has been noted that Tanzania’s security forces - Tanzania Police Force, Tanzania People’s Defence Force, and Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service—are regarded as

... generally too weak, under-resourced, and poorly coordinated to ensure the security of the country’s borders...Not only is the region characterized by highly porous land and sea borders, it is also beset by largely dysfunctional structures of law and enforcement, endemic organized criminal activity (involving everything from drugs and people smuggling to weapons trafficking) and relative proximity to known Islamist logistical hubs such as Yemen and the United Arab Emirates (LeSage, 2014, p. 5).

The 2009 alleged smuggling of 15 rocket-propelled grenades heading for Dar es Salaam from Zanzibar via a dhow was a tip of the ice bag demonstrating the porosity

of Tanzania's borders and substandard port security both in Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam (Grossman-Vermaas *et al.*, 2010, p. 28). As Moses Ismael Malisa puts it in an interview, the nature of the country's borders encourages the proliferation of SALW through cross border smuggling. He remarked:

Due to the fact that our borders are porous, vast and unmanned, this situation has exposed the country to the many security threats including proliferation of small arms. Porosity of the border has greatly encouraged traffickers of small arms to use illegal entry points to smuggle small arms into Tanzania. Cross border smuggling of goods along border areas is among the push factors which have encouraged proliferation of small arms. For instance, in the Indian Ocean on Tanzanian territory waters, there are 45 illegal ports, which are being used by smugglers to penetrate contraband and smuggled goods including illegal immigrants who come with small arms to Tanzania. About 85 illegal entry points in the Northern part of Tanzania have been identified by the Tanzania Immigration Services Department. These illegal entry points are being used by smugglers in the smuggling of goods into Tanzania as well as illegal immigrants from the Horn of Africa (Malisa, personal communication, 8 February 2016).

In light of the above sentiments, the fact that long and porous borders of Tanzania are contributing to the proliferation of SALW need not be overemphasised.

East Africa is home to violent conflicts and the emerging of new ones remains high with destabilising effects on relatively peaceful neighbours including Tanzania. The "... most insecure countries in the world, Somalia, and it borders other various conflict-torn states, most notably Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo" and "... Kenya experienced internal conflicts in 2008 with the root causes of the violence remaining unaddressed. Border regions between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain volatile, and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda is still active" (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2009, p. 6). Consequently, "... these wars and conflict, refugee camps are prevalent throughout the region, and the spread of fear and violence by militias, gangs and armed pastoralists ..." (UNODC, 2009, p. 6) have made difficult the implementation of regulatory measures dealing with SALW.<sup>2</sup> According to Janabi (2016),

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2 The international regional legal frameworks dealing with the sale and transfer of SALW include UN Program of Action (UN PoA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (2001) and the Arms Trade Treaty (2014). The regional framework comprises the African Union Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000) while the sub-regional framework includes the Nairobi Declaration on the illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa (2000), the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and

the international, regional, sub-regional and national legal instruments dealing with the proliferation of SALW are not respected in the face of conflicts. He remarked that:

These instruments are effective in controlling the spread of small arms but the implementation of the same is somehow difficult especially in conflict areas. When an armed conflict breaks out in a country, law and order also disrupts, so it becomes difficult to control the spread of small arms in that area. And due to our porous borders, these arms get carried by refugees to the other countries. Also, not all countries around us have signed and ratified those protocols, so it also becomes easier for SALW to flow from one country which has less strict laws to the other through illegal means (Janabi, 2016).

This is because both governments and rebel groups continue to arm militias and gangs as a way of guaranteeing their survival. In fact, countries at war do not exhibit any political will to implement the laws culminating in the changing of hands of weapons even by government arming its militia or vigilante groups (Ulaya, personal communication, 28 January 2016). The resultant violence and refugee crisis lead to instability to previously stable parts of the country and other countries due to the availability of weapons that are brought by refugees.

The scale of the problem of SALW in Tanzania is huge judging by the numbers of the weapons that continue to be seized and destroyed by the government since the early 2000s. About 2,772 guns were surrendered and destroyed in 2008 (Alpers & Wilson, 2016). In 2010, 1,500 illicit arms were confiscated by police in Mwanza region during raids on criminals (The Citizen, 9 August 2010). Moreover, a total of 4,000 illicit firearms were also destroyed in 2010 by the police. These were confiscated across the country from "Mara, Shinyanga, Tabora, Rukwa, Mbeya, Ruvuma and Mwanza while other weapons were from the Tabora wildlife department" (Sezzy, 2010). In 2012, a short-lived campaign witnessed police impounding 304 unlawfully owned firearms (Daily News, 6 December 2012). In 2013, 3,100 unlawful SALW were destroyed (Bucyensenge, 2013). Additionally, about 439 illicit firearms were recovered from citizens in an effort that lasted a month, from 5 December 2012 to 5 January 2013, collecting unlicensed arms without consequences to their owners (Sabahi/Guardian, 8 January 2013). Tanzania's Criminal Investigation Department pointed out that illegal arms possession increased from 469 in 2011 to 550 in 2012 (Emanuel & Ndimbwa, 2013, p. 522). According to Reisman, Mkutu, Lyimo and Moshi with support from the Tanzanian Police Force (2013,

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the Horn of Africa (2004) and The Southern Africa Development Community Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials 2001. Tanzania is a state-party to all these mentioned legal frameworks. The domestic legal framework comprise constitutional provisions which include the Armaments Control Act (No. 2/ 1991), the Arms and Ammunition Act (Act No. 2 of 1991 and No. 19 of 2007) and the recently enacted Firearms and Ammunition Control Act 2015.

p. 36), between 2002 and 2013, government led disarmament operations collected and destroyed 24,187 firearms. In 2014, about seven guns largely submachine guns and not less than 420 bullets were seized by the police in the Mara region in an operation aimed at curbing the illegal influx of firearms (Jacob, 2014). While other estimates of how many more illegal SALW were imported without being detected in the midst of government concerted efforts to destroy them are difficult to come by, the persistence of the high figures of those destroyed are roughly indicative of their continued presence and widespread, albeit, obviously with a slight decline.

Tanzania has been a victim of her neighbours worsened by her geographical location that puts Tanzania between the Southern, Eastern and central African states prone to political and civil instability. At one point, Tanzania hosted about 600,000 refugees largely from Burundi and the DRC (Kessler, 2006, p. 3). Moreover, the Tanzanian region of Kigoma had the highest number of firearms in circulation as a result of the spill over effects of the decades long destabilisation caused by conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC. Apart from being affected by a refugee crisis, the spill over effects also came in the form of the establishment of rebel groups training in Tanzania to launch attacks back home (Jefferson & Urquhart, 2002). Tanzania's unstable neighbours, particularly Somalia, Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda have spill over effects of their conflicts not only in the form of refugees numbering over 800,000 in the country but these also came with arms which they sold cheaply in order to get spending money (Maze & Rhee, 2008, p. 27; Kingazi, 2006, p. 13). Importantly, the weapons that were brought by refugees got a market because the people in Tanzania bought the guns. They bought the weapons probably due to their perceived insecurity or inadequate security from the government at the individual and community level. As a result, it can be argued that the individuals and their communities armed themselves in a security dilemma context. More so, the relevance of the regional security complex theory is exposed where conditions of instability prevailing in one country in a region are felt by other countries in the neighbourhood.

Tanzania is also a relevant example demonstrating that the SALW qualities such as cheapness and ready accessibility and portability and easy concealment also account for their proliferation. For instance, there are numerous cases of the exchange of guns for maize and livestock in many regions in Tanzania including in parts of Arusha such as Sale, Loliondo and Ngorongoro populated by pastoralists (The Arusha Times, 2 April 2016). Again, at one point a submachine gun was illegally able to be purchased in Tanzania at a cost of 200 United States dollars (Shyaka, 2006, p. 15). In April 2014, four suspects were caught in Musoma Municipality with a submachine gun and dozens of bullets hid in a box loaded with bananas (Jacob, 2014).

The above discussion reveals that a combination of socio-economic and political factors explains the proliferation of SALW in Tanzania. The uncontrolled border checkpoints

are simply enablers but the underlying causes of the proliferation of SALW are on the demand side of SALW within the country or from which the arms come from. Indeed, arms flow into Tanzania from the north-western borders of the country is worsened by rebels from neighbouring countries in conflict who sell them cheaply to the community or exchange them for food. The next subsection discusses the magnitude of the consequences of the proliferation of SALW on the country's national security.

### ***The Magnitude of the Consequences of Small Arms on Security in Tanzania***

While no exact data is available regarding the extent to which SALW are available in Tanzania, we argue that the country has in recent years showed negative trends due to excessive amounts of small arms in civilian hands. These have increased the levels of violence and insecurity in the local communities.

The destruction programmes were an effort to avoid the returning of the surplus illegal firearms onto the secondary arms market. Increased arms flow into Tanzania from the north-western borders of the country was exacerbated by rebels from neighbouring countries in conflict who shelter themselves in the country and engaging in the proliferation of SALW in East Africa (Janabi, 2016). As a result, an increase in armed crime has been witnessed across the country – cattle rustling and interethnic conflict in rural communities and armed crime in urban areas (Maze & Rhee, 2008, p. 27). Owning a gun has become fashionable for the Tanzanian youths and many of the handguns they own are intended for wrong reasons (Tambwe, 2013). Indeed, there are weaknesses in the destruction campaigns. These include that they do not address concerns contributing to the demand for arms, including but not limited to livelihood and continued existence needs, dearth of official security provision, and the money-making drive factors in small arms possession, in which owning a weapon signifies fast money. Additionally, while on the one hand arms are removed from communities, they are simultaneously being given out with inadequate regulations in other places, such as private security companies, whose guns have sometimes been found in use for criminal purposes (Reisman *et al.*, 2013, p. 36). Clearly, this culminates in small arms proliferation contributing to individual, community and national insecurity. Even the region is liable to face security problems due to SALW proliferation in Tanzania although for now it appears the situation is still under control.

The conflicts between farmers and herders over land and water in Tanzania while existent for many years have over time turned deadly due to the availability of small arms. One of the deadly clashes between farmers and herders is the Kilosa killings that occurred on 8 December 2000 in Rudewa Mbuyuni village between farmers and herders. It culminated in the death of 38 villagers (the worst and deadly clash so far) and the wounding of many. It occurred against the environment of the destruction of the crops of farmers by the herders of livestock which occurred over the years without

compensation that led to conflict between the two communities which in turn armed themselves for self-defence (Benjaminsen, Maganga & Abdallah, 2009, pp. 434-435). Additionally, eight people were killed, several houses torched and livestock stolen in 2008 following the reigniting of the conflict. In January 2014, 10 people were also killed by the Maasai pastoralists in Kitito district. The conflict was over the disputed Embroi Murtangosi forest reserve where the people who are settled in the forest had their houses torched in an attempt to evict them (Makoye, 2014). It escalated because guns and other traditional weapons have become full-time companions of farmers and livestock herders for self-defence in the face of conflict between each other. The lack of quick police intervention to solve the conflicts between them makes the conflicts more fatal (Ulaya, 2016).

Inter-tribal conflicts which previously were addressed through traditional weapons when they go out of hand have also become increasingly fatal due to the availability of weapons. For instance, in Ngorongoro District, especially in Loliondo and Salle tribal killings erupted fuelled by the proliferation of small arms in civilian hands. This culminated in the death of seven people as violence and banditry escalated in the area in 2011 (Ubwani, 2011). In 2013, two people including a former Mwanza Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Regional Chairman, Clement Mabina were killed due to a land conflict. The conflict could have been solved peacefully had it not been for mob justice and the prevalence of small arms that were misused. Anger rather than wisdom and patience became the deciding factor during conflicts due to the presence of guns pushing people to mete out improper and short-lived solutions (Tanzania Daily News, 18 December 2013).

Furthermore, banditry and cattle rustling have been witnessed in the border regions of Tanzania and Rwanda and have become more violent. Cows and goats are stolen in Tanzania for sale in Rwanda and some bandits cross into Rwanda to commit robberies and go back to Tanzania (Shyaka, 2006, p. 15). A good example of the banditry groups involved in such activities is the Kinyange group. The group was formed and led by Kinyange a refugee and a former fighter from Rwanda (Ulaya, 2016). His criminal gang terrorised people both in Tanzania and Rwanda stealing goods and destroying property and taking even people's lives. The group was dismantled in 2004 due to cooperation and information sharing efforts between Rwanda and Tanzanian forces after causing significant harm and damage (Shyaka, 2006, p. 15). In line with the security dilemma and the regional security complex theories, we glean that national security and even regional security is threatened by the armed groups, individuals and communities and can render a country ungovernable and region unstable by taking the law into their own hands.

Moreover, poachers and cattle rustlers have become more violent over time. According to Emanuel and Ndimbwa (2013, p. 523), between 2004 and 2007 cattle rustling was the leading crime committed with firearms with a total of 5,080 cases to 5,153, apart

from murder which also rose from 2,926 to 3,583 and armed robbery which slightly declined from 1,175 to 1,080, respectively. Operation “Kimbunga” (whirlwind) in 2013 which targeted illegal immigrants and bandits vandalising the border regions of Kagera, Kigoma and Geita netted 47 guns, impounded 600 rounds of ammunition and 3,400 cattle. The cattle came from neighbouring countries to Tanzania for grazing with the herders being armed with guns for protection and only left them when they were overwhelmed by the operation. As a result, the operation flushed out about 7,800 foreigners (Daily News, 20 September 2013). In Serengeti and Tarime Districts in the Mara region, guns are not only used to cause insecurity to people and their property but include that of wild animals particularly elephants found in the Serengeti National Park and the neighbouring Ikorongo and Grumeti game reserves that are wildlife-rich (Jacob, 2014). The huge scale of poaching in Tanzania was exposed by Hellwig-Botte (2014: 1) who noted that the census of October 2013 shows that there was a plummet in the elephant population in Selous ecosystem from “109,000 in 1976 to 13,084 today”. Poachers had killed about 67 percent of the entire population in the previous four years because in 2006 it was 70,000 (Hellwig-Botte, 2014, p. 1). Additionally, Kideghesho (2016) has observed that the ongoing high rate of the killing of elephants in Tanzania is related “to increased criminality, corruption, the proliferation of firearms, the failure of the judicial system and a perception that Tanzania is a sanctuary for criminals” (p. 369). Clearly, the scale of the proliferation and misuse of SALW in Tanzania is huge.

Terrorist attacks in Tanzania have also increased over the past few years indicating a negative trend in the country’s stability. Although not solely the cause, SALW proliferation is linked to terrorism. Between 2013 and 2014, there were several blasts in Arusha, Mwanza, and Stone Town, Zanzibar. Most of these blasts have been used in areas with huge population concentrations and culminated in death, injury and destruction of property. About 41 bombs were recovered during this period (Kyalo, n.d., p. 16). In February 2016, police in Arusha halted and killed three alleged terrorists, seized ammunition and materials used for producing explosives and army regalia. The link with terrorists emerged when the deceased were found with two flags with Arabic inscriptions similar to those used by terrorist groups. The death of the three suspects occurred in exchange of fire with the police, according to the Arusha regional police (Business Monitor International [BMI], 2016, p. 9). In April 2016, explosives, military regalia, masks, bomb detonators plus a black flag used by al-Shabaab fighters based in Somalia were seized by police in the Morogoro region. The seizure culminated in the arrest of 10 people in association with the weapons. In 2015, terrorism warnings had been issued in Dar es Salaam and the northern tourist town of Arusha. These had led to improved security measures in regions understood to be terrorist targets (BMI, 2016, p. 9). According to Business Monitor International (2016: 10), al Shabaab, Boko Haram and unidentified Tanzanian citizens inspired by al Shabaab are the major groups in the country. They largely target Western interests, tourist resorts and government

buildings. However, the terrorist threat level continues to be moderate to low. Despite that, this underscores the fact that the increase in terrorist attacks in Tanzania and the region in general is partly linked to the proliferation of small arms.

Tanzania has over the years witnessed an increase in organized crime. It is among other ills brought by the proliferation of small arms and include car hijacking and other armed robberies and serious crimes in Tanzania. For instance, in Dar es Salaam there were daylight armed robberies at the Co-operative and Rural Development Bank in 2004, with 3.1-billion shillings stolen; at Stanbic in 2004 with 2.5-billion shillings stolen, and at Citibank in 2002, with 2.2-billion shillings stolen. Other robberies occurred at the Postal Bank Arusha, National Bank of Commerce Kibo Branch Moshi, Exim Bank Mtwara, and the National Microfinance Bank Igunga Branch Tabora (Macha, 2006, p. 27). Between 2010 and 2014, firearms linked with crimes were reportedly rising (Kyalo, n.d., p. 13). In December 2012, a bank clerk of Artan Company of Dar es Salaam was shot on his way to a bank to deposit Sh150 million by three robbers. He later died in hospital while a bystander was shot and died on the spot when he tried to rescue the bank teller from the robbers through throwing stones at them (Daily News, 20 December 2012). These notable losses in the spate of bank robberies involving small arms undoubtedly hindered sustainable economic development as they become disincentives to new investments. This deepens poverty (which is already high) due to lack of or reduced interest in bank deposits, higher interest rates on borrowed loans forcing borrowers to default on their payments (Macha, 2006, p. 27). The economic security and personal security dimensions of human security were endangered as a result of SALW which in turn threaten the national security of Tanzania. In both the short and long run, national security is threatened by these activities because they retard economic growth, cause serious insecurities at the individual, group and society levels. On the other hand, they prompt the affected individuals or groups' desire to provide for their own security and such a process fuels arms races.

Adding to the above point, people's standards of living have been affected as the few with resources resorted to hiring private security companies to guard their compounds. The resultant engagement of security personnel by individuals and organisations has been bemoaned by Macha (2006) noting that:

Today, heavily armed policemen patrolling streets and armed guards in schools, public buildings, commercial complexes, and private premises are commonplace in Dar es Salaam. Such a proliferation "has often led to the acceptance of weapons as a normal part of life ... These developments have created numerous anxieties, induced by perceived threats to personal security and consequent domestic arms races. The formation of paramilitary, civilian defence and armed vigilante groups can be seen as both symptoms and causal factors in processes of societal militarization and weapons proliferation" (p. 27).

In line with the security dilemma theory an increased presence of armed individuals somehow force other members of the community to arm themselves for protection since they cannot trust each other. This unwittingly leads to an arms race at both the individual and community level. This argument dovetails with Cross, de Caris and Urquhart's (2003) observation that "domestically Tanzania has a significant firearms problem. Violent firearms-related crimes are numerous and impact heavily on people's perceptions of security, leading to law-abiding citizens feeling the need to arm themselves for protection" (p. 8). This explains the security dilemma caused by the proliferation of small arms prompting the need to control them.

Furthermore, crime rate in Tanzania increased over the past years. Organised crime levels are on the increase due to the growing number of weapons in private hands (Kipobota, 2010, pp. 153-154). Despite having a moderate homicide rate, Dar es Salaam has a high rate of community violence largely as a result of lynching and vigilantism (Outwater, Mgaya, Msemu, Helgesson, & Abraham, 2015). According to SGA Security (2015), about 16 guns and 53 rounds of ammunition were recovered by police following the arrest of five bandits who had raided Sitakishari Police station in Ukonga in Dar es Salaam. During the raid, the gunmen had shot seven people to death and injured four who included policemen. Similar incidents have been on the rise at Ushirombo in Geita Region, Rufiji in Coast Region and Kawe in Dar es Salaam and were intended to reduce police efforts to protect people and their property (SGA Security, 2015). More so, a more than an hour shoot-out between police and armed robbers in Bukoba District that led to the death of the four robbers was also another incident. The robbers had invaded Chenjuba village and took away several items including cash from villagers at gunpoint (Ulaya, 2016).

Again, violence has become the often resorted to means of society in addressing conflicts with state and corporate interests. For instance, in Mererani, the TanzaniteOne Company which mines Tanzanite has tightened its security and was allowed by the Tanzanian state to use force. This did not go well with the residents of Mererani and small scale miners who were opposed to the dominance of a foreign owned private company securing profits from mining at their expense (Helliesen, 2012). In addition, in 2013 there were protests against the unequal distribution of benefits from mining concerns, especially in the southern part of Tanzania, in Mtwara where violence erupted (LeSage, 2014, p. 5). The protests which took place at mining sites such as the North Mara gold mine in March 2013 and spontaneous riots that ensued following the pronouncement of new extraction licensing repeatedly halted mining progress. This did not only threaten the mining industry and future mining investments but risked destabilising the whole country (Cooper & Stevens, 2013). To this end, Cooper and Stevens (2013) observed that Tanzania's long observed image as the anchor of East African stability is fast becoming an illusion due to among other things adverse invest-

ment laws and growing religious conflict. These are exacerbated by the proliferation of SALW which easily turn the conflicts into fully-fledged violence. Tanzania needs to prevent some of its regions from falling victim to small arms like the Niger Delta region where small arms have been used to settle conflicts generated by the unequal distribution of proceeds from natural resources leading to perpetual loss of life, violence and instability characterising life in that part of Nigeria (Garuba, 2007).

Although not similar to the levels of election violence that have been witnessed in Kenya, Tanzania over the years has also seen some incidents of political violence since the beginning of multi-partyism in 1995. Among other incidents include during the August 2005 presidential campaign when CCM's presidential candidate, Jakaya Kikwete's house was attacked by a mob of unclear party membership (Kessler, 2006, pp. 6-7). In Zanzibar violent elections have been witnessed several times although these have not been sustained (Kessler, 2006, pp. 6-7). The most violent elections were those held in 2000 and 2005 where the opposition party, Chama Cha Wananchi (CFU or the Civic United Front) violently demonstrated against allegations of vote-rigging by the CCM (LeSage, 2014, p. 4). Indeed, CCM attempts at undermining its challengers culminated in a dangerous rise in political violence. In 2013, the CCM was accused of relying on state-sponsored repression after throwing a hand grenade against Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA, or the Party for Democracy and Progress) rally in Arusha killing four people (LeSage, 2014, p. 4). This demonstrates the evolving problem of small arms and their effects on individual security and by implication national security in the country.

The proliferation of small arms has also engendered a situation of general insecurity among Tanzanians. For example, more than 31% of people in Dar es Salaam do not feel safe in their areas after sunset (Macha, 2006, p. 27). In January 2010, 14 people were left dead in a mass shooting. In response, the police arrested nine suspects and recovered a sub-machine gun with 68 bullets and a short gun with five bullets dumped in a nearby bush. However, they had not established whether the recovered guns were the ones used in the killings (Katulanda, 2010). Moreover, in March 2010, a gang armed with a machine gun invaded a wedding party at night where they killed five people and left six including two children injured in Kimusi village, 40 kilometres outside Tarime Township (Mayunga, 2010). This clearly indicates that Tanzanian communities (both rural and urban) are now living in fear because guns have become a permanent danger in their lives.

Overall, we refute the conclusion reached by Jefferson and Urquhart (2002) during the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century that Tanzania is relatively a safe country. This is so because the foregoing discussion maintains that the country's image of peace and stability is likely to become an illusion if the SALW problem is not permanently addressed. Our evidence largely proves that the situation in Tanzania is worsening. A number of changes have taken place since these two scholars' study including an increase in the lack of confi-

dence in the police among other public institutions. Many people in the country are of the opinion that most police officers are corrupt and once the suspect is in the hands of the police justice will not take its course as the offender could be released on the complainant's back. This has led to mob violence due to "... lack of confidence in the police force, far locations of some police stations, citizens' ignorance of the due legal process of handling a suspect criminal and public anger against petty crimes" (Kipobota, 2010, p. 17). Unsurprisingly, it is the public's lack of confidence in the law enforcement agencies' ability to ensure security and justice that motivates many to resort to the need to own a gun as a form of self-protection (Janabi, 2016).

In 2009, Transparency International ranked Tanzania's judiciary number four in East Africa's most corrupt public institutions while the Immigration department was ranked 6<sup>th</sup> (Kipobota, 2010, p. 175). The variables used to determine the ranking of corruption in the country are not specific to small arms. However, they generally point to the level of corruption in the country at the time, particularly given the centrality of law enforcement agencies in enforcing arms stocks management, security and border security. The African Development Bank (2011: 4-5) noted that "incidents of grand corruption scandals, weak sanctions, deficient accounting standards and ineffective internal/external audit; all underscore the need for greater oversight and accountability in government, strengthening legal and judicial reforms and revamping the country's fiduciary environment". However, as highlighted below the corruption levels in the country have slightly improved. In consonance with the security dilemma theory this somehow explains the prevalence of firearms and a proclivity by individuals (both in rural and urban areas) to own a gun for self-defence among other undisclosed reasons. However, the dismantling of the Kinyange gang in 2004 among other successes, especially the disarmament efforts shows that Tanzania has been successful in some areas. As such, although contemporary trends are negative, Tanzania still suffers less internal violence than her neighbours. Consequently, we have demonstrated that in the midst of growing weaknesses there are successes.

## **Discussion**

For any state to confidently embark on development, peace and security are prerequisites. It is critical to point out that the presence of small arms undoubtedly promotes crime. This generates a number of repercussions including but not limited to: threatening human security, hampering development, obstructing investment and corrupting state institutions. Good examples in Africa where the pervasiveness of small arms have increasingly caused security problems to the state and region are numerous and include but extend beyond: Libya (during the Arab Spring), Mali in 2012, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Central African Republic and Sudan (Ayuba & Okafor, 2015; Hove, 2017; Ngboawaji, 2011; Nna, Pabon & Nkoro, 2012; Oluwadare, 2014; Thurston, 2013; Wezeman, 2011).

Many of these case studies demonstrate that small arms proliferation is at the core of the outbreak of many violent conflicts in Africa. The associated repercussions include: violence, deaths (both of civilians and combatants), crime, rise of terrorist groups, incessant political instability and civil wars, cattle rustling, poverty, illiteracy, poor infrastructure and social services all with a bearing on national security in both the traditional and contemporary approaches (Chelule, 2014; Cilliers, Hughes & Moyer, 2011, p. 75; Emanuel & Ndimbwa, 2013; LeSage, 2010, pp. 2-4; Souare, 2010).

Further, violence perpetrated by, between and against organized groups has been equated to the more traditional armed conflict in both scale and intensity (Cilliers *et al.*, 2011, p. 75). Besides, affecting the whole continent in various ways, small arms have been singled out as one primary obstacle to West Africa's peace and security (Malam, 2014; Souare, 2010). Ogu (n.d.: 1) asserts that the implications of small arms on national security and its cross-border impact in Africa have increased the likelihood of numerous other security threats and damaged the ability of governments to fulfil their legitimate security mandate. Clearly, this demonstrates that small arms proliferation has profound security implications on national security. Social and human capital is eroded due to high levels of crime and death rates and business is driven away (UNODC, 2009, p. 9). This is because investors both local and foreign perceive crime as a sign of instability and a disincentive to investment. The tourism sector, for instance, is a major contributor to economic growth and is highly disrupted in the face of crime concerns brought by the proliferation of small arms in Tanzania (Janabi, 2016). In this regard, the re-emergence of terrorist attacks by Islamist militants targeting local Christian leaders, foreign tourists, bars and restaurants beginning in 2012 is a wakeup call for the Tanzanian government officials to support the country's security forces to nip in the bud or pre-empt this security threat (LeSage, 2014, p. 1). As Kideghesho (2016) notes, "besides tarnishing the image of the country, elephant poaching has undesirable effects on the ecological, economic and security aspects" (p. 369). Again, the areas of Kigoma, Kagera and Morogoro where firearms were prevalent were affected by economic decline demonstrating a correlation between a perceived sense of lack of safety and the worsening economic situation (Jefferson & Urquhart, 2002). This has largely continued.

The ability of the state to promote development in education and health, among other development sectors of the country is hampered by the challenges brought by the proliferation of small arms. Consequently, the farsighted words of the former United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a speech on 16 April 1953 bemoaning how the arms trade precipitates human rights abuses and underdevelopment are still relevant in Tanzania as well as the world at large to date. He said:

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone.

It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children... This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron (Shah, 2013).

In light of the above quotation, individuals in Dar es Salaam among other urban places in Tanzania have suffered huge losses due to armed robberies. Loss of property and at times life has been witnessed.

However, Tanzania has hitherto demonstrated to be a unique weak state. This is because “the World Bank governance index for 2015 rates Tanzania low to moderate in accountability, low in governance, low in rule of law, low to moderate in regulatory capability, low in political stability and absence of violence, and low in control of corruption” (Cordesman & Jones, 2016). On the contrary, of late, the country has a somewhat more favourable corruption rating compared to some of its neighbours where out of 168 it ranked 117 in 2015 (Transparency International, 2015). More so, between 1996 and 2010, Tanzania’s legitimacy and state capacity scores have been favourable each with an overall average score of -0.37 and -0.45 (Ababu, 2013, p. 15). In 2013, the country was in the very high warning category ranking 81.1 out of 120 countries on the Failed States Index. However, the breakdown of the scores by indicator was as follows: demographic pressures-8.6, refugees and internally displaced persons-6.8, group grievance-6.0, brain drain and human flight-6.4, uneven economic development-6.4, poverty and economic decline-6.8, state legitimacy-6.2, public services-8.8, human rights and rule of law-6.2, Security apparatus-5.5, factionalised elites-5.7, and external intervention-7.7 (The Fund For Peace, 2013, p. 38). The country fell neither in the best performers category nor worst performers category. Again, the 2016 Global Peace Index ranked Tanzania’s state of peace high at 58 out of 163 countries and scoring 1.899 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016, p. 11). Nevertheless, Tanzania’s inclusion in the top 10 list of unhappy countries in 2016 and 2017 where in the latter it was ranked the third unhappiest country in the world represents a negative trend (Helliwell, Huang & Wang, 2017, pp. 22-23). Notwithstanding these standings in state weakness, Tanzania continues as a relatively stable country.

Our mention of the weaknesses of African states contributing to the outbreak of violence seem to obscure the fact that the presence of armed Interahamwe cadres from Rwanda did not cause the Rwandan civil war to spread to Tanzania, as it did in the then Zaire (now DRC). There are diverse explanations for Tanzania’s uniqueness. Among other things, the lack of involvement of Tanzania in the Rwandan conflict in a similar manner as Uganda or the DRC did coupled with other factors has been cited. Tanzania largely limited itself to helping refugees without being involved in the Rwandan affairs (Smith, 1995, pp. 54-55). In the DRC, the Rwandan civil war caused violence because of a combination of factors such as similarities in ethnicity which led Laurent Nkunda, a Congolese Tutsi to launch a war to put an end to Hutu insurgents from the Democratic

Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). He blamed the Congolese government for sponsoring the FDLR. The forces which constituted the FDLR had vowed “publicly before the new government gained power, and before refugee camps and a government in exile were set up in Zaire, that they would use the camps as a staging ground for future attacks” (Smith, 1995, p. 56). The abundance of natural resources in the DRC which are not equitably exploited for the benefit of the locals also exacerbated the situation (World Without Genocide, 2013).

Additionally, unlike in DRC, Tanzania did not allow refugees to come with heavy weapons although former military persons and militia men were living in the refugee camps (Smith, 1995, p. 56). The DRC government allowed and facilitated further receiving of arms shipments by the ex-Interahamwe soldiers and the sheltering of its senior officers under the DRC commanders (Doctors Without Borders, n.d.). In 2015, there were revelations about how the FDLR apart from being provided with arms, military support and intelligence by the Congolese army it is also assisted to profiteer from eastern Congo’s massive natural resources, particularly charcoal (Mungai, 2015). In this regard, the lack of the major factors that generate conflicts in the region and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa explains why the Rwandan conflict did not extend to Tanzania. These include but are not limited to: “local elites political manipulation, competition over scarce resource, culture of cattle rustling, and state policies that exacerbate regional inequality and marginalization” (Ababu, 2013, p. 15).

In addition, it appears ethnicity causes conflict when it is made the basis for exclusion, both real and imagined, as in Kenya among other cases which is not the case in Tanzania (Cocodia, 2008; Kagwanja & Southall, 2009). Tanzania’s over 120 ethnic groups have never at any given time been the basis for political divisions and there is a much stronger national identity (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011, p. 9). This has been attributed to the country’s post-independence state and nation building path where its first president, Julius K. Nyerere established educational and linguistic policies intended to foster a Tanzanian identity. Again, the equitable distribution of resources from central government in Tanzania coupled with the creation of elected district and village councils with wide legitimacy across ethnic divides closed the incentives for competition over political and economic rewards (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011, p. 9). High and less variable economic growth has been witnessed in Tanzania and this is linked to low occurrences of popular unrest. To this end, the case of Tanzania is a good example to show that “ethnic and religious diversity do not necessarily make a society more prone to conflict” because although it is “one of the world’s most ethnically diverse countries, [it] has been peaceful for decades” (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011, p. 8).

Overall, the state’s role under the broadened concept of national security including human security to create the enabling environment for its citizens to live secured lives full of self-realisation, self-development and self-actualisation (Jinadu, 2000, p. 3) might

become an illusion in Tanzania if the SALW challenge is not fully addressed. The failure of the state to provide its citizens with the enabling security environment compels its citizens to arm themselves thus generating a market for SALW. Small arms proliferation undoubtedly poses a threat to national security because they prevent the accomplishment of the three basic human instincts important to national security from the human security perspective. These encompass self-realisation, self-development and self-actualisation. This is because it is the general insecurity in the broad understanding of security felt by citizens that create the fertile ground for small arms proliferation. In other words, the proliferation of small arms should not be simply seen as a threat to national security but should also be viewed as a symptom of individual, groups and communities' need for security caused by the failure of the state to provide that security. Generally, in search of security individuals, communities and groups compete to acquire arms to provide for their own security. Such a reaction is driven by the state's failure to fulfil its obligations to provide for both state and human security.

### **Conclusion and the Road to Sustainable National Security**

Guided by the security dilemma and the regional security complex theories as well as ideas of state weakness, this paper has argued that although Tanzania is not unstable politically it has been affected by the proliferation of SALW. These come largely from her unstable neighbouring countries ravaged by sustained political instability and armed conflicts. Among other things, the situation has been worsened by the country's long and porous borders. The proliferation of SALW in Tanzania affects the pastoral societies, border area communities and urban societies. Therefore, small arms have profound implications on Tanzania's national security because development in the health, education and economic sectors of the country has been impeded. The rise in cases of political violence and resurgence of terrorist activities in recent years coupled with the proliferation of small arms if unchecked will destabilise the entire country and become a real challenge to Tanzania's national security. Tanzania is not yet totally overwhelmed by the SALW problem but the prevailing situation in the country points to the urgent need to tackle the problem because prevention is better than cure. An introduction of a more reliable and effective security sector institution by the Tanzanian government for both urban and rural areas as well as at border and port areas will reduce SALW proliferation. It is imperative for the government of Tanzania to enhance the operation of its security sector by sending its members for training into other countries with a good record of curbing the proliferation of SALW.

The authors maintain that Tanzania's long observed peace and stability image might become an illusion as a result of the proliferation of SALW. Its citizens are increasingly resorting to the use of weapons as the first solution to solve their conflicts (both interpersonal and inter-community problems). The widespread availability of SALW and the public's lack of confidence in the police force fuel their circulation and mis-

use. The authors fully acknowledged that while Tanzania has a functional police and other security sector institutions, these institutions are facing a number of challenges such as lack of capacity, and resources required to ensure effectiveness. The prevailing lack of trust between civilians and the authorities responsible for providing security within local communities is worsening the problem of the proliferation and misuse of SALW. Dialogue between civilians and local authorities and security details needs to be encouraged and hastened as a precursor to sustainable solution via disarmament including addressing other fundamental root causes of SALW movement. The demand for weapons will still remain unless the attitudes of civilians towards the police force and other security forces and the justice system are comprehensively modified. To change this reliance on weapons into nonviolent conflict resolution skills the country requires long-term government and other stakeholders (security forces, private companies, nongovernmental organisations, local authorities and civilian groups) driven strategies and commitment. The participation of the police, armed forces, and other security sector elements will ultimately lead the way to the development of new policies and practices that all the stakeholders are prepared to observe. Engagement is crucial because groups as well as individuals will always find ways to address their own fears and find common solutions to ameliorate their security rather than the dangerous current reliance on firearms.

Moreover, the holistic implementation of international, regional, sub-regional and national legal instruments and measures meant to prevent the proliferation of SALW will go a long way in curbing the proliferation of SALW in Tanzania and its consequences on national and regional security. It is thus imperative for Tanzania to develop a multi-pronged strategy to build up capable, resourced, and effective efforts to curb the proliferation and resultant misuse of SALW. Overall, we maintain that the efforts by the government are largely likely to contribute immensely in easing the movement and misuse of SALW in Tanzania if they are earnestly bolstered and continued. This is evident in the dismantling of the Kinyange gang in 2004 and the continued seizure and destruction of illicit weapons which demonstrate that Tanzania has been clearly successful in some areas. While the trends are negative, Tanzania still faces less internal violence compared to her neighbours.

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