

# Rwanda: In the Aftermath of Genocide against Tutsis. Survivor and non-victim position to the subordinate identity and “rwandeity” promotion policy.

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**Abstract.** *Following the genocide against the Tutsi in 1994, the Rwandan government implemented a policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of the ethnic group identities, which resembled the common in-group identity model (CIIM) known in social psychology. The present interview study examined how participants live being a member of the survivor or non-victim group and being a Rwandan. It also investigated the different perspectives of survivors and non-victims in relation to the policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of the ethnic groups. Consistent with socio-emotional needs-based model (NBM) (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008), the results show that most non-victims support the policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of the ethnic group identity because the national identity permits them to escape this negative moral image conferred by the subordinate identity. For survivors, their subordinate identity is related to the history of victimization. Half of them were supportive of this policy but they had to ensure that the commemoration period is maintained. The two oldest survivors preferred political identities which consider the ethnic group and national identity at the same time. Other reasons advanced of supporting single recategorization policy are related to the official translated version of the history, diverse government policies, empathy towards to the members of the perpetrator group and not representing the prototype of the group.*

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**Keywords:** *Rwanda, genocide, subordinate identity, super-ordinate identity, single recategorisation policy and needs-based model of intergroup reconciliation.*

Conflict Studies Quarterly  
Issue 23, April 2018, pp. 23-47

DOI:10.24193/cs.q.23.2  
Published First Online: 04/10/2018

## Introduction

Rwanda is situated in the Great Lakes region of central-south Africa. It had about 12 million habitants that can be grouped into three social classes (the Hutus, the Tutsis

and the Twa). All Rwandan classes speak the same local language (Kinyarwanda), have the same culture and have lived side by side for many centuries. These social classes have developed on the basis of power and socioeconomic conditions. The powerful and wealthier in cattle class were regarded as the Tutsi (Newbury, 1988, p. 11). However wealthy Hutus could become honorary Tutsis after acquisition of cattle.

During colonial period (1884–1962), the German and Belgian colonizers ruled with the local Tutsi chiefs who were considered by colonials as superior group (Prunier, 1995). In 1933, during Belgian rule, identity cards were introduced by Belgian colonizers with social class for each person (Clark, 2010). From that day these social class became the ethnic group and the mobility between classes was prohibited.

In 1959, the Tutsi monarchy was removed from power by the Hutu group led by Gregory Kayibanda and installed a government that discriminated Tutsi in many ways (Kiwuwa, 2012). In 1973, General Habyarimana claimed power by coup d'état and continued to implement pro-Hutu policies. In April 1994, Hutu extremists started the genocide against Tutsi after the crash of airplane that carried President Habyarimana, and extended quickly to cover the whole country. The Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), an armed wing of Rwanda Patriotic Front, led by current president Paul Kagame, ended the genocide and gained the control of the country.

When it was established on July 19, 1994, the current Rwandan government was confronted with the management of the cohabitation of genocide victims and perpetrators as well as rebuilding a country following its social, political and economic destruction (Presidency of the Republic, 1995). About one million Tutsi and Hutu opposed to genocidal ideology had just been killed by Hutus extremists and Interahamwe militia. The coexistence between genocide survivors, perpetrators and their respective family members was inevitable, there was no other possibility. To promote this cohabitation, various rehabilitation policies were adopted, the pillar of which was and remains reconciliation (Presidency of the Republic, 1995). The Rwandese government has promoted national identity as a tool of reconciliation and response to the identity problems of a society destroyed by the interethnic division. The policy for the promotion of Rwandese nationality has been implemented at the expense of the ethnic group identities, by discouraging ethnic identification (Buckley-Zistel, 2006; Kanazayire, Licata, Melotte, Dusingizemungu, & Azzi, 2014). In that line, the mention of ethnicity in identity cards has been removed and at the political level, parties based on previous group membership (or any other demographic criterion) were also prohibited by law (Mukashema & Mullet, 2015).

The initiative for the promotion of Rwandese nationality at the detriment of ethnic group are considered by the Rwandan political leaders as shrewd given the illegitimacy of ethnic identity constructed by Belgian colonizers (Moss, 2014) and the excesses associated with ethnicity, which led to one of the worst genocides in human history

(Shyaka, 2003, p. 191). In terms of social psychology, this policy is consistent with the Common Ingroup Identity Model. The results of a quantitative study in non representative sample conducted by Kanazayire, Licata, Mélotte, Dusingizemungu & Azzi, (2014) showed that levels of national identification were at comparable levels among both survivors of the genocide and non-victims, and national identification was associated with more reconciliatory attitudes in both groups. However, this strategy seemed to be more effective among non-victims than among survivors.

Unfortunately, this study did not measure differences in social identifications between ethnic groups, given the inability to directly measure the participants' ethnic identification. Consequently, the authors were not able to confirm if the common in-group identity model is better than dual identity model. The purpose of this study is to examine the manner in which survivors and non-victims live with their subordinate identity and their attitudes to the policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of ethnic group identity.

### **The Common In-Group Identity Model**

The Common In-group Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman & Rust, 1993) is proposed as a strategy to improve the relations between groups in conflict. The CIIM (Dovidio, Neir, Ward, Banker & Rust, 2001; Gaertner, Man, Murell & Dovidio, 1989), like the social decategorisation model (Brewer & Miller, 1984; Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, Rust & Guerra, 1998; Miller, Brewer & Edwards, 1985) and dual identity model (Crisp & Hewstone 1999; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Hornsey & Hogg 2000b), is based on the theory of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and on self-categorization (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). According to this model, intergroup relations improve if individuals identify with a supra-ordinate common group, such as nationality, rather than if they identify with different subordinate groups, such as ethnic groups (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000, Gaertner *et al.*, 1993).

Even for groups in conflict, identification at the inclusive level reduces prejudice, contributes to the development of positive attitudes towards the exogroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), reduces intergroup antipathy (Gaertner *et al.*, 1993), favours intergroup contact (Gómez, Dovidio, Huici, Gaertner & Cuadrado, 2008) and promotes forgiveness between these groups (Gaertner *et al.*, 1993, Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).

Indeed, the effect of identification at the inclusive level on pro-social behavior has been demonstrated in both laboratory studies with minimal groups (Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzic, & Matoka, 1997) and in the natural context with the different racial groups in American schools (Dovidio, Gaertner, John, Halabi, Saguy, Pearson & Riek, 2008), in multi-ethnic schools ((Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio & Anastasio, 1994), (Mottola, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997), in social justice (Huo, Smith, Tyler & Lind, 1996), in the recomposed families (Banker & Gaertner, 1998) and post-genocide situations (Wohl

& Branscombe, 2005; Cehajic, Brown & Castano, 2008; Licata, Klein, Saade, Azzi & Branscombe, 2011; Noor, Brown & Prentice, (2008; Shnabel, Halabi & Noor, 2013; Kanazayire *et al.*, 2014).

Nevertheless, some researchers have demonstrated that the model of common group identity does not always apply equally to all groups and all social contexts. The model of identification at the inclusive level does not take into account the fact that some groups may identify more than others at the supra-ordinate level. Several studies (Binder, Zagefka, Brown, Funke, Kessler, Mummendey & Leyens, 2009; Dixon, Tropp, Dürrhein & Tredoux, 2010) found that members of the disadvantaged minority group preferred interventions aimed at reducing intergroup bias compared to those of majority-favored groups. Majority group members prefer policies that promote inclusive identification (Verkuyten, 2006), while members of the minority group prefer policies that promote dual identity because it takes into account social and ethnic distinctions (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2007; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson & Casas, 2007; Verkuyten, 2006, Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008).

In addition, the model of identification at the inclusive level does not take into account victim and perpetrator status. According to the needs-based model (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008), at the end of a conflict, the perpetrators face a threat concerning their moral image (Zechmeister & Romero, 2002; Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Shnabel, 2008) and fear of being rejected by their moral community (Tavuchis, 1991; Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton, 1994; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio & Carmi, 2009; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). On the other hand, victims suffer a threat to their identity as a powerful actor (Foster & Rusbult, 1999; Nadler, 2002; Scobie & Scobie, 1998) and are likely to have a high degree of self-esteem (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). The victims and perpetrators will thus be motivated to identify at the super-ordinate level if this inclusive identity permits them to restore the agency and positive moral image, respectively.

However, it should be remembered that identification with the superordinate group poses a threat to subordinate identity in individuals strongly identified with their in-group (Crisp, Stone & Hall, 2006). Compatibility between the two identities is only observed in individuals who are weakly identified with their in-group (Anastasio, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997) and in disadvantaged minority groups (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2007; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson & Casas, 2007; Verkuyten, 2006, Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008).

Members of the perpetrator group might experience collective guilt and feel responsibility for atrocities they personally did not commit (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Those who identify themselves strongly with their in-group may adopt different attitudes towards threats related to their moral image. To distinguish themselves from other members of the in-group who have committed negative actions, some members of the perpetrator group can value their personal identity (Branscombe,

Wann, Noel & Coleman, 1993). Other members of the perpetrator group may also use a strategy of distinguishing faulty members responsible for negative actions from other in-group members in order to protect the overall value of the identity of the in-group (Branscombe *et al.*, 1993). Alternatively, minimizing or discarding the extent to which the in-group as a whole is responsible for the mischief, group members do not need to distance themselves from their in-group identity.

In addition, members of both groups (victim and perpetrator) may experience threats of exclusion or rejection from members of their ingroup because they are not the prototype of the group. In other words, they do not embody the stereotypes attributed to the whole group, nor

the group's most abstract ideal (Turner *et al.*, 1987). In general, those excluded from the group are people who are far from the norm. They may differ from others on the basis of age, ethnicity, skin colour, religion, etc. (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The manner in which these people deal with the identity threat of exclusion from the ingroup will depend on their level of identification. Those who identify strongly with the in-group will make efforts to be accepted (Noel, Wann & Branscombe, 1995; Iyer, Jetten & Tsivriko, 2008) and decide to follow the standards in order to get closer to a central group position (Noel *et al.*, 1995). In some cases, like exclusion based on ethnicity or race, this strategy can't work. We believe that in a similar situation the identification with a super-ordinate group can also constitute a good strategy for facing the negative moral image of the in-group and the exclusion linked to not representing the prototype of the in-group.

In the present study we investigate the way the members of genocide survivor and non-victim groups live with their subordinate and super-ordinate identity and the threats related to these identities. It examines also their positioning regarding the policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of the ethnic groups.

The present study examines the way the members of survivor and non-victim groups identify themselves with their subordinate identity and the threats related to this identity. It also investigates the positions of survivors and non-victims in relation to the policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of the ethnic group identities and interest ourselves in the motivation that underlies them.

## **Method**

### ***Participants***

The study was conducted in 2011 at the Kibungo Institute of Agriculture, Technology and Education (INATEK) in the eastern province of Rwanda. The participants were students of the Faculty of Psychological Sciences and Education, 3rd and 4th year of license, of Rwandan origin. The sample consisted of 20 participants, selected from the

300 participants who had previously participated in a quantitative study on identity. Of the 20, 10 were genocide survivors and 10 non-victims (member of perpetrator group). The interview lasted between 20 and 30 minutes. Participants' ages ranged from 22 years to 51 years at the time of the survey. The mean age is 31 years with the standard deviation of 8.08.

**Table 1:** Demographic characteristic of participants

Participants	Status	Sex	Age at interview
N° 1	Survivor	Female	22 years
N° 2	Survivor	Male	23 years
N° 3	Survivor	Male	25 years
N° 4	Survivor	Male	24 years
N° 5	Survivor	Female	51 years
N° 6	Survivor	Female	48 years
N° 7	Survivor	Male	31 years
N° 8	Survivor	Female	31 years
N°9	Non-victim	Female	30 years
N° 10	Non-victim	Male	25 years
N° 11	Non-victim	Female	36 years
N° 12	Survivor	Male	28 years
N° 13	Non-victim	Female	26 years
N° 14	Non-victim	Female	36 years
N° 15	Non-victim	Female	36 years
N° 16	Survivor	Male	24 years
N° 17	Non-victim	Female	26 years
N° 18	Non-victim	Female	27 years
N° 19	Non-victim	Male	28 years
N° 20	Non-victim	Male	43 Years

### ***Procedure***

Following the collection of data for the quantitative study, we returned to the Institute of Agriculture, Technology and Education of Kibungo (INATEK) to inform the Dean of the Faculty of Psychology and educational sciences that we needed participants for a qualitative study. The Dean agreed to give us access to the students and asked the teachers to facilitate the recruitment. Explanations of the study were provided to the students during to clarify that the persons eligible for participation were those who lived in Rwanda during the genocide and who participated in the first study. Many of those who were willing to participate remained at the end of the class, signed up on a sheet of paper and they identified themselves as mentioned their status (survivor/non-survivor). Only 20 participants were selected, the first 10 genocide survivors and the first 10 non-victims (member of perpetrator group who were not persecuted during genocide against Tutsi) on the list. Participants signed a free and informed consent


form. Five of participated in the interview on the same day and the others made an appointment to be interviewed at a later time.


### Materials

The aim of this study is to investigate how participants experience being a member of the survivor or non-victim group and their perspectives in relation to the policy of strengthening national identification at the expense of the ethnic groups. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in Kinyarwanda. Some interviews were conducted at INATEK and others at the Kigali Health Institute. The interviews lasted between 20 and 30 minutes. The semi-structured interviews were conducted in order to explore the following research questions: How the participants experience being a member of survivor group or non-victim group and a Rwanda at the same time? How the participants respond to the “Single Recategorization Policy” which promotes national identity to the detriment the ethnic identity group? Do they think that single recategorisation policy can constitute a solution to the threat related to subordinate identity the face? Interviews were recorded and probes were added if answer were not clear enough.

### Analysis Method

Since our aim was to identify different attitudes in relation to national identity, subordinate identities and policy that promote national identity to the detriment of ethnic group identity, we carried out a thematic analysis (Braun and Clark, 2006). This analysis implies an identification of the responses taking into account the particular aspects mentioned. After a discussion with colleagues on the categories identified in the interviews, the main themes and the sub-themes were differentiated. The schemas below, provides a detailed analysis of the categories, themes and sub-themes that guided us in the presentation of the results.





**Results**

***Different types of positioning in relation to subordinate identities***

***Different types of positioning in relation to non-victim identity***

During the interviews, we realized that the non-victim identity was directly understood as the Hutu identity. When talking about non-victims or people who were not persecuted but were in Rwanda, the non-victims responded directly by saying “*I understand you want to talk about the Hutus*”. The non victim group was related to ethnic identity. Four positions were observed in relation to how non-victims live with this identity directly associated with the non-victim identity.

***Guilt of the group without distancing from the in-group***

One out of ten non-victims felt collective guilt but did not mention anything that would imply that she is no longer attached to her group. “*I think every Hutu lives with guilt and shame. (...). As a member of the Hutu group, I still live with this guilt*” (Int.18). However, individuals who feel collective guilt may adopt strategies that allow them to escape guilt and collective shame, as illustrated by the following themes.

***Distance to the in-group***

Six out of ten non-victim participants revealed that they were not proud to belong to a perpetrator group. They felt shame and guilt about belonging to this group and they wanted to change it. This is reflected in Int.17: “*I am neither proud nor content to belong to the Hutu group. If it were possible for me, I would leave this group and look for another group of which I would be proud. I feel sorry for the fact that I belong to the hang man[the genocide perpetrator group]*”. Another participant agreed in the same sense that she would like to belong to another positively valued group: “*... I am not happy to*

*be a member of the group whose members have committed genocide. (...). I always want it to change. I want to wake up one day and be told that my family is no longer a member of the genocide perpetrator group” (Int.9).*

These two participants have a negative image of themselves as members of the victim group. They are ashamed and disliked to belong to a guilty group and, if mobility was possible, they would have left the Hutu group to escape the negative identity.

### ***Distance to the two groups***

A non-victim often strongly expressed threats related to mixed identity. These threats arise from the fact that the participant is not a prototypical member of any group. *“I am identified as Hutu. In Rwanda, we are in the patriarchal regime where the person takes the ethnicity of his father. I identified myself with both groups before the genocide. My mother was a Tutsi and my father was Hutu. (...). After the genocide, I sought to identify myself with my mother’s family. I no longer wanted to identify myself with a group that had committed genocide. (...) I thought I had a choice. I felt that I was not accepted by my mother’s family. I was sometimes labelled a child of Interahamwe or even Interahamwe. When it began to weigh heavily, I turned to my father’s family. But here too, I did not feel accepted; there I was labeled a cockroach or a snake. (...). In terms of ethnicity, I can say that I belong nowhere, neither to the Hutu group nor to the Tutsi group. Neither of them accepts me” (Int.10).* This excerpt shows that participant 10 is rejected by members of both groups and cannot do anything to adopt prototypical postures. He eventually disidentified from both two groups.

### ***Individualization of guilt***

It is important to note that two out of ten non-victims strongly identify with the non-victim group and did not place guilt on the group’s back. For them, the guilt is personal and should not be attributed to all members of the group. Although these two non-victims adopted the same strategy, one felt the collective shame of belonging to the non-victimized group while the other felt neither collective guilt nor collective shame. Those who feel shame opt for a strategy of distinguishing the wrongdoers from the innocent to protect the value of the group (Branscombe *et al.*, 1993). It is expressed in the following way: *“In reality, I am like the other members of the group of executioners. Nevertheless, I was not together with them [the genocide perpetrators] in the crimes they committed. I think that those who committed the genocide must accept and confess in order to remove our shame. They must accept without delay what they have done so that the other members of our group can feel at ease. For even without committing genocide, as a member of the executioner group, we walk and we always live with this shame” (Int.11).*

Participant 11’s comments must be understood in the social context at the time of the survey. These are statements made in 2011, when the Gacaca courts were coming to an end. These jurisdictions were closed in December 2012. The hope of escaping collective

shame for this participant may be based on the fact that after the close of the Gacaca jurisdictions, the distinction between guilty and innocent members of the non-victim group would be clearly established.

Unlike participant 11, who mentions the fact that she walks and lives with shame, participant 19 showed that this was not the case for him. He has chosen a strategy of using personal identity to distinguish himself from other members of the group who have committed negative actions (Branscombe *et al.*, 1993). *"I feel like a member of the Hutu group, some of whom have committed genocide. But I do not feel ashamed or guilty of belonging to this group, for to me the crime is personal. (...) Me, I'm not part of this basket that includes the perpetrators. (...), I deal only with what concerns me"*.

We have just seen how individuals identify with their non-victimized group and how they experienced certain threats related to non-victim identity. In the next section, we will discuss how survivors experienced their subordinate identity.

### **Different types of positioning in relation to survivor identity**

The survivor status was not directly related to ethnic identity, as was the case for members of the non-victim group. The victim identity does not refer to Tutsis. Moreover, three positions were observed in relation to how survivors live with the identity.

#### ***Highlighting their victimization story***

Seven out of ten survivors showed that how survivors live with their survivor identity is related to their victimization stories. They talked about their vulnerability and suffering related to genocide. Two of these six survivors went so far as to demand compensation for what they had experienced. *"As a survivor, I feel like someone who has suffered. I would like to see even the other people recognize that the survivors have suffered a lot. Let them have grief. (...) I even think that as survivors, they need to be compensated for all that they have suffered and lost"* (Int.5). In the next section, we will talk about some survivors who have been able to overcome this vulnerability and have become self-reliant.

#### ***Evolution ranging from vulnerability to self-reliance***

Two out of ten survivors revealed that an evolution appears in the way survivors experience their in-group identity and in the way they lived right after the genocide. Both participants acknowledged that government programs have played a role in this evolution: *"It was a time when we were vulnerable, imprisoned by our grief. We were hostages of our grief. But thanks to the Association of Genocide Widows (AVEGA) and the various government programs that strengthen us, we are no longer in this situation. We were able to move forward positively in life and take charge of us. (...). In general the survivors have gone beyond being hostages of grief, they are now looking to the future"* (Int.6).

Participant 8 agrees with this and believes that the survivors have become autonomous and thanks to the Funds of Assistance to the survivors of the Genocide (FARG). *“I see myself as someone who is self-reliant. Before, I thought I was more vulnerable, but now it is no longer the case. I was able to study due to the Fund of Assistance to the survivors of the Genocide and I work as a nurse. I take charge and try to help survivors who are still vulnerable”.*

These remarks highlight a certain recognition of the survivors towards the Rwandan government. This self-reliance and reconstruction mentioned by the two participants can be understood in the positive sense. Both participants have a positive image of themselves. Let us also add that the hope for the future mentioned by participant 6 is in line with the new orientation advocated by the National Commission of the Fight against the Genocide (CNLG) from 2009, with the new launch of the logo of hope (The flame of hope). From 2009, the CNLG has encouraged people not to forget the past but to commit themselves and to invest for their future. This motivates the survivors to mention in their testimonies their achievements in order to create optimism for the future among other survivors. The concern for the future is also evident in another participant who believed that, unlike before and during the genocide, he currently has dignity and worth.

### ***Current power status in comparison with the period before the genocide***

Although having travelled through traumatic events as a survivor, participant n°12 thinks he is a valuable person. *“As a victim, I am someone who has value unlike before and during the genocide. I have to live and no one has the right to refuse me to live. I know that I must not misbehavior and harm myself by abusing drugs or alcohol. I am someone who must struggle to live, because I think there is a reason why I survived”.*

This participant believes that he was able to restore a status of power that he had neither before nor during the genocide. It shows how it fits into both regimes. He refers to the fact that he had no value and no dignity during ex-President Habyarimana’s regime compared to now.

The results of the interview revealed that seven out of ten survivors highlighted the history of victimization. Two other survivors had gone beyond the stage of seeing themselves as victims and vulnerable survivors and saw themselves as people who can take care of themselves. This way of perceiving oneself positively is found in another survivor who mentions that he has value as survivor of the genocide.

The results not only informed us about positioning in relation to the in-group identity, but also confirmed that the non-victim identity gave a negative image to most non-victims. On the other hand, for survivors, survivor status was not directly related to ethnic identity, as was the case for members of the non-victim group. Therefore, in

response to the question of how they perceive themselves as members of the group and whether they are proud to belong to their in-group, most victims insisted on their suffering and the history of victimization during the genocide. Few survivors spoke positively or valorized the status they have after genocide.

### **Different types of positioning in relation to national identity**

The different positions of the participants in relation to the policy of promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic groups can be grouped into three categories.

#### **Support for the promotion of national identity at the expense of ethnic groups**

It emerged from the interview that eight non-victims and three survivors supported the policy of promoting identification with the Rwandan nation to the detriment of ethnic group identities. All those who supported this policy believed that it is a solution to the shame and guilt felt by non-victims. While these participants supported this policy, the reasons for their adherence differed according to the group. Indeed, non-victims questioned the basis of ethnic differences in order to justify this policy of categorization at the super-ordinate level.

#### ***Challenging ethnic groups***

Participant No. 9 supports the promotion of national identity because the elements on which the Hutu are differentiated from Tutsis are unfounded. *“I support this policy, because we are all the same, the Hutus and the Tutsis. We speak the same language, inhabit the same territory, have the same culture. There are not even any physical differences that were mentioned, that the Tutsis are slender with a long nose, that the Hutus are short with a stocky nose. When I try to see especially in my generation, I see no difference. For me, it is the fact of identifying oneself as Rwandans and not as Hutu and Tutsi that will make disappear the interethnic conflict”*. Participant No. 9 raised arguments corresponding to those in the official version of the policy, that the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis is only artificial (Moss & Vollhardt, 2015).

#### ***Mobilization of mixed marriages***

Mixed marriage was mobilized to support the policy promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic group identities. *“For me, Rwandan nationality is a solution. In addition to being Rwandan, we are brothers and sisters. As a member of the Hutu group, we have members of our families in the other group who have been killed. There were marriages between the Hutus and the Tutsis. That is to say, in reality, we have the same blood, we even have kinships in the other group”* (Int.17). The latter mentions that mixed marriage justifies Hutus and Tutsis as brothers. We will find in the next section a participant who revealed that she was the victim of this mixed marriage and that the national identity is a solution for her.

### ***National Identity: a solution for threats related to mixed identity***

For participant No. 10, the program of identification with the Rwandan nation is a solution because it allowed her to have a group to belong to, and to meet her basic need of belonging, since she was excluded by the two groups: *“My mother was a Tutsi and my father was Hutu. I am proud to be a Rwandan. I identify myself as Rwandan because at least with the Rwandan nationality, I am sure that I am Rwandan and no one contests it like, like my family members do it with my ethnic identity. I am for the promotion of national identity at the expense of ethnic groups”*. We have just seen the different reasons put forward by the non-victims who support the policy of promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic groups. In the next section, we will discuss the survivors who took the same position.

### ***The reference to the colonial period***

Participant N°3 refers to the colonial period in support of the policy of promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic group identities. *“The ethnic groups merely separated and opposed Rwandans who were initially the same. Let us remain Rwandan as was the case before colonization, this will save us many problems”*. It appears that this surviving participant supports this policy in order to promote the unity of the Rwandans. He also uses the pre-colonial period described in the official version as a harmonious period (Bilali, 2014) to show that this unity existed before the introduction of ethnic groups.

### ***Compassion for Innocent Hutu Youth***

Participant No. 2 argues that this policy of promoting national identity to the detriment of ethnic group identities can be a solution for innocent Hutu youth: *“When I try to look at my colleagues, there are really those who suffer because they belong to the Hutu group. The latter carry a burden of things they have not done, because of the members of their families”*. This compassion for the suffering and burdens of innocent Hutu youth is important in the process of reconciliation. It shows that survivors can take a step, abandon competition for victim status and recognize that members of the out-group may suffer, even if it is not for the same reasons as the in-group. It should be mentioned that this compassion was revealed by a survivor who was 6 years old during the genocide.

### ***Confidence in Government***

Another survivor supported this policy for the sole reason that he has confidence in his government. *“I am proud to be Rwandan. I support the policy of identification with the Rwandan nation to the detriment of ethnic groups. I have confidence in Rwandan government and I am sure the government will do its best to make this program a success”* (Int.7). These two survivors support this policy without any conditions. On the other hand, other survivors also supported this policy but by protecting their victim status.

## **Supporting the promotion of national identity while responding to the need for positive differentiation**

### ***Supporting the promotion of national identity while protecting victim identity***

Eight out of 20 participants (7 survivors and 1 non-victim) supported the policy of promoting national identity to the detriment of ethnic identities by proposing different conditions that would allow them to gain a positive identity. Five survivors wanted the commemoration period to continue, two wanted ethnic identities to be maintained, and one non-victim hoped that there would be a clear distinction between non-culpable victims and innocent non-victims.

The period of commemoration is a period that recognizes the victimization of survivors. We believe that insisting on the period of commemoration allows survivors to protect their victim status, allowing them to respond to their needs for positive differentiation.

### ***Promotion of dual identity model***

Some survivors (2 out of 10) identified strongly with the nation identity but also claimed recognition of their ethnic identity, which may be forgotten in favor of the Rwandan identity. *"I am proud to be Rwandan despite the genocide of the Tutsis. Only, what worries me is that for me, we must not forget the ethnic groups. We were victims of these ethnic groups. Our people were killed because they were Tutsis. But removing ethnicities for me amounts (means) to denying my survivor status. (...). For me, one must keep ethnicities and perpetual teachings about the ethnic groups. One must show that one ethnic group has been the victim and another one perpetrated the genocide"* (Int.5).

Participant No. 6 agrees in the same sense: *"The fact that there is no ethnicity on identity cards and that is good because we have been victims of this for a long time. This time, there is no one who lacks scholarships or job because of his ethnicity. But even if we advocate the Rwandan identity and suppress the ethnic groups, I cannot forget who I am. I lost my children, I became a widow, all because of my ethnicity, I cannot forget my ethnicity. I am proud to be a Rwandan, and I support the program of highlighting the Rwandan identity. Nevertheless, I would also like the ethnic group to be kept, because suppressing ethnic groups can serve as an alibi for Holocaust deniers"*.

Both participants suggested that ethnic identities should be protected and maintained because they were victims of their ethnicity. People of the older generation seemed to care more about ethnicities than younger generations. These people who supported ethnic identity were middle-aged people. They know the whole history of ethnic groups and have experienced this directly. It is not easy for them to detach themselves from these ethnic groups. Young people were just concerned about their identity as a victim, while the older ones want to protect both the ethnic identity and the identity of the victim. Only one non-victim mentioned a condition that would promote the success of

this policy of categorization at the super-ordinate level while allowing innocent non-victims to protect their positive social identity.

### ***Separating Hutus perpetrators from Hutus non-perpetrators***

Participant N° 11 was not against the promotion of national identity, but she thought that this promotion would not be a solution for the moral image of her group as long as it is possible to generalize the attribution of responsibility of the Genocide to non-victims *"I am proud to be a Rwandan and I have nothing against this policy of promoting identification with the Rwandan nation. But for me, what would be a solution to my shame would be to make a clear distinction between the Hutus who were involved in the genocide and the innocent Hutu"*. We have just seen that certain victim participants support the policy of identification with the Rwandan nation to the detriment of the ethnic identity but evoked the necessary conditions for the success of this policy. As we have seen below, this participant mentioned that *"I think that those who committed the genocide must accept and confess without delay in order to remove the shame"*. For another non-victim, although she recognizes that the promotion of national identity at the expense of ethnic identities may be a solution for some members of his group but for him, whether this policy takes ethnicities into account or not, it doesn't make any difference.

### **A neutral position in relation to the policy of promoting national identity to the detriment of ethnic identities**

Participant N° 19, non-victim, is neither disturbed by the maintenance of ethnic groups nor by their suppression. *"(...) But for me, I do not care whether we advocate the Rwandan identity or keep the ethnic groups. I do not even see why we would try to get rid of the ethnic groups, anyway, we know our ethnic groups. It may help some members of my group who are ashamed and guilty about their belonging. For me, the ethnic groups should not disturb me, if no one uses them to harm others and deprive people of their rights"* (Int.19).

This participant takes a neutral stance but insists that once the ethnic groups are maintained, care must be taken that they are not used to discriminate against some. This caveat reminds us that ethnic groups have been manipulated by the leaders of two former political regimes and corresponds to the version officially conveyed by the current Rwandan government (Moss & Vollhardt, 2015).

All the participants of the two groups expressed their pride in being Rwandan; they like to belong to the Rwandan group and they cannot bear if a person speaks ill or something bad of the Rwandans. Seventeen out of twenty (9 non-victim and 8 survivors) supported the policy that promotes identification with the Rwandan nation to the detriment of ethnic identities. However, while eight non-victims supported this policy and were ready to identify with the Rwandan nation without any conditions, only three survivors were

in the same situation. A single non-victim required conditions to support this policy, while five of the survivors made the same request. A single non-victim had a neutral position in relation to the promotion of the Rwandan identity to the detriment of the ethnic identities, while two survivors were against it because they considered that this policy does not take into account the ethnic groups. In short, non-victims suffered from their negative moral image and national identity can be a solution for these threats. On the other hand, while all survivors supported the promotion of national identity, some of them required conditions that allow them to retain the identity of a victim for their positive differentiation, while others, belonging to the former (old) Generation, propose to take into account both national identity and ethnic identity.

## **Discussion**

During the interviews, we realized that the non-victim identity was directly understood as the Hutu identity. When talking about non-victims or people who were not persecuted but were in Rwanda, the non-victims responded directly by saying "*I understand you want to talk about the Hutus*". Regarding the survivors, the results revealed that the term survivor did not refer to the Tutsi identity for them but rather to the status of victim. This may be due to the fact that there are other repatriated Tutsis, victims of the 1959, 1963, 1973 and 1990 massacres that were not in Rwanda during the genocide. Another explanation could be also that some survivors were moderate Hutu.

Overall, most findings of this study are coherent with the need based model of the intergroup reconciliation approach (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). This model postulates that the victims and perpetrators have different threats related to their social identity after the conflict. The victims face threats related to their agency loosed during the conflict and for the perpetrators, their threats are related to a moral subgroup image tarnished by their group's perpetration of violence. The victims and the perpetrators are motivated to remove these threats and to restore agency and the positive moral image, respectively.

In that line, our results show that most non-victims (member of perpetrator group) suffer from the negative moral image in relation to their identity of non-victim, which is directly associated with the ethnic Hutu identity. The way in which most survivors experience their identity as survivors is linked to their history of victimization rather than their ethnic identity, and the suffering experienced during the genocide and the resulting vulnerability. Some of them mention their evolution from vulnerability to self-esteem and from the devalued status that they had before and during the genocide towards the current valued status. This evolution is due to the assistance from the Funds for Assistance to Genocide Survivors.

Concerning positioning their attitudes related to the policy of promoting national identity to the detriment of ethnic identities, the results show that all participants liked and

were proud to be Rwandese and supported the policy of promoting national identity to the detriment of ethnic identities. Some motivations that underlie positioning of members of different groups were in line with the need based model of intergroup reconciliation (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008).

The majority of non-victim and some survivors participants supported the policy of promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic groups as a solution for the negative moral image and guilt conferred by the non-victim identity, while most of survivors also support it with some conditions. Half of the survivors were proud to be Rwandan and were in favour of the policy that promotes national identity, but only on condition of maintaining the period of commemoration, maintaining policies that recognize their victimization.

We believe that insisting on the period of commemoration which recognizes the victimization of survivors permits survivors to maintain their victim status and allowing them to satisfy their needs for positive differentiation. It should also be pointed out that, according to an official of the National Commission for the Fight against Genocide (CNLG), there have been many changes and evolution in the politics of commemoration that may be of concern to the survivors. A further study needs to be carried out to explore the reasons behind for the choice of maintaining the commemoration for some survivors.

The survivors mentioned above wanted to maintain their victim status through the commemoration period. On the other hand, middle-aged survivors, like the widows of the genocide, supported this policy but suggested also recognition of their identity as victim as well as the Tutsi identity. For these people, minimizing or ignoring the Tutsi identity meant denying their victim status because they saw them as intricately linked. They were persecuted and members of their families were killed because they were Tutsi. These middle-aged survivors recommended a model of dual identity that recognize and respect subgroup identities, while promoting a strong identification with the inclusive group at the same time (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000a; Kessler & Mummendey, 2001). It should be remembered also that compatibility between subordinate and superordinate identity is observed among the members of disadvantaged groups (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2007; Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson & Casas, 2007; Verkuyten, 2006, Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008).

Survivors of the older generation cared more about ethnicities than younger generations. They knew the whole history of ethnic groups and had experienced this directly. It was not easy for them to detach themselves from these ethnic groups. Young people were just concerned about their identity as a victim, while the older ones wanted to protect both the ethnic identity and the identity of the victim. This difference has been observed also in a study conducted in Lebanon by Licata and colleagues (Licata, Klein, Saade, Azzi, & Branscombe, 2012). The results of this study showed that identification

with Lebanon had a positive effect on intergroup attitudes of young Christian Maronite participants toward Muslims after the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), whereas identification with their religious group had the opposite effect.

Other reasons which were not in accordance with Need Based Model were also given by some participants. Two survivors, for whom national identity posed no threat, fully supported the policy of promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic identity. One argued that he supports this policy because he has confidence in his government. For the other, his reason was his compassion for the suffering of innocent young Hutus, linked to their ethnic identity. Indeed, this study has shown that it is possible for a victim to sympathize with the suffering of a member of the perpetrator group who has not been involved in the perpetration of the atrocities. Unlike victimization as a barrier to reconciliation (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008, Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998, Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003), compassion for the suffering of out-groupmembers can promote reconciliation and reducing competition in victimization (Noor *et al.*, 2008).

We think that this kind of compassion for the genocide survivors who empathized with the suffering of younger members of perpetrator group who were not implicated in genocide are not common in post genocide context, and can play a big role in reconciliation. According to the need based model (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008), this empathy or compassion can be considered and perceived as a manner of acceptance by the victim (e.g., forgiveness, understanding of perpetrator's perspective), which can remove the negative moral image among members of perpetrator group and increase willingness to reconcile.

Staub (2003, 2005) has developed a new concept "altruism born of suffering" to explain how individuals victims of physical and sexual abuse, persecution, violence rather than become vengeful, hostile against other can dedicated themselves in helping others. Staub (2003) argue that that in the case of collective violence, caused with human agency and intention like in genocide, an important manifestation of altruism born of suffering can have a signification implication in preventing a large-scale cycles of revenge. However, Vollhardt (2009) precise that even if altruism born of suffering has a positive impact on important on the interpersonal and societal level, collective helping and helping of out-group members is less common. Subsequent studies on the pro-social behavior toward their perpetrators, after experiencing a collectively suffering caused with human intention like genocide and its influence in the reconciliation process must be carried out.

Indeed, some participants support this policy because the ethnic groups are artificial. The Hutus and the Tutsis are the same and the physical differences between them do not exist. One of the survivors mentioned that he was in agreement with the promotion of national identity, that people should identify themselves as Rwandans and not as Hutus and Tutsi, as was the case during the pre-colonial period. These different points of view correspond exactly to the official version according to which the distinction

between Hutus and Tutsis is only artificial (Moss & Vollhardt, 2015) and which regards the pre-colonial period as a period of harmonious relationships during which unity reigned (Bilali, 2014). The myth of Gihanga, which serves as a basis for the policy of promoting national identity at the expense of ethnic group identities, is included in the courses given in the Ingando solidarity camps (reeducation camps for former guerilla soldiers, prisoners (Straus & Waldorf, 2011), students (Ndushabandi, 2013).

The results also indicate that non-victims with mixed identities may feel a threat to their prototypicality as group members. For this kind of non-victim, national identity can be a solution to escape these different threats. Members of both groups (survivor and non-victim) may experience threats of exclusion or rejection from members of their in-group because they are not the prototype of the group. In other words, they do not embody the stereotypes attributed to the whole group, nor the group's most abstract ideal (Turner *et al.*, 1987). In general, those excluded from the group are people who are far from the norm. They may differ from others on the basis of age, ethnicity, skin colour, religion, etc. (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).

We can also add that two non-victims identified with the Rwandan nation, but for them, promoting national identity at the detriment of ethnic group identity was not the solution for threats to group identity. They advocated for other solutions; one of them proposed the distinction between the perpetrator and the members of Hutu group who are innocent after Gacaca court. Another one choose to privilege personal identity to the detriment of social identity, since the social identity gave them a negative moral image while they were innocent (Branscombe *et al.*, 1993). We believe that the use of the narrative history of non-victim Heroic Helpers called « indakemwa » can be a solution for those non-victims suffer from homogenization.

## Conclusion

Our study has shown that members of victim and perpetrator groups have different needs after violent intergroup conflicts. Globally, our results suggest that the policies of strengthening national identification at the detriment of ethnic group identity, endorsed by the Rwandese government after the 1994 genocide, is fully supported by the most of non-victim participants. This policy is a solution for the negative moral image faced by non-victims. For the survivors, they support this policy but have to be ensured that other policies that recognize their victimization such as commemoration will be maintained.

However, the results of this study also show that some programs or policies put in place by the Rwandan government in post-genocide management play an important role in the process of identification, intergroup perception and the determination of intergroup attitudes. These programs are the Gacaca Courts and the Funds for Assistance to Genocide Survivors. The end of the Gacaca jurisdictions would allow, according to some non-victims, a clear distinction between innocent and perpetrating non-victims.

Thus, this distinction would eliminate the shame and collective guilt of non-victims. In addition, our study has shown that some intra-categorical differences, such as age or mixed identity, play an important role in positioning in relation to subordinate and super-ordinate identity. Future studies should place more emphasis on this.

A small number of participants suggested a dual identity model, but one of them expressed a concern about the use of these ethnic identities. This model has been suggested to be better than the common in-group identity model, which doesn't consider the ethnic distinction (Dovidio, Gaertner & Saguy, 2007, Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson & Casas, 2007; Verkuyten, 2006; Saguy, Dovidio & Pratto, 2008). However, each model must take in account the historical social context (Kanazayire *et al.*, 2014) and post conflict transitional processes. In Rwanda post genocide context, due to the excesses associated with ethnicity, and security need it is not yet appropriate to use dual identity process. The fear that identities can be mobilized for violence is persistent, as mentioned by one non-victim participant and Moss & Vollhardt (2015). As long as the policies which recognize the victimization of the survivors of genocide against Tutsi are maintained, the policies of strengthening national identification, whilst also minimizing ethnic identities, endorsed by the Rwandese government after the 1994 genocide, might be the one efficient in promoting intergroup reconciliation.

### **Limitations and Future Research**

We can't pretend to generalize the findings given a size of our sample but this study allows us to understand the deeper the resultants from our quantitative research titled Does identification with Rwanda increase reconciliation sentiment between genocide survivors and non-victims? The mediating role of perceived intergroup similarity and self-esteem during commemoration against Tutsis.

The findings from the present study suggest several future research directions; same research could be done with a larger sample which can consider intra-categorical difference.

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