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# TURKEY: Youth empowerment through governmental initiatives

Murad DUZCU

**Abstract:** The inception of AK Parti government's initiative to terminate the Kurdish issue in 2009 has paved the way to finding a political solution to one of the most intricate questions of modern Turkey. The political initiatives of the incumbent government not only ended the 40-years-long violence and related terrorism cycle for a short period of time but also promoted a heightened awareness of peace and reconciliation efforts. In regards to the role that they have played during the implementation of recent peace process (2009-2015), Kurdish youth has been frontline proxies of violence instigation. That said, Kurdish youth in Turkey have faced the implications of the conflict since early childhood. Struggling to survive amidst violent occurrences is a part of their daily routine as a result of structural deficiencies and proximate causes of participation in violence. Therefore, this article analyses existing youth peacebuilding initiatives for Kurdish youth in conflict-affected areas of the country. Similarly, it also intended to explore whether these initiatives respond to the roots causes of the conflict.

**Keywords:** Youth radicalization; Peacebuilding interventions; Kurdish Issue; peace processes.

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## Introduction

From July 2009 onwards, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, abbreviated to AK Parti in Turkish) government embarked on a new Kurdish policy, a political settlement, and reconciliation process for the permanent resolution of the Kurdish issue. The policy change provided the impetus for the resolution of a four-decades-long conflict. Moreover, the government's political initiatives not only managed to make the transition away from

violence cycle in the course of the Solution Process (2009-2015)<sup>1</sup> but also unveiled an interest in peace and reconciliation efforts after facing repetitive violence for a long period of time. Therefore, with the start of political initiatives in July 2009, Turkey's protracted Kurdish issue entered into a new phase since its inception in the late-1970s. In this phase of the conflict, the political initiatives to end the conflict marked the beginning of an era of efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue in contrast to long-held security-oriented approaches. The process, however, faced internal and external pressures in that the progression unfolded a spiral movement from violence to resilience, which repeated over time as the country went through successive war-to-peace transition moments. The governmental initiatives involved careful political considerations of the implementation of the process, legal amendments to resolve conflicting issues, and some public relations campaigns to raise awareness about the Solution Process. Turkey's quest for peace; however, was discontinued when a relapse into violence disrupted the ongoing political process in June-July 2015.

In consideration of these developments, relevant peacebuilding actors were at a crossroads where existing policies, programs to shape youth functioning and young people's potential peacebuilding roles in post-conflict situations meet. A conflict-sensitive agenda for relevant peacebuilding actors in this regard must incorporate all available resources into young people's vast energy to engage them in several peace projects. For that reason, in order to promote and maintain peace and contribute to reconciliation in Turkey, peacebuilding efforts must have an understanding of youth-related issues in conflict-affected areas. Such efforts must consider and invest in the design and development of policy frameworks with broader peacebuilding and reconciliation objectives as a necessary first step.

### **1. The youth and violence nexus**

The negative/positive role of young people during and in the aftermath of peace processes has become central to peace and conflict research and the interest on youth roles in such crisis times often stems from the risk factors and contradictions associated with war-to-peace transitions and in post-conflict situations. Hence three major themes have been identified in framing the place of young people in conflict and post-conflict situations: victims, threats (or perpetrators), and peace-makers. These post-conflict roles expand to a debate in peace and conflict research. Specifically, authors such as Graça Machel (1996; 2001) have long paid attention to young people as victims of war and this has led to an advocacy or rights-based approach with regards to young people's

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1 The 'Solution Process' is used throughout the article as an umbrella concept to cover all of the initiatives of the Ak Party government in the 2009-2015 period, despite different uses of the specific initiatives and titles attributed to these political efforts such as democratic or Kurdish opening, the peace process, Solution Process etc.

engagement in post-conflict situations, particularly young persons who are at the early adolescence stage (less than 18 years of age). That is, young people's rights in conflict and post-conflict situations are considered as a human security issue, which needs to be regulated and protected by legal norms and conventions, as in the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) of 1989 (see Kemper, 2005).

Following this, recent studies have characterized young people as independent actors in addition to the early portrayal of young persons as victims of war and in its aftermath. However, the term independent actors suggest a positive meaning if young persons are engaged meaningfully, on the one hand, and a negative one if they are frustrated and disillusioned, on the other. In other words, academic studies of youth emphasize that conflict-affected young people may assume roles as agents of peace (peacemakers) or as instigators of violence (perpetrators) (see McEvoy-Levy, 2006).

A relapse into violence can derail peace negotiations and lead to a collapse in conflict settlement efforts (see Darby, 2001). This conception in post-conflict situations necessitates an imperative focus on the roles of young people as they occupy a central position in the relapse into violence. In such post-conflict predicaments, young people are perceived as an important factor in the generation and perpetuation of violence, particularly in opposition to ongoing peace negotiations and against the implementation of peace agreements. The negative role, which young people can play has been the subject of several UN resolutions and is part of its conflict prevention agenda. The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, for instance, referred to how a "surging youth population" faced by a multitude of factors such as unemployment and urbanization can lead to violence or a relapse into conflict (UN, 2004). UN missions to West Africa have similarly reported the link between unresolved socio-economic situations and young people as potential risks to sustainability and security (UN, 2004). The 2001 UN Secretary-General's report on armed conflict stated that young people with limited education and few employment opportunities often provide fertile recruiting ground for parties to a conflict. Their lack of hope for the future can fuel disaffection with society and make them susceptible to the blandishments of those who advocate armed conflict. This problem can be especially acute in countries that have a 'youth bulge', a population comprised of a large number of youth compared to other age groups ... Addressing the needs and aspirations of adolescence is, therefore, an important aspect of a long-term prevention strategy. In addition, youth can also be an important resource for peace and conflict prevention (UNSC, 2001, p. 124).

Similarly, large youth cohorts in society are also perceived as a security threat in many developing and post-conflict countries, which are often argued by the proponents of the youth-bulge theory (see Hendrixson, 2003; Huntington, 1996; Kaplan, 1996; Urdal, 2004). With its origins in the early works of Heinsohn (2003), Fuller and Pitts (1990) and Goldstone (1991), a 'youth bulge' is defined as "extraordinarily large youth co-

horts relative to the adult population” (Urdal, 2004, p. 1). In this stream of research, proponents of the theory conceptualize young people as a demographic threat against social well-being and a society’s normal functioning. Similarly, a precursor of the debate about young people as a demographic threat in the 1990s was Samuel P. Huntington (1996), who defined 20% or more young people (between 15-24 years of age) in the population composition of a country as a sign of vulnerability to violence. In *Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington (1996) opposed that youth demographics play a crucial role in the instigation of violence, focusing particularly on the Muslim world and on radicalization trends, stating that: “...but the key factor is the demographic factor. Generally speaking, the people who go out and kill other people are males between the ages of 16 and 30. During the 1960s, 70s and 80s there were high birth rates in the Muslim world, and this has given rise to a huge youth bulge” (interview with S. P. Huntington in Steinberger, 2001). Likewise, Robert D. Kaplan described youth cohorts in West Africa as “out of school, unemployed, loose molecules” (1996, p. 16). Finally, Hendrixson (2003) referred to dissatisfied and angry young males in most underdeveloped and developing countries (such as those in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East) as a deviant population and an uncontrolled demographic force in society.

Notwithstanding the alarmist language in the portrayal of young people in the 1990s, recent academic studies in this stream have found that the presence of youth-bulges in (economically and politically) distressed societies correlates with the instigation of violence. Hendrik Urdal (2004) pointed to “intermediary political regimes and negative or stagnant economic growth” in countries such as “Zambia, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Yemen, Niger, Togo, Iran and Jordan” as examples of the causal relationship between a youth-bulge and violence (17). Moreover, Urdal (2004) also suggested a positive link between political change processes (towards democratic governance) and the eruption of violence, particularly in the Arab world where autocratic regimes are able to curb violence despite economic problems and large youth cohorts. A World Bank (2011) report in the aftermath of Arab uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa pointed to a similar notion with anecdotes of popular demands and protests for economic, political and social change as underlying factors in the sudden outbreak and escalation of street violence.

Given that there is a tendency to identify young people as perpetrators of violence or peace spoilers, the contribution of young people to the promotion and maintenance of peace is often disregarded and academic interest in this issue has only developed in the last decade (see McEvoy-Levy, 2013). In contrast to the portrayal of youth as a demographic factor and an agent of violence instigation, recent studies have shown that when they are empowered, young people can contribute to peace and reconciliation efforts. In this context, a stream of research has emerged at the intersection of youth and peacebuilding (see Del Felice & Wisler, 2007; Kemper, 2005; Kurtenbach,

2008; McEvoy-Levy, 2001, 2006, 2011a, 2011b; Özerdem & Podder, 2015; Pruitt, 2008; Schwartz, 2010). Recognizing the positive role that young people can play in peacebuilding, contrary to the previous dispositions, young people refrain or prevent others from involvement in violence and from disturbing the post-conflict order and stability. This fact is evidenced through field research and ethnographic studies on young people's unique experiences of conflict (for instance, see Boyden & DeBerry, 2004; Collins, 2004; Daiute, Beykont, Higson-Smith, & Nucci, 2006; 2006; Hart, 2006; Richards, 1996; Shepler, 2005; Sommers, 2006a).

Even so, the presence of a relatively large youth population, as a unique and important demographic dividend in most conflict-affected societies, is detrimental to conflict prevention and transformation, in general, if inclusive policies are not in place. In this regard, young people's mobilization to armed conflict and their recruitment to violent groups as combatants constitute the first layer of academic research on youth and peacebuilding (see Özerdem & Podder, 2015). The second part is about "resilience, nonviolent coping strategies, care-taking, meaning-making and the social reproduction roles of young people, not just combatants, who are experiencing war" (McEvoy-Levy, 2013, p. 300). In short, the important role of young people in conflict and post-conflict situations is closely linked to the protection of youth and to young people's representation and empowerment in peacebuilding efforts as part of a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy with the aim of encouraging young people to shape lasting peace and to contribute to justice and reconciliation.

In light of the discussion above on the youth and violence nexus, following sections deal with the historical place of youth in Turkey's society, and particularly the negative role of young people during the recent Solution Process.

## **2. Kurdish youth: from 'storm youth' to an uncontrolled cohort**

Historically, the process of politicization and radicalization of Kurdish youth, is premeditated within three periods: "ideological precursors" of organizational structure and political violence in the 1960s-1970s; "human assets" in the irregular fighting within the positions of outlawed groups and terrorist networks since the late-1970s; and "protesters" or "troublemakers" in urban areas since the 2000s and onwards.

The level of political violence in Turkey has increased since the late 1970s at an exponential rate and the Kurdish youth grew into a major human resource for armed groups. In contrast to the rebellions in the Ottoman and early Republican periods, the bearers of the Kurdish politicization in the 1960s-1970s; however, were not the religious or tribal leaders but a new group comprising intellectuals, students, the working class and peasantry. From the 1960-1970s onwards, the role of youth in Kurdish political movement and radicalization of young cohorts is undeniable. This is why, it can be

argued that young people were at the center of political movements and instigation of violence for decades, yet the features of each cohort were not the same.

The cohort who founded the PKK by using terrorism as a means to ends and launching attacks as a primary method involved an educated group in the main universities of Turkey. This cohort can be considered as the first inner circle of the organization. The occurrences of violence since then have predominantly been instigated by this first cohort. In the meantime, this cohort became narrative-builders in society. Their roles in the making of militarized identities in Turkey's southeast have been a noteworthy component of youth involvement in violence in the later phases. In the second period, cohorts from the 1970s to 2000s have been driven by various methods to join in the organization. The substantial effect of these cohorts was to escalate the number of violent events. As a result, the inhabitants in Turkey's southeast have gradually been socialized in violence by the lived experiences of the conflict environment. As Yavuz (2001) stated, most of the young people who joined the organization in this period came from segments affected by the conflict and then by exclusionary dynamics in society i.e. displacement, neoliberal policies, rapid urbanization.

A third period has been marked by a generation growing up in the conflict environment during the 1990s as the frequency of violence reached a peak. Although it is the fact that agents of socio-political movements were mostly urban and university-educated youth in the 1960s-1970s (see Bozarlan, 2008); the majority of assets of armed groups were peasant youths with no or little education in the 1980s-1990s (see Yavuz, 2001). In spite of the role of an educated cohort during the period of the PKK's appearance, a new generation of teenagers became the potential human assets of the PKK in the 1990s (Bozarlan, 2008). Population displacement and migration from rural to urban areas were the two major reasons for a generation to emerge with inadequate education and low prospects for economic opportunities in the suburbs of major cities, not only in western Turkey but also in the south-eastern provinces. Furthermore, the youth were socialized in violence due to the large number of violent occurrences and through the experiences and memoirs of earlier generations in the 1980s-1990s period. This new cohort has often been called 'storm youth' by Kurdish politicians, composed of angry and frustrated youth groups. This term was invented in the Kurdish body politic to mirror the legacy of conflict on the new generations. In this sense, Kurdish politicians like Şerafettin Elçi, for instance, argued that the current cohort may be the last one to have a sort of dialogue with Turkish counterparts to discuss peace and a possible political solution, contending that new generations have been socialized in violence, and also deprived of manners of dialogue and a collective memory with Turkish counterparts in contrast to previous cohorts.

The mobilization of the cohorts in the 2000s and onwards is, therefore, an exceptionally different case from what was typical in the preceding generations. In contrast to

the grievances of early cohorts and the translation of young people's frustrations into ideological pretexts for mobilization by conflict entrepreneurs (see Tezcür, 2015; Yavuz, 2001) as a result of, for instance, structural inequality or discrimination, past policies and political alienation; proximate factors, such as trigger events (Öcalan's prison conditions and health after his imprisonment in 1999) and external political developments (the Syrian conflict) have started to turn into principal causes of mobilization for political violence in the 2000s.

In sum, a relationship between the instigation of violence and young people was established in the face of youth-led political and anti-social violence in this consecutive periods. This situation has alarmed the public authorities to explore the measures to mitigate conditions that increase young people's proclivity to violence. Various laws and regulations have been passed to confront issues related to youth and children affected by rising violence. The legal documents and proceedings introduced a violence-prone segment of young people to the public as 'stone-throwing children' - (*taş atan çocuklar*) or 'youth drifted to an offense' - (*suça itilen gençler*). This language inaugurated a conceptualization of Kurdish youngsters in society that has frequently been used in official vocabulary, legislative acts, juridical cases, and in youth-and-children-focused rehabilitation and also social integration programs. Likewise, local branches of the state in Turkey's southeast have concentrated on youth-related issues, initiating programs for the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the General Directorate of Police, local governments, and the Southeast Anatolia Development Project (*Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi*) administration. Therefore, it can be argued that the role of young people in the instigation of violence was a totally new situation and became a social problem due to the involvement of a young cohort (1990s-2000s birth) affected by the prolonged conflict environment in Turkey's southeast.

The exclusion of young people from peace processes can yield adverse outcomes. McEvoy-Levy (2001), for instance, argues that alienation of youth from the peace process in South Africa produced negative outcomes as critical roles attached to young people in the fighting stage had been denied during and after the peace initiatives. These developments slowly forced South African youth into criminal activities (ibid). As the political environment in Turkey is often interrupted with the onset of unexpected developments and crises, the presence of a discontented cohort poses similar risks for the continuation of peace efforts. Young people can exploit or endure the execution of pro-solution political activity as substantiated in countless post-conflict settings and peacebuilding practices. In the context of the Kurdish issue, however, young people's role as part of political developments has mostly been negative since 2009. Moreover, youth perceptions of the Solution Process, with reference to their negative role tended to be in conflict with pro-peace politicians' views with regards to the Solution Process. In such a complex political environment, young people have been converted into spoilers of peace in the end, often depicted as an "uncontrolled generation".

#### **4. Youth interventions in Turkey's southeast**

This part of the article presents the findings of a fieldwork undertaken in Turkey's southeast in order to evaluate peacebuilding activities for young people and respond to the problems associated with Kurdish youth as discussed in the previous section. Therefore, the following parts of the article provide an evidence-based assessment of key themes that occurred as part of conflict prevention practices in Turkey's southeast, i.e., vocational training opportunities, educational opportunities, empowerment by field visits, youth camps, sports, and festivals, and youth advisors in psychosocial programming, basic skills training.

##### ***4.1. State ownership in peacebuilding for conflict-affected youth***

A fundamental responsibility in the socio-economic integration of youth in the conflict-affected areas of Turkey rests on the implementation of programs by state institutions and through governmental funding. The central government in Ankara, and state-led units and agencies, and their provincial administrative organizations are used to be the major players in youth interventions. The major players in the field of youth-related issues are the Directorate for Youth and Sports (GDYS), Ministry of National Education (MoNE), Social Services and Child Protection Agency (SHÇEK) and the Turkish National Agency for the Youth in Action Program. Also, local governments (municipalities) and the Southeast Anatolia Project Regional Development Agency (GAP) take part in youth-related activities and projects (UNDP, 2008: 114), especially to deal with the socio-economic costs of the Kurdish issue. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Internal Affairs also have active youth dimensions within their institutional structures (Göksel, 2007, p. 21). State-led initiatives and funding schemes, such as the SODES (Social Support) program, provide funding for youth-oriented projects. The recipients of such funds are from both governmental and non-governmental sectors: governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations, or directly involved in youth activities.

For Kurdish youth, the most successful programmatic measures aimed at coping with the implications of the conflict are vocational training, educational programs, psychological counseling, youth empowerment efforts and social support programs for basic skills training. State institutions and CSOs often implement these strategies throughout Turkey's southeast in order to prevent youth participation in violence. In the meantime, cross-community interactions in the form of youth empowerment efforts have emerged as part of programmatic responses, which aim to engage Kurdish young people and improve their social integration.

To these ends, one of the major undertakings is the SODES program. Following the inception of PKK activities in Turkey's southeast, the SODES commenced in 2008, with the aim of ensuring the social and economic integration of the most disadvantaged

sectors of society, including youth, children and women (SODES, 2013). As a state-sponsored social support program, SODES is primarily composed of a funding scheme for both public and civil society actors directed towards social inclusion initiatives, and targeting vulnerable sectors through interventions that are aimed at increasing the chances of employability and integrating such vulnerable groups into society via capacity building activities. In this regard, central and local governmental units, such as governorships perform significant functions in implementing the projects as part of the SODES program.

Despite the fact that the program was initiated for beneficiaries such as public institutions and CSOs in the southeastern provinces, the extent and scope of the projects covered by the SODES program incorporated other less-developed provinces of Turkey, including provinces in the eastern region of Turkey (the total number of provinces in the program reached a total of 25 in 2010) (SODES, 2013, p. 3).

Due to the perceived role of young people in conflict settings, the 'youth problem' seemed to attract the attention of state institutions. As a result, several youth centers have been established by the governorships, the Youth and Sports Ministry and the GAP administration. As a youth worker pointed out, recent governmental investments to expand the scope of youth work in the region encouraged the opening of new youth centers, particularly after the establishment of the Youth and Sports Ministry. For instance, the number of Ministry-led youth centers increased from 1 to 4 in the city of Diyarbakır throughout the last decade. This has also increased the number of beneficiaries and the type of activities in such facilities.

#### ***4.2. Vocational training opportunities***

The rise of the unemployment rate, which devastated the economic infrastructure in Turkey's southeast can be seen as one of the costs of the 40-year armed struggle. Acknowledging the economic aspects of the Kurdish issue, therefore, various governments since the 1990s have adopted comprehensive economic development programs, mostly as part of the repeated GAP action plans that involve preventive measures (effective employability policies, vocational training courses, and employment coaching and re-designing vocational schools) in order to assist the economic development of the region. In this sense, it is observed that many actors such as the Ministry of Development, governorships, regional development agencies, the GAP Administration, and İŞKUR (Labor Placement Office) assume key responsibilities when it comes to accomplishing declared broad development objectives. On the economic inclusion of Kurdish youth, for instance, SODES-funded projects appear as one of the most efficient youth initiatives. To exemplify the extent of the program, under the employment action of the SODES funding scheme, 6792 participants have been assigned a job between the years 2008 and 2011 (excluding employment at public institutions) (SODES, 2013, p. 45). During

the field research in Turkey, participants often referred to the role of SODES-funded programs in the economic empowerment interventions. Therefore, several interviews with key experts in the head offices and training centers of state and CSOs have been conducted in order to shed light on the efficacy of their programs. To demonstrate the role of several actors in economic empowerment activities, it is observed that CSOs frequently consulted with the İŞKUR and local employers at the design and implementation stages of the activities to meet the requirements and pressing needs of the local employers. There is also a division of responsibilities when it comes to engaging different categories of young people. Particularly, regarding the criminalized youth and children, state agencies for the youth services (SHÇEK), and *Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü* (Police Department) undertake fundamental responsibilities. In a project entitled '*Umut Yıldızı*', for instance, the contribution of the police force in Diyarbakır to the employment of youngsters, who have been convicted of drug use, could be described as exemplifying the active participation of the Police Department in the social integration of young people in the region.

In such activities, the aim is often to train young people in activities to meet the local industry's intermediary positions such as operating computer-based machines, and self-employment jobs such as tailoring, sales assistantship, barbering, and computer programming. Certain matters of concern appeared that are often raised in the interviews with key staff regarding the activities provided for vocational training courses. For instance, it was observed that the employment success of participants after completing vocational training courses appeared to be linked to the type of activities provided and the proficiency levels of the host institutions, as well as the local employment needs and capacities. As one of the interviewees argued, it is very likely for participants to find a job after graduation if they acquired the necessary skills required to satisfy the demands of the local industry. In the meantime, he stated that job prospects are directly connected to the job supply and economic activities in the localities. This latter situation is particularly crucial for Turkey's southeast as the economic opportunities have traditionally been lower, and the economic and commercial activities further affected by violent clashes and sabotages since the inception of PKK activities in the region. Another interviewee alluded to this notion and argued that host institutions' relations with the local industry and their willingness and capacity to supervise participants' job search are also as important as the domestic economic conditions in a specific location. For instance, he mentioned that they not only try to predict the local industrial trends and needs before starting a vocational training course, but also directly get involved in the arrangements for a job interview and placement with potential employers.

A crucial aspect of current youth activities is that local police forces play a positive role when it comes to assisting the CSOs in selecting participants among marginalized and disadvantaged groups. This includes particularly young people who have been involved in violent and criminal activities and ex-PKK members who have benefited from the

repentance law. According to the interviewees, CSOs frequently collaborate with police forces, both to involve particular types of participants, as well as to secure the spaces from various security breaches due to participant profiles. Such special arrangements are in place for a limited number of activities as most of the economic empowerment activities administered by public and civil society actors rely on open calls for admission processes, reaching all sectors of society.

The physical environment in the vocational training courses could also be perceived as a factor that contributes to the skills acquisition process positively or negatively. With that said, the places visited in this study demonstrated that some spaces were inadequate regarding the number and skills of the staff, and the availability of material resources. There were also institutions equipped with high-quality machinery identical to the ones used in industrial facilities. Regarding the use of such spaces by the participants, however, one of the interviewees mentioned that they frequently face instances of misuse and pocketing the amenities in their centers. She argued that the instructional materials, especially drillers and supplies that could be used for an offence and drug abuse, have frequently been stolen when they commence the courses for the youth who have once been sentenced and released for certain crimes and anti-social violence. She further argued that a certain number of CSOs and public institutions, therefore, have intentionally been prevented from initiating activities for such youth groups.

Another issue that emerged during the interviews has been the disparity between the expectations of the participants after completing the training, and the appropriate skills that they have acquired throughout the courses. For instance, one interviewee mentioned that those who gain basic computer skills expect to find jobs as if they were computer engineers. This situation can clearly be seen as a critical dimension of youth frustrations whereby young people who have been alienated from education due to the existence of political conflict and the violent environment, expect to find valued economic positions in society. Most of the participants also argue that intermediary jobs are often discriminated against by the general public, and the vocational courses that are usually aimed at training youth for such posts are undervalued, and sometimes could be counter-productive. It could also be argued that similar problems exist among the educated youth cohorts, particularly after graduation. As higher unemployment or under-employment is one of the most pressing issues of conflict and post-conflict situations, these aspects frequently become the lively topics of several peacebuilding interventions.

#### ***4.3. Educational opportunities and young people's social integration***

State institutions and CSOs, provide educational opportunities for youth and support educational inclusion activities by launching additional educational courses aimed at preparing them to excel within the school system. In this regard, such opportunities

often target high school students, who are pursuing success in the nationwide university entrance exams in order to reserve a place in higher educational institutions. Enhancing educational opportunities for disadvantaged groups, particularly for young people who have traditionally been the most vulnerable sectors of society, such educational courses contribute to the conflict prevention agenda in Turkey's southeastern provinces. As one of the interviewees urged, involving young people in the educational system is a major challenge in many neighborhoods for a variety of reasons. According to him, most parents are not interested in their children's educational advancement, which is partly due to the financial problems, resulting in many deprived families being unable to afford educational expenditures. Considering the prevalence of big families, which are roughly composed of 4-5 school-age children, their educational expenses put a heavy fiscal burden on already very limited budgets. Financial circumstances also compel some families to consider youth and children as part of a workforce required for the family to earn and contribute to the household income. This latter situation is the case in rural areas of Turkey's southeast, where children and youth participate in the family businesses such as farming and livestock production. In the urban centers, however, they often get involved in the informal economy and sometimes forced to participate in illegal business activities.

It can be argued that recent educational investments, as part of the democratization efforts in the predominantly Kurdish populated areas in Turkey, are motivated by a motivation to accelerate the social transformation in order to promote a peaceful environment. There are certain structural issues that thwart the efforts made to generate the intended results. For instance, as one of the civil society leaders argued, the region has long been suffering from insufficient educational infrastructure, i.e. the shortage of qualified manpower and educational facilities. He argued that teachers and staff who are appointed by the central government and who are also from the western regions of Turkey, often pursue the occasion to leave their posts in the southeastern provinces of Turkey. This situation hinders the stability and quality that is required for success in the educational system, which altogether causes frustrations among the local population. It was also mentioned that the language barrier could be a reason for the alienation of youth from education. Since most students learn Turkish language mostly after their enrolment in first grade, their inclusion into the educational system poses a challenge that affects the cognitive learning abilities of pupils. Also language barrier impacts the teacher-student relationship. For instance, one of the interviewees mentioned how their inability to speak Turkish is criticized by the teachers. Moreover, a structural problem such as the prevalence of the use of violence in school influences young people's schooling rates and success. Interestingly, another participant, working as a teacher in one of the schools in Diyarbakır, complained of the fact that teachers could also be exposed to violence coming from mature students and their families.

#### **4.4. Empowering youth with field visits, youth camps, and sports**

Young people's engagement through recreational activities is the most widespread tool used by both public and civil society actors in youth interventions. The methods used in young people's social inclusion should move beyond basic needs such as education or employment. That being said, such initiatives need to be comprised of elements that nourish the relational aspect of socialization, generating a socially inclusive environment, in which individuals find the opportunity to build constructive relations with others. In this sense, addressing the issue of resentment and antipathy towards other members of the in-and-out-groups is one of the building blocks of youth empowerment. Youth empowerment efforts were also mentioned by most of the key experts like the chief mode of activities that exists in the region. In this sense, engaging young people in recreational activities, such as inter-regional field visits, youth camps and festivals, youth actors appear to fulfil peacebuilding roles in order to help young people overcome the difficulties that arise as a result of instances of violence occurring in or near their neighborhoods, as it limits their social development and interactions in the larger society.

It has been observed that cross-community field visits function efficiently with regard to shaping young people's perceptions of the 'self', and 'others' by visiting different parts of the country. It is expected to help reduce long-established stereotypes and prejudices that can be observed in the narratives of violent groups and networks. Participatory dialogue can be considered as a constructive approach in the activities of public and civil society actors, which often involve aims such as changing the perceptions of Kurdish youth by enabling them to visit other geographical regions of Turkey, as well as by helping them to form new relationships with their counterparts in the provinces they visited. These types of activities generate negative results as well, since young people are more likely to compare the prosperity in other regions of the country with their own war-torn, lacking environments. An interviewee from the public sector, for instance, highlighted this fact and said that it could reserve the benefits expected from such activities if the aims are not well explained to the young people. He further suggested that the pre-visit informative training and practices overcome the difficulties that might arise at the end of the youth interventions:

*While our objective is fostering a sense of belonging among young people to the country, young people who visit the places like Antalya or İstanbul, and then return to their homes could ask: 'why are they living in very pleasant cities, and we are living a life of misery?' We should not let them say this. Then, it would not mean anything even if we wanted to do something good. It would turn into a pointless experience for both sides. This is why, we, first, prepare its background before initiating a project. We do not directly ask youngsters to come with us to the excursions, but we clarify them objectives in the courses in advance for*

*about 7-8 months to prepare them for further similar interactions, like organizing sports activities, arranging visits and picnics within the city boundaries.*

It is clear that building trust and eliminating prejudice among youth in both the western and southeastern provinces must be a vital component of existing and future peace-building activities in Turkey. Similar social impacts of youth projects can be observed in the experiences of Turkish young people who have been mobilized for face-to-face interactions with their counterparts in the southeastern provinces. For instance, one of the interviewees working as a project officer in a youth organization in Istanbul referred to their youth project as a 'Peace Bridge', and commented on the experiences of Turkish young people in the region:

*It is quite crucial to listen to people's complaints in its local contexts. And it is not significant to do this in Istanbul but to achieve it in Hakkari. That's a significant activity when young people arrive there and communicate with locals, and thus begin to break their prejudices. For instance, recently one of our volunteers told us that he had lots of prejudices when they went to the city of Van for a school renovation project. He further said, however, "once I had conversations with the people in Van, then I found the chance to realize the extent of shared values and the abundance of common things to talk about". I think this is crucial because if there would be a transformation, and we enter into peace environment, these would happen once the people get to know about each other. It is not wise to do this based on information on the TVs. You should travel there and talk to the people. We also organize the same activities to the west (Turkey).*

Young people's participation in sports activities occupies a significant part of youth centers' activities. The increasing interest in sports activities as a means of empowering young people is one of the strongest ways when it comes to improving social integration of youth in conflict and post-conflict situations. The importance that is given to the relationship between young people and sports as a means of social inclusion can be traced back to the national youth policy in Turkey. As one of the social worker interviewees argued, the state bureaucracy in Turkey has long been equating young people and sports in order to redirect young people's vast energy into an active path, in a way to reveal a point of escape for young people who are affected the most by the implications of the prolonged conflict environment. In fact, the national higher authority for youth affairs in Turkey's capital is called the Youth and Sports Ministry, reflecting the significance of sports and its relationship with youth empowerment. This is why, in most of the youth centers, sports trainers work alongside other instructors and youth workers to engage young people who might be interested and have the capability to do extremely well in one of the sports branches provided in these centers. Among others, martial arts, boxing, and other individual sports activities are usually the most popular branches among the participants. Regarding the relevance of sports activities, most of

the interviewees noted the effectiveness of such activities in preventing young people's participation in violence. That is, sports activities not only enable young people to gain self-confidence but also, excellence in a sports activity leads to economic benefits, social status and prestige. One of the interviewees, a sports trainer in a youth center, for instance, mentioned that:

*Sports activities occupy a large segment of our operations. To give an example, recently, we learned that one of our participants entered the physical education department in Y province. If I may say so, these young people were amongst those who were throwing stones at the police forces, without a future or hope. After we started to work with them for 5-6 years, he became a national sportsman, and in the meantime, now started a job as a physical education teacher.*

The success story of young people from the southeastern provinces who have been competing in national sports events often capture the headlines in the national news, very similar to the example referred to in this above excerpt. As another sports trainer interviewee argued, the sports initiatives are uniquely compatible with the existing socio-economic situation in the region, first, because of the widespread interest in sports activities as a means of providing economic incentives. Second, he stated that sports education in higher institutions requires a physical capability, in contrast to other educational branches, which attract more people from the region. Acknowledging the inadequate educational infrastructure, and conditions that prevent young people from attaining a better educational background, excellence in various branches of sports and its education, apparently, provides a crucial incentive for the youth. In return, the likelihood of their involvement in violence is being reduced significantly.

#### **4.5. The role of youth advisors in psychosocial programming**

One of the most pressing issues regarding youth experiences of political conflicts emerges in the areas of past and on-going traumas, which inhibits young people's meaningful participation in society. It is observed that SHÇEK is a competent actor, especially when it comes to addressing young people's social and psychological needs. Similarly, youth centers function as hubs for young people, enabling them to overcome the implications of their conflict experiences. In recent years, violent incidents instigated by Kurdish youth, along with the on-going peace process in Turkey have heightened the need for the participation of young people with positive roles within society, more than any other period since the 1980s. However, Kurdish youth have frequently faced the implications of the surrounding fragile environment, in which several forms of violence have been nurtured by the cyclical armed clashes in the region, and as a result of traditionally constructed structures. For instance, escaping from domestic violence or violence in the streets or school, it was observed that youth centers often emerge as spaces, which shelter young people from the costs of the nearby fragile environment. As they experi-

ence problems with their parents and peers, youth centers provide the means to cater to their psychosocial needs. A youth worker in one of the youth centers, which is located in Diyarbakır's midtown area, stated that most of the centers in their city had become alternative spaces for them, as they have been isolated/escaped from violence-prone environments. He stated that young people have frequently been exposed to several forms of violence in their neighborhoods, schools, and within families. He further said that in youth initiatives such as study halls, rehabilitation services, and spaces to engage youth via youth advisors, young people are joining an entirely different atmosphere in which there is no alcohol, drugs or violence.

These views were echoed by another informant who was formerly a teacher in Diyarbakır before becoming a youth worker at one of the centers established by the Youth and Sports Ministry. He highlighted the role of advisors and instructors in the centers, helping young people to cope with the dilemmas of their daily interactions. Young people's interactions with advisors appear as part of their regular everyday work. Young people's frustrated upbringings often surface when they are emotionally upset with their parents and siblings, or distressed because of being exposed to physical violence, which befits them to the youth services provided by Diyarbakır's youth centers. As one of the youth workers highlighted: "we are receiving letters from participants stating that, today, I was flattered by the instructor, and they never get angry with us". He further said, "it is often regarded as a naïve thing for ordinary people to encounter this (*being flattered*), but they are apparently deprived of such interactions in their near surroundings". The fact that they are deprived of fundamental emotional needs, and encountering the absence of constructive interactions with peers and parents, these youth centers provide the opportunity for youth to establish meaningful and lasting connections with participants in the centers and youth advisors. Besides the emotional attachment between the youth and advisors, the latter's social profile often set a good example in young people's life choices. For instance, a youth worker, to illustrate both the attachment and role-model functions of advisors, noted that:

*Teacher X has had a student here. His father passed away a year ago. He was not going home. He was spending more time with X than his family. Apparently, he had problems at home and found the compassion and natural affection here. Young people are joining in here, either for material gains or attach themselves with emotional ties, as in this one. Those who are linked to only material benefits often split away and we cannot keep in touch with them further in future. However, once emotional attachments are established the communications usually continue afterwards.*

#### 4.6. Capacity building training

Capacity building training is another key component of programmatic responses to address youth needs in conflict and post-conflict settings. As aforementioned, the scope and extent of program areas often overlap in the course of the implementation stage, which can be seen in the core competencies training activities as well. Emphasis is mostly given to human rights awareness initiatives, as it is the most observed entry point in the activities of civil society. A role can be assigned to the EU-sponsored activities aimed at the dissemination of European values and non-formal education as part of the EU's Mediterranean partnership program. Since the most pressing issue of the prolonged conflict environment in the region, human rights activities feature as one of the most significant peacebuilding intervention. In this regard, increasing young people's awareness of universal human rights values, building the necessary capacities to monitor human rights abuses and advocacy activities appear to occupy a major role in civil society initiatives. To this end, a social activist working in one of the most recognized human rights associations in Şanlıurfa commented that:

*Our work as a civil society organization is aimed at spreading the peace and prosperity ideals for young people through creating a youth consciousness by providing educational activities...This educational work is particularly on social issues; and experts, intellectuals, academicians, legal practitioners are usually invited to deliver seminars to contribute to the development of social consciousness in the society...We have a clear distance to triggering crime and violence, and supporting armed activities. Therefore, we are promoting democratic rights of all, and working towards an environment in which people freely exercise such rights. Our thinking, thus, by adhering to the ideals of human rights, aims at enhancing such practices to all segments of the society.*

As she explains, human rights awareness initiatives frequently dominate the activity agenda of civil society in the region, which was also discerned in the fieldwork visits to the other provinces in the area. In these campaigns and educational activities, young people are often 'objects' of the civil society human rights programs. For instance, the role of youth in these activities is limited to showing up for press releases or demonstrations and attending the public lectures of high profile individuals. Therefore, the perceived functions of civil society, in this sense, do not surpass the utility of a human rights course offered in formal educational settings. In contrast, unconventional methods, such as initiatives involving various features of informal and peer education, and vesting in youth 'agency' in the first place by including them in the knowledge and experience give-and-take processes can be seen as one of the necessary means of observing the actual impact and expected personal changes in relation to youth perceptions of the 'self' and 'others'. It is found that some civil society initiatives address these objectives. For instance, a foundation, which has been established as a network of youth

volunteers, and headquartered in Istanbul, operating through subgroups comprised of mostly university students and organized in almost all of the provinces of Turkey can be seen as one of the most effective practices. To encourage young people to take part as a 'subject' in the awareness campaigns and activities of complicated human rights and social issues, a youth activist, for instance, described young people's participation as both participants and trainers in their interventions:

*What we observe is that they acquire the basic human rights awareness and advocacy skills during 4 years of participation period (this refers to the university education time as most of the participants are initially college students) in the foundation's activities. If they become trainers the impact increases exponentially, so the transformation of their agency. Accordingly, they have the opportunities to visit different locations and receive some skills from the 'training of trainers' activities. If they only participate in the organizational activities, they are still subject to a sort of personal transformation and acquire some skills in the face of mutual interactions. Our efforts to install a "volunteer's consciousness" into youth could become a feasible objective as the participants are now able to internalize an approach to intellectually process the cohabitation of cultural differences at the end of the activities.*

Similarly, he also pointed out the role of peer education as an effective mechanism for knowledge and experience exchange:

*Young people who participate in our activities frequently refer to the peer education as one of the best practices in our foundation's activity pool. In such activities young people find the opportunity to deliver the training to their counterparts. This training includes human rights education, social rights, and reproduction health. Therefore young people as mentors communicate their experiences with other youths... The significance of this type of activities highlights the fact that young people usually listen to their elders, yet the actual learning process occurs among them. It is, in fact, true that we often comprehend the topics better once we are talking to our peers because your role models are indeed the ones by your side. That old typical notion of taking someone as the role model in my life does not exist anymore.*

## **5. Socio-political barriers to conflict prevention in Turkey's southeast**

There are a number of conflict prevention interventions examined, which are quite successful in responding to the socio-economic implications of the prolonged conflict in Turkey's southeast. Social support projects as part of the SODES program, for instance, can be seen as one of the broadest funding schemes in comparison to conflict response programs elsewhere. Governmental partnership with the CSOs, in this sense, stimulates promising social integration outcomes. Building the educational infrastructure of

deprived areas of Turkey's southeast after the inauguration of democratization efforts can be seen as investments, which address the ignored educational consequences of the conflict. Recent improvements in educational infrastructure go beyond the governmental and private investments in comparison to the entire Republican era since the 1920s.

However, jobs for marginalized young cohorts, participation in sports activities, or a university degree might not be a solution or alternative for some young people's social inclusion or non-involvement in violence. This is partly an outcome of ethnic and political conflicts, which are often a function of the root causes that are further than acute economic or social problems. Therefore, it can be argued that peacebuilding as a strategy to disclose and help to overcome the root causes of conflicts, entails peacebuilders not only to reserve resources in reviving the socio-economic structures but also to change the relationships and transform the agency of conflict-affected individuals. This strategy can be one of the ways to solve political conflicts where individuals are ideologically indoctrinated and mobilized by ethnic, irredentist or nationalist ideas.

### ***5.1. Ideological challenges in peacebuilding work***

Despite economic and social problems associated with the conflict in Turkey's southeast that has lasted for over 30 years, qualitative data obtained from the field research accumulated diverse views and conclusions regarding the role of factors in young people's social inclusion. Some key experts and state employees have paid more attention to the socio-economic inequalities and inadequate education opportunities as the major indicators of young people's participation in violence. These informants have stated that youth empowerment through socio-economic measures are an efficient tool when it comes to integrating a conflict-affected population into society. They reiterated the fact that socio-economic issues have long been known as the inherent characteristics of Turkey's southeastern provinces that need to be addressed as part of peacebuilding initiatives and to find a permanent political solution to the Kurdish issue. From their perspective, a causal relationship exists between socio-economic backwardness and the Kurdish issue. Therefore, drawing attention to the impact of socio-economic backwardness on the inception and escalation of the conflict in Turkey is also a way of dealing with youth needs and concerns. This relationship is evident in the profile of the recruits of extremist and terrorist armed groups, indicating that most of the members of such groups are unemployed and uneducated young people at the beginning of individual recruitment processes. Providing socio-economic opportunities for them, the role of state-affiliated institutions is expected to reduce the prospects of youth involvement in violence as long as they are empowered with skills and tools to become a valued member of society, and therefore helping to break the vicious cycle of recruiting new members to violent armed groups.

Socio-economic conditions, however, seem to indicate less significance compared to or without considering other significant root causes or factors of the conflict. In particular,

ethnic identity salience, acquisition of cultural rights, such as education in the native language, appears as the most significant conflicting issues. Despite the fact that the majority of recruits are unemployed or uneducated, university graduates and economically stable persons also participate in violence. This is an attribute of recruitment processes in ideological and ethnic groups. To this end, the prevailing narrative used by violent groups about politicization has been the role of traditional socio-economic structures in exploitation of rural population.

Therefore, the socio-economic integration of young people is interpreted by violent groups as an influencing behavior of others for their own purposes, which causes young people to leave their fanatical ideological views. Socio-economic opportunities provided by the state institutions, for instance, are being interpreted as a part of the political agenda to eliminate the influence of such ideological pretexts in young people's decision to participate in violence. The state's socio-economic projects in these provinces are, then, is disputed. These facts are evidenced in the offensive actions of the PKK that regularly aim to disrupt the economic infrastructure and interrupt the educational system. While young people are the most important actors in these types of actions, such activities also show the logic that how socio-economic issues are being construed by violent groups.

The categorical affinity between the views and actions of young people and the narratives of violent groups highlights the role of ideological indoctrination and politicization of youth grievances to shape the 'agency' and 'positions' of youth in the society, which frequently limits the efficacy of socio-economic integration interventions. In this sense, interventions that improve socio-economic opportunities are not valued to impede youth participation in violence. Thus disregarding ideological and ethnic aspects, peacebuilding interventions are inefficient tools in conflict prevention. Likewise, interventions that aim to improve socio-economic opportunities are sometimes directed at the wrong audiences, as these activities usually target young people who are not ideologically inclined to the ideology as claimed by the violent groups. Besides, even when vulnerable youth clusters are engaged in peacebuilding initiatives, they frequently face ideological indoctrination at some point in their lives, especially during higher education years.

## ***5.2. The selectivity of youth practices and impenetrable youth spaces***

The presence of several youth categories in Turkey's southeast; peacebuilders usually seek different socialization means for each youth group. In most of the cases, actors, spaces and perspectives linked to the youth activities are highly selective about participants and the scope and extent of activities supplied for them. In other words, it may be impossible to set up a forum for young people from different backgrounds for a training course, unless members of each sub-group are fully satisfied with the aims and profiles of peacebuilding actors. These assumptions have partly been derived from

the field observations and informed by the interviews with key experts by analyzing responses to issues seeking to describe beneficiaries from youth activities, and enrolments into such programs. For instance, in one of the interviews, it has been explicitly mentioned that certain categories of youth have been excluded from the activities, such as criminalized youth. Moreover, some young people purposely select activities in line with personal preferences of ideology, family or religious affiliation. Therefore, it can be argued that young people in Turkey's southeast are a highly fragmented social group in observation of the characteristics, and spaces they do attend regularly. However, youth categories are not composed of mutually exclusive groups of young people since one individual may participate in more than one activity or group, and/or switch into another category at a particular moment of their lives.

### ***5.3. The actor/implementation problem***

In contrast to the conflict situations in different places, international programs for young people are mostly superseded by national schemes in Turkey. A possible explanation for this might be that unlike instances of conflicts elsewhere, the Kurdish issue has been a conflict that emerged between the state, and an outlawed group, which has used terrorism as the modus operandi to realize its political objectives. Therefore, the Kurdish issue has been viewed through a security lens, and countering violence has become a primary goal, that constrained discussions regarding the Kurdish issue into the national boundaries and has attracted national intellectual and material resources. Also, in most conflict situations, state authority is weakened by the repercussions of the armed conflict; therefore, the resources for post-conflict reconstruction activities have already been lacking. International funds aim to revive such 'failed states', instead of allocating resources to states with already functioning administrative apparatuses.

With regards to state-led youth initiatives, however, they are externally planned and rarely reflect local contexts and priorities. Personal biases are often on the grounds of family disapproval to participate in such activities. Economic and political measures that are formed to assist post-conflict reconstruction strategies are typically confined to externally driven goals, such as promoting liberal economic systems and developing more democratic societies. However, this approach consistently neglects local perspectives and overlooks inconceivable issues, such as culture and identity, inherent conflicting relationships and conflict traumas that are considered as the root causes of conflict. Therefore, addressing sensitive issues for one of the most vulnerable segments of the conflict societies, youth policies and programs should suggest solutions by reflecting on several dimensions of the conflicts and produce multi-faceted approaches in a way to think about young people's needs and concerns. This includes changes/transformations in established structures, antagonistic relationships and biased perceptions, which consistently reproduce conflict drivers. These approaches, in return, require an in-depth investigation of issues surrounding young people but most importantly, necessitate

familiarity with the local circumstances and indigenous methods for peacebuilding activities that are often embedded within the existing social structures and relationships.

#### **5.4. Youth profiles in selected peacebuilding work**

The peacebuilding initiatives partially address the needs and concerns of conflict-affected young Kurds and fail to reach the most serious categories of Kurdish youth. In contrast to the conflict experiences away, economic and educational opportunities may not provide the necessary tools to socially integrate conflict-affected youth, although these factors, as evidenced in many other conflict settings, are also among the major issues of concern in Turkey's southeast. Therefore, a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy, entailing context-specific measures that recognize young people's perspectives of the conflict, and similarly incorporating local concerns into existing youth activities, necessitates reflecting on peacebuilding initiatives in different conflict settings and learning from the lessons drawn from different youth-oriented peacebuilding initiatives.

Certain disadvantages in youth initiatives often limit the capacity and impact of youth-oriented activities, despite good practices and success stories. State-led efforts were initially intended to engage several categories of young people in the operational precincts. As one of the youth workers put it, the 'selection of participants are not on the grounds of political preferences', and they accept 'young people as long as the capacity of centers allows receiving further participants'. However, amongst the youth who participated in two different interviews conducted in the *Sanlıurfa* and Diyarbakır provinces, two divergent discourses emerged. Firstly, a considerable number of participants mentioned that family disapproval against these types of activities on the grounds of mixed-gender activities and other religious factors inhibit their participation in such youth activities. Secondly, some participants were biased against state-led activities, due to their ideological/political backgrounds. Together these observations provided insights into the personal and familial preferences of the local people regarding youth participation in particular types of activities and gave hints about the sustainability of peacebuilding activities in Turkey's southeastern provinces. Considering the predominant traditional and religious aspects of local culture, and discriminatory personal preferences, such evidence represents one of the crucial factors that need further reflection when designing and implementing peacebuilding activities for conflict-affected youth.

While the peacebuilding interventions initiated by several actors have targeted conflict-affected youth, because of their interest in the activities in line with proximate ideological/religious associations, they split youth into various ideological/religious groupings. In these groups, peers or mentors deliberately spread ideas to help form young people's minds along with the youth-oriented activities or programs. The diversity of actors and programs in peacebuilding work is a sign of effort by adopting strategies addressing very specific youth needs and challenges, as long as they are in line with the peace pro-

cess in Turkey. However, considering the sharp split in ideological/religious lines, the competitive edge for recruiting youth into the affiliated youth groups, and incompatible perceptions of each other inhibits the peacebuilding strategies towards building trust and reconciliation in the region, and in particular among conflict-affected sectors of the society. A plan to establish peace structures that lay a new framework for cross-group visits to alleviate collaboration, and to relieve the tensions among these groups are an effective means of overcoming the issues of multiple actors in peacebuilding activities.

## **6. Lessons learned and recommendations**

Political and administrative institutions in Turkey's southeast need to take into consideration of the role of institutional deficiencies regarding a nationwide youth policy as the first dimension of post-conflict reconstruction efforts in addressing the concerns of young people to enable them to practice peacebuilding roles in a conflict-free society. Second, it is frequently argued that the undesirable implications of the conflict have long been felt in big cities after the forced migration of the conflict-affected Kurds to urban centers in Turkey's southeastern and western provinces. In this context encounters between Turkish and Kurdish residents and between the rural and urban populations within the mostly Kurdish populated areas have exposed the risks for youth participation in violence. Lastly, responding to the social consequences of the Kurdish conflict requires to take action about the identity related issues as part of the root causes of the conflict. This fact requires conflict transformation skills at the individual level that involves changes in attitudes and behaviors of young people. In particular, a significant role in this respect rests on political elites as the political positions and ethnic goals, in particular, are some of the primary incentives for youth mobilization that shapes the nature of personal development processes for young people in wider society.

To sum up, the following lessons can be drawn from the field research in Turkey's southeast:

- Existing youth programs should employ a comprehensive assessment of the characteristics of the youth population in Turkey's southeast. This evaluation must reflect the contextual factors, such as the religiosity and traditional features of the Kurdish society.
- Widespread regional (economic and social) development programs often fail to respond to the personal aspects of youth participation in violence. This assessment usually prioritizes providing educational and economic opportunities as a ubiquitous programmatic response for existing youth challenges. Such a structural approach, however, often ignores the role of 'agency' in young people's decisions to participate in violence.
- Due to the dominance of a 'structural' attitude in addressing youth challenges in society, existing youth programs often involve young people in peacebuilding to an

extent and a level. In this regard, young people's personal development processes, particularly following the secondary or high school stages, are usually left to the influences of 'other' social and political actors. This 'gap' leads to coaching young people starting from very early ages in line with the agendas of these political/social actors.

- Community-level mechanisms in order to prevent youth participation in violence can be an efficient tool based on the prevailing features of the Kurdish society. Due to the negative reputation of social actors such as the traditional religious or tribal groups, particularly in the rural areas, these actors fail to act as suitable agents for youth empowerment in peacebuilding. The fundamental changes in Kurdish society (from rural/feudal/religious to urban/modern/secular and nationalist) following the effects of migration trends from rural to urban areas and expansive urbanization, the role of these actors in society is also in decline.
- There is an urgent need for 'new' youth engagement mechanisms especially in addressing the personal development of young people. These instruments; however, should incorporate the sensitivities of youth and cultural characteristics of Turkey's southeast. These instruments should reduce the tensions between different youth clusters (in particular between Islamists and Nationalists) in Turkey's southeast. A major role, in this regard, rests on the political elites in absorbing a peacebuilding agenda in their political activities.

Therefore, the following recommendations are made as a result of the assessment of youth issues and challenges in Turkey's southeast:

- The existing security-based conflict prevention mechanisms should be transformed into peacebuilding instruments.
- A holistic attitude that is comprised of structural (economic and educational) and personal (identity) determinants must be a priority for peacebuilders.
- A contextual understanding of youth challenges and issues must be emphasized in youth interventions that specialize on different youth groups, such as rural, urban or migrant youth.
- The community-level actors should be taken into consideration by empowerment efforts at different levels, such as training for peacebuilding, institutionalization and funding opportunities.
- A locally-owned peacebuilding strategy can engage young people to participate in activities, which would change the perceptions of youth as troublemakers.

## **Conclusion**

Socially integrated individuals participate as full members of society by gaining access to a comprehensive set of rights and opportunities as individual parts of a collective. In conflict societies, the integration of young people into society is recognized as one of the most essential components of war-to-peace transitions (Sommers, 2006a; 2006b).

Indeed, occurrences of political and anti-social violence often instigated by young people in post-conflict settings urges the need to address young people's challenges in the well-functioning social systems. Indicators of exclusion (economic, educational or political), in this context, offer an explanatory framework. In conflict societies, exclusion differs significantly compared to normal societies, where other conflict drivers (ethnic, ideological or religious social markers) are often negligible factors. The process of peacebuilding in fragile contexts thus requires a wider perspective, taking into consideration the contextual conflict drivers and root causes in a specific conflict. It is particularly significant in complex conflict situations such as in Turkey's southeast. The dynamics of exclusion, as an outcome of the conflict, is a relatively understudied area. However, as exclusion is also a phenomenon prevalent in normal societies, especially in migrant-abundant locations, it is often a convenient way of programming peacebuilding interventions and of detecting means of addressing such challenges. In these contexts, the fieldwork findings in this research demonstrate that addressing socioeconomic factors and a liberal peacebuilding perspective dominate the overall aim of present conflict prevention and peacebuilding work in Turkey. Therefore, there are a reliance on vocational training, educational support, and recreational activities and basic skills training activities as a means of preventing participation in violence.

However, separating some of the conflict dynamics from peacebuilding interventions may not yield the anticipated post-program results. By explaining these challenges as barriers to peacebuilding, the results of the fieldwork exhibit that the divisions in Kurdish society causes alternative means for youth socialization in venues. Social and political actors often weaken the overall rationale of integrating youth into society and preventing participation in violence.

As civil actors are highly ideologically motivated a crucial role rests on state-led institutions. Complex conflicts require institutions, which are responsive to the challenges that young people face. It can be argued that following the developments, which occurred as a result of the recent peace initiatives, structural violence is a priority for the incumbent government, which is evident in legal improvements (UPOS, 2014). Existing peacebuilding interventions addressing the structural issues could similarly serve as the basis of post-violence period interventions. In contrast to some of the findings in the peacebuilding interventions in different conflicts, however, young people are often familiarized with pro-violence thinking during the higher education years. Therefore, the fieldwork findings discussed in this article can be a key for the success of peacebuilding interventions in Turkey's southeast. In other words, the primary focus should be on the role of the identity formation process, influenced by social and political actors at the personal level.

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# EAST and SOUTH AFRICA: Spillover Effect of Conflicts

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**Abstract:** The article aims to present four conflicts in East and South Africa that spilled over into neighboring states. The article covers a limited period of time from the end of the Cold War to the present and focuses on the area of East and South Africa. All these conflicts are briefly introduced and the author concentrates mainly on the description of the spillover effect (it includes, for example, the phase of the conflict in which the conflict spilled over to a neighboring state, timing, interconnection or cooperation of armed groups). The most important goal of the article is to analyze conditions based on conflict theories and spillover effect theories that led to the spillover into these states and compare them with other neighboring states, where the conflicts did not occur.

**Keywords:** Conflict; Cooperation; Neighboring state; Security; Spillover effect; War.

## Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, there were several positive but also some negative trends in conflict studies. Positive is that there is a reduction in the number of interstate wars and the number of deadly wounded soldiers on the battlefield has been decreasing

as well. On the other hand, the number of national wars is higher and, moreover, these conflicts negatively affect the civilian population that has to be resettled. At the same time, civilian losses are increasing, which are several times higher than in the wars before the year 1990. Africa has the highest conflict potential, the end of the Cold War has not brought a peaceful period there, while many conflicts, which were suppressed due to bipolar rivalry and the interest of the superpowers, broke out with even greater intensity. Not only the end

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of the Cold War but also other factors such as natural conditions and inefficient economic development, ethnic hatred and tribalism (largely influenced by colonialism and decolonization), high level of poverty or instability of state institutions are important factors affecting Africa's conflict environment. This is confirmed by statistics that show that over 40% of all African countries have been affected by at least one civil war over the past 40 years (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2009, p. 3).

One of the phenomena that occur in conflicts in Africa is its spillover effect. In a few cases, we may have seen that a conflict that began in a domestic state has spilled over into neighboring states. I do not mean the internationalization of a conflict that involves governments of two states fighting against each other. In these cases, the national war caused destabilization and chaos in a neighboring state, and these negative effects caused the outbreak of a new civil war in that state. In these new conflicts, in the vast majority of cases, militias from neighboring states (not state ones), abuse the unstable situations in the neighboring state to expand their activity. In some cases they are directly involved, in other cases, they only support rebel groups in neighboring countries. The key to this phenomenon of conflict spillover is the continuity of time and the involvement of actors from the neighboring state. However, why is in some cases, the neighboring state destabilized and conflict spilled over, and in others not? I will describe this on the example of conflicts from East and South Africa.

East Africa is a region rich in human capital, but other characteristics include harsh climatic conditions (frequent droughts), increasing environmental degradation, poverty, political instability or high conflict potential. Somalia is part of this area. It is a very unstable state and a civil war has been going on there since 1991. The war spilled over into neighboring Ethiopia. Another conflict that spilled over to a neighboring state is the civil war in Ethiopia that spilled over to Djibouti. In contrast, South Africa is a more stable region than the Eastern one. However, even there, the security situation is not good, there is a very high crime rate, a high influx of refugees and uneven population geography. All these factors increase the conflict potential, and therefore we can find conflicts that have spilled over also in this region. Specifically, it is a civil war in Angola that spilled over to Namibia and the conflict in Cabinda (Angola), which spilled over to the Republic of Congo. In this article, I will describe these four case studies and focus on spillover analysis.

### **Theoretical Framework**

A number of world authors have been concerned with the definition and classification of conflicts over the years. In the most general sense, conflict can be expressed as a state of competition between two or more actors who have incompatible interests. However, not every dispute or tense situation can be considered as a conflict. The conflict has certain characteristics. According to Holsti (1991), the conflict must have these specific

characteristics: actors (at least one of them is state actor), a definable area of conflict interests, present tensions, and conflicting actions. Very often used criteria are those from Smolík and Šmíd (2010). They divide them into the qualitative and quantitative categories. On the basis of these criteria, national conflicts can be considered as a war when at least one of the armed forces is subordinate to governmental power, at the same time showing a managed organization, a determined strategy, and continuity of operations. The quantitative criterion of 1,000 dead per year determines the most intense kind of conflict – war (Smolík & Šmíd, 2010, pp. 18-25). The civil war is a kind of conflict that, like conflict, has been described by many authors. In my opinion, the aptest criteria of the civil war were determined by Fortna (2008). The civil war has killed over 1,000 people over its lifetime, taking place within the internationally recognized borders of a sovereign state, threatening the sovereignty of that state, one of the struggling parties being state troops, rebels are organized and capable of causing losses to the state (Fortna, 2008, pp. 2-5). These criteria clearly determine what civil war is.

### **The Spillover Effect**

The Spillover Effect is a relatively new concept in security studies that have been taken from economics. This concept is very often mentioned but without some theoretical anchoring. Kofi Annan's statement is well known in this context. He claimed that wars in neighboring states will not leave the surrounding states intact (Whitaker, 2003, p. 1). One of the most famous conflict scientists, Paul Collier, works with the spillover effect too. According to Collier (2007), civil war flows from the countries concerned not only to neighboring countries but also to more distant states through terrorism, drug trafficking and the spread of epidemics (Collier, 2007, p. 147). Thus, there is a spillover of threats from states in conflict. Collier, however, did not pay close attention to this phenomenon and focused primarily on the trap of conflict and the causes of civil wars. Another well-known author who mentions this phenomenon in his work is Stewart Patrick. Patrick (2006) states that weak and failing states are very often the place where threats such as terrorism, proliferation, and crime are spilling from. Thus, the author does not associate the concept of spillover with the spillover of conflicts and wars, but rather with the spillover of threats that may cause instability in neighboring countries and undermine security. Patrick argues that the relationship between state weakness and spillover is not linear. It always depends on the type of threats, and on religious, geographical, and cultural factors (Patrick, 2006, pp. 7-17). A similar study was published by the African Development Bank, which describes the impact on the neighboring state and the spillover of threats from conflict-affected states. They divide these threats into social and economic. Economic threats and impacts include e.g. disruption of infrastructure or decline in economic performance. Social threats include, for example, the influx of refugees or the spread of diseases and HIV / AIDS (African Development Bank, 2008, pp. 11-19).

There are several authors who dealt with the spillover effect in more detail. Among the most important work is the work of Bosker and de Ree, who conducted research on spillovers in 2009. Based on historical events and mathematical calculations, they tried to determine whether conflicts spilled over and how probable it is. As a result of their study, conflict spillover is a phenomenon that can only be confirmed in Africa. It can also be argued that if a given African country is adjacent to at least one conflict country, the risk of conflict in that country is about 4% higher (Bosker & de Ree, 2009). Silve and Verdier (2018) studied the theory of regional security complexes. At the same time, however, they also focused on the spillover threats that spread within the complex when a civil war is taking place in one of the states. They determined the so-called main elements of instability, which undermine security within the complex and can lead to the outbreak of war in another state. These elements of instability include the proliferation of small arms, the high influx of refugees and ethnic cross-border ties. They also described the negative impact of the size and porosity of the border and the instability of state institutions. Terrill (2008) described conflict spillovers over Iraq. According to him, there are four spillover factors, which can then lead to conflict. The first is the influx of refugees and displaced persons, the second is cross-border terrorism, the third is an international crime and organized crime, and the fourth is the intensification of separatism (Terrill, 2008).

According to available research, threats such as enormous migration, terrorism, and arms trafficking spillover when a neighboring African state is hit by the conflict. At the same time, these threats weaken the economic performance of neighboring states. All these factors weaken neighboring states, and in some cases, the conflict itself actually spillover, especially in Africa. In order to discuss conflict spillovers and not just the outbreak of a new conflict in a neighboring state, certain conditions must be met. The vast majority of spillover authors define a certain continuity of time. This is defined by the period during which the conflict in the neighboring state takes place, and most of them add to this period five another years after the conflict itself ends. This period of time, therefore, clearly determines the continuity of the spillover effect. I also work with this definition of time continuity in my research. At the same time, I add the second and third conditions, which, in my opinion, are crucial. Otherwise, it cannot be clearly demonstrated that this is a spillover of the conflict and not a mere outbreak of a new conflict in a state which has been weakened, for example, by unfavorable regional developments. The second condition is the involvement of some of the same actors. This is mostly a certain anti-state militia that can physically engage in the fighting itself in a neighboring state, but indirect involvement is also sufficient, it usually involves financial technical or logistical support. The second key factor is, therefore, the involvement of some actors from the conflict that spilled over to a neighboring state. The third condition for a clear definition of the spillover effect is cooperation, a certain degree of cooperation between the actor from the original conflict and one of the actors involved in the

conflict in the neighboring state where the conflict spilled over. These three conditions for defining the spillover effect have been determined on the basis of the analysis of the above-mentioned literature on spillover effect, as well as on the basis of the analysis of several case studies of a spillover effect from East and South Africa.

## **Methodology**

The first goal of this work is to describe the spillover effect of conflicts on cases from East and South Africa. This describes how the spillover effect works and focuses on the time continuity of conflict's spillover and the involvement of cross-border actors. As a result, the spillover effect of conflicts in Africa can be described. Descriptive-analytical techniques and comparisons are used for this purpose. The cases were selected on the basis of similarity, namely Mill's method of matching, the two examined phenomena have one factor in common (Kouba, 2008, p. 116). In this case, the dependent variable (spillover of conflict) is common for all cases. All cases are geographically close and meet the necessary conditions that differentiate the spillover effect from the outbreak of a new conflict. It includes time continuity, the involvement of cross-border actors and cooperation.

The second goal of my thesis is to determine which factors characterizing neighboring states were present at the moment when the conflict spilled over, and how these factors differed from the states without spillover effect. Based on theories about spillover effect, causes of conflicts and regional security complexes, I have identified factors characterizing a neighboring state that may affect the spillover and unleashing of a conflict in a neighboring state. I have divided these factors into four categories: social, political-security, economic and geographical. I have worked with several dozen authors to cover the widest possible range of factors. Among the theorists mentioned in the theoretical part about spillover, it includes Patrick (2006), Silve and Verdier (2018), Terrill (2008), Millett (2002), African Development Bank, Carmignani and Kler (2013) and Whikater (2003). At the same time, I have also worked with publications by other well-known scientists, like Galula (1964), which describes the conditions in states where it is easier for rebels to prepare a successful uprising. Galula defines a number of geographical factors. From these mentioned factors I have chosen five, which are easily mathematically expressed and therefore can be incorporated into my analysis. Galula also describes the economy and level of development. It is the reason why I work with the value of GDP (Galula, 1964). In addition to GDP, I have added two factors related to the occurrence of natural resources, which Collier describes in his work, saying that if these factors are met, the chances of a conflict eruption are much higher (Collier and Hoeffler 1999). Other authors, included in my work, are Ncube and Jones, who characterize the causes of conflicts in Africa and define the factors that influence the outbreak of conflicts. Based on the theories of these authors, I, therefore, characterized other factors that increase the chances of conflict's spillover and its outbreak in a neighboring state. Among the

above-mentioned factors, I added a high incidence of terrorist attacks and a human development index. Other factors, with the exception of weapons proliferation, have already been included. Proliferation cannot be included because there is no accurate and relevant data on Africa for this phenomenon. At the same time, other factors not mentioned by these authors have been included. Many other authors and institutions consider these factors as a weakening element of the state, increasing the likelihood of conflict. This is, for example, a high influx of refugees, described by Enghoff, Hansen, Umar, Gildestad, Owen and Obara (2010, pp. 67-76), Gomez, Christensen, Araya, and Harild (2010, pp. 7-20) or FFP, which measures the Fragile State Index. In addition, Carmignani and Kler (2013) or Whitaker (2003), which I have already mentioned, mention the influx of refugees as a risk factor. Some factors are also included on the basis of the Fragile State Index (FFP) theories, namely humanitarian disaster, high crime rates and the presence of armed active militias. The overall distribution of factors can be seen here:

**SOCIAL FACTORS:**

- a) High occurrence of the same ethnicity in neighboring states
- b) High occurrence of the same religion in neighboring states
- c) Humanitarian disaster (e.g. famine)
- d) Common war history
- e) Low human development index (life expectancy, literacy + income)
- f) A high influx of refugees

**POLITICAL-SECURITY FACTORS:**

- a) The different political ideology of the neighboring state
- b) High level of terrorism
- c) The political instability of a neighboring country
- d) The high crime rate of a neighboring country
- e) Existence of armed active militias
- f) Small army

**ECONOMIC FACTORS:**

- a) Presence of important natural resources in the border area
- b) Dependence on exports of one natural resource
- c) Low GDP

**GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS:**

- a) Porous and long borders
- b) Size of neighboring state (large state)
- c) The population of the neighboring state (populated)
- d) Uneven population demography
- e) Uneven ethnic demography

For the purposes of this research, I use qualitative comparative analysis with sharp sets, which uses Boolean logic to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of a given phenomenon.<sup>1</sup> The characteristics of the neighboring states are divided into four categories based on social, political, economic and geographical factors. Subsequently, truth tables are created for individual cases. Columns consist of individual variables (factors and result), rows represent all hypothetically possible combinations of factors (Beneš & Drulák, 2016, p. 86). These tables are used for all factors involved in all neighboring states. Data on social, political-security, economic and geographical factors are converted, calibrated to 0 and 1 (1 indicating the occurrence and 0 the opposite). Thus, dichotomous data encoding occurs (Ragin, 2008, p. 131). Then I compare what factors (within the QCA condition) were present in the conflict that spilled over and whether these factors were present in situations where the spillover effect did not occur. The cases of spillover effects will be compared with each other – whether there are factors that are the same for each case. For some of these factors, values can simply be converted to 0 or 1, depending on whether or not the phenomenon occurs in the neighboring state. For others, a threshold is created based on the African or regional average.

### **Spillover Effect of Conflicts in East Africa**

After the end of the Cold War, two conflicts spilled over into neighboring states in East Africa. The first is the civil war in Somalia, which has been going on from 1991 to the present. After the overthrow of the Barre regime in 1991, a power vacuum emerged in a country that various armed factions and militias tried to fill. The most famous militias were those of Ali Mahdi Muhammad and Muhammad Farah Aidid (Pham, 2013, pp. 135-137). Individual clans and militias divided the territory of the country and fought each other in almost all parts of the state. There were total anarchy, chaos and mass movements in the country. After the end of the foreign intervention in 1995, clashes between individual militias continued, but not to the same intensity as in previous years. Until 2000, fighting took place only in certain areas. In 2001, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was created (Williams, 2009, p. 515). UIC also formed armed factions, which during 2006 conquered the most important strategic sites, including the capital Mogadishu. The UIC subsequently disintegrated into several fractions. The most radical faction that has waged war against the government since 2007 until now is the Islamic terrorist group, Al-Shabaab. Another, previously active, terrorist organization, which has already disappeared, was Hizbul Islam. This conflict, spilled over into one of the federal states of Ethiopia, into Ogaden.

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1 Boolean logic deals with logical operations on a set of values {0, 1}. I also use this set in my research (Caramani, 2009, p. 25).

The second conflict that spilled over was the civil war in Ethiopia, which took place in 1974-1991. Spillover to neighboring Djibouti occurred after the end of the Cold War, so I work with this case as well. In 1974, part of the army formed the Coordinated Council of the Armed Forces of the Police and Territorial Army, which they called the Derg. Derg carried out a coup d'état and overthrew the emperor. There were several opposition groups in the country trying to weaken the power of the Derg and fight against it. One of the most famous groups was the WSLA (Western Somali Liberation Front), an irredentist movement that operated in the Ogaden region. In the 1980s, a series of uprisings took place mainly in the Eritrean area (which at that time belonged to Ethiopia) and in the Tigray area. At that time, the EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front), whose goal was the secession of Eritrean territory, was particularly active. TPLF (Tigray's People Liberation Front), which had similar secessionist goals, cooperated with EPLF. The government has prepared several attacks against the EPLF and TPLF. The aim of these attacks was the total destruction of these organizations. Operations such as Shiraro, Lash and Adwa were launched, but these attacks were not successful. TPLF together with several other groups formed at the turn of 1988/1989 organization Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which, with the support of local residents and the United States of America, managed to depose Derg in 1991. During 1990, Mengistu's army was pushed into the capital, then Mengistu fled the country, and the army surrendered to the EPRDF (Vestal, 1999, p. 75). The following sections describe the spillover of these two conflicts to neighboring states.

### **Spillover of Conflict from Somalia to Ethiopia**

The conflict in Ogaden began in 1994, three years after the outbreak of the civil war in Somalia. One of the fighting parties of the conflict is ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front), the other is the military-led party EPRDF. ONLF was officially established in 1984, but until 1994 it was a non-violent organization that tried to promote its interests mainly through political channels. ONLF took part in the 1992 elections, the new elections following the overthrow of the previous communist regime, and ONLF became the main party in the regional parliament after these elections. The main aim of ONLF is the right to self-determination of Somalis in Somali federal state Ogaden, the secession of the area, or at least gaining autonomous status. This, of course, is not compatible with the goals of the central government (Vaughan, 2011). The situation became more pronounced during and immediately after the first elections in 1992. Several members of ONLF disappeared, others were found dead under unclear circumstances. The situation in the region began to be alarming, the population rebelled and therefore the central government led by the EPRDF decided in 1994 to abolish the regional parliament in Somalia. From this year ONLF declared a violent campaign against the central government (Dagne, 2010). Because the organization did not have enough means and capacities, it resorted to the strategy of hit and run during the 90s.

During the 1990s, the organization carried out a series of attacks on government and military targets. Most of them were bombings. Between 2003 and 2004, the government took an offensive to destroy ONLF troops. However, this offensive was neither extensive nor systematic, so the declared objectives were not achieved (Home Office UK, 2004). In 2006, there were mainly attacks on military bases, but also an attack on the Chinese oil company Sinopec Limited in Obole, which killed more than 60 workers (Opalo, 2010). In response to these events, the Ethiopian army launched a very brutal offensive in early 2007, which was directed not only against ONLF but against all residents of the Somali Federated States. A trade blockade was launched, which, together with the drought that prevailed in Ogaden at the time, caused famine. In addition, there were mass arrests of people who were imprisoned for several years without trial. Another collective punishment was the burning of villages, where residents allegedly sympathized with ONLF or villages that allegedly supported or cooperated with ONLF. In 2010, government representatives met with representatives of ONLF in Frankfurt, Germany, where they signed a peace agreement to end the fighting. However, part of ONLF led by Muhammad Omar Osman disagreed with this agreement and created its own offshoot of ONLF called the Ogaden National Liberation Army (ONLA), which is still active in the area (Home Office UK, 2017). In 2013, ONLA relocated to the Somali capital of Mogadishu, where it plans and conducts all operations against the Ethiopian government. Clashes continue at low intensity, e.g. ONLA killed 23 Ethiopian soldiers in 2016 and more than 30 in 2017 (Harar24, 2017).

In order to discuss the spillover effect, there must be a temporal link between the conflict in Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as the involvement of some of the same actors. The conflict in Somalia began in 1991, after the collapse of the Barre regime and with varying intensity, this conflict has continued. The conflict was the most intensive in the first half of the 1990s and during the UIC's rise to power. During this first intensive period, spillover to neighboring Ethiopia began, specifically at the turn of 1993-1994. At the same time, it has been noted that the most intense fighting took place in Somalia in its central and southern parts, especially along the borders with Ethiopia and Kenya, which negatively affected the security situation in both countries (Menkhaus, 2007). Security threats have been spilled in border regions of Kenya and Ethiopia. This included arms and counterfeit trade, drug trafficking, increased terrorist activity, increased crime and an overall deterioration in the security situation compared to the national average (Gastrow, 2011). In the case of Ethiopia, the conflict itself was spilled over, which was also influenced by internal factors. It is obvious that there is a continuity of time in conflict's spillover.

The second factor discussed is the involvement of the same actors. According to the latest statistics, the Somali federal state occupies more than 95% of ethnic Somalis, in the 1990s this figure was a few percent lower, slightly above 90%, but even in this

period, the Somalis represented a majority group (Ethiopian Government, 2018). The vast majority of Somalia's people are ethnic Somalis, for whom ethnicity is not a key element, but clan membership is crucial. Major clans in Somalia include Darod, Dir, Hawiye, Isaaq, and Rahanweyn (Pham, 2013). The clans are then divided into several dozen sub-clans. The area along the border with Ethiopia is inhabited primarily by the Darod clan (roughly 2/3), followed by the Rahanweyn clan. A very similar ethnic demography is also along the border with Somalia in Ethiopian territory. This territory consists only of the Somali federal state, where the vast majority of the population are Somalis from the Darod tribe, namely the sub-clans of Ogaden, Jidwaq, and Marehan (Lewis, 1999). During the beginning of the Somali Civil War, the territory of Somalia was divided among the factions, which were created on a clan basis. Members of the individual clans worked together across Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Ethiopia's people were involved in the Somali conflict in Somali territory. At the same time, the Somalis very often crossed the international border and used the territory of the Somali Federal State to recruit new members, gain financial support and an environment for illegal trade, which was one of the main sources of income (IRB, 1999). Therefore, cooperation across the states was clear.

In addition to this clan involvement, cooperation and interdependence of some organizations are also evident. Specifically, it is a cooperation between ONLF and AIAI (Al-Ittihad Al-Islam - an armed Islamic organization that was established in 1990 in Somalia). Since 1990, the AIAI has operated not only in Somalia but also in the Somali Federal State of Ethiopia. The AIAI supported ONLF activity there until 1997 and the organizations discussed their activity together. There was also a common trade and training. It is therefore evident that one of the most active Somali organizations of the beginning of the civil war in Somalia has also influenced the Ethiopian organization ONLF (Terdman, 2008).

### **Spillover of Conflict from Ethiopia to Djibouti**

Djibouti gained independence in 1977 until then it was a French colony. From the very beginning, there have been disputes between the two main ethnic groups. The Issas seized power, formed a single-party government in the country - the People's Union for Development (RPP - Rassemblement Populaire pour le Progres) and oppressed the second largest ethnic group, Afars.<sup>2</sup> Afars' disagreement with the central government resulted in a civil war between 1991 and 1994. It was a low-intensity conflict, as the number of victims does not exceed 260 (according to the UCDP), some estimates are higher but do not exceed 1000 (UCDP, 2017).

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2 The Issas are a sub-clan of the Somali Clan Dir, so if we speak of an ethnic group, the Issas should be labeled as Somalis, but the Issas label is used more often (Lewis, 1999, p. 191).

The situation within Djibouti was very tense in the 1980s. The Afars were increasingly marginalized. They were not represented in the government and parliament and were disadvantaged also in other areas. Tensions increased and also neighboring states had a negative impact on the situation as well. In Somalia, Barre was deposed in 1991 and civil war began in the country. In Ethiopia, the Mengistu was deposed and the regime changed. The unfavorable conditions in the immediate vicinity of the state, together with the worsening economic situation and economic crisis, had an impact on the already tense situation in Djibouti. The catalyst for the outbreak of the conflict itself was the wave of arrests of the Afars during January-August 1991. The arrests were based on alleged anti-state actions and disruptive tendencies of arrested people (Kadamy, 1996). At that time, three Afar organizations formed the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), which began a violent guerrilla struggle against the government in the Obock region in November 1991 (ARDHD, 2008). In the initial phase of the conflict, there were series of bloody fighting between the Djibouti army and FRUD, especially in the north of the country near Obock and Tadjour. FRUD's units were very successful and largely managed to occupy this area. Therefore, the central government continued to arrest all FRUD supporters in all parts of the country. During the first six months of the conflict, Djibouti soldiers were very brutal towards the civilian population, with several incidents in the north of the country, they were firing into an unarmed crowd of civilians. Since 1992, France has evidently become involved in the conflict. The French representatives were trying to facilitate peace talks between the rebels and the government and also deployed French troops to help government troops to stop FRUD (ApNews, 1992). The last major government offensive was launched in July 1993 to clean up the last cities in the north of the country, which was still under FRUD's control. Government troops actually managed to push most of the FRUD's troops out of the territory, but the destruction of FRUD's units did not occur. FRUD retreated to mountain areas while crossing the boundaries of Eritrea and Somalia, where it began to manage its activity (Leta, Zeray and Haile, 2015, p. 5). The peace agreement was signed in December 1994, among other things, the ruling party of the RPP committed to liberalize and democratize the country. However, this transformation cannot be considered as successful, and despite tolerated opposition, elections in the country are not free and democratic, and the RPP continues to control its position of power (Freedom House, 2018).

In this section, two factors are discussed, the timing of the conflict in Djibouti with the conflict in Ethiopia, as well as the involvement of consensus actors. The Ethiopian Civil War took place between 1974-1991 and the most intense fighting took place in the late 1980s in three Ethiopian regions in the north - Amharia, Afar, and Tigray. From these areas that the conflict subsequently spilled over to Djibouti. There was a civil war in Djibouti between 1991-1994. The time continuity of the conflict is therefore evident, it is interesting that the conflict spilled at the end of the Ethiopian War, which is justified by the fact that in the 1970s most of the clashes took place in the central part of the

country and eastern Ethiopia, while in the 1980s fighting has moved to the aforementioned north of the country. The key was the porosity of the border and the occurrence of the same ethnic groups in a neighboring state. Crossing the Djibouti border occurred early in the 1980s, particularly the ALF (ALF - Afar Liberation Front) used the border area and territory of Djibouti as a base for the preparation of attacks and they also recruited new members from that territory (Yohannes, Hadgu and Ambaye, 2005, p. 35).<sup>3</sup>

Disputes between the Somalis of the Issas and Afars tribes not only took place in the territory of Djibouti but also negatively affected the Afar region in Ethiopia. These disputes date back to the 19th century. Both groups form a nomadic community, while the vast majority of them profess Islam. Very often there have been disputes over water and pastures to which the Afars have historically claimed. The situation in Ethiopia and Djibouti was different. In Ethiopia, Afars have a majority in a regional state, so Issas are oppressed and discriminated against. They migrated to Djibouti during the second half of the 20th century to find a safer place. By contrast, Afars is a minority in Djibouti, where they are disadvantaged compared to Issas (Ahmed, 2009). During the civil war in Ethiopia, there was an exchange of inhabitants between the two areas and ALF used this border area as its base. At the end of the civil war in Ethiopia, some soldiers from the former Derg regime withdrew from Ethiopia to Djibouti. They left there a large number of weapons and military equipment after the war. At the same time, some of the soldiers joined the newly formed FRUD and, in the early stages of the conflict, represented the main combat component of the FRUD alongside the Eritreans (Yasin, 2010). Some ALF members also participated in the conflict and supported FRUD financially, technically and personally (Vaughan, 2011). This was also because they were dissatisfied with the EPRDF's progress and developments in Ethiopia after 1991. The Central Ethiopian government was concerned about the success of the FRUD and weakening its own position in the country since the Afars are not only a minority in Djibouti but in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Therefore, they asked the French to intervene against FRUD. In addition, they arrested several members and supporters of FRUD in their territory (Mohammed, 1996). Finally, the EPRDF ended cooperation with the ALF and created a new puppet party representing the Afars's interests in the country, the Afar People's Democratic Organization (APDO). From these data, it is evident that some ALF and Derg militants who participated in the war in Ethiopia moved after the end of the war to Djibouti, where they joined the local militias.

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3 The Afar Liberation Front (ALF) was established in 1975 in Ethiopia as an armed militia fighting the Derg in the Afar region. Their main goal was to enforce more rights for the Afar ethnic group, which was particularly disadvantaged under the regime of Haile Selassie.

## **Spillover Effect of Conflicts in South Africa**

After the end of the Cold War, two conflicts spilled over into neighboring states in South Africa. The first one is a civil war in Angola, which took place between 1975-2002. In the initial phase, the main players were three parties, the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola), the FNLA (National Liberation Front of Angola) and the UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) (Fiala, 2005). These three groups concluded an agreement in 1975, which failed after only a few months, and since the beginning of Angola's independence (11 November 1975), there has been an armed struggle in the country. MPLA took advantage of controlling the capital of Luanda and proclaiming all other parties to be rebels (Dyčka, 2010). In early 1976, the MPLA launched an offensive with the help of Cuban troops to push UNITA and FNLA out of the country. In the case of the FNLA, this offensive was truly successful and FNLA leader Holden Roberto had to flee the country. In the case of UNITA, the organization was pushed to the south but not pushed out of the country (Ferreira, 2006). In the following years, neither of these two parties gained a significant advantage, UNITA controlled the south of the country, MPLA the north. In 1988, South Africa agreed to grant Namibia independence and to stop support UNITA in exchange for withdrawing Cuban troops from Angola. This stopped the support of the two largest international actors in this conflict, Cuba and South Africa. The conflict itself ended in April 2002 with an attack on Savimbi, who died during the attack. An overwhelming majority of UNITA members followed the Lusaka agreement signed in 1994 (Saunders, 2009). This war spread into Namibia, where the conflict took place during 1999.

The second case is conflict in Cabinda, which spilled over to the Republic of Congo.<sup>4</sup> In Cabinda, Front of the Liberation Enclave Cabinda (FLEC) has been fighting MPLA since the 1970s. FLEC attacked MPLA's units, but the intensity of the conflict was very low compared to the intensity of the fighting between UNITA and MPLA. FLEC controlled territories in the densely forested inland areas of the province and sporadically attacked the army and state targets. In 1983 there were personnel disputes within the FLEC leadership and the organization was divided into two groups, FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) and FLEC-FAC (Cabinda Armed Forces) (HRW, 2004). At the end of the 1990s, the intensity of the fighting increased, some UNITA members withdrew to the area and mass population movements took place. In October 2002, following the end of the civil war in Angola and the ultimate defeat of UNITA, the Central Angolan government regrouped its attention to Cabinda and sent 30,000 troops to the area to finally defeat FLEC. In 2004, the two wings of FLEC were merged, and at the same time, a series of

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4 Cabinda is an enclave in the north, which has officially been part of Angola since 1956, although it has a different history and is not geographically linked to Angola as it is separated by the DRC zone (Porto, 2003, p. 11).

peace negotiations between FLEC and MPLA began. The United FLEC, together with representatives of the Catholic Church of Cabinda and members of the Cabinda Civic Movement Mpalabanda, subsequently created the Cabindian Dialogue Forum (FCD). It should represent the interests of Canadians in peace negotiations (OMCT, 2015). Subsequently, in 2006, a peace treaty was signed between MPLA and FCD representative António Bento Bembe, who reportedly signed the agreement under duress without the consent of the majority of the FCD member (Southern Africa Monitor, 2006). Since this year, the government officially declares the end of the Cabinda's war, but members of the FLEC-FAC formation have not agreed to sign the treaty and continue to run attacks against government and military targets. Over the past few years, they have attacked government units and kidnapped foreign workers. They also attacked the national football team of Togo in 2010 (Guardian, 2010).

### **Spillover of Conflict from Angola to Namibia**

The conflict in Angola spilled into neighboring Namibia into the Caprivi region. The people in this area have different ethnicities than the rest of Namibia, and since the time of German colonization, they have longed for independence and the right to self-determination. After Namibia's independence in 1990, SWAPO (South-West African People's Organization) seized power. Part of the Caprivi local political party DTA (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance) was dissatisfied with the full domination of SWAPO, and in 1994 they formed an organization called the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA), which from the very beginning established a violent solution of the problem. On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of August 1999, the CLA launched an offensive on the city of Katima Mulilo, the capital of the Caprivi region. CLA's units attacked several buildings, an army base, a police station, and a state radio station. During the fighting, 14 people died and more than 3,000 people were moved to neighboring Botswana (IRIN, 1999). A state of emergency was declared in the province and the government began to arrest all alleged members of the CLA. In August and September 1999, there were several other armed clashes between the CLA and the NDF (National Defense Forces), the last one took place in September. Major CLA members, including Mishake Muyongo, fled to neighboring states, especially Botswana. Some of them got granted asylum in European countries. Since these events, no other armed clashes have occurred.

The civil war in Angola took place between 1975-2002. As it was written in previous sections of the work, MPLA, which was for most of the conflict the ruling party controlled the north of the country, UNITA controlled the south. The conflict itself was characterized by a very different intensity in the course of time, the most intense fighting took place in three periods of time. The first of these periods was at the beginning of the conflict between 1976-1977, the second involved the offensive at Cuito Cuanavale, which represents the years 1985-1988. The third period was the most intense (in terms of the number of casualties and armed clashes) and this took place between 1998-2000.

The spillover to Namibia occurred in 1998 when the first armed clashes between the rebels and the government began in Namibia. Thus, as in most previous cases, the conflict spilled over at the stage of its greatest intensity. At the same time, there is also an apparent time sequence. The interesting thing about this case is that the civil war in Angola was very long and the conflict spilled over almost at its end. The explanation is logical, as over the years UNITA had international support and controlled a large part of the territory. The organization used the territory and got from the territory financial resources and physical support. Moreover, South Namibia was dominated by South African SADF (until the early 1990s). UNITA had no reason to expand beyond Angola. Everything just changed in the 1990s, when Namibia gained independence, there were dozens of deserted military camps in its territory, used in the past by SADF units. These old camps were a great opportunity for UNITA when the organization was pushed out of most of Angola's territory (1998-2000). For these reasons, the spillover occurred in the late 1990s.

The Namibian population has been involved in the war in Angola since its inception. The SADF's government units consisted mainly of the people of South Africa, but also of the Namibians. However, a large part of the Namibians was involved in the fighting on the MPLA's side, supported by the revolutionary Namibian SWAPO. Even today it is relatively common in Namibia to meet someone who participated in these battles and remembers these events well. This is confirmed by the fact that it was indeed a very high involvement of several thousand. However, after independence, SWAPO and SADF withdrew from Angolan's territory in the vast majority of cases. SWAPO began to concentrate on events in the new state, first elections, constitutional creation and consolidation of power. However, there were several personal conflicts in the party and some of its major leaders left the party in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The best known is Mishake Muyongo, who was until 1980 a vice president of SWAPO. All these people withdrew to the north of the country, where they formed their own political organization DTA. Part of the DTA subsequently formed the CLA. In the 1990s, UNITA lost control of much of its territory, diamond mines, and parts of its physical base, and it was forced to withdraw to Namibia and Botswana. In Caprivi, UNITA used the former camps of SADF, which also served to train CLA units. In the mid-1990s, UNITA provided CLA with ammunition and equipment (Prendergast, 1999). The reason was UNITA's hatred of SWAPO for its involvement in MPLA fighting. In 1998, the Namibian NDF army discovered a training camp in the Caprivi area called Mudumu Game Park, where several CLA and UNITA members were involved (IRIN, 1999). The link between CLA and UNITA is, therefore, more than obvious. Moreover, experts from the University of Pretoria and Cape Town agree on the cooperation between UNITA and CLA (Irishtimes, 1999). In addition, four CLA members confirmed this link during an interview in Botswana (IrinNews, 1999). In this case, the rule is that the common enemy, which was (for UNITA and CLA) the SWAPO party, makes friends from two opposing parties.

## **Spillover of Conflict from Angola (Cabinda) to the Republic of Congo**

The war in Angola and the war in the province of Cabinda spilled over into the Republic of Congo. There were two civil wars in the 90s. The first one took place between 1993-1994, and in terms of scale and intensity, the war was much milder and not so intense compared to the second civil war that took place between 1997-1999. The first civil war took place because of the disputes that followed the 1992 elections. The country was divided into three areas based on the support of individual candidates, the key was the ethnic division. In addition, militias were formed in these areas, the so-called Zulu militias supported Pascal Lissouba, Ninja militias supported Bernard Kolelas and Cobra militias supported President Sassou Nguessa (Englebert & Ron, 2004). Lissouba's supporters have created other militias, such as the Cocoyes militia or Mambas militias. Fighting began between the Zulu and Ninja militias in the capital Brazzaville in the second half of 1993. During these fights, 2,000 people died. Ninja militias did not participate too much in the fighting. The violence ended in 1994.

Over the next two years, there was a restless peace in the country, which was occasionally disrupted by brief episodes of violence. New elections were to be held in July 1997, but the Lissouba's and Sassou's supporters had been preparing for armed confrontation since March. In May 1997, Sassou decided to candidate in the northern city of Owando, where the former President and former Prime Minister of Lissouba, Jacques Yhombi-Opango, came from. His speech led to the outbreak of violence between local supporters of Sassou (mostly Mbochi) and supporters of Yhombi (mostly Kouyou). In addition, Lissouba discovered that Sassou was arming his militias, so he decided to send an army to Sassou's residence to arrest some of his collaborators who were reportedly involved in the violence in Owando. Everything ended in a bloody shootout that unleashed violence throughout the capital. Thus the second civil war in Congo began (Trapnell & Pflapsen, 2005). At the beginning of the war, the militias of Kolelas and Sassou cooperated against the militias of Lissouba, and Sassou was also supported by France. Lissouba cooperated with UNITA and FLEC troops, who he allowed since 1992 to legally reside in Congo. Lissouba and UNITA rebels have been working together since the 1990s. In the second largest city of Pointe-Noire, they smuggled weapons to assist local fighters. Angola joined the war in October 1997, sending about 3,000 troops to help Sassou. This induced Kolelas's cooperation with Lissouba. On the one side, the Ninja militia and the Cocoyes fought, on the other, the Angolan army and the Cobra militia. Sassou, thanks to the help of Angola, quickly gained the upper hand and Lissouba and Kolelas fled into exile in 1998. In the second half of 1998, the fighting shifted to the south of the country, but since January 1999 the intensity of the fighting decreased, until the end of 1999 rebellion ended in an agreement that provided amnesty to all commanders of Ninja and Cocoyes militias (Atzili, 2007). Sassou Nguesso came back to power and he reigns in the country until nowadays.

The conflict in Angola itself took place between 1975-2002, and in Cabinda, the conflict lasted four years later, until 2006 (it is the official end on the basis of signing the peace treaty and the government declaration). Two civil wars took place in the Republic of Congo, in 1993-1994 and in 1997-1999. In the Second Civil War, UNITA and FLEC troops were involved, but also Angolan soldiers from the MPLA-controlled state army. Their presence decided the outcome of the conflict. The timing of the spillover of the conflict is evident in this case. The conflict spilled over at a time when there was still war in Angola. This is a very special period in terms of intensity since there was still a ceasefire in Angola in 1997, but since the beginning of 1998, bloody fights started again and the intensity of the conflict was very high. The key thing is that during this period, UNITA was pushed out of 2/3 of the country's territory, and that is why it largely occupied the territory of the Republic of Congo and the DRC. At this time, FLEC controlled very limited, mostly rural areas of Cabinda and, like UNITA, made extensive use of neighboring states. So it can be said that this is a period when the presence of UNITA and FLEC troops in Congolese territory was the highest. In terms of intensity, however, the conflict was not spilled in its most intense phase.

Since the beginning of the Second Civil War in Congo, the cooperation of various militias with UNITA and FLEC troops has been evident. There was very extensive cooperation between the Lissouba's militias, especially the Zulu and Cocoyes militias, with the Angolan groups. UNITA and FLEC troops have been fighting on Lissouba's side since early 1997 and were included in his militia. As a result, UNITA received air shipments of weapons from the town of Pointe Noire, which was completely under the control of Lissouba (Turner, 2002). FLEC troops, on the other hand, received primarily financial support, but between them and the Lissouba's militias was cooperation since 1992, which included mainly arms trade, but in some cases, joint training of units. Angolan President Dos Santos was very worried about how the Congo war could affect the outcome of the civil war in Angola. Angolan military units (FAA - Angolan Armed Forces) involved in the fighting on the side of the Cobra militia. The intervention itself took place on October 12, 1997, when 3000 FAA soldiers entered the country. As a result, Sassou gained a very quick advantage and subsequently won.

### **Analysis of Spillover Effect**

In this part of the work, a qualitative comparative analysis is used to compare conditions in all neighboring states of countries where conflicts took place and subsequently spilled over and in the other neighboring countries where it did not happen. For a detailed comparison of the factors described in the methodological section, the truth table has been created. If a given factor occurred in a neighboring state, it is assigned a value of 1, if not a value of 0. At the same time, it should be noted that I work with data from the time, when the conflict spilled over, not the latest data. The form of truth table can be seen in Annex 1. A computer program (Tosmana) was used to evaluate the results. In

the beginning, it is necessary to explain the crosses in the table. In the case of the civil war in Somalia, a different political ideology was not included in the analysis. This is because there was no central government in Somalia in the 1990s to control most of the country and maintain a certain ideology. The country was divided among various factions that had different ideas and motives. Therefore, the state ideology cannot be compared with the ideologies of neighboring states. It is evident, at first sight from the table that economic factors did not play any role in these cases and therefore we can say there is no link between economic factors and the occurrence of the spillover effect. Therefore, the natural resources dimension does not play a significant role in these cases as it was only present in the case of the Republic of Congo. According to Collier, dependence on the export of one commodity increases the chance of conflict, but in practice of spillover effect, it does not apply. At the same time, it is obvious that there is no single explanation to clarify all the cases. Therefore, it is not possible to talk about causality and generalize the conclusions. There is only a coherence between the combination of factors and the occurrence of a spillover effect. To be able to talk about causality we would have to work with a greater number of cases. However, it is also clear from this analysis that some factors are more important than others.

Annex 1: Truth Table of Spillover in East and South Africa

Case ID	Soc a	Soc b	Soc c	Soc d	Soc e	Soc f	Pol a	Pol b	Pol c	Pol d	Pol e	Pol f	Eco a	Eco b	Eco c	Geo a	Geo b	Geo c	Geo d	Geo e	Spillover
Ethiopia	1	1	0	1	1	1	X	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Kenya	0	0	0	0	0	1	X	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
Djibouti	1	1	0	0	1	0	X	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Djibouti 2	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Kenya	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
Somalia	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Sudan	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
Congo	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
DRC	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Namibia	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1
Zambia	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0

Source: Author

Overall, there are twelve combinations of factors whose presence in a neighboring state increases the likelihood of conflict’s spillover. The political-security factors that have the most frequent representation seem to be crucial. Among these factors, the most represented factors are different political ideology, political instability, the existence of armed active militias and having a small army. Besides political-security factors, social and geographical are important as well. The most frequented social factor is a high

occurrence of the same ethnicity in a neighboring state and the most frequented geographical factors are uneven ethnic demography and having a porous and long border. These are a combination of factors that increase the likelihood of spillover conflict and can even lead to spillover itself:

1. Political instability + existence of armed active militias + small army
2. Political instability + different ideology + small army
3. High occurrence of the same ethnicity + high crime rate + small army + porous and long border
4. Existence of armed active militias + small army + uneven ethnic demography
5. High crime rate + small army + uneven ethnic demography
6. Existence of armed active militias + small army + porous and long border
7. High occurrence of the same ethnicity + different ideology + small army
8. High occurrence of the same ethnicity + small army + porous and long border
9. Porous and long border + uneven population demography + uneven ethnic demography
10. Existence of armed active militias + porous and long border + uneven ethnic demography
11. High occurrence of the same ethnicity + porous and long border + uneven ethnic demography
12. High occurrence of the same ethnicity + high occurrence of the same religion + high influx of refugees

As you can see it at the combinations of factors, there are scenarios created just from political-security factors, but also scenarios that contain just social or geographical factors. It is therefore not possible to say which category is the most important and it is clear that all three categories (political-security, social and geographical) are important during conflict spillovers. On the other hand, economic factors are marginal compared to other factors. If we apply this analysis to theories about the description of the spillover effect and the causes of conflicts, we can say that the most accurate theories are the theories that Silver and Verdier created. However, even these theories do not fully cover our conclusions, and it is clear that spillover is a much more complex phenomenon, which must be explained by a combination of several factors, moreover, as can be seen from the analysis, there are several typologies of spillover.

## **Conclusion**

The spillover effect is a phenomenon that accompanies some conflicts. It is most often seen in Africa and that is why this article deals with the analysis of the spillover effect on cases from South and East Africa. In the past, very few surveys on spillover effect analysis with the use of real examples have been conducted. Therefore, understanding and analyzing this phenomenon is very important.

In the theoretical part of this work, the conditions that distinguish the spillover effect from the outbreak of a new conflict were clearly defined. This includes time continuity, the involvement of some of the same actors and the cooperation of local and neighboring actors. At the same time, I also focused on describing and determining the moment when the conflict spilled over (in terms of the intensity) to the neighboring state. Whether the conflict spilled over when the conflict was most intense, at the time of the ceasefire or after the conflict ended. The analysis shows that in all cases the spillover time continuity has been met. In three cases the spillover effect occurred at a time when the conflict had the greatest intensity. This is confirmed by a spillover of the conflict from Somalia, from Ethiopia and also by spillover from Angola to Namibia. The case of the spillover of the conflict from Angola to the Republic of Congo is specific. There was still a ceasefire in Angola in 1997, but since the beginning of 1998, bloody fights have started again and the intensity of the conflict has been very high. The key thing is that during this period, UNITA was pushed out of 2/3 of the country's territory, and that is why it largely occupied the territory of the Republic of Congo. In addition, other organizations, such as MPLA units, were not involved in the conflict until 1998. In all cases, there was a spillover, when the fighting took place near the border or when the troops were pushed beyond the border. In all cases, the actors from the neighboring state were involved in conflicts and worked with local militias. They physically engaged in the fighting and fought on the side of their allies in all four cases. In some cases, financial and logistical support or bartering has also taken place, but physical involvement is crucial. From these cases, it is concluded that if there is intense fighting along the border, the chance of spillover is higher.

The second part of the work deals with the analysis of factors in neighboring states that increase the probability of spillover effect. In total, there are twelve combinations of factors that are key to spillover. The analysis shows that economic factors are irrelevant. On the other hand, we cannot say which of the remaining category of factors is the most important as there is always a scenario that increases the likelihood of spillovers and involves combinations of factors from only one category (either political-security or only social or geographic). However, the most prevalent factors can be identified. Among political- security factors it is: different political ideology, political instability, the existence of armed active militias and having a small army. The most frequented social factor is a high occurrence of the same ethnicity in a neighboring state and the most frequented geographical factors are uneven ethnic demography and having a porous and long border. All these factors are logical, because the long and porous borders make it easier to spillover the conflict, especially when fighting takes place along the border. If the area on a second side of the border is inhabited by the same ethnic group this area can serve as a good base for the militia. The same ethnicity increases the sense of belonging and this often leads to support for the militia. In cases, when the army is small it is not able to control its entire territory. Political instability leads to dissatisfac-

tion among the local population and often creates space for new (sometimes violent) changes. In cases where there are already present armed active militias in the country, it is clear that something is not working in that state. This, in combination with other factors, can lead to the spillover of the conflict itself. It is therefore clear that these factors are not coincidental, and states in the immediate vicinity of the conflict should try to work on these issues to avoid the spillover of the conflict.

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# **WEST AFRICA: Cooperative Institutionalization of Conflict Prevention Mechanisms in Regional Subsystems**

Reuben J. B. LEWIS

**Abstract:** Conflict prevention projects require concerted efforts by institutions and groups towards its operationalization. The multi-dimensional and multi-faceted agendas of preventive action, as well as the process-based nature of its organization and implementation, make its outcomes unpredictable and hard to evaluate. In a regional subsystem such as West Africa for prevention mechanisms to gain solid footing they must be embedded within institutions that serve as pillars and carriers working towards its institutionalization. In this regard, therefore, this article explores a concept of cooperative institutionalization in regional subsystem as an applicable method for organization and implementation of conflict prevention mechanisms across communities in the sub-region. The paper explains existing institutional capacities for transnational implementation of conflict prevention mechanisms and responds to a critical question of how can institutional cooperation and partnership between sub-regional, state, non-state and local actors help to institutionalize conflict prevention; and how and in what way institutions converge in taking action to respond to conflict risk factors in the sub-region?

**Keywords:** Cooperative institutionalization, ECOWAS, conflict prevention, West Africa.

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## **Introduction**

The idea and practice of conflict prevention are considered to be more than extremely controversial in all kinds of settings. On the academic and research domain, there are disagreements over its meaning, scope and conceptual composition. Whilst for practitioners in the peacebuilding community, they view it as broad, unattractive and hard to evaluate. Both scholars and practitioners

disagree over its conceptual scope as well as its organizational arrangements. However, the practice of conflict prevention is organized around different programs and processes that are divided into direct or operational and structural or deep prevention. The former deals with immediate actions that respond to risk of impending conflict such as mediation, early warning, military deployment, dialogue, reconciliation, etc.; whilst the latter deals with long term responses that involve good governance and development initiatives (United Nations Report, 2001).

In recent years, the idea of systematic prevention has emerged which aims to tackle conflict risk factors and human security concerns such as transnational terrorism, arms proliferation, drug trafficking, health epidemic, cross border armed criminality, climate change etc., which affect communities across countries (United Nations, 2005, United Nations Report, 2006).

Considering the transnational nature of these threats, the operationalization of conflict prevention has been quite challenging, especially in societies coming out of conflict and for communities that are impoverished and incapacitated to deal with conflict risk factors. The transnational nature of risk of conflict has led to increased cooperation between governments and social groups in taking action to institutionalize mechanisms for conflict prevention. However, the practice of conflict prevention has not been conceptualized within the prism of institutionalization and in the context of regional subsystem as a whole.

In this regard, there is a need for research work that presents a holistic conceptualization of conflict prevention that recognizes the cooperative interaction among multiple actors. This conceptual gap between theory and recent practices needs further exploration, which is part of the purpose of this study. For clarity, the term 'regional subsystem' refers to geographical zone of cooperation and interaction within a given sub-region in Africa (Anda, 2000). This paper focuses on the subsystem of West Africa and is used as an exploratory case study to reconceptualize recent development in the practice of conflict prevention through the lens of institutionalization.

### **Rationale (Why West Africa)**

The sub-region of West Africa is widely considered to be one of the worst affected regions in Africa from the consequences of the end of the Cold War with specific reference to peace, stability, governance and development placing it 'amongst the world's most unstable regions'. The deficiencies in the political, social and economic spaces of communities represent existential risk factors that have the potential to generate conflict. The sources and causes of conflict in the sub-region have emerged from identity (ethnic, religion, nationalism), resources (economic agendas) and patrimonial politics (Francis, 2001, 2006). In some instances natural resources have served as a motiva-

tion that fuel violence and prolonged conflict, and at some point built into sub-regional conflict complexes.

Therefore, conflict prevention processes in the sub-region are broad and continue to evolve bringing on board different methods of responding to potential crises and insecurities. Many studies have been conducted to understand the dynamics of conflict prevention in West Africa based on Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) peace and security architecture, on peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, security sector reforms, elections and good governance, mediation, countering violent extremism, control of small arms and light weapon; all of which form parts of the processes for conflict prevention. These studies have been undertaken by academics, researchers, including peace-building institutions across the sub-region and beyond. However, the wide range of practices of conflict prevention seems elusive. This makes its application sometimes lukewarm or understood at surface level and less appreciated.

However, the new framework for conflict prevention in West Africa requires actions to be taken in a cooperative way and in an institutional manner. Therefore, in this paper, I proposed the concept of 'Cooperative Institutionalization in Regional subsystem' as an analytical framework to re-conceptualize institutional cooperation for conflict prevention between and amongst regional organizations, state government, transnational civil society structures as well as sub-state level processes. However, in order to give my conceptual postulation clarity, I will briefly explain three critical issues why West Africa is used to test its validity and applicability as a method or process for conflict prevention in regional subsystems.

### **Regional Conflict Formation**

The term Regional Conflict Formation (RCF) was initially used in the 1980s to understand the development of regional sub-systems in the study of international relations, security studies, regional integration and regional security complex during the Cold War (Buzan, 1991). However, the connection between RCF approach and regional security complex initially focused on a conceptual understanding of the governance and management of inter-state security within regions as a result of the Cold War rivalries and did not concentrate on contemporary internal conflict issues. However, in recent years, the concept of RCF is used to describe the 'regional character of conflict' and the 'complex web of cause and effect that is difficult to understand or address at the level of a single state' (Buzan, 1991). This means that sub-regions that are interlinked by a common history, politics and socio-economic processes are met with common vulnerabilities with spillover effect across borders (Vayrynen, 1984).

West Africa is widely considered to be quite unstable as various countries have been 'embroiled in an interconnected web of conflicts' that destabilized the entire sub-region, creating more weak states that have the potential to collapse or with visible character-

istics of politically disintegrating and socio-economically degenerating into crisis point (Rotberg, 2008). This transnational nature of the conflict is characterized as RCF and serves as the rationale for cooperative institutionalization of prevention mechanisms as a regional approach to respond to risk factors in West Africa. This is premised on the arrangement of partnership between ECOWAS, state governments, transnational civil society networks and local institutions that cooperate towards the institutionalization of policies and programs across communities and institutions to prevent conflict (KA IPTC, 2010).

### **West Africa Conflict Prevention Framework:**

#### *ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF)*

In 2007, the ECOWAS secretariat was transformed into a Commission with a new vision to build architecture for Peace and Security. Part of this vision is the basis for the adoption of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) in 2008 as a roadmap for conflict prevention (ECOWAS, 2008). However, this framework requires conflict prevention mechanisms to be integrated across member states. The Framework, by all intent and purpose is well structured, as it intends to engineer the implementation of many different sets of activities that will directly or indirectly impact on the prevention of conflict and promote human security. The framework intends to make conflict prevention programs well harmonized and coordinated with both state and non-state actors implementing activities that are guided by the principles of the framework. The operationalization of the ECPF hinges on cooperation across wide-range of institutions, thereby giving relevance to the conceptual application of cooperative institutionalization of conflict prevention mechanisms in West Africa (Ismail, 2011).

#### *National Infrastructures for Peace (NI4P)*

The internal dynamics across countries in the sub-region paint a grim reality of inherent risk factors for conflict. This has encouraged many countries, especially those in conflict or coming out of conflict to develop national and local structures for peace. These structures form pathways to developing infrastructure for peace in the state. Country-level I4P brings together national and local institutions or groups to find common grounds to conflict issues in their communities (Tongeren, 2011).

In this regard, NI4P composes of other activities such as early warning systems, community mediations and dialogue, peace negotiations, security protection, local police partnership, etc. It also involves institutions such as government ministries, departments and agencies in the form of human right commission, office of the Ombudsman, state security forces, civil society organizations, religious institutions, traditional groups and community based organizations; all of which form an interconnected web of institutions that cooperate and take action to mitigate risk factors to conflict within the state.

## **Institutionalization/Collective Prevention Nexus in Regional Subsystem**

For a conflict prevention mechanism to work in regional sub-system, they should be institutionalized. They gain strength and viability when they are objectively infused into institutions. In such, an institutionalized framework serves as pillars that uphold collective actions, which become routinized in the social, economic and governance system of communities. This enforces conformity and performance of duties among actors and across sectors (Scott, 1995, p. 33, 2014). In the context of collective action for conflict prevention, institutionalizing methodically infuses into organizational structures, response mechanisms to prevent conflict (Lund, 1996, p. 176). In a sub-regional framework, institutions are instrumental elements for collective action to prevent conflict across communities (Lund, 2008).

West Africa is overshadowed by an array of risk factors as a result of weak institutions, the crisis of governance and economic challenges. In this regard, peace-building institutions are partnering on issues of early warning, security governance, cross border security and countering violent extremism. Their partnership has brought about a network of cooperation amongst institutions at various levels. Therefore, this paper proposes a conceptual approach as part of the discourse on how, why and in what way institutional cooperation responds to risk factors from local, national to regional subsystem level in West Africa.

## **Conceptualizing Cooperative Institutionalization in Regional Subsystems**

As a general term, cooperation is defined as a process of working together to achieve a common end. It involves collaboration, partnership, mutual support, coordination, joint action, combined effort, synergy, compromise, etc. Cooperation in this current discourse stems from the liberal ideas of institutional interaction, dialogue and decision-making for progress and change in society. However, it takes a departure from the traditional approach of inter-state engagement and focuses on cooperation amongst a collective group of state and non-state actors.

The organization of transnational cooperation is increasingly taking place at various levels and with multiple actors across international and regional sub-systems. This means that interactions between states and non-state actors form part of the broader network of cooperation. These networks of interaction amongst multiple institutions is what I described as '*Cooperative Institutionalization in Regional Subsystem*'.

In my view, cooperative institutionalization in a regional subsystem describes a network of formal and informal processes of collective action and decision-making amongst multiple institutions towards achieving their collective interest in the subsystem. These institutions vary in type, level of operation, constitutive organs and socially constructed setting, but form part of a growing set of institutions that collectively engage, inter-

act, implement and coordinate in taking action to institutionalized ideas, principles, norms, rules, laws, policy initiatives, etc. Such institutions within a regional subsystem include intergovernmental bodies, state-governments and their departments and agencies, transnational organizations, non-state actors, multilateral agencies, regional civil society structures and sub-state groups at national and local levels. They all make up the institutional pillars, which persist over time, forming a geographic zone of cooperation.

It is important to note that the State is the core pillar that holds the foundation for cooperation across all levels and forges the interconnected web of relationships amongst institutions in the sub-system. A categorization of these institutions is made in the table below.

**Table 1:** Types of Institutions in the Regional Subsystem

<b>Regional Institutions</b>	<b>State Institutions</b>	<b>Non-State Institutions</b>
–Regional Inter-governmental Organizations	–Federal and State Governments (Executive, Legislature, Judiciary)	–Civil society groups
–Inter-state Arrangements	–Departments	–Non-governmental Organizations
–Transnational Cooperation	–Government Agencies and Corporations, military commissions and	–Interest groups
–Regional Civil Society groups	Police sector, etc.	–Academia
–Interest-based regional organizations, etc.		–Community-based organizations
		–Religious institutions
		–Traditional institutions

Cooperative institutionalization, in practice, recognized that within the scope of regional sub-systems institutional interaction could be structurally symmetric or asymmetrical. There are different patterns of interactions that produced cooperation. This means there are institutions with unequal status, power, influence, depth and scope, whilst there are others with relatively equal standing, authority and operational scope. This heterogeneous nature of the interaction is important for the formation of an institutional order that strives for cooperation.

Standing with an institutionalist appeal, cooperative institutionalization in the regional sub-system finds its root from historical and sociological institutionalism. In hindsight, historical institutionalism is associated with rules, norms and regulations promulgated by formal and informal institutions as well as ‘emphasize the asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of institutions’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996, Simmons & Martin, 2002). Sociological institutionalism also emphasizes that formal rules, procedures, norms, symbolic systems, cultural-cognitive frames are socially constructed and transmitted by cultural practices for the realization of institutional order.

These historical and social commonalities amongst governments and people form the basis for cooperation as an institutional practice, and, in theory, as cooperative institu-

tionalization. Furthermore, cooperative institutionalization in the regional subsystem is realized when institutions converge to make or take collective decision. This point of convergence serves as a central point for cooperation that enables collective actions, conformity to rules and policies as well as implementation of programs to achieve their common end. Institutionalization of ideas, programs, norms, rules, and laws in a subsystem are realized when institutions converge and translate their ideas into implementable goals.

For the purpose of this study, the regional subsystem is described as an organized constitutive component of political, economic, social and even cultural systems of interaction within a given community of nations distinctive to or from the larger international system. Interactions, in this case, are made possible as a result of geographical proximity bounded by mutual structures of cooperation in the economic, political and socio-cultural life of the constituting states and her peoples. Thereby, forming an interconnected web of relationship that endures internal acceptance and recognized within its external environment. However, regional subsystems are liable to change as a result of internal structural dynamics and external pressures; and 'changes in one part of the subsystem can become the catalyst for change in other parts of the region' (Thompson, 1973).

### **Pre-conditions for Cooperative Institutionalization in Regional Sub-system**

In a regional sub-system, careful observation of interactions unfolding amongst the multiple categories of institutions shows that there are preconditions in the social systems for cooperation to be realized. They are highlighted and explained below.

#### ***Commitment Capacity and Domestication of Commitment***

For any cooperative venture to be pursued and gain effect in a social system, all participants, be they individuals, groups and institutions must exert an unquestionable degree of commitment. In regional sub-systems, cooperative institutionalization is applicable to the condition that there is an unflinching commitment agreed upon by all institutions involved. Without commitment by all participating institutions it is hard for the instrumental pillars, carriers and drivers in the cooperation process to gain meaning and get an outcome that resonates with the common interest of them all.

States-governments are key players in the establishment of commitment and the political capital and willingness rest on them for its realization. When states in a regional subsystem make a commitment to a particular process of cooperation, its institutions and agencies become involved in the process, and non-state actors and other partners are given a voice. This enables collective action that leads to a process of institutionalization.

### ***Mobilization Capacity***

Mobilization here means bringing resources to bear in responding to a given issue. It can involve both physical and non-physical as well as political, economic, financial, social and other technical and human resources. It also implies the ability of the regional sub-system itself, having the capacity to reach out and garner support from the multiple sets of state and non-state institutions that are required in the implementation of a cooperative agenda. In the regional process of integration, there are states that have hegemonic status and others that are small. In this case the hegemonic state must have the rallying power to bring all others into the ideology of cooperation. Also, non-state actors are recognized as having supplementary role in the institutionalization of the regional cooperative agenda.

### ***Vertical and Horizontal Partnership***

Partnership implies the establishment of relationship between two or more entities that are characterized by mutual cooperation and responsibility. There must be partnership between and amongst institutions. Vertical and horizontal partnership, in this case, connotes interaction between regional institutions and government of member states including non-state and local actors. This structure of partnership helps institution to coordinate and complement one another as they deal with social concerns.

### ***Harmonization of Policies and Programs***

Regional sub-systems at any given point in their history can develop structures for formal integration of economic and social policies as well as security cooperation. In this case, the system requires states to have common policies to achieve their common ends. This requires harmonization of policies and programs amongst member states, and participating institutions. It also means that programs and policies are designed and implemented across all states and institutions. Realizing the harmonization of normative frameworks from sub-regional institutions into the national legislation of member states is a crucial aspect towards achieving the objectives of the process of institutionalization. In this regard, crucial to the adoption of norms is the need to adopt them into laws in the national legislative structures of the various states that have signed and ratified them.

### ***Multi-Dimensional Actors***

Cooperative institutionalization is based on the assumption that many institutions are involved. The process of cooperation must be very inclusive of a variety of groups and institutions that are involved in taking collective action for a common end. As noted by Leatherman, 'multilateral endeavors provide an opportunity to admit new actors, giving

legitimacy to the parties, reframe the issues, establish mutually agreed rules' as well as provide a system of participation of civil society actors (Leatherman 1993, p. 405).

### **Cooperative Institutionalization of Conflict Prevention Mechanisms in Regional Subsystem**

Cooperative institutionalization conceptualizes the process of conflict prevention, and especially in the organization of preventive regimes in regional conflict complexes in Africa. Its purpose is to understand the network of interactions among and between institutions as well as methods, programs, policies and activities in the implementation of regional conflict prevention programs. Institutional cooperation is identified as a core variable that gives meaning to the concept. It is the enabler of interaction and the foundation for the convergence of different state and non-state actors in finding solutions to conflict and human security challenges.

These actors include regional organizations, state governments, transnational groups, local governments, specialized agencies, interest groups, and varieties of civil society structures. Together, they form an interconnected network of institutions working on policies, implementing activities, collaborating and coordinating on different issues in the prevention of violence and conflicts within local communities, at the state level, and between states in a regional subsystem. Some have equal status, power and authority whilst others do not. There is some level of hierarchy in their interactions from the regional, to state government and local structures. But all of them can be resourceful and actively work on issues that help prevent conflict in their communities, states and sub-regions.

Institutions are important for conflict management and prevention. This is because, they frame norms, rules and regulative processes as well as create the platform for cooperation in collective decision-making and constraining actors in ways that regulate, manage or even avert conflict. Alexander Siedschlag states that the theory of institutions as a platform for 'optimal collective decision making' aims to prevent conflict right from their inception. In drawing up a conceptual analysis of political institutionalization and conflict management in Europe, he uses a reflective institutionalization framework as his approach to a rationalist design for understanding institutionalization process towards conflict management. In his view, the concept of reflective institutionalization aims at a deep transformation of conflict, ameliorating the underlying culture of conflict through proactive or preventive conflict management (Siedschlag, 2001, p. 10).

In a regionalization framework, institutions are essential for the implementation of programs to prevent conflict in communities. Conflict risk factors have led to cooperation between organizations for political and security purposes. Institutionalizing these cooperative arrangements are critical for their successful implementation of response mechanisms to reduce the risk of conflict. Many regional organizations have taken

responsibility to find solutions through peacemaking, peacekeeping and other forms of political intervention. Laying a foundation for the prevention of conflict within the regional subsystems. Therefore, cooperative institutionalization conceptualizes these approaches to respond to risk of conflicts in West Africa.

Building a preventive regime in a regional subsystem requires collective action. However, collective action by all actors is only possible when there is a platform for interaction that enables cooperation. The convergence of state and non-state institutions on initiatives such as early warning systems, infrastructures for peace, preventive diplomacy, restorative justice systems, social empowerment and development projects enables them to take or make collective decisions, identified methods of implementation and decide on the collectiveness of their endeavors towards conflict prevention.

### **Cooperative Institutionalization of Conflict Prevention Mechanisms: From Concept to Practice in Africa**

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) was conceived from the desire of the AU to reform the OAU MCPMR and has become the foundation for the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The PSC was adopted in July 2002, entered into force in December 2003 and started operations in March 2004. It is 'a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa' (Africa Union Commission, 2002). The PSC focuses on the 'promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa; anticipating and preventing conflicts; promoting and implementing peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities as well as coordinate and harmonize continental and regional efforts for institutional cooperation in prevention of conflicts. Membership into the council is on the basis of 'equitable regional representation and rotation' across the various regional subsystems in Africa. The decisions of the Council are generally guided by the principle of consensus' and in cases where they are unable to reach a consensus to take a decision, a simple two-third majority vote can take effect (William, 2011, p. 158, Biswaro, 2013).

The core of the AU architecture for peace is the PSC, which was developed with operational pillars serving as essential response structures to deal with conflicts and insecurities. They include the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund (African Union, 2001). There is a process of cooperative institutionalization of these continental frameworks in regional subsystems through existing Regional Economic Communities (REC) and their Regional Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. For example, CEWS has been institutionalized into East Africa community through IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism; the same has been done in the West African Community with the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network and Southern Africa has also institutionalized early warning through SADC's Regional Early Warning

Centre based in Gaborone, Botswana. This method of cooperative institutionalization of conflict prevention has been applied in the implementation of the Africa Standby Force to undertake peace support operations and Panel of the Wise to undertake mediation and negotiation processes in different regional subsystems in Africa.

These structures have been used to respond to conflict and crisis situations in different countries. They have shaped AU response and enabled harmonization and coordination of activities in the Commission's various interventions to crisis situations across various regional subsystems as well as arrangement of cooperation with external partners and non-state actors such as regional and national civil society structures. Since 2015, the AU has developed an operational roadmap of APSA from 2016 to 2020 focusing on the link between development and conflict prevention. Also, in 2015, 'the AU endorsed its Conflict Prevention Framework as a Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF) as well as country structural vulnerability assessment (CSVAs).

During the AU summit in January 2017, the AU Master Roadmap on Practical steps for silencing the guns by 2020 was adopted. This roadmap maintains that national and regional structures must develop 'practical output in relation to structural prevention, including infrastructures for peace and structural vulnerability assessment (SVAs) (Carvalho 2017, p. 5). The AU designed and operates institutional frameworks at a continental level. However, states and regional structures have a greater role to tackle risk and vulnerabilities to conflicts. Structural problems need to be recognized and infrastructures for peace need to form part of the regional and country-level response to prevent conflict.

### **The Case of West Africa**

From an analytical point of view, the evolving preventive regime in West Africa emphasizes the need for conflict prevention processes to be integrated across countries and institutions. However, this approach to conflict prevention can only be made possible on the basis that different sets of institutions undertake activities within their area of engagement that may impact on the prevention of conflict at local, national and across countries. ECOWAS normative instruments now recognize the inextricable link between economic development and regional integration and the need for security of the people of West Africa through the institutionalization of conflict management systems and structures. Though the priority for integration in the sub-region was for economic cooperation and harmonization of economic agenda of member states, there is now a new vision of 'integration with emphasis on prevention' in order to achieve the collective action needed amongst member states for conflict prevention. This emphasis sits well with systematic prevention of conflict based on regional approach to address security threats.

The new approach to prevent conflict emphasizes that normative instruments should be implemented through harmonization and domestication of response mechanisms across member states. This is the logical argument for cooperative institutionalization of conflict prevention. For example, through the ECOWAS Small Arms Commission Programme (ECOSAP), legal frameworks have now been enacted to prevent the flow of weapons, a regional code of conduct for the Armed forces and Security services and a Regional Framework for Security Sector Reforms and governance have been harmonized and political support being galvanized for these principles to be integrated and institutionalized by states government. This will go a long way towards governance and control of armed forces in the sub-region. In addition, ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan has been rolled out for member states to integrate into their national security strategy.

This new approach for collective prevention presents a vertical and horizontal method to institutionalize conflict prevention agendas within ECOWAS and its specialized institutions as well as between ECOWAS Commission, member states, non-state actors and even the private sector. This means that the ECOWAS Commission has a responsibility to harmonize its conflict prevention agenda across departments and agencies within the Commission in order to achieve the gains of collective prevention. For example, the ECOWAS Early Warning Programme (ECOWARN) should be able to give information, early enough for the Department of Political Affairs to coordinate with the Council of the Wise in undertaking fact-finding mission or mediation efforts in a member state facing threats of instability. All these networks of interaction amongst different institutions are conceptualized as cooperative institutionalization of conflict prevention mechanisms.

As seen in Table 2 below, conflict prevention in West Africa requires a multi-actor approach involving different sets of institutions. There are four institutional methods prescribed in the table below. Firstly, ECOWAS and its departmental and specialized unit design policies within the framework for conflict prevention and working under the auspices of the commission undertakes programs with impact across all member states. For example, in the aspect of Security Governance, the conflict prevention framework states that 'ECOWAS shall develop and promote the implementation and monitoring of a set of practical guidelines to govern the activities of all actors implementing or supporting SSR initiatives in the sub-region'. In this regard, a Code of Conduct was adopted by the ECOWAS Council of Ministers in August 2011 in order to 'promote the integration of democratic norms into the behavior of the armed forces and security services' within member states of ECOWAS (Uzoehina, 2014, p. 9)

Another institutional approach highlighted above is a partnership between ECOWAS and regional non-state actors. This method is identified based on the current pattern of engagement between ECOWAS and Non-State actors with regional focus. This approach gives due consideration to the fact that many non-state institutions work on training

**Table 2:** Methods/Processes of Institutionalization of preventive action in West Africa

Actors	Method of engagement	Structure of Activities	Current Initiatives
Regional State	ECOWAS Sectoral/ department unit	Vertical and Horizontal coordination with state and non state actors	Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security on electoral governance and monitoring, etc.
		Designing and implementing regional policies	ECOWAS Parliament on democratic governance Early Warning Directorate on regional early warning systems
	ECOWAS and Regional Non-State Partnership	Design and implementation of Preventive Action Country-based networks and coordination	ECOWAS/WANEP Partnership in Implementation of Early Warning across West Africa
Non-State	Intergovernmental Specialized Agencies	Inter-state cooperation for preventive action	West Africa Police Chiefs Committee on Security Policing and transnational criminal enterprises
		Design and implementing regional policies	
Local Actors	Transnational NGOs Regional Civil Society	Training, and research, capacity building efforts, advocacy, awareness-raising, etc.	WANEP, WACSO, WASSN, WAANSA, etc. undertakes program on Early warning, Training and research, Security governance and Small Arms Control respectively
		Traditional/ local institutions	Community building, restorative justice, security cooperation National Infrastructures for Peace (NI4P), Local policing boards, community healing and reconciliation, etc.

and research, capacity building programs, policy advocacy with some level of coordination with country-based network and local actors. For example, ECOWAS and West Africa Network for Peace Building, has built more than a decade long partnership in the development of early warning systems in West Africa.

In addition, intergovernmental arrangements among specialized agencies has an important role to play in making sure that conventions, treaties, laws and policies coming from regional grouping, are harmonized and implemented in the state. Those institutional organs of government whose programs fall within the scope of regional initiatives must take appropriate action towards the implementation of such policies. The West Africa Police Chiefs Committee operates within an intergovernmental framework in dealing with regional security challenges such as transnational criminal enterprises, security policing, etc.

Sub-national and local institutions such as traditional authorities and religious groups and civil society groups take on initiatives towards creation of national and local infrastructures for peace as we see in Ghana, local police partnership board as developed in Sierra Leone, community healing and reconciliation programs as developed by religious and civil society groups in northern Nigeria.

All the actors grouped in the table above can play a variety of roles and undertake activities for conflict prevention ranging from early warning, preventive diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, fact-finding, outreach, peacemaking, election monitoring, security governance, cross-border security, local peace committees, etc.

Therefore, conflict prevention frameworks are no longer state-centered alone as the new theatre of violence and insecurity comes from within states and regional subsystems with communities imploding on one another and creating a state of instability and conflict that affects entire sub-regions (Tschirgi, 2012; Wallensteen, 2015). In the case of West Africa, ending such conflicts requires the involvement of multiple working together to pre-empt and prevent conflict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Mail, 2011).

### **Conceptual Flaws**

Cooperative institutionalization conceptualizes relational arrangement, partnership, collaboration, coordination and interaction between different institutions in a regional sub-system. However, the process of cooperation takes time and its outcome may be hard to evaluate. The impact and outcome of collective action, shared the responsibility or intersubjective interactions spanning varieties of institutions are difficult to assess in a regional sub-system. Institutional and state politics, interests of groups and unforeseen circumstances also make it hard to evaluate their effect in the subsystem.

Furthermore, institutions in a different point in their history can change. This means they can change their goals, interest and focus in response to exogenous or endogenous forces. These changes affect institutional performance, conformity to rules, norms, and value systems. It also affects existing interactions and collective actions between institutions as interests change, making it difficult or impossible for cooperation to thrive within an already organized institutional order. Therefore, the concept can be constrained by structural changes in response to changes in interest and direction of an institution.

Another fault line to consider is the issue of political commitment. The key institutional actor for cooperative institutionalization in a regional sub-system is the state. The State connects the regional structure to national and local institutions and creates a stable governance system with the necessary institutions. Therefore state-governments need to be politically committed to a process of cooperative institutionalization through agreed-upon rules, convention, regulations, laws and policies that must be transmitted

into national and local laws and policies. The collective actions of states to cooperate and institutionalize norms and rules across a regional sub-system are important and its lack thereof challenges the very foundation of the theoretical assumptions and causal logic of this work.

## **Conclusion**

Theorizing or conceptualizing in social sciences research is a bit of a complex process of arranging ideas, facts and observable phenomenon in our social environment as the basis of forming a theoretical proposition. As mentioned by Grix (2004) 'theory is an abstraction of reality, in which concepts-with referents in the real world- are related to other concepts, offering us tentative hypothesis or explanation'. This paper proposes that cooperative institutionalization is a method for collective action towards conflict prevention in regional subsystems. As the global community is becoming more arranged in regional subsystem, especially in developing regions like Africa, there is the need for a conceptual framework that analyzes institutional cooperation beyond the confines of the state. These interactions take place vertically and horizontally within states and between states and are becoming viable in dealing with human security challenges.

This article attempts to put into perspective the practice of cooperative institutionalization of conflict prevention mechanisms in West Africa. As conceptualized in the paper, cooperative institutionalization maintains that culture, shared history, common interest has enabled intersubjective interaction within subsystems leading to the establishment of regional integration programs and transnational networks of cooperation amongst different institutions. In the context of conflict prevention, cooperative institutionalization applies to the formation of norms and policies and their implementation by different institutions within the subsystem. In Africa, there are Regional Economic Communities that foster cooperation amongst countries in dealing with matters of interest to them.

Such matters may include transnational criminal activities, the control and proliferation of illicit flow of small arms and light weapons, transnational terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental concerns, etc. As stated in the UN Secretary-General Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, these human security risks that affect multiple countries across continents and regional subsystems can only be reduced through a process of 'systematic prevention'. In West Africa, the ECOWAS Conflict prevention framework alludes to this approach, as it requires a systematic process of implementation of conflict prevention programs through cooperation amongst different organizations and groups.

Cooperative institutionalization in a regional subsystem is realized on the basis of collective action and shared responsibility giving legitimacy to decision making and rules that are enforced by multiple actors for conformity and adherence towards achieving their common collective ends within the subsystem. However, it is important to note that lack of commitment by state-governments, the domestication of decisions and

rules as agreed by states and the inability of non-state actors to engage renders the concept less applicable.

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# NIGERIA: Understanding Boko Haram

Etienne LOCK

**Abstract:** This article is a contribution to the study of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It aims to demonstrate that the ethnic identity issues in Nigeria can provide elements in understanding Boko Haram as a contextual phenomenon. Indeed, this terrorist group has taken advantage of a fragile social context fueled by problems related to ethnic identity, for its emergence and its development. These problems are also related to religion which is connected to ethnic identities and which is an important component in the Boko Haram crisis, within the Nigerian political context mainly expressed in the federalism and its consequences. From an analysis of the way problems related to different ethnic groups in Nigeria have been handled since colonial time, the article shows that the concept “Boko Haram” itself depends on this particular context which in its turn enlightens Boko Haram’s terrorist actions.

**Keywords:** Nigeria, ethnic identity, federalism, insurgency, Boko Haram.

## Introduction

Since 2010, many reflections on the Boko Haram crisis have been released in two directions. Some reflections have mainly highlighted Boko Haram in relation with the global terrorism and a strain of radical Islam, emphasising its violent actions and its consequences in Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Other reflections have proposed ways to counter this unprecedented violent movement.

However, those reflections have not sufficiently considered the ethnic identity issues in Nigeria, for the understanding of the Boko Haram crisis. Yet, the integration of different ethnic components of Nigeria in building a nation has appeared as a constant challenge since independence. Therefore, the issues of

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ethnic identity and the Nigerian political history are connected. Because this history is also marked by conflicts, one can establish some relation between conflicts extended to security problems and ethnic identity issues. Moreover, generally considered, the ethnic identity is strongly linked to religious identity: for instance, while the northerners in their majority are considered as Muslims, the southerners in their majority are also considered as Christians. However, beyond these generalizations, the reality is more complex and it is in this complex reality of ethnic/religious identity that Boko Haram has also to be considered, and its actions analyzed. Therefore, how does the analysis of ethnic identity issues in Nigeria lead to the understanding of Boko Haram?

In reference to that question, the current reflection recalls some aspects of the Nigerian political history also characterized by ethnic identity claims. The article will first emphasize how the ethnic identity issues remain present and prevailing in Nigeria, then it will demonstrate that the Nigerian federalism is a perfect manifestation of the ethnic identity problems in that country. Finally, this reflection will focus on the way ethnic identity problems in Nigeria enlighten the comprehension of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria.

### **The ethnic identity issues in Nigeria**

Nigeria as a modern state seems have been built on ethnic considerations. These considerations have an impact on policy, economy and social development (Badru, 2010, p. 159). It is one of the most diversified countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with its about 350 ethnic groups (Babalola, 2015, p. 75). These groups can be divided into two groups: the majority groups and those considered as minorities. Those two kinds of ethnic groups are in competition over land, political power, economic resources, and official appointments. This makes Nigeria a kind of arena where many ethnic claims are often louder than the common national interest (Attah, 2013, p. 607).

Understanding such a landscape requires a brief back to history. As a British colonial territory, Nigeria was created in 1914, from the policy of amalgamation conducted by Lord Frederick Lugard. He merged former British protectorates previously administered independently and having not common characteristics or very little, and brought together different peoples having different backgrounds in a single territory, just for the British vested interests and in order to promote a low cost colonial administration (Badru, 2010, p. 158). The representative government of 1951 was based on ethnic groups, and so on religious belonging due to the conjunction between ethnic identity and religion (Solomon, 2013, p. 430). Moreover, three regions were created following the peoples already identified as hegemonic: the northern region with the Hausa-Fulani, the eastern region with the Igbo and the western region with the Yoruba. It remains difficult to precise the objective criteria which prevailed in designating those ethnic groups as majority groups, for a rigorous census preceding this has not yet been established. However, this generated *de facto* another problem not yet known hitherto:

the minorities, with some consequences. Olu-Olu underlined it, as far as the creation of the hegemony of the Hausa in the region of the Middle belt is concerned: "In the middle belt the peaceful coexistence of the middle beltters (such as the Tiv, Idoma, Agatu, Erulo, Nyifon) to mention a few were thwarted by the infiltration of the British and its installation of the Hausa hegemonic." (Olu-Olu, 2015, p. 217). According to Attah the categories of majority and minority are strictly a colonial creation in the Nigerian context, where such a distinction was not known before: "Historically, ethnic identities in Nigeria have been categorised into the two broad majority and minority groups (...) Prior to these categorisations, there were neither major, nor minor groups distinctions." (Attah, 2013, p. 610).

The independence process espoused ethnic identities lines, through the political parties created on the basis of the majority groups in their regions: the Northern People's Congress (NPC) for Hausa-Fulani led by Ahmadu Bello, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC) for Igbo led by Nnamdi Azikiwe and the Action Group for Yoruba whose head was Obafemi Awolowo. Therefore, even if the political parties were demanding political emancipation and self-government, they were already in competition for the interests of their particular regions and so the majority groups (Badru, 2010, p. 160). Were those political parties able to express the voices of other peoples? The answer to that question may be connected to the exclusiveness each majority group gave to itself in controlling Nigeria as a big country, by excluding others: "While the Hausa Fulani believe that they were born to rule and therefore should hold on to political power, the Yoruba were of the opinion that power belongs to the educated while the Igbo believe that they should control commerce..." (Olu-Olu, 2015, p. 222). In such a context, one can understand the increasing claims of minority groups for more access to political life, economic resources and development plans. This context has also become conducive to manipulation of the Nigerian diversity by politicians in competition (Abubakar, 2001, p. 32).

As for religion, its connection to ethnic identity is rooted in the history and the sociology of each great region of Nigeria, where religion has contributed to shape the peoples identity and where it appears as a distinctive feature (Basedau, Vüllers and Körner, 2013, p. 866). Therefore, the North – due to the legacy of the Sokoto caliphate (1804-1903) and the figure of Usman Dan Fodio who imposed Islam there – is identified as a Muslim region, because Hausa-Fulani are mostly Muslims. This general identification ignores some exceptions which might exist amongst Hausa-Fulani and other ethnic groups (minorities) which may have other religious beliefs. The same situation is observed in the South-East identified as a Christian territory, due to the Igbo ethnic group identified as Christian. This type of classification where minorities are practically absent simply shows how religion contributes to the complexity of the ethnic identity issues.

Therefore, dealing with ethnic identity is also dealing with religious belonging. In some cases, the struggle of an ethnic group in order to achieve a political ambition or an economy and social development is seen as an advantage for a religion. The connection between religion and ethnic identity is more complicated, due to the fact that there are generally several trends in the same religion: in Islam for instance, there are Sunni, Shia, Salafiyyah groups...; in Christianity there are many Christian tendencies. The access to economic resources and political positions arouses many claims from minority groups and even creates other minorities within the already known majority groups. Nigeria overcomes this complex situation that challenges its stability and the national cohesion – as the war of secession in the Biafra did between 1967 and 1970 – by often using violence against ethnic groups (Olu-Olu, 2015, p. 223). Another way Nigeria handles the problems related to ethnic identity, is to go further in establishing its federalism.

### **The Nigerian federalism**

Nigeria is, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, one of the remaining African countries with a federal organisation and governance. The particularity of the Nigerian federalism is on the one hand, related to the British colonial administration. On the other hand, Nigerian federalism is an important deal with ethnic identity issues: “Promoters of the idea were of the view that the interests of the ethnic minorities in the country would be better protected under a federal political arrangement.” (Babalola, 2015, p. 75). Indeed the Nigerian federalism took a policy of balance after independence, applied to its ethnic components and its regions. However, this contributed to fuel ethnic competition for more access to power and resources, overshadowing national integration the Nigerian federalism also intended to promote in a context of diversity (Suberu, 2001, p. 1). Therefore, the federal organisation became strongly connected to ethnic identity issues, which continues today (Osadolor, 2010, p. 196).

If the first constituent units were created in relation to the hegemony of the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo and the Yoruba, the latter units weakened this hegemony. The current policy in that regard seems to be oriented in order to make sure that any of these majority groups could not represent the overwhelming majority in any of the Nigerian states: “The incongruence between ethnic and state boundaries in Nigeria is not the result of a natural divergence between ethnic and territorial identities (...) Rather, the divergence of ethnic and state boundaries in Nigeria has resulted from a federalist state-building strategy that has sought to break up the country’s three major ethnic groups into several states and to substitute ostensibly innocuous administrative divisions for presumably more fraught ethnic identities.” (Suberu, 2001, p. 80; Jinadu, 2002, p. 6).

The importance of the ethnic identity issues into the Nigerian federalism is also expressed by the “federal character” established in the 1979 Constitution and reaffirmed in the 1989 and 1999 Constitutions (Adesoji and Aloa, 2009, p. 158; Dibua, 2011, p. 11).

According to the “federal character”, any appointment in National Government is based on the states’ representations, rather than ethnic or regional (referring to the former great regions). Yet, since the states constituents in the Nigerian federalism are aligned with the ethnic identity issues, the “federal character” makes the federal state policy focused on ethnic groups. Historically, the interweaving between federalism and ethnic identity highlights political manoeuvring in dividing the country into many states, as it was the case when the western region was portioned into two parts in 1963 with the creation of the Middle West just to weaken the Yoruba dynamism, or when the issue of the creation of the states was tackled by the military regimes.

Some scholars have supported the Nigerian federalism in its current implementation, arguing that because of the diversity – geographical as well as ethnic – of the country, federalism is the adequate way for the political organisation of this country (Adamalekun and Kincad, 1991, p. 188). This position seems to ignore the colonial legacy and its continuous effects on the ethnic cleavages created and complicated (Badru, 2010, p. 159; Attah, 2013, p. 612). Moreover, many countries in Africa are not federal like Nigeria, but have diverse peoples, languages and cultures. So, the federal system is not a panacea to solve problems related to ethnic diversity.

The “federal character” which has reinforced the claims of many minority groups of the country is also connected to another kind of group cleavage, opposing satisfied people and those who are dissatisfied of the policy conducted by the federal state and its constituencies. Satisfied people are those who can access to power or economic resources, and dissatisfied people are those far from political power and resources. Actually, the connection between federalism and ethnic identity has strengthened the feeling of belonging to a particular group as more important than belonging to a nation where many groups coexist. In such a context, the success or the appointment of one of the members of a given group is considered as the success of the entire community, which is therefore in the position of satisfaction, though this kind of success remains individual. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction are therefore other parameters in the comprehension of the complexity of the identity issues in Nigeria relatively to federalism.

The Nigerian federalism has certainly some success, but the insufficiencies are numerous due to corruption and manipulation of ethnic identities by politicians bereft of political bid, as emphasized by many scholars like Solomon pointing out a bad leadership: “Nigeria has been beset with a leadership which (...) has no idea of Nigeria and no notion of Nigeria as a spatial and structural instrument of the construction, expansion and popularisation of egalitarian social life. Far from attempting to overcome these divides, Nigeria’s political (and military) mandarins have cynically exploited the country’s fault lines – whether regional, religious or ethnic – for personal advantage.” (Solomon, 2013, p. 430).

This has led the federalism in Nigeria to a fragile organisation which bears the risk of its collapse as demonstrated by new current claims such as the Biafra independence justified by the “Igbo marginalisation” (Badru, 2010, pp. 163-164). Some other regions might join this inclination to secession. Besides, there are many other calls for more states in Nigeria because of the growing of the willingness to access to the “national cake”. Therefore, the future is in question: “Unless some structural or fundamental means can be found to discourage the process, the creation of new states and localities may become, in Olusegun Obasanjo’s opinion, ‘an endless joke which will continue to reduce the viability of our federalism.’” (Suberu, 2001, p. 110). Due to the strong connection between federalism and ethnic identity, the better would be to questioning federalism as political organisation suitable to Nigeria or to rethinking Nigerian identity in the frame of the national cohesion and a real citizenship which could overcome problems such as indigene-settler relation.

### **The indigene-settler issue**

The indigene-settler issue appears as one of the most important consequences of the Nigerian federalism (Jinadu, 2002, p. 35). Indeed, having mainly been based on the ethnic identity issues this has contributed to establish the indigene-settler issue, referring to the dialectic of “son of the soil” meaning “natives or indigenes” versus “settlers or foreigners.” (Alubo, 2008, p. 1). This dialectic is related to privileges or access to privileges.

Yet, it is important to stress that Nigeria is not the only country in Africa where disputes between natives and settlers exist. In Cameroon for instance, similar problems do exist since some decades; and a city like Douala has witnessed the claims of the so-called natives over land and some administrative positions. The state policy to solve this issue is to appoint natives in some government positions in local level. An example is the position of *Délégué du gouvernement auprès de la Communauté urbaine* who represents the government in a big city as a “super mayor”. The person in that position is a senior official in charge of the municipalities’ affairs and he/she is above the mayors who are elected by the populations.<sup>1</sup> In Douala, in Yaoundé, in Bafoussam, and in other big cities elsewhere in Cameroon, the incumbent of this position is always a “native” appointed by the President of the Republic, without considering the skills required by the position: the only purpose is to satisfy the claims of “natives”. In the national level, the policy of regional balance outweighs the requirement of competencies and even creates some injustice. For instance, the competitions for enrolment in schools training the senior officials is driven by that policy of regional balance, instead of promoting a

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1 Cameroon seems to be the only case in the world where such an inconsistency is observed. It is seen as an impediment to democracy, since the position has been created and reinforced in the 1990s by Paul Biya, the President of the Republic, to counter the mayors then elected and who were coming from the political parties of opposition.

recruitment on the basis of the merit, as the scandal of the Cameroonian Institute for International Relations (IRIC) has clearly demonstrated in 2015 with the Minister of Higher Education, Professor Jacques Fame Ndongo.<sup>2</sup> Similar things are observed in some other African countries, where the ethnic identity plays an important role for political positions (Badru, 2010, pp. 149-169).

In the Nigerian case, the fact that the federalism is aligned with ethnic identity issues has opened the way to many interpretations and practices of exclusion: "The 1979 Constitution from which the 1999 Constitution was modified has been seen as laying the basis or foundation for the indigeneship problems. This is because it expressly provides that in order to enjoy access to positions and opportunities on the basis of 'federal character' one needs to be an 'indigene' of the state or local government concerned." (Adesoji and Aloa, 2009, p. 158).

The same comprehension of the 1999 Constitution related to the indigene-settler issue has been presented by Alubo (Alubo, 2008, p. 5). In the federated states of Nigeria, the competition over access to schools, lands, scholarships, civil positions..., etc, is in priority opened to the "natives" of these states. One could hypothesize that this measure has been taken in order to allow the minorities to have the same opportunities as the identified majority groups. However, the indigene-settler issue has definitely generated many other problems that question citizenship in Nigeria and create other discriminations remaining unsolved.

The indigene-settler issue in Nigeria is not only a question addressed to the citizenship, but also a challenge vis-à-vis the citizenship and even a threat upon it. Indeed how is it possible to conceive a citizenship in a Federal Republic and articulated to the indigene-settler problem? Some scholars as Dibua in the wake of Momoh have identified three categories of citizenship in Nigeria: constitutional citizenship, ethnic citizenship and diasporic citizenship (Dibua, 2011, p. 4). Dibua even considered a fourth category based on the *sharia*, for its implementation and influence in the northern states of Nigeria (Dibua, 2011, p. 5). In the same vein, the contest between citizenship and indigeneship leading to other forms of citizenship has been presented by Nwosu (Nwosu, 2008, p. 83). However, amongst the citizenships identified, the most efficient seems to be the one connected to ethnic identity, which also overlaps with religion (Harnischfeger, 2004, p. 443).

Relatively to the concept of foreigner, the indigene-settler issue seems to be rooted in some Nigerian peoples' traditions such as Yoruba. As Akanji has stressed it, in the Yoruba pre-colonial society the dichotomy indigene-settler was already present and was

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2 For this competition, three different lists of the results had been published and the names of some laureates deleted and replaced by those who were unsuccessful. The Minister explained the changing of the lists by the necessity of the regional balance, which in Cameroon refers to an ethnic identity issue.

concerning the land. More precisely a stranger or foreigner was (and is still) a person who could not claim the land. Thus, the title of foreigner was devoted to those who were farming or fishing in an area, namely a piece of land, which was not belonging to them (Akanji, 2011, p. 119).

All what precedes suggests that being Nigerian would be firstly belonging to a particular ethnic group located somewhere in Nigeria; this means being a “native” from somewhere: “Certificates of state and/or local council indigene have become prerequisites for a wide array of opportunities such as admission to schools and employment even as the conditions for obtaining these are immutable.” (Alubo, 2008, p. 8). Therefore, what about Nigerians without such references, since according to the constitution the citizenship can also be acquired by naturalisation of people coming from outside Nigeria?

Another issue raised here is the situation of women. Indeed, the dialectic indigene-settler seems to ignore the women getting married in the states other than theirs. According to the traditions of Nigerian peoples and even the Nigerian constitution, a woman who gets married to a man belongs henceforth to her husband people; but she is not obviously considered such as, when comes the time for access to employment, political positions or scholarships. Women sometimes need to return to their states of origin where they have priority in competitions regarding official positions or scholarships.

The indigene-settler issue has already triggered many riots in many Nigerian states as well as violent disputes between peoples of different ethnic groups of the same state. While the natives consider themselves as having all the rights, the settlers do not always consider themselves as foreigners, because in Nigeria the concept of settler is very changing, also depending on the kind of relations different groups have with each other in a same state (Akanji, 2011, p. 119). Therefore, who is actually a settler? After a century of settlement is it right to continue to be considered as a settler, meaning a foreigner? Those questions suggest that the distinction between natives and settlers can be problematic in some cases (Adesoji and Aloa, 2009, p. 154).

The indigene-settler issue seems very far from its end, for the problems related to ethnic identity are still present; they are even increasingly reinforced. It would be therefore important for Nigeria to revise such a disposition and even to fight against the official practice of discrimination related to the indigene-settler issue. From this complex issue, it seems easier to define an ethnic identity like the Igbo, the Tiv, or the Yoruba, than to define the Nigerian citizenship.

### **“Boko Haram” within the ethnic identity issues**

Many scholars working on the African insurgencies and more specifically on Boko Haram, have practically the same definition of the concept “Boko Haram” itself. Even though some of them consider the concept as combining Hausa and Arabic words re-

spectively while for others the concept is totally from Hausa language, they agree on the same translation and definition. Their common definition of Boko Haram is linked to the relation between that terrorist group and anything from the West or connected to the so-called “modern civilisation”. One has for instance, Aghedo and Osumah translating Boko Haram by the evil character of western education (Aghedo and Osumah, 2012, p. 858); and Murtada defining Boko Haram as opposed to the western educational system (Murtada, 2013). For Akanji the group’s name is connected to western education as something forbidden (Akanji, 2015, p. 61). More recently, Alozieuwa has translated the concept as “Western Civilization is forbidden” (Alozieuwa, 2016, p. 50); Iyekekpolo has defined Boko Haram vis-à-vis the western education, which is considered sinful (Iyekekpolo, 2016).

All those definitions given to the concept “Boko Haram” seem to ignore the very reality of the ethnic group issues in Nigeria. Indeed, the scholars above have separated “Boko Haram” from the Nigerian reality, which needs to be taken into account in the definition of this terrorist group. Otherwise, how can a Nigerian phenomenon be only linked to the West, while history, politics and even sociology of Nigeria are able to provide explanations to any problem emerging from the particular context of that country? Boko Haram is first and foremost a contextual insurgency. Therefore, its comprehension requires a consideration of its context of appearance and development which is the northern Nigeria, fashioned and still influenced by ethnic identity issues. Moreover, the definition of “Boko” in relation to the West seems mostly related to the connection established between “Boko” and “book” symbolising the western education or more widely the western civilization. On this particular issue of book, one should mention that attributing the concept “book” exclusively to the West appears as a mistake, for the Muslim tradition in which most of the peoples of the Northern Nigeria are rooted, also knew books and many scholars, especially during the time of the Sokoto Caliphate.

According to Professor Mohammed Munkaila of the University of Maiduguri, one of the leading linguists of the Hausa language, “Boko” is not related to “book” as some scholars have argued. As far as the concept “Haram” is concerned, there is a consensus over its meaning, although some little differences could be noted on its translation. Indeed, “Haram” defined or translated as forbidden, sinful, bad, or rejected, indicates the same thing, qualifies something in the same way. Therefore, the word that needs clarification in the concept “Boko Haram”, is “Boko” due to the above-mentioned disagreement over its translation.

In *A Hausa-English Dictionary* edited by Newman and recognized as “the dictionary of choice for Hausa-language scholars” (Buba, 2008, p. 458), the concept “Boko” has four senses: western education, Latin alphabet (especially as contrasted with the Arabic alphabet for writing Hausa), secular, and fraud (Newman, 2007, pp. 22-23). Amongst them, only the fourth sense could be considered as not related to a particular civilization

or cultural issues. Indeed, “western education” and “Latin alphabet” are related to the western civilization, while “secular” is linked to a particular society according to the importance and the place given to religion in that society. Thus “secular” gives some cultural references. For instance, France is a secular country because of the neutrality of the state vis-à-vis religion; and the French secularism is one of the most important components of the French culture.

As for the fraud that also means here deceit, it is something rather connected to the common morality and rejected in any culture and by all civilizations. Therefore, the problem about “Boko” lies in the three first senses of the dictionary edited by Newman. Since those senses have something to do with cultural issues, and particularly the western culture (western education, Latin alphabet and secularism are related to the peoples of the West), one can link them to the encounter between Hausa and western peoples. Thereby, the understanding of “Boko” also needs to be situated in the history of the encounter between the West and the African continent, particularly in Northern Nigeria.

The concept “Boko” arose in a context of fundamental intellectual reaction by Islamic *ulema* against European or western imperialism, based on cultural domination, during the colonial time. Indeed, as the colonial expansion was an enterprise aiming to impose the “civilisation” made up of the western ideologies, the western way of life, and the western religion namely Christianity, the intellectual (and even the military) reaction within the Muslim communities was to protect the Muslim religion as well as the Muslim tradition: this also meant protecting ethnic identities fashioned by Islam as a religion. In Nigeria for instance, the struggle of the Muslim authorities, after the conquest of Sokoto in 1903 by the British colonial army, was to keep the Muslim community away from the proselytizing of the Christian missionaries. Indeed these missionaries sought to convert Muslims, in spite of the policy of the British colonial administration of impeding this (Sodiq, 2009, p. 650; Barnes, 2010, p. 442). It should be noted that the reaction of Islamic *ulema* against European domination was not because the imperialism was European or western, but firstly because this was something foreign and able to disturb the way of life in Muslim communities and Muslim religion. That explains some movements of resistance as the one carried out by Samory Touré against the European expansion in Africa (Peterson, 2008, pp. 261-279). Thus, it is obvious that even if the imperialism or the cultural domination as a threat came from Asia, from America or from elsewhere, the reaction would have been the same in order to protect Muslim communities.

Therefore, the concept “Boko” appears as strongly connected to what is foreign or what is related to foreign influence, for that comes from outside and it is able to disturb the organisation of the Muslim communities whether in Nigeria or elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. However, inside Nigeria, the concept “foreign” itself is very ambiguous, especially when one considers the ethnic identity issues, the Nigerian federalism and the indigene-settler issue. From these issues that characterize the Nigerian political,

historical and sociological context, as demonstrated with the “federal character” and its interpretation, a foreigner is not only a person coming from outside Nigeria. In fact, from one constituent state of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to another, a foreigner might also be a Nigerian in Nigeria. Thus, a Nigerian settler or non-indigene is indeed a foreigner somewhere in Nigeria.

“Boko” in Nigeria has to be taken in a sense which considers the situations presented above. In northern Nigeria, and relatively to Muslim communities, a foreigner can also be a northerner who is not Muslim or who is not practicing Islam in a certain manner. This could appear as an extremist position; yet, it is important to remind that the Northern Nigeria is mostly established in the legacy of the Sokoto caliphate and its main figure Usman Dan Fodio who led a *jihad* against the political Muslim class he considered “stranger”, due to its un-Islamic behaviour (Iyekekpolo, 2016). The northern Nigeria is therefore seen as a Muslim territory, and this could explain some political orientations taken, regardless those who are not Muslims, as it was the case in a northern state of Nigeria, when the “Governor of Zamfara announced plans in 1999 to implement ‘full *Shari’a*’ in his state.” (Thurston, 2015, p. 28).

In northern Nigeria, the concept “Boko” related to “foreign” is also related to people who are not from that part of the country, as it was during the colonial era, when they could not settle inside some towns because of their way of life that did not comply with the requirements of living in the North. In Kano for instance, this kind of people had to settle outside the city (Akanji, 2011, p. 120). This practice was supported and even encouraged by the British colonial administration which, with its policy of indirect rule, also maintained the religious, political and traditional organisation established many decades before by the Sokoto caliphate. Thus, the concept “Boko” would not only be applied to people, but also to some ways of life other than those prescribed in some native communities of the northern part of the country. This could even be extended to other regions or states in Nigeria.

In his recent book entitled *Searching for Boko Haram: A History of Violence in Central Africa*, Scott MacEachern has brought out the historical background of the region covered by Boko Haram attacks. That historical background is mainly based on resistance of whatever comes from outside and does not correspond to a certain way of practice of Islam: “The history of this region has been marked by horrific violence, indigenous adaptation and fierce resistance to outside control, and memories of that history still affect how local people understand the scourge of terrorism that Boko Haram has brought to the lands around Lake Chad.” (MacEachern, 2018, p. 3). Indeed, it appears that the origins of Boko Haram “lie in a complex history of religious disputation and political competition that started centuries ago in the lands around Lake Chad.” (MacEachern, 2018, p. 6). Any approach that ignores or disregards this particular background still having impact in the present might fail to provide a sufficient explanation and a thorough

understanding of Boko Haram. The perspicacity of MacEachern's book is also shown by his definition of the concept Boko Haram, which corresponds to the approach given above and which differs from what is commonly said: "Boko Haram' might thus more accurately be translated by 'Deceitful education is forbidden', which does not fit quite as well with western reductionist images of the group as fundamentally ignorant and backward." (MacEachern, 2018, p. 11).

Boko Haram appears therefore as a terrorist group that not only is rooted in a tradition of violence, but that also takes advantage of the complex situation of ethnic identity issues based on competition in Nigeria, in order to impose its disastrous agenda. The group seems to be entrenched in the prohibition of all what does not correspond to the northern Nigeria and to the principles of a radical and fundamentalist Islam. Thus, Boko Haram combines religion and region, which are also the crucible of many internal conflicts in Nigeria.

Relatively to the ethnic identity issue, this seems to be aligned with the mindset of many northerners represented by Ahmadu Bello, the *Sardauna* of Sokoto, during the independence campaign and even before, within the Northern People's Congress (NPC). The objective openly presented by the party was to put the northerners in the positions of the political power (Elaijwu and Galadima, 2003, p. 129). Due to this tradition of only caring about the northern region, it seems relevant to hypothesize that Boko Haram is not a movement whose aim is to conquer Nigeria, but certainly to recover the authentic northern Nigeria with probably the frontiers of the Sokoto caliphate which was a dominated Hausa-Fulani empire. Inasmuch that empire blanketed some current neighboring countries like Cameroon, one can understand why Boko Haram is active in Northern Cameroon and even why some northern Cameroonians have found themselves involved in Boko Haram actions. Indeed Boko Haram also plays with the feelings of the trans-border peoples brought out in a study conducted by Ikechi Onah: "This study has shown clearly that fractions of trans-border groups are effectively prevented from involvement in the commanding heights of the economy and politics of any one of the countries in which they live, the tendency is always for them to see the larger ethnic group as the alternative, hence their increased attachment to the group and solidarity with other fractions in the other countries." (Ikechi Onah, 2015, p. 90).

All what precedes could also explain the attacks of Boko Haram against people who are not Hausa-Fulani and Muslims, and even against those who are Hausa-Fulani but far from the fundamentalism: "In Nigeria, despite the popular portrayal of the Muslim Boko Haram attacking Christians, extensive research by Human Rights Watch on the victims of Boko Haram violence found that the Hausa-Fulani Boko Haram were targeting victims on the basis of not only their religion but also their ethnicity (largely Yoruba and Igbo)." (Solomon, 2013, p. 432; see also Aghedo and Osumah, 2012, p. 859; Attah, 2013, p. 617). Moreover, the general context of Nigeria regarding ethnic identity issues

is very conducive to the doctrine of Boko Haram, since the “son/daughter of the soil syndrome” seems to play its game in northern Nigeria (Jinadu, 2002, p. 37). It is in the same way that one can understand the position of Boko Haram against the western or modern civilisation, expressed in the destruction of the schools and other modern facilities which remind the western influence in Nigeria (Murtada, 2013, p. 18).

Some scholars as Akanji have argued that Boko Haram aims to impose Islam to the whole Nigeria (Akanji, 2015, p. 62). But this is quite difficult to admit, because the predominant political tradition in the northern Nigeria since independence is to defend the interests of the northerners anywhere in Nigeria, and not to impose the North everywhere in the country. Besides, Islam in Nigeria has many different trends, and the trend claimed by the Boko Haram insurgency is a particular one. Indeed its alignment with the Islamic State is the proof of its radicalization and contributes to explain the terrorist actions led against other Muslim communities. An observation one can make is that the Nigerian context seems favorable to the development of radicalization, whether on the side of the ethnic identity or on the side of religion connected that identity. Boko Haram therefore appears as a kind of accomplishment of this, by combining both kinds of radicalization in its doctrine and its terrorist actions.

## **Conclusion**

The ethnic identity issues in Nigeria are an important key of comprehension of its political itinerary since independence, as well as its current difficulties made up of many insurgencies observed in the North and elsewhere in the country, like in the Niger Delta. And the situation seems to be far from its end, since Nigeria needs to forecast other possible insurgencies, with the ethnic identity claims increasingly growing.

The Nigerian federalism has been presented as the response to the necessity to promote the diversity of the country and to create an atmosphere of peaceful cohabitation of different peoples, overcoming at the same time competition between ethnic groups and frustrations related to that competition. However, this federalism based on a colonial legacy which encompasses ethnic divisions and frustrations, seems not yet able to solve the ethnic problems. Moreover, considering the willingness of the Nigerian federalism to satisfy many ethnic groups presented as minorities from other minorities or from traditional majority ethnic groups, the implementation of the “federal character” and its interpretation which sometimes changes from one constituent state to another, will probably worsen the indigene-settler issue, as an institutionalized discrimination.

Those fault-lines give explanations to some inevitable conflicts in Nigeria. They are also a crucible of the Boko Haram insurgency whether in its terminology, in its agenda and its terrorist actions. The sect appears, not only as a radical religious group rooted in a particular historical context of violence and aligned with the Islamic State, but also an expression of the complex situation created by the ethnic identity problems in Nigeria.

Thus, overcoming such an insurgency might require a serious reconsideration of these problems in which religion is not absent, due to its connection to them.

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# PHILIPPINES: Youth as Conflict Managers. Peacebuilding of Two Youth-Led Non-Profit Organizations in Mindanao

Primitivo III C. RAGANDANG

**Abstract:** An emerging trend in studies proves how young people are engaged in post-conflict initiatives, yet minimal studies were conducted on how do youth enhance their peacebuilding agency when access to formal training and formal institutions are unavailable. Especially for youth-led organizations in developing and conflict-driven regions, the inaccessibility of proper training and the inability to establish strategic directions is a challenge. This research examined the peacebuilding project management of two youth-led and arts-based peacebuilding organizations in Mindanao. Both organizations have strategies that are developed through experience gained by their key stakeholders. Its goals and peacebuilding programs are inclined to bring impact to its beneficiaries at the individual, interpersonal, and community levels. Especially for non-profit literature, the empirical data from this study contributes particularly to developing and conflict-driven regions where proper training is scarce, that experience-based strategies can be effective in enhancing staff and members' capacity.

**Keywords:** Mindanao, peacebuilding, project management, youth.

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In the recent years, the use of arts as a tool for peacebuilding has become popular especially in the post-conflict areas (personal communication, Potler, 2012), yet for being considered as a "soft" approach (Shank & Schirch, 2008), it is not as popular as compared to conventional approaches such as lectures, meetings, and conferences. In Mindanao, the use of arts such as dance, painting, drama, and games forms part of

the annual Mindanao Week of Peace (MWP) among civil society organizations (CSOs), with the youth and children as common players. As to music, Pruitt's (2011) preliminary analysis from a case study conducted in Northern Ireland shows that music is an alternative way to engage in dialogue for building peace for the fact the music can bring youth together to share meaning. Ragandang and Viloría's (2018) examined how arts-based youth organizations can achieve sustainability despite the unpopular acceptance of arts as a tool in peacebuilding.

A study by Zelizer (2003) on the role of artistic processes in peace-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina revealed that community arts-based processes had become one of the most important components of peacebuilding work in conflict and post-conflict states. He affirmed that the arts-based approach to peacebuilding "can be an especially effective tool to bring together identity groups through sharing common cultural experiences ... and engaging communities in creative projects." If positioned within the larger framework of civil society-based initiatives for peacebuilding, Zelizer (2003) affirmed that arts-based efforts are fitting. Such activities might range from joint economic projects to grassroots mediation and dialogue programs.

With the advice and regular support from their adult advisers, organizations with arts-based approaches towards peacebuilding have always involved the youth. Although the role of youth has been recognized in peacebuilding discourse, there has been limited research on how do youth enhance its peacebuilding agency when access to formal training is unavailable. This is as true as well on studies about the impact that the youth may have on peacebuilding processes (Del Felice & Wisler, 2007).

Various scholars (e.g., Ardizzone, 2003; Arnold, 2009; Bennett, Karki, & Nepal, 2012; Del Felice & Solheim, 2011; Gillis, 2002; McEvoy-Levy, 2001; Pruitt, 2011; Ragandang & Viloría, 2018; Theis, 2006; Tom, 2014; Ungerleider, 2001) affirm how youth can be agents for managing conflict through various youth-led peacebuilding initiatives. These initiatives may include emergency relief assistance, utilization of social media for positive messaging, interreligious dialogue, seminars on inner peace, and arts-based activities on empathy education (McEvoy-Levy, 2001; McEvoy-Levy, 2012; Radomski, 2010; Schreiter, 2015; Ungerleider, 2012; Silverio, 2010). In Mindanao alone, a rapid appraisal reveals that there are at least 150 individual youth-led peacebuilding organizations.

This paper endeavors to examine the nature of peacebuilding programs as well as strategies in managing these programs. It utilizes the case of two youth-led arts-based (YLAB) non-profit organizations in Mindanao, herein referred to as YLAB A and YLAB B. The importance of studying young peacebuilding can be arranged into three points. One, it is in the lives of the youth where the length of conflict goes as they grow (Gillis, 2002; Smith Ellison & Smith, 2012). Two, youth-based programs will likely fail if youth themselves are not included in the process (Bennett, Karki, & Nepal, 2012; Lopes Cardozo

*et al.*, 2015). Three, resilience is one of the values young peacebuilders earned in the process, while making them more capable of addressing trauma (McEvoy-Levy, 2001).

### **Research Design**

This research is a case study of two arts-based youth-led organizations in Mindanao, the Philippines. Focused group discussions (FGD), interviews, and participant observation were conducted during the fieldwork. The researcher is a member of one organization under study and therefore tries to use the reflective approach in qualitative research. The reflective approach is when the researcher tries to reflect and interpret its own suppositions, trying to differentiate it with the suppositions of others, and by putting his own assumption to objective review (Alvesson & Sköldbberg, 2000).

### **The locale of the Study**

Though programs and projects of YLAB A and YLAB B are implemented in different regions throughout Mindanao, this research is conducted in the northern region of the island. Northern Mindanao is also known as Region X, comprising the provinces of Camiguin, Misamis Oriental, Lanao del Norte, Bukidnon, and Misamis Occidental. Cagayan de Oro City is the regional center. It has a total land area of 2,049,602 hectares. Aside from the fact that these two organizations are founded and grew in Northern Mindanao, the other reason that makes Northern Mindanao as the appropriate locale of this study is that the majority of the organizations' peace-building projects and programs are conducted in this region. Thus, most of its key, primary, and secondary stakeholders are living in this area.

### **Key Informants of the Study**

The informants of this study are mainly the staff and members of YLAB A and YLAB B. For purposes of historical background, former members and other individuals who had been part of the early years of the operation of the organizations are also included.

Moreover, purposely selected stakeholders and partner communities are also part of this study. The maximum variation sampling category of purposive sampling was specifically used in this study, which Dudovskiy (2017) defined as a heterogeneous type of purposive sampling which "selects participants with diverse characteristics in order to ensure the presence of maximum variability in the primary data." An FGD was conducted with these purposely selected recipient communities and stakeholders in which peace-building programs and projects of these two organizations have been conducted.

Also, other stakeholders who had been part and are currently part of the organization are also interviewed for purposes of data triangulation.

## **Data Gathering Method**

Data in this research is gathered through key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussion (FGD), and direct and participant observation. On KII, a semi-structured interview guide helped the researcher conduct the interview in the community. According to Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008), questions in a semi-structured interview guide may differ in wording and order yet are anchored on the main guide research questions and the research's main concerns. Key informants include the organizations' founders and its founding members. Hybels and Weaver (2001) defined an interview as "a series of questions and answers usually exchanged between two people who have the purpose of getting and understanding information about a particular subject or topic." In this research, interviews were conducted for selected members of YLAB A and YLAB B. It was conducted between February 20 and June 15, 2017. The researcher made a thoughtful consideration that only youth members who have substantial years of being a member of the organization will be selected as informants, as the study delves will looking into the experience of the organization in managing peacebuilding programs.

Secondly, FGD was conducted with members from the partner communities and stakeholders. Hybels and Weaver (2001) defined FGD as a forum where ideas are proposed and then modified in response to group feedback. It is a way for everyone to participate and be heard. Using an FGD guide, it was conducted in the places where partner communities and stakeholders reside which include barangays of Puerto and Macasandig in Cagayan de Oro City, municipalities of Villanueva and Tagoloan in Misamis Oriental, and in Malitbog, Bukidnon. Purposely selected because of their involvement in the organizations for over three years, and considering the role they played in managing their peacebuilding programs, respondents were interviewed using a voice recorder gadget.

The third method used is direct and participant observation. Fetterman (1989) stressed that fieldwork is the key activity in all qualitative research designs. Formal data gathering followed upon acquisition of necessary data gathering protocols. Interviews and focused group discussions were scheduled, according to the availability of the informants as well as checking on the weather conditions of the area.

## **Results and Discussion**

This section presents the results and analysis of the study, gathered from the fieldwork.

### ***Peacebuilding Programs of YLAB A and YLAB B***

As youth arts-based peacebuilding organizations, peacebuilding programs of YLAB A and YLAB B are implemented throughout Mindanao, through its young members. It uses arts as a tool anchored on the belief that it can better capture the attention of their prospective beneficiaries, the youth. By using ice breakers, games and movement-based

activities, the program can be fun and entertaining at the same time which in turn makes the participants' time and experience during the activity worthwhile. According to one member of YLAB B,

*Dili gyud mi musugot na boring ang programming kay the director believes that boring your audiences is a mortal sin. So in everything we do, kung murag taas na gani ang lecture, putlon na dayon na sya. Automatic gyud dayon na sya butangan ug usa ka ice breaker or anything na related ra pod sa topic. After all, we are rich in games and movement-based activities. So always, fun is the key. (We really won't allow that the program will be boring because the director believes that boring your audiences is a mortal sin. So, in everything we do, if the lecture takes already takes long, we will immediately cut it. We will automatically give an ice breaker or anything related to the topic. After all, we are rich in games and movement-based activities. So always, fun is the key).*

Parallel to its organizational objectives, the peacebuilding programs of YLAB A and YLAB B are summarized in the table below based on three categories, namely: individual, interpersonal, and community peacebuilding.

**Table 1.** Peacebuilding programs of YLAB A and YLAB B

Types of Peacebuilding Program	YLAB A	YLAB B
Attainment of inner peace	School and Community-based Training-Workshops on Maximizing Youth Potentials through the Arts Safe Space for a Safer Life Program: An Artsville for Street Kids	Workshops on Gender-Sensitivity, Stress, and Anger Management Programming on Empathy Education and Emotional Intelligence
Promotion of positive interpersonal relationship	Young Peacebuilders In Action: An Art Attack Busker's Project Helping our fellow youth: School Supplies and Pre-Loved Books Campaign	Colloquium on Diversity and Youth-based Peacebuilding Understanding the other: School Supplies and Pre-loved Shoes Campaign
Development of a peaceful community	Trash matters: an Eco-Peacebuilding Recycling Project Observance of socio-cultural events (Mindanao Week of Peace, Human Rights Week, Arts month, Earth hour)	Training on Bullying Prevention and Building Safer Spaces Observance of socio-cultural events (Mindanao Week of Peace, Human Rights Week, Anti-bullying month)

*Attainment of inner peace programs of YLAB A and YLAB B*

On one hand, the individual peacebuilding programs of YLAB A include the “Safe Space for a Safer Life Program: An Artsville for Street Kids” and “School and Community-based Training-workshops on Maximizing Youth Potentials through the Arts”. Firstly, the Artsville of YLAB A serves as a home for Cagayan de Oro’s street kids, where at the same time they were able to discover their potentials through the arts-based programs

of the organization conducted in the Artsville. This Artsville project of the organization is their winning entry to the Ten Accomplished Youth Organization (TAYO) Awards in 2010, held in Malacañang Palace, Manila. The founder emphasized that one of the main purposes of this project is to guide these young people who experienced domestic and street violence and who resort to violent strategies to make a living. According to respondent YLAB A2, their first Artsville catered 75 beneficiaries and is located in Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City through a grant from the British Council. Currently, a new Artsville is under construction in San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. Having a safe space for street children such as Artsville supports the theory of Lederach (1997) on “the importance of creating safe and accessible social spaces or relational spaces as part of peacebuilding.”

Secondly, the organization’s training-workshops in schools and community centers aimed at maximizing youth potential through the arts. Depending on the agreement between YLAB A and partner organization, the implementations of these training-workshops are usually held during April and May when students from elementary and secondary levels are on vacation. It usually lasts for eight hours and specifically uses music, painting, and sculpting as arts-based tools in potential maximization. The founder of YLAB A believes that the art is an effective tool to identify and maximize the potentials among young people, and that “arts serve as an entrance door for the young people to know more-not just their talents but their aspirations as well”. Respondent YLAB A-4 explained that throughout the workshop, members of YLAB A monitor the participants by grouping them into small teams and guide them throughout the process. At the end of the workshop, selected participants are asked about their experience. Also, selected parents and partner administrators are also asked about their experiences. Any comments and suggestions of the youth participants, parents, and partners serve as a guiding point of the organization to develop their programs in the future.

Based on the data from YLAB A, it can be gleaned that the lack of a written evaluation tool for individual peacebuilding programs of the organization is not a hindrance for the organization to still evaluate its programs. Unstructured verbal conversations allow them to evaluate their programs. However, this also implies that due to limitations of human memory, some responses from the verbal evaluations can be forgotten. Thus, developing a written evaluation tool is helpful.

On the other hand, the individual peacebuilding programs of YLAB B include the “Workshops on Gender-Sensitivity, Stress and Anger Management” and “Programming on Empathy Education and Emotional Intelligence”. Firstly, the workshops on gender-sensitivity, stress and anger management aimed at addressing gender-based stresses of individuals which usually resulted in anger, thus the absence of inner peace. In these workshops conducted mostly in government agencies throughout Northern Mindanao, a 2016 preliminary study of YLAB B found out that there are a lot of cases when em-

ployees do not experience inner peace in their workplace because of stresses caused by male-female difference, which basically include office orderliness and the manner of approaching an office issue. The Philippine Director added that the increasing request from government agencies for gender-based stress and anger management workshops started upon the establishment of the budget intended for Gender and Development (GAD). These workshops last for 24 hours over the course of three days. PeaceMovers Program Facilitators conduct the workshops, headed by the Philippine Director.

Respondent YLAB B-4 explained that throughout the workshop, PeaceMover Program Facilitators monitor the participants by spreading themselves around the session hall and attends to their needs. At the end of the workshop, a one-page standardized evaluation form is distributed to all involved. Also, selected participants are asked about their experience. Any comments and suggestions of the participants serve as a guiding point of the organization to develop their programs.

Secondly, in support of the provisions of the Department of Education (DepEd) Order Number 55, series of 2013 (also known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Antibullying Act of 2013), YLAB B is implementing the year-long programming on empathy education and emotional intelligence since June 2013. This individual-level programming of YLAB B is their winning entry to the Ten Accomplished Youth Organization (TAYO) Awards in 2015, held in Malacañang Palace, Manila. It is guided by a Pre-K-12 workbook that was developed by a group of selected youth members of the organization and was reviewed by adult teachers. The workbook is based on the research-based Pre-K-12 curriculum developed by a Fulbright scholar in Bogota, Colombia, and is now being implemented in schools in New York City, Baltimore, and Washington DC in the United States of America. Since its inception, respondent YLAB B-1 added that such workbooks have undergone two revisions and are being used by Pre-K-12 students from the cities of Iligan, Cagayan de Oro, Davao, and in Midsayap, North Cotabato.

The main objective of the programming is to strengthen the schools' anti-bullying and social-emotional program through capacity building for educators and school leaders to address the emotional health of themselves and their students in order to foster safe and supportive learning environments. According to respondent YLAB B-4, the process and schedule of the programming are as follows:

Each teacher will be given a username and password to access the organization's online hub. The program is five (5) times a week and is good for 20 minutes to be distributed throughout the day. Teachers will lead the daily morning and afternoon empathy rituals with their students. Moreover, workbook activities can be done either during the Homeroom or Values Education period – depending on the school's preference.

According to the Philippine Director of YLAB B, their staff conducts bi-quarterly site visits in the implementing schools. In this site visit, the staff observes classes, talk with the teacher, and gives recommendations to the school administrators. Also, a standardized evaluation tool is administered to students, teachers, and school administrators before and after the year-long programming. The standardized evaluation tool of YLAB B is developed through the help of its mother organization in the United States of America who partnered with the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education. Yet, respondent YLAB B-1 added that the results of this evaluation are rarely integrated into the program development due to the fact that because of manpower scarcity, efficient and timely data collection is hardly practiced.

Based on the data presented above, it can be gleaned that both organizations have individual-level programs; however, evaluating such programs is a challenge. This supports the findings of a commissioned study by Special EU Programmes Body (2010) that in reality, it is challenging to quantitatively measuring the impact of a peacebuilding program. Peacebuilding has no single definition and is often targeted at looking into tangible outcomes such as relationship and behavioral change - changes that are hard to measure quantitatively. In addition, the report stressed that evaluating a peacebuilding program can even be more challenging as it requires long-term monitoring, thus making a short-term evaluation of peacebuilding programs methodologically limited. Also, the report added that it is hard to isolate a peacebuilding program to the social, political, and cultural factors that may influence its failure or success. As a result, developing indicators and measuring outcomes can be considered a common problem across peacebuilding interventions.

*Promotion of positive interpersonal relationship programs of YLAB A and YLAB B*

Beyond the focus of the post-conflict phase, the current definition of peacebuilding substantiates the need to nurture interpersonal relationships towards sustainable peacebuilding. In addition, building positive inter-group and interpersonal relationships is one of the keys to successful peacebuilding (International Platform on Sport & Development 2018). Along these lines, the interpersonal peacebuilding programs of YLAB A and YLAB B aimed at enhancing positive interpersonal relationships among its culturally-diverse stakeholders.

For YLAB A, its interpersonal peacebuilding programs are dubbed as "Young Peacebuilders in Action: An Art Attack Busker's Project" and "Helping our fellow youth: School Supplies and Pre-Loved Books Campaign." The art attach busker's project is one of the organization's summer performances in one of the major public places of Cagayan de Oro City's, where a group of long-haired and tattooed young artists gathers and perform every Friday evening throughout summer. It became one of the city's weekly

attraction for local and foreign spectators while strengthening the bond of these local artists who shared the same interest in the art. It is important to note, however, that before discovering their creative talents and artistic agency, they are previously in the life of drug addiction, extreme poverty, and have been engaged in criminal activities (Lorenzo 2017). In an article written by Lorenzo (2017), he describes the project as follows,

Spread over carpets, hanging over makeshift posts are crafts woven by their hands – dream catchers, necklaces, wrist bands, and feathered accessories. With the lively beat of the drums, some of them dance amidst the dim street lights.

The project lasted for 12 Saturdays in the whole months of April and May 2017, gathering over 1,500 spectators per week, while building interpersonal relationships among its fellow members. Respondent YLAB A-5 added not only at their interpersonal relationship, but such positive engagement among members of the group also radiates to the spectators, especially those who are still in the streets.

In addition, a similar project between YLAB A and YLAB B on interpersonal relationships is the school supplies and pre-loved books and shoes campaign. Staff and active members of the organization collect pre-loved shoes from its partner communities in Cagayan de Oro City and distribute it to recipients living in the hinterland rural areas of Bukidnon, Misamis Oriental, and Camiguin provinces. The Philippine Director of YLAB B emphasized that during the items collection period, “we tell the potential donors that the campaign is one way of building an interpersonal relationship with hinterland-based youth through their pre-loved books and shoes”. In particular, as an empathy-based organization, YLAB B’s main objective of this campaign is to promote empathy and compassion by simple means of sharing pre-loved shoes to less privileged children. As an empathy-based organization, YLAB B’s emphasis on shoes over other items is in line with the common definition of empathy which is “putting yourself to the shoes of others”. During distribution, a short art workshop with the recipient is also conducted.

Lastly, colloquia on diversity and youth-based peacebuilding are another program of YLAB B, which aimed at building interpersonal relationships. Also, in its effort to enrich the peace education component of National Service Training Program (NSTP) program among tertiary schools (as stipulated in Executive Order 570, also known as the Institutionalization of Peace Education program at all levels of education), YLAB B has carefully designed this colloquium that focuses on using arts-based approach to build interpersonal relationships among students from diverse socio-cultural background.

Participants who completed the colloquium receive a certificate of completion which is the prerequisite for their application to become Junior PeaceMovers. As Junior PeaceMovers, they will undergo a 16-hour intensive training that will qualify them

to become Accredited PeaceMovers. Accredited PeaceMovers is part of the YLAB B's global family, shall receive more training opportunities, meet other PeaceMovers from the United States, Colombia, and Germany, plus a chance to travel all over the region.

Comparing the data of two organizations, it can be gleaned that the youth's involvement in interpersonal peacebuilding programs does not only equip them to be effective program organizers but in the process, learns to build positive interpersonal relationships. Along this line, one staff of YLAB B stressed that, "*the more you give updates to people, the more nila ma feel nga part diay sila as tag-iya sa organization and ang ilang commitment ma develop*" (The more you give updates to people, the more they feel that they are part as owner of the organization, which in result develops their commitment).

This particular finding supports the contention of Delgado and Staples (2008) that since the twentieth century, youth-focused models have transformed the traditional roles of young people as consumers, perpetrators, victims, and needy clients, into being agents for society's change. In relation, Checkoway (1998) viewed that youth action is grounded on the fundamental belief that the youth themselves are the best capable of assessing their own issues and needs. Thus, they themselves are their own group's most effective spokespersons. While adults can be a support system, it is the youth who must centrally play a role in making decisions especially on matters concerning them. (Zeldin *et al.*, 2001 as cited by Delgado & Staples, 2008).

#### *Development of peaceful community programs of YLAB A and YLAB B*

Especially in a post-conflict setting, the idea that civil society's engagement can bring more sustainability in peacebuilding is a popularly growing paradigm. As emphasized in a vast amount of practical experience in peacebuilding, it is necessary to engage the local community in organizing local peacebuilding programs, especially due to the context-specific nature of post-conflict settings (Swiss Academy for Development, 2015).

Along these lines, community peacebuilding programs of YLAB A and YLAB B are designed to holistically involve its community stakeholders and tailored to the local socio-cultural context. In particular, YLAB A has two community peacebuilding programs named as "Trash matters: an Eco-Peacebuilding Recycling Project" and "Observance of socio-cultural events: Mindanao Week of Peace, Human Rights Week, Arts month, and Earth hour".

"Trash matters" is an eco-peacebuilding recycling project of YLAB A where plastic bottles are turned into robots. Casiño (personal communication, 2017) recalled that when they started, dreadlocks, tattooed, and longhaired individuals gathered and enjoyed the artist camaraderie in the Artsville. Then they started making junk arts, turning plastic bottles into robots, in addition to weekly free jamming with music, fire dancing, hu-

man beatbox, and magic shows that have become norms at the event while advocating on talent development among young people who have become outcasts in the society. Respondent YLAB A-4 added that the plastic bottles are collected from their partner communities in Northern Mindanao. They then surfed on the internet on how to make it into something creative. They decided to make it into robot-like structures and put it up in the entrance of their Artsville, inviting the attention of by-passers, while building peace with the environment where humanity resides.

Observance of socio-cultural events such as Mindanao Week of Peace, Human Rights Week, Arts month, Anti-bullying month, and Earth hour are community peacebuilding projects common to YLAB A and YLAB B, where both organizations partner with other groups in Mindanao in the implementation. In particular, YLAB A and YLAB B celebrated Mindanao Week of Peace together in December 2015 through a peace concert in Mindanao University of Science and Technology, with the audience from different sectors of Northern Mindanao. In celebrating Earth's hour, both organizations partner with local media groups, private entities, and government offices where their arts-based skills are their contribution to the event.

Lastly, training-workshop on bullying prevention and building safer spaces is the other community peacebuilding project of YLAB B. Especially designed for teachers, school and community leaders, it is a three-day training-workshop that introduces innovative and evidence-based approaches of using creative expression and mindfulness activities to enhance empathetic behavior, create safer spaces, and eventually prevent bullying through social and emotional intelligence. Different methods of interactive work are used which include working in small groups, experiential exercises, arts-based workshops, and role-playing. The ways by which the two organizations engage with their communities are done in simple manners. As stressed by one staff of YLAB 2,

*Mo adto mi sa among mga partner organizations and partner schools ug mo greet sa ilaha like Hi and Hello, Kamusta kamo Ma'am/Sir ... ingun ana lang ka simpol. (We visit our partner organizations and schools and we greet them saying Hi and Hello. How are you Ma'am/Sir...as simple as that).*

The data shows that community engagement is a tool of both organizations in implementing community peacebuilding programs. Reiterating on the organization's theory of change, the Philippine Director of YLAB B stressed that the more the community is engaged in peacebuilding programs, the lesser their tendency to engage in conflict." Theory of Change refers to the "how and why" an aimed change will happen in a particular setting. It is targeted at filling-in gaps by looking into how a particular program can actually fill that gap (The Center for Theory of Change, Inc. 2018). This also supports the findings of World Association for Christian Communication (2016) that when equipped with programs that increased knowledge and understanding among people

about conflict issues, a reduction in conflict incidences in a Ugandan district is experienced. Many conflicts have been reconciled and people are living in greater peace and harmony. There is also an increased willingness of communities to come together and participate in the resolution of conflicts.

### ***Organizational Strategies for Managing Peacebuilding Programs***

As young people are less invited in post-conflict peacebuilding programs, Özerdem and Podder (2015) contended how such practice can be dangerous in long-term peacebuilding success, especially that it is in the youth and children where the length of conflict goes. In Mindanao, there exist youth-led peacebuilding organizations from both academic institutions and nonprofit organizations that actively engaging students and youths on a range of subjects, including peacebuilding (Macalawan, 2015), this include YLAB A and YLAB B. In particular, this section of research looks into the strategies of the two organizations in managing peacebuilding programs.

Following the project management framework of Oladele (2011), the four interconnected stages of peacebuilding project management such as planning and budgeting, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation is discussed in this section.

#### *Strategies on managing planning and budgeting phases of peacebuilding programs*

Firstly, planning and budgeting are foundations of sustainable project management. Along with the planning phase, the budget process is a means by which the organization prepares a clear budget plan. It is a good planning and budgeting practice when key members of the organization, especially those who are really implementing the programs, are invited in the preparation of the plans and budget of the organization. It must be well documented, while clearly stating the responsible person, timelines, and specific objectives. It is also a good planning and budgeting practice when income is first budgeted before being used to defray expenses (Foley, 2010). However according to the respondent YLAB A-1,

*With no staff who can specifically work on the financial and administrative work of the organization, it is very hard for us to maintain an annual budget, among other things. But we are already discussing it that we cannot tolerate this practice. However, in the absence of such, I am happy to say that we exist for almost a decade now, having programs throughout Mindanao. So I can see magic, and I think that magic is having dedicated and selfless people in an organization. Templates and best practices are good, but passion is far more important.*

In the case of YLAB A, the organization's strategies in managing planning and budgeting phases of peacebuilding programs are characterized by the involvement of key stakeholders, facilitated by the Executive Director, and guided by ideas coming from online

posts and personal experience. When they have decided what activities to pursue, they then prepare their budget. Meanwhile, for YLAB B, it involves key and primary stakeholders, guided by a list of activities. Respondent YLAB B-4 added that it commences with centering which is facilitated by any staff or member. Upon the approval of activities, each committee will be asked to prepare a budgetary request per committee. For both organizations, these strategies are being followed across all six peacebuilding programs which are categorized as individual, interpersonal, and community level.

The role of the directors in both organizations is vital in framing the organization's plan and budget, with their advanced experience compared to other members of the team. This directors' role supports the theory of Brosseau (2018) that directors as "thought leaders are the informed opinion leaders and the go-to people in their field of expertise". One of their assets is "trust who moves and inspires people with innovative ideas; turn ideas into reality, and know and show how to replicate their success". This correlates with the contention of Sandu (2013) that trust is one of the important qualities necessary to connect with people from diverse personalities. Thought leaders are making a positive change in their communities while effectively engaging others in the process. They can be revolutionary in approach, not necessarily urging others to follow them, but by providing others a blueprint to follow (Brosseau, 2015).

#### *Strategies on managing the implementation phase of peacebuilding programs*

Secondly, the implementation stage follows after planning and budgeting. Olsen (2017) defines it as the process that turns strategies and plans into actions in order to accomplish strategic objectives and goals. Along this line, the strategies in managing the implementation stage of the peacebuilding project of YLAB A include the utilization of arts-based approaches such as music, painting, and dance. It involves key, primary, and secondary stakeholders, with the presence of mass media to boost community peacebuilding awareness. While for YLAB B, key, primary, and secondary stakeholders are involved, guided by a program flow, and utilizes arts-based tools too. It commences with culturally-sensitive opening rituals (such as ecumenical prayers), uses arts as an approach, and is movement-based in nature.

Respondent YLAB B-3 stressed that programs led by the youth themselves are effective because most of the participants in almost all of their programs are also youth. In this sense, the participants can easily relate to the facilitators. In cases where the participants are teachers, principals, and other professionals, the facilitators can easily catch their attention through fun games and activities, which in turn creates a harmonious atmosphere. On the other hand, YLAB A is also a youth-led organization; thus most of its programs are facilitated by its youth performers, led by their Executive Director. Moreover, another strategy at the implementation stage that YLAB B exercises

are basically following a detailed program flow. This strategy helps the organizers or facilitators be guided by the exact sequence or order of the entire program, especially that the nature of the activities of the organization is game and movement-based. In order to be familiar with the parts of the program, the team conducts a dry-run a day before the program proper so that during the actual program, they will not be confused and everything is in order. Unlike YLAB B, members of YLAB A are less dependent on program flow. During practices prior to the event implementation, a series of performances are already sequenced, thus regular practice helps the performers memorize the sequence of performances.

Further, it was emphasized that in all of the meetings and in all of the programs conducted by YLAB B, they always commence with a centering. According to respondent YLAB B-4, centering is an act wherein every member is asked of his personal feeling or emotion at the moment, and whether he/she is feeling good or not. The team then ends with one deep breathes in and one deep breathes out so as to release any tension within every member or facilitator. Furthermore, the Philippine Director of YLAB B added that one of the most important strategies that they employ is making sure that the programs and activities that they are conducting are fun and entertaining. By using ice breakers, games and movement-based activities, the program can be fun and entertaining at the same time which in turn makes the participants' time and experience during the activity worthwhile.

*Strategies on managing the monitoring phase  
of peacebuilding programs*

Monitoring is the third phase of peacebuilding project management and is considered to be a phase critical for program success. It is a process of regular observation and recording of activities taking place in a project or program through routinely gathering information in all aspects of the project (Bartle, 2011).

Of the six peacebuilding programs of YLAB A, monitoring strategies involve key stakeholders who are conducting unrecorded casual conversations with beneficiaries. In addition, YLAB A respondent YLAB A-4 explained that throughout the workshop, members of YLAB A monitor the participants by grouping them into small teams and guide them throughout the process. At the end of the workshop, selected participants are asked about their experience.

On the other hand, YLAB B engages its key stakeholders using a standardized monitoring guide wherein program facilitators to conduct through site-visits. Additionally, respondent YLAB B-4 explained that in peacebuilding programs of YLAB B, PeaceMover Program Facilitators monitor the participants by spreading themselves around the session hall and attends to their needs. According to the Philippine Director of YLAB B, their staff conducts bi-quarterly site visits in the implementing schools. In this site

visit, the staff observes classes, talk with the teacher, and gives recommendations to the school administrators. Also, a standardized monitoring tool is administered to students, teachers, and school administrators before and after the year-long programming. The standardized monitoring tool of YLAB B is developed through the help of its mother organization in the United States of America who partnered with the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education. Yet, respondent YLAB B-1 added that the results of this monitoring are rarely integrated into the program development due to the fact that because of manpower scarcity, efficient and timely data collection is hardly practiced.

Based on the data above, it shows that YLAB A still needs to develop a standardized written monitoring tool, while YLAB B has a monitoring tool yet the implementation is a challenge. It can be gleaned that there is a need to re-assess the monitoring strategies of both organizations as a recurring pattern of informal and unsystematic monitoring structure is evident in both organizations. However, it is good to note that in the past few years of operations, both organizations able to continue their programs despite monitoring instability. Yet, it is highly possible that with monitoring instruments, it is easier to evaluate a program. As a result, any evaluation results can be used as a basis in developing a program in its next iteration.

#### *Strategies on managing evaluation phase of peacebuilding programs*

Evaluation is the last phase of program management. It is defined as “a systematic and objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project, program or policy, its design, implementation and results” (United Nations office on Drugs and Crimes, 2017). Both organizations consider making a terminal report as an effective strategy of evaluating peacebuilding project. This becomes more essential, especially that a terminal report is necessary for externally-funded programs. In particular, YLAB A makes a terminal report based on colloquy with involved key stakeholders using open-ended questions as an evaluation guide, while YLAB B conducts it involving its key stakeholders using a standardized evaluation guide. It commences with a centering and is participatory in nature.

YLAB B respondent YLAB B-4 added that at the end of the workshop, a one-page standardized evaluation form is distributed to all involved. Also, selected participants are asked about their experience. Any comments and suggestions of the participants serve as a guiding point of the organization to develop their programs. YLAB A, on the other hand, relies on unstructured colloquy with some participants as part of its evaluation process. Respondent YLAB A-2 said that the lack of written evaluation tool for its peacebuilding programs of YLAB A is not a hindrance for the organization to still evaluate its programs. Unstructured verbal conversations allow them to evaluate their programs. However, this also implies that due to limitations of human memory, some

responses from the verbal evaluations can be forgotten. Thus, developing a written evaluation tool is helpful.

Based on the data presented above, it can be gleaned that both organizations have peacebuilding evaluation strategies however; systematizing such strategies is a challenge. This supports the findings of a commissioned study by Special EU Programmes Body (2010) that in reality, doing an evaluation of peacebuilding programs is indeed a challenging task. As a result, developing indicators and measuring outcomes can be considered a common concern across peacebuilding interventions.

Further, an emerging pattern of strategy in all stages of peacebuilding project management is the involvement of its stakeholders from various sectors. The presence of stakeholders is evident in different stages of peacebuilding project management from planning to evaluation phase, key stakeholders, especially the organizational staff, are directly involved. Primary stakeholders are present during the planning, budgeting, and implementation stages. Especially that most of the primary stakeholders are industry-based, their knowledge and experience are essential in the creation of a plan, preparing the budget, and project implementation. The implementation stage has been executed by key, primary, and secondary stakeholders. The role of the secondary stakeholders is vital especially that publication and other positive ripple effects of any peacebuilding efforts can possibly be done through them. Any experience during the implementation stage is documented and is being discussed during the monitoring and evaluation stages. Any best practice and lessons learned will now become essential points to be considered for the next peacebuilding program implementation.

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## **Conclusions**

The proactivity of young people, manifested in their ability to build a peacebuilding organization, supports the claims of McEvoy-Levy (2001), Harland (2011), and Gambone and Arbretton (1997) that the current generation of young people is the new cohort of leaders in peacebuilding and that the preparing them to be leaders at the young age can have long-term implications. Thus, it is necessary to realistically engage young people into community-based programs (McEvoy-Levy, 2001; Harland, 2011; Gambone & Arbretton, 1997). There exists an experience-based motivation that inspired the founders and co-founders of both organizations to start the youth-led arts-based non-profit organizations for peacebuilding in Mindanao, making them real catalysts of building sustainable communities (McEvoy-Levy, 2001; Harland, 2011; Gambone & Arbretton, 1997).

Manifested in its peacebuilding programs, both organizations aimed at contributing to building peace in Mindanao through the arts-based approach. Using the arts as a tool for peacebuilding is not a conventional approach (personal communication with Potler, 2013; Casiño, 2017) to the extent that there are individuals who are not convinced of the efficacy of the program (Potler, 2013). While it has not gained popular acceptance in the present time, its arts-based nature has captured the attention of the youth and is therefore seen as an attractive tool in comparison to the traditional approaches (doing seminar whole day, sitting down the whole day, waiting for lunch and snacks break).

It can also be gleaned that both organizations have individual-level programs; however, evaluating such programs is a challenge. Evaluation is also complicated for the fact that the outcomes from peacebuilding are essentially long-term, which makes short-term monitoring and evaluation difficult. Also, the study added that it is difficult to isolate the impact of specific peacebuilding interventions from the complex political, economic and social contexts in which they are located. As a result, developing indicators and measuring outcomes can be considered a common problem across peacebuilding interventions.

More so, youth's involvement in interpersonal peacebuilding programs does not only equip them to be effective program organizers but in the process, learns to build positive interpersonal relationships. In relation, Checkoway (1998) viewed that youth action is grounded on the fundamental belief that the youth themselves are the best capable of assessing their own issues and needs. Thus, they themselves are their own group's most effective spokespersons.

In the absence of proper training and formal institutions to hone their peacebuilding agency, young peacebuilders rely on experience-based approaches of doing peacebuilding work. It is a trial-and-error method that while can lead to failure sometimes, still gave valuable lessons to the young peacebuilders. With experience serving as a structure to facilitate peacebuilding agency, lessons from such experience ripple down from one person to other members of the organization, thus impacting individual and organizational aspects of peace work.

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