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BURKINA FASO: An Inquisition of Ansaroul Islam Insurgency in West Africa and Its Emerging Threat

Frederick Appiah AFRIYIE

Abstract: Burkina Faso has suffered the numerous cruelties of terrorism, Ansaroul terrorism inclusive. Prior to their dormancy, two popular terrorist groups, the Ansaroul Islam and Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) had existed as the principal terrorists in Burkina and adjacent political entities. In some past years, the masters who had been behind the mask of violence in Burkina has been the Ansaroul. Believed to belong to a jihadist sect of the Mali rebellion and as well traced to the Al-Qa'ida, the Sahel area hosted this popular terrorist. The group has been responsible for far-reaching radicalism and cutting-edge violence within the Sahel, spreading its influence on the neighboring Afro Islamic countries, especially Burkina Faso. Against this background, this paper conducts an examination of the Ansaroul Islam activities. Inferences are drawn from secondary sources, thus articles which has already an about the subject of interest. The study will route audiences through analysis of literature to present the implications of related policies, their significance and consistency in giving a deadly blow to terrorism in the said region. However, the unrevised terrorism policies which do not align with provisions in a holistic international framework lacks the ability to break the shackles of terrorism on Africa and the global anti-terrorist society. Efforts to combat terrorism will, in the bosom of weak policies, remain infidel to peace.

Keywords: Inquisition, Ansaroul Islam, Emerging West-Africa, Insurgency

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Introduction

The few past years have witnessed an upsurge in the activities of terrorists in Burkina Faso. This contemporary chronology of terrorism incepted with the abduction of two international aid volunteers in December last year and a miner from Canada. The latter was found lifeless. The country has been recording consistent terrorist events for

quite a long period. In 2014, President Blaise Compaoré was ousted through a prevalent insurgency. This event chalked the gradual demise of the Burkina security system, birthing an era of brutality and chaos under a broad umbrella of three-year prolonged terrorism since 2016. Cases within the time stretch have been over 200. Most people are not amazed by the sudden uprising since speculations hover around that President Compaoré negotiated with terrorist groups in his attempt to free the country from insurgent acts. In addition, there is an influx of terrorist groups from the sister country Mali, into Burkina Faso, strengthening the terrorist base of the later. The Soufan Group (2019) have concluded that terrorism seems to flourish in West Africa, owing to its social, economic and environmental conditions which allow for easy absorption of youth into the groups.

Burkina Faso is an inland country, bordered by three coastal countries, Ghana, Benin and Togo. These terrorist activities in Ghana have stimulated a growing concern for the security of her neighbors. From 2015 up till now, the insurgent activities have not been able to diffuse to these landmarks even though far-reaching implications alight on the front doors of the countries. Ghana, Togo and Benin have not been treated by jihadists as Burkina, regarded as the anchorage for networks like Al-Qaeda and related groups, following their unpopularity in Mali. Their presence in Burkina has been alarming and their activities are shockingly accelerating. The past few months have seen terrorist triggers in the east of Burkina, a region in close proximity with Togo and Benin, rekindling the uncertainties of jihadist movements traveling downcoast. Yet in Ghana, the related consequence of Burkina terrorism is yet to approach the country, according to the National Disaster Management Organization. According to BusinessDay (2019), the Bawku northeastern part of Ghana has received about 500 people (children inclusive) as refugees in the area.

Two principal areas in Burkina Faso has been suffering at the hands of terrorists. These are the northern and the eastern sectors of the country, with the eastern sector experiencing intensified terrorist activities. The northern cluster of terrorists has been responsible for numerous terrorist events. These include, but probably unlimited to the Splendid Hotel attack and the Cappuccino in Ouagadougou. The latter occurred in January 2016, ending with over 50 casualties and 30 lives lost (The Soufon Group, 2019).

Burkina Faso's Ansaroul Islam can be described as a domestic group originating from the Sahel area. It surfaced in 2016 and has since been battling with the peace of Burkina Faso till date, affecting the formation of several other similar rebellions. According to the Human Rights Watch (2019), two major groups parent the various terrorist groups in Burkina, the Ansaroul Islam being threatful amongst them. It is believed by the Watch that, both Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have through the Ansaroul and minor terrorist groups been responsible for raids on police, gendarme and army posts, as much as civilian attacks which have taken lots of lives, incapacitated others and inflicting injuries on civilians.

Statistically, more than half of terrorist activities between 2016 and 2018 in Burkina Faso can be traced to Ansaroul Islam. This gives the group a leading role in the inventors of the unstable northern Burkina environment. The region receiving great impact from the violent events of the Ansaroul was the Soum province, with its center Djibo suffering most. The province recorded about 64 raids, claiming over 40 casualties in 2018. The tendency of the Ansaroul Islam raiding civilians was high. Mainly, slightly more than half of their attacks target civilians. This record represents the second-highest of such in Africa to northern Mozambique and the highest percentage in the Sahel area. The Soum province has ended school activities in more than 300 schools and over 100,000 families have abandoned their unsafe homes, due to militant Islam attacks. Interestingly, Pauline Le Roux (2019) reveals that records show the Ansaroul has staged 16 vicious activities with just about 7 casualties.

Terrorism in Burkina Faso has not only been the doing of the Ansaroul militant Islamists. The JNIM sub-grouped, believed to have been supported by Al-Qaeda has as well been responsible for numerous attacks in the Sahel region, spreading their tentacles to Burkina Faso. Consequently, in recent times, the group's super terrorist events have acquired international recognition in the global terrorist community and infamy on the international security front. Radical Islamist activities of the JNIM takes the form of raids on security posts, peacekeepers and hotels which hosts visitors from the western world. There has been widespread abduction of aid workers, diplomats and tourists from American and European origin in the Sahel region, for which the JNIM is responsible (Donati, 2019). The recent attack on the French embassy in Ouagadougou in March is considered to be a handiwork of the JNIM as it bloated the newspapers all over the country and worldwide. In addition, the group was also responsible for the attack on the national army headquarters, taking 8 lives of soldiers. Following these terrorist events, the United States government has responded by enlisting Ansaroul and JNIM as one of the world's treacherous terrorists.

Methodology

This paper considers examining the emerging Ansaroul Islam terrorist groups in recent times through critical analysis. The study will detail its observations according to the likenesses and differences in the various terrorist organizations, their operations and specific aims they ought to achieve.

Arguably, this study can follow specific methods but most popularly through the use of qualitative analysis of evidence from trivial events, as agreed by Burnham, Lutz, Grant, & Layton-Henry (2008). In accordance with the arguments of Collier (1993), that "this focus on a small number of cases is adopted because there are relatively few instances of the phenomenon under consideration that exhibit the attributes of interest to the analysis", the qualitative method, applies. It is apparently impossible to access

the influential people and even the members of these terrorist groups. This leaves the research with no choice than to depend on free data which is published for public use. The study therefore draws information on these two terrorists' groups from primary sources as archives, media, terrorist watches and state reports. To support this, tentative information is as well obtained from secondary sources such as other articles. Lijphart (1971) gives a preamble in relation to the time, efforts and capitals resources and conclude that examining a few cases thoroughly is quite better than statistics from a chunk of cases which may attract lesser funding and focus.

Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Terrorism defies precise definition, especially among institutions and states which deal with and use the term frequently and even among the terrorist's community (Tuman, 2003). The political, emotional and personal dimensions of the concept make it difficult to identify who a terrorist is. In fact, a hero from another country can be an insurgent in another country. Drawing insights from the principles adopted by Boko Haram to operate, this study will consider Terrorism as the "use or the threatened use of force designed to bring about a political change (Twum, 2003)". Again, this study defines terrorism in the religious context as "A type of political violence motivated by an absolute belief that an otherworldly power has sanctioned and commanded terrorist violence for the greater glory of the faith. Acts committed in the name of the faith will be forgiven by the otherworldly power and perhaps rewarded in an afterlife. In essence, one's religious faith legitimizes violence as long as such violence is an expression of the will of one's deity" (Martin, 2015, p. 130) since the primary terrorist groups focused in this paper's discussion connect their actions to their religious beliefs. The theory that backs is study is the relative deprivation theory as proposed by Gurr (1970), even though there is a host of lightly tested hypothesis which can support the study. this theory will be used to trace the roots of expanded ferocity of the rebellions as Ansaroul Islam. According to Gurr (1970), radical disruptions in the political discourse of a country may be linked to the human perception of being starved one's due merit or right. Again, the sentiment is aggravated by the contrasting lives of others, supposed to be in an optimal condition than the terrorists, planting in them an ever-growing motive for their acts. In the words of Gurr (1970), "the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity" (p. 24) as "men are quick to aspire beyond their social means and quick to anger when those means prove inadequate but slow to accept their limitations" (p. 58).

The Emergence of Ansaroul Islam

Discussions in this section will focus on the origin, organization, leadership and the funding of the Ansaroul Islam. The various methods adopted to operate, and potential

targets will as well be highlighted in this section. In addition, the various global networks of Ansaroul Islam will be highlighted.

Ansaroul Islam can be described as a domestic terrorist group and fist of its kind in Burkina Faso. There had been numerous staged terrorists' activities far before the inception of Ansaroul Islam in Burkina Faso, from different radical jihadists. In 2016, Ansaroul Islam identified themselves as a fresh terrorist group, following the attack on a Burkinabe-French army camp in the last month of that year. The Islamic principle of universal brotherhood and equity was extended to a more radical form through the teachings of Boureima Dicko in 2012. Going back into history, the Ansaroul Islam seeks the awakening of an ancient Burkinabe empire which had long been evaporated by the presence of the French in the 1800s. Regarding themselves as the resurfaced Djeelgodji, the Ansarouls stages most of their operations in Mali and Burkina, believed to be the ancient home of the Djeelgodji. Those who suffer at the hands of these insurgents are poor civilians and innocent security officers from the Burkinabe security sector and the anti-terrorist units of the French government on visits. Activities of the Ansaroul Islam are pronounced in the Soum province, including some regions in Mali and along the borders between Burkina and Mali. Ansaroul Islam has principally occupied two areas of Boulkessi and N'Daki in Mali. According to Nsaibia, Heni, and Caleb Weiss (2018), the strategic locations of this town along the Burkina Mali border makes it possible to alternate terrorist activities in both countries. In addition to the two towns, there are prominent terrorist settlements in Fhero and Fousare. The post-assault period in early 2017 in Fousare led to the disintegration of the insurgents into smaller units that scattered into far away parts of the Suom province.

Leadership

The leadership of Ansaroul Islam has not had many successions. There have been only two leaders, believed to be the founder and his brother. The founder and first leader of Ansaroul Islam is Boureima Dicko (December 2016 – May 2017) who was succeeded by his younger brother after his death. The second and current leader of the Ansaroul Islam believed to be the brother of the founder of this group is Jafar Dicko, who started reigning in May 2017. It all began with radical Islamic teachings and later escalated to revolts after the capture of the founder, Dicko by the French anti-terrorist group in the later part of 2013. Widespread radical teachings in smaller social gatherings and on media channels led to the establishment of Al-Irchad Network. On his release by the French group, the ignition to revolts turned on automatically with the smaller holding Ansaroul Islam group in the Mondoro forest of Mali. This is where it started, and when he died naturally in May 2017, a blood successor emerged to preserve a psychopathic legacy (Center for International Security and Cooperation [CISAC], 2018).

Targets and Tactics

The targets who have suffered the hands of Ansaroul Islam has been mainly the security forces (police and army) of Burkina Faso and the French anti-terrorist bases. In addition, Nsaibia, Heni, and Caleb Weiss (2018) retorts that Ansaroul Islam disrupts society by their raids on educational and government facilities within the Sahel area. There have been several executions of civilians at the hands of Ansaroul Islam, promoting the life of fear and panic within the Sahel region. In most cases, victims who fall to the religious scandals of these militants are either witnesses to security forces or persons who have closer links with the Burkina government. The Human Rights Watch (2018), agrees that targets may be those who disagree with the ideologies of deep jihadism. Prior to the year 2017, weapons which were used by the insurgents were smaller firearms in its raids. After the interception of JNIM, passing knowledge and skills to Ansaroul, the latter upgraded their arms base to the stocking of IEDs. In addition to raids and killing of civilians, there have been numerous robbery and theft cases of Ansaroul Islam (Nsaibia & Weiss, 2018).

Source of financing

Every organization, be it socially accepted or otherwise requires resources to achieve specific goals. A superior terrorist group called Ansar Dine has supported Ansaroul in different forms, ranging from technical support to resource provision. Other supporters include the MLF and Katibat Serma. It has come to light that, the group contacts Abu Bakr al-Shinquit, leader of another militant group AQIM. This group has reportedly provided human and financial resources towards the establishment and growth of Ansaroul Islam (CISAC, 2018).

International Connection

There is a higher global tendency of minor militant groups associating themselves with rooted groups, have reported that an associate of Ansaroul founder Boureima Dicko is Amadou Kouffa, an emir of the Macina Liberation Front (MLF). From this emir, Ansaroul has received all kinds of support in its terrorist activities, especially at the inception phase of the group. Another associate identified is the Katibat Serma of the Ansar Dine group, a militant unit which collaborated in the raid on Nassoumbou in late 2016 (CISAC, 2018).

Some subgroups of the Ansar Dine consolidated to establish Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen in March 2017. Popular among these subgroups was MLF. There is uncertainty regarding the links between the JNIM and Ansaroul Islam even though the former allegedly supports the operations of the later with skills enhancement and resources, more especially with the utilization of IED weapons. There is also another controversy regarding the group responsible for a series of attack staged in 2017. Center for

International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) (2018) retorts that local news exposes the Ansaroul Islam to be responsible for about six attacks. The story later changed as JNIM announced its full handiwork of these raids.

Another network associated with Ansaroul is Al-Qaeda. In effect, Ansaroul seems to be more of a representation of Al-Qaeda in the Sahel African region. Smaller militant groups liaise with Ansaroul, a group believed to be in direct contact with the Al-Qaeda network. According to Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC, 2018), Al-Qaeda had a hand in the formation of Ansaroul as their Senior AQIM commander Abu Bakr al-Shinquitte helped built Ansaroul through militant enlisting and training.

Why radical groups and terrorism is taking root in Burkina

Burkina Faso has over the past few years become an open and fertile platform for breeding terrorism and activities of radical Islamists. This is due to some factors, grouped under 'push' and 'pull' factors. In the first place, push forces include structural circumstances which direct people to accepting the radical jihadist philosophy, later resulting in excessive violence in Burkina. After an assessment of one's environment, certain conditions including corruption and impunity, economic hardships, poverty, higher rates of unemployment and higher costs of living, the mindset and cognitive perceptions of the individual is likely to develop resentment for the nation.

Secondly, the pull factors are embedded within the benefits one ought to enjoy as being part of an insurgency group. They are packages which serve as a magnet to dismayed youth. Joining militant groups helps some individuals to fulfill their dreams of giving everyone an equal social opportunity, brainwashed with radical Islamic teachings and solving domestic economic inefficiencies. These pull factors stimulate the interest of people in violent jihadist movements (Antwi-Boateng, 2017).

Push Factors

Corruption and Impunity

Quite a lot of the sub-Saharan countries, including Nigeria and Ghana face the national challenge of corruption within several public offices and institutions. Burkina Faso is of no exception to this challenge (Loada & Romaniuk, 2014). Various government agencies in Burkina and civil society organizations have reported an increase in corruption cases. Not-for-Profit organizations have also recorded high profile corruption activities in the country. On sectoral basis, corruption has shown its face in agencies as the civic promotion, justice departments, health sector, revenue departments and most severely, in the security services of the country.

Empirically, the Réseau National de Lutte Anti-Corruption (REN-LAC - National Anti-Corruption Network) observed corrupt conducts in 2011. Crimes do not only take

physical form but economic and political as well. Impunity has been on the rise the resultant effect was digging out the radicalism in people, which the Burkina government has been aware since 2011.

The Burkina government seemed to be playing with the incidence of corrupt acts in the country. Evidently, the Burkina Prime Minister on consistent occasions admit to a corruption filled government and promises to address the menace. The leaders of the country should have long known that their tortoise movement on the corruption issue would wake the religiously just lions to dictate their strategies for them.

As much as the government has been dragging her feet on corruption, the courts are not strong enough to prosecute cases on corruption. As observed in the 2011 state of corruption reports, impunity was on the rise, following the broken judicial system. The judicial instruments laid to address public sector corruption and misconduct has not been effective and this breeds corruption the more.

Impunity has slapped justice with incompetency and this is birthing a chaos atmosphere where every young strong militant is an Attorney. There is not the duality of 'mob justice' and 'incivism', reigning the streets of Burkina Faso in the form of intense civil unrests, a new order likely to chalk violence in the history of Burkina Faso. In effect, ordinary citizens deprived of what is fundamentally due them are embracing terrorism as the sole way of overcoming the corruption that breeds their afflictions. Clearly, this circumstance fuels the willingness of people to side with Ansaroul Islam when joined with the radical teachings on social equality. Citizens are redirected to believing that the resolution to corruption and impunity is violent religious justice (Loada & Romaniuk, 2014)

Rural Poverty

The various factors which join forces to drive people to act violently in the name of social justice by means of religious radicalism are the marginalization, deprivation from due basic services and economic hardships. The poverty margin between the urban regions and the rural regions of Burkina Faso is wide enough to declare poverty as a resident of rural Burkina. But poverty is concentrated in the northern and eastern parts of the country, introducing the perception of neglect to the people in these areas by the government they have so voted into power. The abysmal economic atmosphere in the northern enclaves of the country makes the region prone to Ansaroul influence. The Suom province in the northern part of the country is made up of Fulani tribe, a large ethnic group of people in the north but smaller in a national context. In the land of the Fulani, there is no low provision of social services and the lot of them feel dejected at the national level. Inferiority complex is widespread amongst the northern Fulani population, stimulating internal hatred for other tribes. In the Suom province, there is the struggle for traditional dominion owing to the absence of religious order. These conditions within the northern sector prepared the region as an environment favorable

for Dicko to recruit masses into his terrorist group. In detail, there are defective legislative, economic and basic social systems. These conditions did not just by themselves introduce terrorism into the region. Rather, it provided a fertile ground where the joint force of periodically unstable environment and the tactical strategies adopted by the Ansaroul thrived. In addition to these, there is widespread robbery, theft and burglary cases in the north. These will intend mandate individuals to help restore social order to the environment. In Fada N’Gourma, culprits are prosecuted as citizens are encouraged to help in the cases of offenders. However, these witnesses receive little to no protection from security (Loada & Romaniuk, 2014).

High Cost of Living

It has not only been the widened poverty gaps between the rural and urban parts of Burkina causing people to team up as militants. The country has suffered the high costs of living, a condition which does not match up with the incomes of the citizenry. Evidences span from the 2008 food shortage which generated some disturbances in the country. The Burkinabe government attempted to minimize the problem through diversified means but still did not work to the grassroots poor. This contributed to the lost confidence in the government even though there has been current redress of the living costs by relocating of budgets to social services. It is widely believed to be domestic and external influences which are causing living inequalities in the country and this is well known to slip the control of the government of Burkina Faso (Loada & Romaniuk, 2014).

Unemployment

Idle youth of every economy would like to find something to occupy them. Several counties have recorded an increase in socially unaccepted occupations adopted by the youth when there are higher rates of unemployment. Higher rates of unemployment and mostly, underemployment has been a shackle around the neck of the Burkinabe economy, availing terrorism as an option to the idle hands, usually in the slum parts of cities. This condition may not be completely able to drive the youth to join terrorists. Amid their financial instabilities, most youths are invited to join the terrorist groups through monetary offers and other incentive packages. In effect, attractive offers from the terrorist groups capitalize on the economically distressed environment to recruit the youth of the northern and eastern parts of Burkina (more especially from the Fulani subgroup to fight in Mali and Burkina) (Loada & Romaniuk, 2014).

Imploring to local grievances

One of the major pull factors which attract individuals to join terrorist movements is the satisfaction that radical teachings give to the local grievances in Burkina Faso. In the media and community teachings of radical Islam, teachers seem to have fair judgment

and practice of what they preach. These teachers are distinguished personalities who speak against social inequalities and economic disorders in the country. The teachings as well center on principles of equity and fair distribution of resources, discarding the widened livelihood gaps and class stratification within societies. The sermons of Ansaroul Islam appeals to the 'inferior minority' to break the status quo into a perfect, equal society. With class issues playing background music, some non-Fulani people have joined the insurgent group. Disregarding the traditional succession, Ansaroul uses religious claims to invalidate the power of domestic Imams and religious personalities. Again, Ansaroul has taken advantage of sentiments of counter-foreign, anti-state and ethnic origins to appeal to youths. Among the numerous messages in their sermons were the desire to end state taxes which had already received much attention in the unattended north (Estelle, 2019).

Making it more appealing, the teachings of Ansaroul blames the West for the woes of Burkina Faso, typically saying that Westerners are responsible for the economic inefficiencies of Burkina due to their extraction of the country's vast resources. Some teachings of the Ansaroul Islam stresses on the inferiority of the Fulani minority, using terms as 'Rimaibe of the whites' meaning, the under classed Fulani population. Already, the inferiority complex of the northern part is high as their expectations from the government are not met. Striking more radical Islamic messages into the ears of the 'supposedly' neglected class of Burkinabes ignites the acceptance and practice of Islamic extremism. With time, the ideologies become more violent and radical, giving chances for militant groups to break out (Estelle, 2019).

Implementing Social Policies

In addition to the appealing nature of Ansaroul Islamic teachings, the group is promoting a new social order. This commenced in northern Burkina Faso and is aimed at restructuring the Burkinabe society through religious teachings and violence. Basing their actions on religious reasons to halt events that will empower local authorities, and this has been widely accepted by the poor within society. A perfect example is the stoppage of the practice of paying tokens to local authorities during marriage ceremonies. In most of these bans, the far-reaching benefits seem appreciable to the local people. As such, traditional and cultural preservation becomes a waste of time, rather, there is motivation to support the banning course.

Another way that Ansaroul is reshaping the society is promoting the extreme Islamic culture of restricting women. In detail, females are prevented from moving to football centers, smoking, enjoying ban music and encourages to put on the hijab (Estelle, 2019).

The group is also re-aligning the educational system of the north to suit their own culture and beliefs. Curriculums are being revised to replace French education with Islamic teachings. Strategies which are being adopted by the groups to reshape the

society includes monetary offers and forceful activities. The group's activities is creating a social disorder and even those who accept the movement are often not able to involve themselves in certain traditional practices with genuine religious backings. The roots of the changing social order can be attributed to the forcible supremacy, coupled with the advantages which comes with these ideologies for the less recognized group of citizens (Estelle, 2019).

Radical Islamic Ideology

The Ansaroul pact of Islam appeals to the marginalized group of people through radical Islamic philosophies. Even though the group is purported to consist primarily of Fulani, this condition is just a result of regional concentration of Fulani in the Suom province. The origin of Ansaroul Islam cannot be traced on tribal basis but rather linked to pleasing radical messages which find the ears of resentful locals. Several individuals of lower social status believed to be youthful herdsmen of Fulani tribe and Rimaibe (believed to historical be a slave group of Fulani people) were attracted to the sermons of Dicko and ultimately joined his force. In effect, the hatred for normal social class disintegration probably explains why there are raids on traditional Islamic leaders within the Suom province (Le Roux, 2019).

What are the responses to this emerging violence?

The actions of Ansaroul Islam got to the table of Burkinabe government in August 2017, receiving 772 million dollar funding for the development of the Suom region. This was the apex period of the militant group and they seemed to gain the attention they required. The government knew that social infrastructure is inadequate in Suom province. Therefore, Paul Kaba Thiéba, Burkinabe Prime Minister during the period under review announced the purpose of the funds as for the construction of schools, roads and hospitals. The funds were disbursed in trenches, 13 million in 2017, 17 million in 2018 and 2019 receiving much more attention from the government. It is not only giving in to the demands and claims of Ansaroul Islam that underpins these moves by the government, rather the attempt to unpopularize the militant group by ensuring most citizens likely to join the group have no yet reason to do so. Earlier this year, Yirgou suffered disturbances between some ethnic groups, causing deaths and injuries. Claims have been made by civil advocates that, there has been no arrest in the post unrest period. This may be linked to the corrupt security agencies of Burkina Faso. The corrupt arms of these security forces have been claimed to release their anger on innocent settlements, bringing deaths and injuries to resident of these places and adding to the injuries left by the insurgents (Le Roux, 2019). Actions of security forces, in replying the Ansaroul bullying has become nothing less than a non-tactical move confirming the Ansaroul claims of neglecting some part of Burkina on basis of social

infrastructural provision, including security. Violent security action is rather adding fuel to militant activities. Rather, security forces are advised to diplomatically team up with local settlers to uproot terrorism. It should be noted that many citizens have suffered by the hands of Ansaroul, laying the 'lack of confidence in government security' foundation in them. There is the need to provide peaceful security and strategically rolled out methods of completely sealing the possible resurface of insurgent jihadists and Ansaroul. This should be done together with local settlers. The key role that ought to be played by local leaders and the entire settlers in the smooth and calm fight against Ansaroul cannot be underestimated by the government (Le Roux, 2019). The Burkinabe government also rolled out a strategic instrument in 2015. This was the institution of the national observatory for the prevention and management of communal conflict with the objective of making social conflict resolution flexible. This observatory clearly has not been powerful and effective until now. Under its control, violent activities slip from captivity and showcase on the streets of Burkina. It, therefore, calls for refurbishment of the observatory by providing it with the necessary resources to fulfill its mandate by ensuring the cutting of support for Ansaroul by community leaders and activists.

Conclusion

The past decade has witnessed uprisings of terrorist activities in the Sahel region, spreading down to towards the coastal parts of sub-Saharan African. Ansaroul Islam originates from the northern Suom of Burkina Faso, making contacts with external bodies as Al-Qaeda and JNIM brotherhood and support from locally dissatisfied settlers. This disturbance has hindered the economic and social progress of Burkina, stimulating government response in the form of armed raids and observatory body set up. Notably, the contributory factors to the uprising come from social and economic inequalities. These factors give clues on how to tackle terrorism in Burkina as recommended below.

Recommendations

Following the roots of Ansaroul Islam and other militant activities in Burkina Faso, there are three basic ways which are recommended by this study to curb the situation. These recommendations are poverty reduction strategies, intensified educational policies and negotiations.

Education can be employed as a weapon for combating terrorism. First and foremost, education, intensified in all areas within the country will serve as disruptive methods in the breeding grounds of terrorist and extremist philosophies. Again, it is globally accepted to counter terrorism as a social policy in the wake of violence. This study will recommend that the education sector executes this strategy in two different ways. In the first place, educational projects will have to be rolled out to address the problems of social inequality and marginalization, especially in the Suom province of Burkina Faso.

This will go a long way to rekindle the confidence of local settlers in the government and reduce their resentments to the state. Secondly, targets of education should be the segregated in the community. Curriculums designed to proportionately shape lives against terrorism and improve in technical and professional skills will reduce the rate at which young men join militant groups. In addition to these two, Counter-Terrorist Education programs can be introduced in different agencies such as the media, schools, churches and communal level to provide people with alternative ways to violence and reassure the marginalized groups of intended attention of government (de Silva, 2017).

Another way of countering terrorism is by negotiations. Well planned ways of negotiating with insurgents can also be employed by the Burkinabe government to solve the terrorism problem in the country. Democratic entities do frown on negotiation with terrorism due to the conception that it validates the actions of these insurgents and belittle the pursuers of peace. It is also believed that it gives a terrible pace and offsets global attempts at combating terrorist activities. However, proponents of the negotiation approach retort that these same democratic actors give in to negotiations when the need arises. Evidently, in 1991, the UK government agreed to the demands of the Irish Republican Army after an attack on 10 Downing Street. A similar thing happened in Spain in 1988 after a shop bombing by Basque Homeland and Freedom. Considering these hypocritic moves, the Burkinabe government can negotiate with Ansaroul Islam, not to offer its weakness but to show the readiness to settle for peace (Neumann, 2007).

Economic differences have been ,one-factor promoting acts of violence in the northern half of Burkina. Poverty is widespread in the northern sector. This situation should be tackled by looking at sustainable measures of offsetting the poverty outbreak in the country, especially within the Suom province. There are three generic frameworks within which this can be done. In the first place, the government can introduce livelihood programs through skills training and acquisition for the uneducated youth and women. Artisan works would be learned, and capital provided for individuals to start up. Secondly, primary (agro-based) enterprises could be initiated in the northern half. This will require empowering potential entrepreneurs to put their few resources and skills to use. Finally, the government can improve the private sector to absorb more of the idle youth. Additionally, the public sector can also be expanded to employ more citizens.

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PAKISTAN: Enticing factors of Youth Extremism in Higher Educational Institutions

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Abstract: Extremism in universities is not a new phenomenon in the contemporary educational system. This study was conducted to explore the student mindset on extremism in higher educational institutions in Pakistan. In the HEIs, different groups are showing their power and do the extreme act for creating a horrifying and dangerous environment for students and in

and outside of the university. The main objective of this study to explore the multiple grounds in higher educational institutions (HEIs) which enticing youth toward extremism. This research is based on secondary data analysis of different archives which are published in different newspapers about these extremist acts in universities. Thematic analysis technique was applied to highlight and discussed the relevant information related to the study objectives and themes. In this study, we found out different themes -ideology, heterogeneity ethnicity, identity, political and religious groups, university faculty and administration - that became the grounds of extremism acts. This study recommended that counter the extremism strategies that the main focus on the amendment in the education policy. Universities could control the activities of extremism in our education system through quality content and pedagogy. Universities should provide an excellent environment and encourage the youth to become tolerant flexible and open-minded.

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The term “extremism” is a comprehensively debated term and diverse efforts at its definition have not escaped controversy. Alex Schmid, describe “since extremism is a relational concept, to answer the question: “what is extreme?” one needs a benchmark, something that is (more) “ordinary,” “centrist,” “mainstream,” or “normal” when compared with the (extreme) political fringe. Peter Coleman and Andrea Bartoli (2015) on the other hand, describe extremism as “... activities (beliefs, attitudes, feelings, actions, strategies) of a character far removed from the ordinary”.

Extremism is a complex phenomenon, although its complexity is often hard to see. Most simply, it can be defined as activities (beliefs, attitudes, feelings, actions, strategies) of a character far removed from the ordinary. In conflict settings, it manifests as a severe form of conflict engagement. However, the labeling of activities, people, and groups as “extremist” and the definition of what is “ordinary” in any setting is always a subjective and political matter.

In reality, different factors are closely related with each other push factors base on structural and contextual condition (university management and faculty), contribution of personal factors (such as cognitive, depression and self esteem in students) and pull factors (heterogeneity population, ethnic groups, environment, political and religious groups, boosting the students. Scott (2017) admitted that extremism takes place in a social setting and informal social control, where youth join the different groups and network.

Pakistan is a sixth populated country based on multi-religious, multi-lingual society, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic. The present education system was not designed and prepared according to globalization and digitalization (Robinson, 2014). Traditional education system produced the supervisors and labor when youth were not able to achieve their goals they become extremist.

Education is a source of knowledge, self-development, analytical thinking and interpersonal and intrapersonal communication. It encompasses a teaching method of students to make a rational approach, sound the interrogative and research skill for finding the results according to goals. The skilled and educated youth is a troublesome situation due to the extremism as this academically strong and technically skilled youth is an asset of a nation (Akers & Silverman, 2004). The educated youth become toys of these extremist group, these groups are busy to ruin the modernity and society. The objective of our universities in creating social flexibility is debatable, but the existence of certain political-religious slogan in the country is a definite reality and is the main grounds to promote extremism in the society. The major challenge for Pakistan is THE presence of political religious parties and their political wings in higher educational institutions. These parties utilize their wings for achieving own objective and construct their identity in universities.

The extreme acts happened in Karachi, being connected with graduate students of a well-known university of Karachi (Rana, 2015). Punjab University and Quaid-a-Azam University are a nursery of extremism activity where ethnic groups are involved to promote the extremism in campuses. These incidents show there are various issues in our educational system that does not neutralize the extreme views of the youth. Top ranking universities, business schools are unable to teach and instill tolerance, acceptability, difference of opinion and freedom of expression. It is a point to consider for our education experts. Similar is the incident in Government College University (GCU) when a female student wearing veil was denied admission. Another extreme incident of Mama Qadeer (a person from a remote area of Pakistan) is not welcoming by The Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). On 13 April 2017 a young 23-year-old student Mashal was murder in the premises of Abdul Walli Khan University Mardan. In Punjab University and Quaid-e-Azam University political religious and ethnic groups fight with each other is a routine matter.

Theoretical framework:

In the social disorganization theory, Shaw and McKay (1972) argue that disorder and delinquency were more familiar in areas of metropolitan with better-concentrated inconvenience, ethnic/ racial heterogeneity, residential and urban areas instability. These factors were more significant because they make feeble social networks in urban areas symbolize by these features, due to this reason the probability of informal social control was minimized. Groves and Sampson (1989) identified the factors of social structure that effects on residential mobility, ethnic heterogeneity, low economic status and urbanization. Researchers precede the frequency of unofficial and delinquent youth groups, peer groups network density and measure the capability of youth groups to self regulate by factors of informal social control, the direct relation of social structure with crime which explored in the studies of social disorganization. (Sampson & Groves, 1989).

Heterogeneity of population is associated with the factors of social structure. In different studies Community organization and neighborhood directly affect of ethnic heterogeneity and racial communities (Barton & Jensen, 2010). Universities are not based on the local population and a large number of admission links to heterogeneity population that is expected to link by ethnic and racial composition. The youth heterogeneity population in the universities has increased from the last few decades (Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005).

In this study, we apply the social learning theory on the university students; students learn extremism by just observing even if they have not direct connection with extremist. Students observe their behavior, likelihood and awards which were getting attraction through observation. Social learning theory linked to the social behavioral approach that draws attention to the reciprocal link between behavioral environmental and cog-

nitive determinants of social behavior. In the theoretical approach belief, narratives and ideologies are encouraged by the environment then youth intimate extreme act. According to the social learning theory, an individual has own attitudes and values, he knows what is an acceptable behavior or not. They are rational according to the situation, evaluator of the environment, having decision power what is right and wrong, good and bad, their moral attitudes define desirable and undesirable. Individual cognitive, explain constructive to deviance provide a mindset that enticing youth toward extreme act when the opportunity is created and occurred.

The study in hand was qualitative in nature. Secondary information was used to explore the different acts of the extremism in major universities of Pakistan. Thematic analysis technique was applied to probe the events of extremism happening in the different public sectors universities. The researcher goes through with the various archives that highlight the various causes of extremism in higher educational institutions on the bases of study objectives. The whole sampling design for the study is multistage. At the first stage, different universities of Pakistan were selected where the incidence of extremism is reported. At the second stage of sampling procedure, three incidents from Abdul Walli khan University Mardan, University of The Punjab, Lahore, and Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad were selected purposively where political religious and ethnic groups fight with each other is a routine matter. Moreover, a sample of twenty (20) archives from authentic sources that ensures the descriptions of the acts of extremism that enticing youth. Thematic analysis technique was applied to highlight and discuss the relevant information related to the study objectives and variables.

Sr No	Variables	AWKUM (Mashal Murder Case)	PU Lahore (two group fighting)	QUI (two ethnic groups fight)
1	Ideological clash	✓	✓	✓
2	Ethnic heterogeneity	✓	✓	✓
3	Identity	✓	✓	✓
4	Behavior,	✓	✓	✓
5	University Teaching faculty role	☒	✓	✓
6	University Administration role	✓	✓	✓
7	Blasphemy	✓	☒	☒
8	Political involvement	✓	✓	✓
9	Religious involvement	✓	✓	✓
10	Environment	✓	✓	✓
11	Curriculum	✓	✓	✓
12	Informal social controls	✓	✓	✓

Commonalities

Among the archives of the Mashal murder case, incidents between two groups of Punjab University Lahore and fighting between two groups in Quaid-a-Azam University Islamabad show extremism practice in universities. The commonalities point out these themes are more important to contribute in university extremism and discussed this one by one.

Students of higher education institutions build up their own ideas and beliefs. They develop their own norms and ideas based on their individuality and social groups. The education system does not support the ideas and values according to social transformation and support the conventional education system. Employees of HEI integrate into immature youth psyche which is the reason of poor knowledge (Mahmood, 2017).

Ideological clashes between Islamia Jamiyat-E-Tuluba (IJT) with all other regional student councils, yet again led to the physical fight. As the members of IJT in a sociology department vigorously grabbed Pakhtoon student (while he was busy in his paper) from his class and was harshly beaten and misbehaved with the teachers too. Stephens (1994) discussed how these different frames of ideologies lead the conflicts and different ideological groups attract the youth for achieving the unequal objective.

There are different variables of society, particularly language, ethnicity, gender, religion and nationality. There are multiple variables that cause conflict and intense situation which is twisted by youth. Heterogeneity ethnicity in universities is linked to religious, political, economic and geographical marginalization. All these differences are factors to justify and identify the act of extremism against students (Baloch, 2018).

Sindhi, Punjabi, Pakhtoon and Balochi students were targeted and beaten by each other, especially conventional ethnic groups, to support their culture and values forcefully and with extreme acts. As a result of these extreme acts, many were critically injured, psychologically distressed and showed poor performance in the study (Mahmood, 2017). All the heterogeneity acts of these ethnic groups have multiple objectives mostly are religious and political in consideration. Some other factors include self-governance, demand for independence, power and respect for every group's identity and culture in the institution. Stevens (2010) had described a group composition base on the ethnic heterogeneity that leads to socio-demographic and economic characteristics of large youth groups. In universities different religious, political and cultural groups cause the conflicts to achieve their own aims and objectives such as support their narrative, authority and access to a resource, etc.

In some Pakistani universities, the leading cause of extremism, militancy and other issues is lack of rules, regulations and supervision, said Ashfaque Hasan Khan, dean of the School of Social Sciences and Humanities at the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) in Islamabad.

Educational institutes in Pakistan have been found to implement their main purpose of spreading knowledge in society and all of its members and therefore play a vital part in the development and stability of society (Zugri, 2015). The failure of these educational institutes in disseminating knowledge in society can be proved statistically.

The limited physical and extra curriculum activities, restrict the behavior of employees in the universities are another cause of extreme behavior in HEIs. As there is an old saying 'an idle mind is a devil's workshop'. Hence if students in their most creative days in universities are stayed back without doing much around, they can easily be preyed by organized extremist organizations. The limitation in meetings, discussions and events, which could develop a channel for students to discuss their problems anxieties and issues, is making them oppressive and leading them to get solace in an exclusionary and simplistic discussion of extremists (Khan, 2017a). The socio-demographic element in minimizing extremism is allowing the students freedom of speech in campuses which is carefully guarded in universities in the West.

The most terrible thing was the supposed role of some university employees and faculty members in provoking violence in students and that too on trumped-up blasphemy charges. Our only focus on science and technology is the reason of the prevailing narrative of extremist in academia of Pakistan. Although science and technology are essential for monetary capital growth and financial development, the social sciences and humanities are significant for social capital growth. (Amjad, 2012). Human capitals are benefitted and promote prosperity with the help of moral and ethical values. All developed countries make reforms and utilize different modern approaches according to the requirement in the education system. Unluckily Pakistan contains the old approach, no amendments in the curriculum, no faculty training workshops at the university level, suppress analytical skill and not promote the entrepreneurship. The present teaching method enforces the learning material for memorization of the lesson without any practical and comprehensive work and does not build critical and analytical thinking skills.

University administration gives leverage to these groups and not make an effective plan on how to control the extreme action of the students. According to the police officials "security in charge at the university, is the main accused in Khan's murder" (Akber, 2017).

Zeshan Hyder, a student of Punjab University, told *University World News* that students and higher education were suffering because of "rogue students backed by political agendas", Political interference is a big question for authorities. University administrations aren't able to solve critical and emergency issues (Nafees, 2017). Administration Efficiency is very poor and they linger on the issues which create difficulties for students and promote and fulfill the political agenda.

A student lynched in the premises of university by accuse of blasphemy. Mashal was tortured and ruined by students with the involvement of the political and religious

group. According to the police officer video show the hundreds of students participate in that mob and show their anger of blasphemy and university administration involved in this act (Malik, 2018).

Political parties influence the university administration and provide protection to students for their own objective. Anis Ahmed points out that the youths are attracted through different thrills and ruin them for achieving the political objective by prohibited means (Basharat, 2018). Political parties in the universities are associated with the traditional educational environment and system. The improper education system and political interference promote the extremism in the students because the state fails to facilitate integrated education (Kaleem, 2017).

The youth of higher educational institutions is used by political-religious parties to promote their goals and identity. Penetration of religious and political identity and ideology in universities is helpful for achieving their vulnerable and political objective and the existence of JTI in the university of Punjab is a piece of evidence (Zugri, 2015). These groups inject the ideologies in students and promote extreme mind in universities for destabilize the education system and gain the youth power (Hussain, 2017).

It is very dangerous to rising the extremism in the premises of institutions for the universities environment. Amjad (2017) reported that Mashal had criticized the university exam system and poor management of the university on the local TV channel. In universities, different forces promote the suffocating environment and traditional thoughts. Deutsch (2004) discussed the different environmental factors disturbing the society and effects on the socio-economic and behavioral pattern according to the youth conflicts. Universities encourage the sports days, cultural day's freedom of speech, participation in curriculum and extra-curriculum activities, Universities have permitted the traditional teaching and learning environment (Siddiq, 2017).

The educational policy-makers failed to develop curricula that inculcate fundamentally democratic, anti-extremist and tolerant values among the students. The curriculum is designed under the pressure of different international forces for targeting their goals, like Zia ul Haq era promote the religious values and culture that attract the students for jihad then these forces provide the funding to Mushraf Government for The curriculum the modernization and globalization (Wazir, 2018).

University students have their own identity according to their ideology and environment; they join different political and religious groups because these forms are easily available in HEIs. Universities have not provided the opportunists to join the academic platforms that show their skill and promote identity according to their talent (Hasnain, 2017).

David and Bar-Tal (2009) discussed that every young individual has an identity in the community and share the norms, values, belief and ethics by using that powerful tool.

Youth join different groups for identity and promote their culture, norms. Unluckily heterogeneity ethnic population is making a problematic issue for achieving the identity in the campuses.

Discussion

This study identified multiple factors why youth decide to engage in extremist activity. Select religious beliefs values were found to support engagement in extremism. Non-material (status, identity, power, honor and glory) plunder are also found to give the opportunity for joining the different youth groups. University environment and Friends are not only given the opportunity to associate the different political and religious groups and they influence and reinforce the youth to become a part of those groups (Haq, 2017).

Students decide to join the groups and engage themselves in different activities for varied and multiple reasons. Religious values and ideologies were found to underpin to joining the different religious groups like JTI (Jamiat Tulba Islam) in the universities and these groups were found to intensify the youth become involved in extremism (Haider, 2018). Religious ideology is not a necessary precondition for extremism, secular and modernity upbringing had found to involve in extremism activities (Khan, 2017b).

Personal identity could lead to an individual re-evaluation and the individual leaving the vulnerable views and adopt the extreme act from following the close social contact. Informal social control gives the opportunity to develop the negative ideology and beliefs that underpin student identity (Sheikh, 2018). Students who involve in extreme activities are no more expected to suffer from psychological disorder or mental illness than the general population. Political ideology is consistent encouraging factors for involving in extremism. Students may take steps in revenge for injustice or harass acted out on themselves or university fellows.

Students provide different links to influence the heterogeneity ethnic groups and also reinforce and support the student to join these ethnic groups. Through strong bonding between individuals and groups opinions can become extreme and violent. Religious and ethnic groups give an opportunity of space and social setting according to their goals. University provides safe environments where the religious, political and ethnic group can organize, strengthened their bonding, develop their identity according the extreme views.

University administration fails to control the extremism and these extreme acts become a black label on the education sector. University cafés sitting areas and student hostels are predominantly used as getting to gather and plan for extremism activities like Mashal murder case. University faculty reinforce the ideology and identity of the students, they are mirrors the dynamics of a society but unfortunately faculty involved in producing an environment where ruin the identity and promote extreme ideas.

In the findings of the study, it is concluded that extremism is main challenge in the Universities. According to the archives that youth were able to identify forms, informal social groups and factors contributing to HEIs. Informal social control and environment are key to youth becoming involved in different groups. Universities administrations fail to control these institutes, they provide a friendly environment where extreme ideologies can be preached, provide the opportunities to strengthened the bonding and relationship with different groups. The main perceived informal social groups and concerning dynamics that were: political groups, religious groups, ethnic groups, peer groups, manner of disciplining youth in university, faculty having extreme views, exposure to extreme curriculum, and low level of university discipline supervision.

Universities can control the activities of extremism in our education system through quality content and pedagogy. Universities should provide excellent environment and encourage the youth to become tolerant flexible and open-minded. New Curriculum and teaching style should give the opportunity to develop the personality, confidence, opinion sharing and entrepreneurial. Social tolerance, counter-extremism and humanities must be thought in every discipline of universities so that youth become able to think about the reason, ask question and answer critically and creativity. In an increasingly complex world we cannot restrict ourselves to circles populated by those who look and sound like ourselves.

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TURKEY: The Kurdish Issue. Limits of Security Methods

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Abstract: The Kurdish issue is a long-running political problem of the Republic of Turkey. It has two main dimensions, an identity rights dimension and its armed conflict counterpart. The Republic tries to resolve the issue via its securitization approach. According to this article, the securitization approach would prevent Turkey from resolving the identity rights dimension of the issue. This dimension would be solved by multiculturalist political arrangements that recognize, preserve and promote Kurdish identity in both public and private realms. The securitization approach would be problematic even for the resolution of the armed conflict dimension of the issue. It puts individual Kurds in an awkward position in the Kurdish-populated provinces, where they face various economic, educational and social problems. All these problems may significantly damage the brotherhood of Kurds and Turks, and accordingly, dampen the Kurds' desire for coexistence. Moreover, they may radicalize ethnic Kurds, especially Kurdish youth, who may begin to consider violent methods as the sole way of persuading Turkey to satisfy Kurdish demands, stimulating them to join the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). This radicalization would produce a constant and dramatic increase in the number of PKK recruits, making the resolution of the armed conflict dimension of the Kurdish question very difficult.

Keywords: Kurds, Turkey, Armed Conflict, Terrorism, Multiculturalism.

Introduction

The Kurdish question is one of the biggest political problems of the Republic of Turkey. The question has two main dimensions, an identity rights dimension and its armed conflict counterpart. The identity rights dimension is the result of numerous assimilationist Turkification policies enforced through the cultural togetherness policy – an official policy embraced by the early republican regime, the military administra-

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tions taking up the reins of government in 1960, 1971 and 1980, and their successor governments. The second dimension is the corollary of the armed conflict between Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê*, PKK), an internationally-recognized terrorist organization, that has continued since 1984.¹

Since the early 2000s, Turkey has made various reforms in order to resolve the Kurdish question by democratic and peaceful means. These reforms have transformed the assimilationist Republic. This had recognized, protected and promoted only Turkish identity – the identity of the majority ethnic group (Turks) – in both public and private domains and banned the recognition, protection and promotion of all minority identities, including Kurdish identity, in both domains. Turkey is now an integrationist republic where not only Turkish but also Kurdish and other minority identities are recognized in the private area, but only the majority identity is recognized, preserved and promoted in the public realm.

The reforms have not, however, resulted in a political resolution to the Kurdish problem. The armed conflict between Turkish security forces and the outlawed PKK is continuing at the time of writing. The Republic is employing security methods in order to resolve the Kurdish issue. In accordance with its securitization approach, Turkey defines the Kurdish question as the PKK problem that threatens its national unity and territorial integrity. The armed conflict dimension of the question might be called 'the PKK problem', but the question also has another dimension – the identity rights dimension – that would be resolved only with multiculturalist political settlements.

The securitization approach would be problematic even for the resolution of the armed conflict dimension of the Kurdish issue. It puts individual Kurds in an awkward position in the Kurdish-dominated provinces, where they encounter numerous economic, educational and social problems. All these problems would damage the brotherhood of Kurds and Turks, and accordingly, dampen the Kurds' desire for coexistence. Furthermore, they may radicalize ethnic Kurds, especially Kurdish youth, who may begin to consider violent methods as the only way of convincing Turkey to fulfill Kurdish demands, urging them to join the PKK. This radicalization would produce a constant and dramatic increase in the number of PKK recruits. In this atmosphere, it would be unlikely for Turkey to end its armed conflict with the outlawed PKK.

This article is organized as follows. In the subsequent section, the article seeks to understand Turkey's Kurdish issue. It then examines the recent transformation process that has rendered Turkey an integrationist republic. Afterward, the article critically

1 The PKK is recognized by Turkey, the European Union (EU), the United States of America (USA) and many other sovereign states as a terrorist organization. For more details, see <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/pkk.en.mfa>.

examines Turkey's securitization approach on the resolution of the Kurdish issue and answers why the Republic is unlikely to resolve the issue via security methods.

Turkey's Kurdish issue and its main dimensions

The Kurdish question is a long-running political problem of Turkey that has led to many democratic, humanitarian and economic costs. The question has two main dimensions, an identity rights dimension and its armed conflict counterpart. The identity rights dimension is the consequence of the Republic's assimilationist Turkification policies, e.g. (1) the definition of ethnic Kurds as Mountain Turks [*Dağlı Türkler*] (Kurban, 2003; Morin & Lee, 2010); (2) the prohibition on the use of the word 'Kurd(s)' (Al, 2015; Heper, 2007; Zurcher, 2003); (3) the ban on the usage of Kurdish in courts and schools (Moustakis & Chaudhuri, 2005; Robins, 1993; Yegen, 2011); (4) the filling of administrative appointments in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia with ethnic Turks (Kurban, 2004; Villellas, 2013; Yegen, 2009); (5) the prohibition on the use of Kurdish personal and place names (Muller & Linzey, 2007; Yegen, 2016b; Zeydanlioglu, 2012); (6) the confiscation of Kurdish books, films and newspaper (Hughes & Karakas, 2009; Olson, 1989); (7) the ban on the broadcasting, explanation and publication of ideas and opinions in Kurdish (Morin & Lee, 2010; O'Driscoll, 2014; Yegen, 2016a); (8) the forceful deportation of ethnic Kurds from their historic territory to Western Turkey, where they were expected to become assimilated into the dominant Turkish culture (Muller & Linzey, 2007; Xypolia, 2016); and (9) the construction of many boarding schools in the East and Southeast with the task of educating Kurdish pupils in an environment that physically separated them from their cultural habitat (Bilali, Celik & Ok, 2014; Ince, 2012; Yanarocak, 2016).

These coercive assimilation policies were enforced not only by the early republican regime, which ruled the country between 1923 and 1945, repressive Turkification policies were also implemented during the second half of the twentieth century when Turkey witnessed three military coups staged in 1960, 1971 and 1980. In this atmosphere, the outlawed PKK was established in 1978. It carried out its first terror attacks against Turkey in August 1984 by assaulting gendarmerie stations in the provinces of Hakkari and Siirt, resulting in an armed conflict between Turkish security forces and the PKK (Bozarlan, 2018; Gutaj & Al, 2017; Gourlay, 2018).

The armed conflict has not only left at least 50,000 people dead so far, but it has also generated other significant humanitarian costs, including village evacuations, forced migrations, extrajudicial killings and persecutions (Barkey, 1993; Belge, 2016; Calislar, 2013; Candar, 2013). In addition, the conflict has cost the economy at least 300 to 450 billion USA dollars (Ensaroglu, 2013; Yayman, 2011). Even the lowest estimates would enable the Republic (a) to build 30,000 kilometers of expressways (almost fifteen times longer than the current length); (b) to cover its last 80-year health expenses; (c) to open

5 million new classrooms; (d) to build 375 new health campuses identical to the Ankara Etlik Healthcare Campus, the largest health campus in Turkey; (e) to construct 1500 new sports complexes the same as the Afyonkarahisar Sports Complex, the largest sports complex in Turkey; (f) to build 60 new railway tunnels similar to the Marmaray Tunnel, Turkey's Bosphorus sub-sea tunnel linking Europe and Asia; and (g) to construct 75 new dams akin to the Ataturk Dam, the largest dam in Turkey. The list can easily be extended, but what I would like to underscore here is just to demonstrate how the conflict has held back development.

Since the early 2000s, Turkey has made various reforms in order to resolve the Kurdish issue in a democratic and peaceful manner, e.g. i) the abolition of the emergency rule in the Kurdish-dominated provinces (Coskun, 2015; Kolcak, 2015a); ii) the foundation of a compensation mechanism for harm caused by terrorism or fight against terrorism (Kolkak, 2015b; Leezenberg, 2016); iii) the elimination of constitutional and legal prohibitions on Kurdish broadcasting rights (Gunter, 2016; Kolcak, 2016); iv) the establishment of TRT KURDÎ, a publicly-funded television channel broadcasting in Kurdish for twenty-four hours a day (Kayhan-Pusane, 2014; Kolcak, 2015b); v) the authorization of municipalities, private language centers, universities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to offer Kurdish language courses (Kolkak, 2016; Weiss, 2016); vi) the authorization of public secondary schools to offer elective Kurdish language courses (Kolkak, 2015a, 2016); vii) the authorization of private schools to form bilingual (Kurdish-Turkish) education systems (Kolkak, 2016); viii) the authorization of public and private universities to offer Kurdish degree programs (Kirisci, 2011; Kolcak, 2015a); ix) the abrogation of the ultranationalist morning oath (*Andımız*) (Kolkak, 2016); x) the removal of legal bans on the use of Kurdish personal and place names (Hemmerechts, Smets & Timmerman, 2017; Keyman & Ozkirimli, 2013; Kolcak, 2015b); and xi) the elimination of legal bans on the usage of Kurdish in courts, prisons and making political propaganda (Koker, 2013; Kolcak, 2015a; Kuzu, 2016).

The above reforms have transformed the assimilationist Republic. Turkey is now an integrationist republic that recognizes not only Turkish but also Kurdish and other minority identities in the private domain. In its public counterpart, the integrationist Republic recognizes, safeguards and promotes only the majority (Turkish) identity and calls on all minority ethnic groups to converge on this identity.

The Republic has some multiculturalist features that enable Kurdish identity to be recognized, secured and promoted in the public area, such as the foundation of the *publicly-funded* TRT KURDÎ; the authorization of *public* secondary schools to offer elective Kurdish language courses; the authorization of *municipalities* and *public* universities to provide Kurdish language courses; and the authorization of *public* universities to provide Kurdish degree programs. All these multicultural policies, however, are exceptions to the characteristics of the integrationist Republic.

The Constitution of Turkey recognizes Turkish as the *only language* of the Republic (Article 3). It hampers *public* schools from using any language other than Turkish as the language of instruction or education (Article 42(9)). In addition, it defines all citizens as Turks by stipulating that “[e]veryone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk” (Article 66(1)).² Hence, the phrases ‘no Turk’, ‘every Turk’ and ‘all Turks’ are the common words in the Constitution and other legal sources, including statutes, regulations, decrees, etc. (Kurban & Ensaroglu, 2010).

The Constitution enshrines Turkishness in its preamble and other sections. The preamble states that “no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, Turkish existence and the principle of its indivisibility with its State and territory, historical and moral values of Turkishness”. It also states that “[this constitution] has been entrusted by the TURKISH NATION to the democracy-loving Turkish sons’ and daughters’ love for the motherland and nation”. Many such phrases as ‘Turkish citizens’ [*Türk vatandaşları*], ‘Turkish Motherland’ [*Türk Anavatanı*], ‘Turkish existence’ [*Türk varlığı*], ‘Turkish Nation’ [*Türk Milleti*], ‘Turkish State’ [*Türk Devleti*] and ‘Turkish society’ [*Türk toplumu*] are incorporated into a significant number of constitutional provisions (e.g. Articles 5, 7, 9, 41, 42, 59, 62, 66, 67, 76, 81, 101, 103, 104 and 174) as well as numerous other primary and secondary laws (Kurban & Ensaroglu, 2010).

The reforms have transformed the assimilationist Turkey into an integrationist republic, but they have not resulted in a political resolution to the Kurdish question. The last round of the armed conflict between Turkish security forces and the PKK has been continuing since July 2015.³ It has cost at least 2,748 lives so far (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2017).⁴ In addition, around 100,000 Kurds lost their homes, while up to 500,000 were temporarily displaced when the State imposed curfews in order to remove the barricades and trenches set up by PKK militants in the central areas of several Kurdish-populated towns and provinces (ICG, 2016, 2017).

2 The Constitution is available at: https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf.

3 The PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire in April 2013 in response to several reforms made with the goal of resolving the Kurdish question by peaceful means. On 11 July 2015, the PKK announced the end of the two-year-long ceasefire on the grounds that Turkey used the ceasefire not for a democratic solution but for preparing for a new war and strengthening its hand in this future war by constructing dozens of military roads, posts and dams for the use of Turkish security forces. Following this announcement, the PKK waged a new terror campaign, leading to a new round of armed conflict between Turkish security forces and the PKK (Cicek and Coskun, 2016; Hamsici, 2015).

4 ICG is a prestigious independent organization aimed at preventing wars and shaping policies that would construct a more peaceful world. For more details, see its official website: www.crisisgroup.org.

Limits of Turkey's securitization approach

Turkey tries to resolve the Kurdish issue via security methods. The Republic is unlikely to solve its long-running political problem through such methods. In accordance with its securitization approach, Turkey tries to convince its citizens to accept the Kurdish question not as a political problem but as the PKK question threatening its national unity and territorial integrity. It acknowledges the eventual victory of its security forces against the PKK as the only way of resolving this question.

The Republic is unlikely to resolve its Kurdish issue via security methods. The main reason for this failure is the inaccurate definition of the issue under the securitization approach. It is true that the issue has an armed conflict dimension that might be called 'the PKK problem', but it also has political dimensions that can only be solved by democratic and peaceful means rather than the securitization approach.

If Turkey had defeated the PKK, would this dissolution mean the solution of the Kurdish problem? The answer is no. This dissolution might solve the armed conflict dimension of the problem, but its identity rights dimension would still be waiting for a political formula without which it is unlikely to be solved. Ethnic Kurds would not give up their multiculturalist demands for a new pluralist constitution, mother tongue education and a comprehensive decentralization policy (Coskun, 2016c). The identity rights dimension can only be resolved by political reforms recognizing, protecting and promoting Kurdish identity and its characteristics in both public and private realms. Having dissolved the PKK, Turkey would still need to resolve another dimension of the problem by satisfying multiculturalist Kurdish demands.

One may still argue that ethnic Kurds would give up their multiculturalist demands after the dissolution of the PKK. This is unlikely to happen. These demands are made by almost all segments of Kurdish society. According to a report prepared by the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (*Bilge Adamlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi*, BİLGESAM) in 2011, almost 90 percent of Kurds ask for the elimination of all discriminatory ethnic biases in the Constitution of Turkey and laws.⁵ The report finds that 30.2 percent of Kurds want no reference to ethnicity; 57.4 percent of Kurds want all ethnic groups, including the Kurds and Turks, mentioned; and the rest (12.4 percent) back the present legal discourse that incorporates only Turkish-based ethnic phrases into the Constitution and laws (Akyurek & Bilgic, 2011).

The findings of the 2011 BİLGESAM Report are confirmed by many subsequent reports. According to a report prepared by the Economic and Social Studies Foundation of Turkey (*Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı*, TESEV) in 2012, 71.6 percent of Kurds want

5 BİLGESAM is a well-known research center based in Istanbul. For more details, see its official website: <http://www.bilgesam.org/en>.

all ethnic groups, including the Kurds and Turks, mentioned in the Constitution and laws; 13.1 percent of Kurds want no reference to ethnicity in the Constitution and laws; and the remainder (15.3 percent) support the *status quo* (TESEV, 2012).⁶

Whilst the 2011 BİLGESAM Report and the 2012 TESEV Report hear Kurdish opinions from all regions of Turkey, another report published by the Political and Social Studies Center (*Siyasal ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi, SAMER*) in 2012, pay attention to Kurdish perspectives only from the Kurdish-majority regions (Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia).⁷ The 2012 SAMER Report finds the followings: 62 percent of Kurds want all ethnic groups mentioned in the Constitution and laws; 33 percent of Kurds want no reference to ethnicity in the Constitution and laws; and the rest (5 percent) want solely Turkish- and Kurdish-based ethnic phrases mentioned in the Constitution and laws (Gurer, 2012).

Similar results were also found by a report published by the International Cultural Research Center (*Uluslararası Kültürel Araştırmalar Merkezi, UKAM*) in 2013.⁸ According to this report, most sectors of Kurdish society want Turkey to strip all discrimination from its Constitution and laws by either recognizing all ethnic groups or using a neutral legal language that does not give priority to any ethnic groups (UKAM, 2013). In a similar vein, a report published by the Justice Defenders Strategic Studies Center (*Adaleti Savunanlar Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, ASSAM*) in 2015 states that most Kurdish tendencies want Turkey to remove discriminatory ethnic biases in its Constitution and laws (ASSAM, 2015).⁹ The final report supporting all the above studies was published by the KONDA Research and Consultancy (*KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık, KONDA*) in 2016.¹⁰ This report finds that almost all Kurdish circles want Turkey to eliminate any sense of ethnicity-based discrimination in its Constitution and laws (KONDA, 2016).

A similar consensus has been reached on the official use of Kurdish. According to the 2011 BİLGESAM Report, four-fifths of Kurds support that Kurdish should be an official language in Turkey (Akyurek and Bilgic, 2011). Similarly, the 2012 TESEV Report finds that almost three-fourths of Kurds want Kurdish recognized as an official language

6 TESEV is a prestigious think-tank based in Istanbul. For more details, see its official website: <http://tesev.org.tr/en/>.

7 SAMER is a research institute based in Diyarbakir. For more details, see its official website: <http://www.ssamer.com/index.html>.

8 UKAM is a research center based in Istanbul. For more details, see its official website: <http://www.ukam.org/en>.

9 ASSAM is a think-tank based in Istanbul. For more details, see its official website: <http://www.assam.org.tr/en/>.

10 KONDA is a leading research and consultancy company based in Istanbul. For more details, see its official website: <http://konda.com.tr/en/home/>.

(TESEV, 2012). The 2016 KONDA Report confirms that nearly three-fourths of Kurds ask for the official usage of their native language (KONDA, 2016).

Another consensus has been made on the matter of mother tongue education in Kurdish. According to the 2012 TESEV Report, 78 percent of Kurds dream of the adoption of a new education system that allows Kurdish to be used as the language of instruction from the kindergarten level to the end of higher education in both public and private schools and universities (TESEV, 2012). Similarly, this Kurdish aspiration is identified as one of the most widely-heard Kurdish demands by the 2013 UKAM Report and the 2015 ASSAM Report. Finally, the 2016 KONDA Report finds that 85 percent of Kurds would like to exercise the full right to mother tongue education in Kurdish (KONDA, 2016).

In the presence of a mass-based consensus upon the above Kurdish demands, it is unrealistic to expect that these demands would be renounced by the Kurds following the dissolution of the PKK. Anyone with a knowledge of the history of Turkey would dismiss this argument. Multiculturalist demands were voiced by the Kurds in the early years of the Republic (Olson, 1989; van Bruinessen, 1992). They rebelled against the coercive or repressive assimilation policies of the Republic eighteen times, including the Sheikh Said Riot of 1925, the Ararat Rebellion of 1927 and the Dersim Resistance of 1936 (Celik, 2010; Mumcu, 1992; Strohmeier, 2003). The Republic succeeded in quashing all these uprisings but failed to convince its Kurdish citizens to give up their identity rights and demands for political representation. These unsuccessful Kurdish insurgent movements did not lead the Kurds to renounce their multiculturalist demands. Even though they encountered numerous social, political and judicial problems, the Kurds continued to ask Turkey to satisfy the demands (Boyras & Turan, 2016; van Bruinessen, 1993, 2000). The Republic's refusal to fulfill the demands resulted in a better organized and more powerful insurgent movement with the establishment of the outlawed PKK. In the absence of such a political formula, the Kurds not only continued to voice their demands but also formed a new insurgent organization using violent methods.

A similar scenario is likely to occur following the dissolution of the PKK. Having dissolved the PKK, Turkey might expect the Kurds to become integrated into its republican values without asking for the adoption of any multiculturalist policy. The Kurds are unlikely to meet this expectation. They would still call on the Republic to fulfill their identity rights and demands for political representation after the dissolution of the PKK. Turkey may still insist on refusing to offer a political resolution formula satisfying the demands. This refusal would stimulate a new Kurdish insurgent movement voicing more radical demands and using more violent methods than the PKK.

Turkey is unlikely to solve the identity rights dimension of the Kurdish question through the securitization approach. This approach may not solve the conflict either. Turkey had used various repressive security methods in order to end the violence in the 1980s and 1990s (Yegen, 1996, 1999, 2007; Zeydanlioglu, 2008, 2009). These methods have

not resulted in the dissolution of the PKK, but a PKK strengthening its support among ethnic Kurds (Gunes, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2016; Marcus, 2007). It is likely that Turkey's current securitization approach will have similar consequences.

The last round of the armed conflict has been continuing since July 2015. It has cost at least 2,748 lives (ICG, 2017). Almost 500,000 Kurds were asked to temporarily evacuate their homes during months of security operations aimed at clearing out the PKK in several Kurdish-majority provinces and towns (ICG, 2016; Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (*Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı*, TİHV), 2016; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 2017). The operations worsened education and social life in the East and Southeast (Amnesty International, 2016, 2017; OHCHR, 2017). They inflicted psychological and social damage to the Kurds (Human Rights Foundation [*İnsan Hakları Derneği*, İHD], 2017). They damaged cultural and historical heritage of several Kurdish-dominated provinces (Human Rights Joint Platform [*İnsan Hakları Ortak Platformu*, İHOP], 2018; ICG, 2017; İHD, 2017). It caused traumas that would be difficult to heal, particularly for Kurdish children (ICG, 2017; İHOP, 2018; TİHV, 2017).

All these problems may significantly damage the brotherhood of Kurds and Turks in the long run (Belge, 2016b, 2016c; Cemal, 2016a, 2016c; Coskun, 2016a, 2016b). They may dampen the Kurds' desire for coexistence (Belge, 2016a; Cemal, 2016b; Yanmis, 2016). Moreover, they may radicalize ethnic Kurds, especially Kurdish youth, who may begin to consider violent methods as the sole way of persuading Turkey to satisfy Kurdish demands, stimulating them to join the PKK (Akyol, 2016; Bayramoglu, 2015; Candar, 2016; Coskun, 2016d). This radicalization would produce a constant and dramatic increase in the number of PKK recruits, making the resolution of the armed conflict dimension of the Kurdish question very difficult (Cemal, 2016d, 2017; Cicek & Coskun, 2016; Sevinc, 2016; Todorova, 2015; Ustundag, 2015). Hence, the securitization approach might also prevent Turkey from ending the armed conflict.

It seems that ordinary citizens are aware of the inability of the securitization approach to solving the Kurdish problem. According to a survey-based report prepared by the Euroasia Public Opinion Research Center (*Avrasya Kamuoyu Araştırmaları Merkezi*) in 2016, a vast majority of Turkey's population (74.4 percent) are of the belief that the Kurdish issue can be resolved through political dialogues, but not through the securitization approach, while only 22.2 percent of the population regard security methods as enabling the Republic to solve the issue (Aslangul, 2016).

Conclusion

The Kurdish question is a long-running political problem of Turkey that has two main dimensions, an identity rights dimension and its armed conflict counterpart. The question has led to many democratic, humanitarian and economic costs. Turkey has made

several reforms in order to resolve its Kurdish problem since the last two decades. These reforms have transformed the assimilationist Turkey into an integrationist republic, but they have not resulted in a political resolution to the problem.

This article has sought to scrutinize whether Turkey can resolve its Kurdish issue via security methods. The article has eventually reached the conclusion that it would be very difficult to resolve the issue through Turkey's securitization approach. This approach defines the issue as the PKK problem while recognizing the ultimate victory of Turkish security forces against the PKK as the sole way of resolving the Kurdish question. The Kurdish question has an armed conflict dimension that might be called 'the PKK problem'. However, the question also has another dimension, the identity rights dimension, that would be resolved only by multiculturalist political settlements enabling Kurdish identity and its characteristics (e.g. language, culture, history, traditions, etc.) to be recognized, preserved and promoted in both public and private areas.

It is unlikely for the securitization approach to resolve even the armed conflict dimension of the Kurdish issue. The approach puts individual Kurds in an awkward position in the Kurdish-majority provinces, where they face many economic, educational and social problems. All these problems would damage the brotherhood of Kurds and Turks, and accordingly dampen the Kurds' desire for coexistence. This would engender a radicalized Kurdish movement using violent methods to persuade Turkey to adopt a political settlement satisfying Kurdish demands. This would provide the PKK with a chance to increase its recruits, making the resolution of the armed conflict dimension of the Kurdish issue difficult.

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LIBERIA: Civil War and the Complications SALWs Proliferation

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Abstract: This paper examines the complications of SALWs in the context of armed conflict with particular reference to the Liberian civil war. Using an exploratory analysis that relied on documentary data, as complemented by insights from Key Informant Interview (KII), the paper observed that the incidence of SALWs proliferation was one of the factors that complicated the Liberian crisis. The paper posits that the complications of SALWs proliferation in Liberia during and after the National crisis (1989-2003) posed a threat to the country's national security.

The threat is evident in the collateral impact of armed violence that characterized the Liberian crisis as well as the wave of armed criminality that has punctuated the country's history in the aftermath of the crisis. In the light of its dire effects vis-à-vis sustainable peace, security and stability, this paper submit that SALWs proliferation has posed a threat to Liberian national security both in the conflict and post-conflict eras.

Keywords: Liberia, Liberia crisis, SALWs, SALWs proliferation, national security, violent crime.

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Introduction

One of the critical drivers of the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) globally is armed conflict. In the aftermath of violent conflicts, large number of arms, largely SALWs, often remains in the hands of government forces, warring parties, and civilians. The illicit spread of these

arms contributes to an atmosphere of insecurity which further heightens the quest for arms acquisition. Ex-combatants and criminals have often leveraged on arms at their disposal to perpetrate violent crime in post-conflict situations. The consequence is a cycle of violence which challenges post-conflict peacebuilding and development (Gyong & Ogbadoyi, 2013).

Of all the million tons of SALWs in circulation in the world today, nearly a half is illegally held by civilians. Although the distribution of these weapons is largely uneven geographically, demographically, and institutionally, the bulk of the arms have ended up in the hands of dangerous non-state groups which are inclined to nefarious agendas. These arms are therefore used to fuel, intensify and exacerbate conflicts and instability. While conflicts subsist, there prevails a continuous need for more arms and ammunition; hence a vicious cycle of violence is perpetuated (Onuoha, 2006).

Generally, arms proliferation and misuse negates post-conflict reconstruction and development, obstructs the delivery and distribution of humanitarian and developmental aid, and holds the potential to destabilize neighboring states and societies. In view of its destabilizing implications of SALWs, its mitigation has been a prime priority in the contemporary global peace-building agenda. Thus, the removal of weapons from circulation in post-conflict situations, usually through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) Programmes, has been an integral component of the stabilization policies in post-conflict states and regions.

Globally, the phenomenon of SALWs proliferation has posed serious, humanitarian and developmental threats to the comity of nations. The post-Cold War arms liberalism accelerated pace of globalization, as well as the rise of asymmetric violence in many parts of the world, has promoted the circulation of both legal and illegal across the ever compromised international borderlines and frontiers. Similarly, the upsurge in intra-state conflicts has created a staggering demand for the SALWs, thereby making them weapons of choice in conventional and unconventional armed violence (Onuoha, 2006). But while all nations are variedly exposed to the threat of SALWs proliferation; states in post-conflict situations are more deeply enmeshed in its lethal complications. It is in the light of this fact that this paper seeks to examine the collateral effects and complications of SALWs proliferation in post-conflict situations in Africa with particular reference to Liberia.

Historicizing the Liberian Conflict

The Liberian conflict occurred in two phases: 1989-1997 and 1997-2003. To better understand the causes of the conflict in Liberia, a brief background of the country's civil war is required. The Liberian civil war started in 1989. The country was ruled by Americo-Liberians (American descendants) until 1980 when Sergeant Samuel Doe, a native Liberian, became the first president of Liberia (Gariba, 2011). This development

was welcomed with excitement by the average Liberians, who for the first time, thought they were going to be liberated under Samuel Doe's regime.

However, Doe's regime became very authoritarian, discriminatory and abusive of human rights in Liberia. It was as a result of the repressive regime of Samuel Doe that Charles Taylor began an attack in 1989 which finally led to the overthrow of Samuel Doe's government by a break-away faction from the rebels' group of Charles Taylor (Gariba, 2011). This group, known as the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), was led by Prince Johnson in September 1990. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a regional peacekeeping group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), mediated, and Dr. Sawyer acted as interim president until the 1997 elections when Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was elected as president (Fawole, 2001).

Two years later, the Liberian civil war began in earnest with two principal rebel groups, namely Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). The former emerged from the border between Ivory Coast and Liberia while the latter was started by a group of exiled Liberians in Guinea. These rebel groups confronted Taylor's government from different fronts leading to the destabilization of the country. With international pressures and ECOWAS intervention, Charles Taylor was forced to resign in 2003. He went into exile in Nigeria and his vice-president, Gyude Bryant, was chosen to act as interim president until the 2005 election, when Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected and sworn in as the President of Liberia in January 2006 (Gariba, 2011).

In the extant academic literature, many reasons have been given for the outbreak of the Liberian conflict. According to Adebajo (2002, p. 19), the conflict is generally attributed to a crisis of governance. Adebajo outlines six key issues, as indices of bad governance, that contributed to the Liberian War: 'the exclusionary rule of the Americo-Liberian Oligarchy, the brutal and inept rule of Samuel Doe; the deleterious effects that Doe's rule had on the armed forces of Liberia, ethnic rivalries and personal ambitions that resulted from Doe's rise to bloody power; and the destabilizing effects of the withdrawal of the U.S. support from Doe, a strategic Cold War ally' (Adebajo 2002, p. 19).

In the light of foregoing, it can be seen that Liberians suffered from the Americo-Liberian rule in that they were systematically discriminated against in terms of employment, political representation and development projects. But this situation did not change with the advent of Samuel Doe, a native Liberian, on the saddle of power in 1980. In effect, Samuel Doe's government became more repressive, authoritative and abusive of human rights. Indeed, there were political, social and economic factors that led to a resumption of the civil war in 1989 (Adebanjo, 2002). In the first place, after the 1985 elections, instead of establishing inclusive democratic governance, Doe deepened ethnic

exclusion by disproportionately appointing his own tribe, the Krahn, and co-opted the Mandingoes, who were the wealthiest businesspeople, into his cabinet to the neglect of the rest of the fourteen tribes of Liberia. Secondly, the extra-judicial execution of Colonel Thomas Quinwokpa and his military men, including the Gios and Manos, brought about counter-reaction. Thirdly, the execution of William Tolbert and several members of his cabinet and the reckless confiscation of property led the Americo-Liberians to support Charles Talyor's uprising (Gariba, 2011).

In light of the foregoing, it is evident that the principal cause of the civil war in Liberia is the issue of crisis of governance. This was variously exhibited in the abuse of human rights, dictatorial rule, social and ethnic exclusion, and institutional failures led to the overthrow of Doe's government and the turmoil that then engulfed the country. Samuel Doe's regime was very repressive and pursued ethnic discrimination policies. As Amos Sawyer argues, 'Sergeant Samuel Doe ascended to power from the lumpen elements of the Liberian Army. Within a few years, he purged the military of all his rivals and of its trained officers and relied on an under-disciplined core recruited largely by his Krahn ethnic groups' (Sawyer, 2004, p. 444). The implication of this is that the professionalism of the military was undermined, and this not only negated merit principles in the military but also weakened the military institution.

Nature, Incidence and Causes of SALWs proliferation in Liberia

The main objective of the study is to examine the nature, incidence and causes of SALWs proliferation in Liberia. The outcome of the study's interviews revealed that Liberia represents a typical instance of the countries of sub-Saharan where SALWs proliferation constitutes a veritable national security challenge. This fact has been corroborated by secondary sources to the effect that the country has variously served as the point origin, transit and destination of illicit arms/weapons circulated through arms trafficking. In effect, the country stands out as a typical volatile zone in terms of arms trafficking and SALWs proliferation in the Mano River Region (Fawole, 2001; Alemika, 2014).

The reasons for the negative Liberian profile in respect of SALWs proliferation were variously identified by the study's key informants as:

1. The corrupt and authoritarian regime of Samuel Doe that fertilized the seed of civil discord and dissent in the country;
2. The incident of the Liberian civil wars and the waves of civil conflicts that characterized its aftermath;
3. The proliferation of rebel/militia groups in the wake of the escalation of the Liberian crisis;
4. The meddling of neighboring states in the Liberian internal security situation;
5. Illegal mining and trading of diamond that provides funding for arms merchandizing;

Table 1: Fourteen Years Of Conflict In Liberia: A Timeline of Key Events

Sn	Timeline	Event
1.	December 1989	Charles Taylor leads his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in an invasion of Northern Liberia-the first step of a plan to topple President Samuel Doe
2.	1990	The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sends an intervention force to Liberia: the monitoring group (ECOMOG). Doe is executed by a breakaway faction of the NPFL, led by Prince Johnson
3.	March 1991	Liberian refugees of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invade Sierra Leone from Liberia, led by Foday Sankoh, an associate of Charles Taylor
4.	May 1991	Liberian refugees from Guinea and Sierra Leone, who had backed ex-President Doe, form the United Liberian Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) a rival to Taylor's NPFL
5.	September 1993	The UN security council establishes the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)
6.	August 1995	A peace agreement is signed in Abuja, calling for a cease-fire and disarmament of fighting forces.
7.	1996	Fighting erupts between ULIMO-J and the NPFL and spreads to Monrovia. ECOMOG troops regain control and another ceasefire is declared. ECOMOG launches a disarmament and demobilization programme.
8.	May 1997	The RUF, backed by Taylor topples President Kabbah in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone's Kamajor fighters, who supported ex-president Kabbah, flee to Liberia where they unite with ULIMO rebels
9.	July 1997	Charles Taylor is elected president. His National Patriotic Party wins a majority of seats in the National Assembly
10.	September 1997	UNOMIL withdraw
11.	February 2000	Anti-Taylor groups including the Kamajors and ULIMO, unite to form Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
12.	July 2000	LURD invades northern Liberia from Guinea
13.	September 2000	Taylor counter-attacks LURD by sending RUF forces into Guinea
14.	May 2001	The UN Security Council imposes an arms embargo and sanctions on Liberia for its continued support of the RUF
15.	February 2002	LURD advances to within 50km of Monrovia. Taylor declares a state of emergency
16.	March 2003	MODEL (movement for Democracy in Liberia) emerges as a new Liberian rebel group, closely linked to LURD but based in Cote d'Ivoire
17.	June 2003	The special Court of Sierra Leone issues a indictment for war crimes against Charles Taylor due to his alleged support for the RUF
18.	August 2003	ECOWAS peacekeepers arrive in Liberia. A CPA is signed in Accra Taylor accepts an offer to asylum in Nigeria and an interim government is establishment, headed by Gyude Bryant.
19.	September 2003	The UN security council establishes the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
20.	December 2003	Liberia's DDRR programme is launched.

Source: Small Arms Survey (2005, p. 111).

6. The failure of the Liberian state and successive governments to enforce public security, law and order in the face of the raging civil unrest, armed conflicts and governance interregnum;
7. The activities of local weapon crafters and arms traffickers that perpetuate the underground armed business in the country;
8. The activities of transitional syndicates that specialize on arms dealing and trafficking in both Liberia and the Mono River axis

Studies carried out by Fawole (2001) Alemika (2014) as well as that of Stohl and Hogendoorn (2010) largely affirmed the aforementioned observations. As observed by Fawole (2001), the advent and subsequent escalation of the Liberian crisis complicated the arms of proliferation debacle in the country. In this context, small and light arms became veritable instruments of armed struggles that characterized the civil ambiance of the country from late 1980s to early 2000s. This scenario was further compounded by the rise of a multiplicity of armed militia and militant/rebel groups in the country in the course of the civil conflicts.

The relative structural and functional failure of the Liberian state in the wake of the Liberian crisis led to the politicization and bastardization of the national armed forces. Most of the study's key informants opined that this trend helped in accentuating the SALWs proliferation debacle in the country. According to them, what resulted in this process was the emergence of a highly undisciplined, disloyal, partisan, and sectionalized national armed forces that was devoid of professional etiquette and discipline (personal communication, June 2015). In effect, the military became engrossed in the civil unrest that prevailed in the country, which worsened the SALWs proliferation syndrome.

The outcome of the Liberian civil conflict was widely implicated by the research informants. Military personnel interfaced within the course of the research at the National Defence College, Abuja maintained that in the aftermath of the Liberian crisis, huge stockpiles of arms/weapons had circulated in the country, with the bulk of them falling into wrong hands (Personal communication, June 2015). Consequently, small and light arms/weapons became a common possession by private individuals and organizations in the country. Worse still, the activities of dissident ex-combatants and criminal syndicates who eke out a living through arms trafficking have made the problem of SALWs proliferation rather endemic and intractable in the country: (cf. Fawole, 2001).

Generally, the drivers of SALWs proliferation in Liberia can be identified thus:

1. The Liberian civil conflicts.
2. Illicit trade on natural resources (rubber timber, and diamond).
3. Arms trafficking by organized and opportunist local and transnational arms cartels.
4. Gunrunning among private individual as well as public security operatives.
5. Plundering of government armories by dissident soldiers.
6. The proliferation of rebel/militia groups.

7. Poor law enforcement, leading to criminal franchise and impunity.
8. Mass poverty and unemployment.
9. Porous and poorly policed international borders in Liberia.
10. Warlordism and populist militancy, etc. (various personal communication, May – June, 2015).

Table 2: United Nations Arms Embargoes on Targets in Sub-Saharan African (2006–2010)

Target	Entry into force	Lifted
Cote d'Ivoire	15 Nov 2004	-
Congo, DRC (NGF)	28 July, 2003	-
Eritrea	23 Dec, 2009	-
Liberia (NGF)	19 Nov, 1992	-
Rwanda (NGF)	16 Aug 1995	10 July, 2008
Sierra Leone (NGF)	5 June 1998	29 Sept 2010
Somalia (NGF)	23 Jan, 1992	-
Sudan (Darfur region)	30 July, 2004	-

Note: NGF (in bold fonts)=Non-Government Forces

Source: Wezeman & Wezenan (2011:27).

Table 5.1 lists Liberia (in bold Italics) as one of the target countries for arms embargo. Although the embargo was actually on non-governmental forces, the implication is that the issue of SALWs proliferation was a serious concern in Liberia during the period under review.

Forms of Arms/Weapons proliferated in Liberia

The second objective of the study was to ascertain the forms of Arms/weapon commonly proliferated in Liberia. The outcome of the field-study indicated that they largely fall within the category classified by the United Nations Report of the panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (UNGA, 2002) as Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs). Table 3 highlights the forms of arms that constitute the afore-stated categories.

Table 3: Light and Small Arms proliferated in Liberia

CATEGORY	FORMS
Small arms	Revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles, and light machine guns
Light weapons	Heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of calibers of less than 100mm.

Source: UNGA, 2009.

Available data suggest that small arms constitute the bulk of arms/weapons proliferated in Liberia. Included in this category are rifles, sub-machine guns and pistols. The disarmament program held in Liberia from April to October 2004 resulted in the recovery of 20,488 rifles and sub-machine guns (Small Arms Survey, 2005). This clearly points to the fact that small arms are widely in circulation in Liberia. This affirms the views of most of the study's informants that SALWS is the most dominant category of arms in proliferation in Liberia (personal communication, May-June 2015).

Box 1: Arms and Weapons used in the Liberian Wars (Small Arms Survey, 2005)

During the Liberia armed conflict, the rebel forces used various forms of small arms including: self-loading pistols, M72 AB2 automatic rifles, FN FAL rifles, AKM and AK-47 assault rifles, M-16 rifles, SKS rifles, PKM light machine guns RPK and RPD machine guns, and Chinese M-60 type 7.622 mm light machine guns. The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) mainly used Chinese-made AK-47s, alongside other pro-government forces.

Both rebel and government forces relied extensively on light weapons, including rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs), RPO-type grenade launchers, British-made 60mm and 81mm mortars and DSHK 12.7mm heavy machine guns, as well as SA-7/Strella surface-to-air missiles. The AFL and pro-government forces used universal and general-purpose machine guns and RPGs.

Available secondary sources indicate that since the end of the Liberia crisis in 2003–2004, the trend of SALWs proliferation in the country has significantly changed. Nowadays, SALWs proliferation in the country is more remarkably skewed in favor of small arms, which are apparently in high demand in the region (Alemika, 2014). Some of the small arms in circulation in the post-conflict Liberia were locally produced while a good number were smuggled into the country through the activities of illicit arms merchants and traffickers (Alemika, 2014). Most of these arms remain in the hands of petty and organized criminal gangs who use them to perpetrate various patterns of armed criminality. A significant proportion of small arms in circulation, however, may be in the hands of private individuals and organizations which use them for self defence and/or protection.

Sources of Proliferated Arms in Liberia

The outcome of the study shows that Liberia variously serves as points of arms origination, arms transits, and arms destination. As a point of arms origination, the country has an underdeveloped, underground arms industry that manufactures different varieties of small arms. This industry is operated by local crafts-persons who use rudimentary techniques and tools to design assorted kinds of small arms and weapons.

Their products constitute, however, a marginal percentage of the total volume of arms in circulation in Liberia (personal communication, June 2015).

As a point of transition, Liberia presents a veritable route for arms peddling and trafficking within the wider context of the Mano River Region. In this regard, arms smugglers and traffickers, representing various transnational underworld syndicates, often 'push' their arms through the territorial spheres of Liberia to other destinations within and without the Mano River axis. In this process, residues of arms often end up in Liberia. As a destination for SALWs proliferation, Liberia presents a huge market for both legal and illegal arms purchase. In effect, arms supplies from local, continental and international sources find their way into the Liberia flourishing underworld arms market for onward circulation. This constitutes a critical dimension of the SALWs proliferation debacle in the country.

Generally, two sources of arms were principally identified by the research interviewees, namely, Local sources and international sources. The former refers to the arms supplies emanating from the domestic environment of Liberian, usually the product of the rudimentary underworld arms industry operated by local semi-skilled craftsmen. The latter refers to arms transfers, whether legitimate or illegitimate, legal or illicit, originating from other countries within Africa or beyond. The foregoing findings from personal communication were corroborated by secondary sources. For instance, the Small Arms Survey (2005) alleged that Burkina Faso and Libya have allegedly served as transshipment points of arms transferred to Liberia. Similarly, Honey Kong and Mainland China allegedly facilitated the transfer of Chinese made weapons to Liberia through the Oriental Timber Company controlled by the ex-president Charles Taylor (Small Arms Survey, 2005, p. 303).

One important driver of SALWs proliferation in Liberia is stealing from the government armories. Some key informants interacted with at the Liberian Foreign Commission in Abuja observed that some soldiers, who defected from government military to rebel forces, carted away from some government arms/weapons. According to a personal communication, in some cases, some of the arms/weapons were sold to private individuals or militia groups. In addition, government armories were massively looted by rebels during the course of the armed conflict in the country. Furthermore, criminal elements in the government military have often stolen from the government armories for sale. The gamut of arms/weapon coming from these sources constitutes part of the SALWs proliferation question in Liberia (personal communication, June 2015).

In terms of international transfers of arms, our personal communications revealed that Liberia relied on importation from a number of industrialized countries such as United States of America, Russia, China, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Italy, Spain, Iran, and so on. Some of the transactions were affected through the use of fronts or proxies for strategic reasons (personal communication, June 2015). Yet, some of them were done

through deliberate tactical subterfuge and deceit as relevant authoritative secondary sources corroborate. For instance, the Liberian government once admitted of acquiring significant quantities of weapons from the former Yugoslavia from June to August 2002 through the Balgrade-based Temex brokering company, using false Nigerian end-user certificates (Small Arms Survey, 2005, p. 330). Information reflected on table 4 showing hereunder is instructive in respect of the aforementioned ex-Yugoslavia arms deal.

Table 4: List of Weapon Shipments from Ex-Yugoslavia to Liberia from June to August 2002, as found in the UN panel of Experts on Liberia Repot (October 2002)

Date of Flight landing in Liberia	Contents of Flight	Weight (Tonnes)
1 June 2002	1,000 automatic rifles (7.62 x 39mm) 498,960 cartridges (7.62 x 39mm, M67) 2,000 hand grenades (M75)	21
7 June, 2002	1,000 automatic rifles (7.62 x 39mm) 1,260,000 cartridges (7.62 x 39mm, M67) 2,496 hand grenades (M75)	40
29 June 2002	1,500 automatic rifles (7.62 x 39mm) 1,165,000 cartridges (7.62 x 39mm, M67)	40
	120,000 rounds of ammunition (7.62mm for M84) 11,250 rounds of ammunition (9MM NATO) 75,000 rounds of ammunition (7.65MM)	
5 July 2002	100 missile launchers (RB M57) 4500 MINES FOR RB M57 60 Automatic pistols (M84, 7.65mm) 20M Pistols (CZ99, 9 mm) 10 Black Arrow long-range rifles (M93, 2.7 mm) 5 Machine guns (M84, 7.62 mm)	33
23 August 2002	1000 missile launches (RB M57) 1,000 mines for RB M57 50 machine guns (M84, 7.62mm) 1,500 automatic rifles (7.62 x 39mm) 17 Pistols (CZ99, 9 m) 92, 500 rounds of ammunition (7.62 x 54mm) 526,680 rounds of ammunition (7.62 x 39mm) 9,000 rounds of ammunition (9mm) 6,000 rounds of ammunition (7.65mm) 9 hunting rifles 152, missile launchers 1,000 mines for RB M57 10 automatic pistols (M84, 7.65mm) 5,200 rounds of ammunition for the Black Arrow long-range rifle (M93, 12.7 mm)	38
25 August 2002	183, 600 rounds of ammunition (7.62 x 54mm) 999, 180 rounds of ammunition (7.62 cx 39mm) 2 sets of rubber pipelines 3 propellers 1 rotor head 17 pistol holders	38.5

Source: Small Arms Survey (2005, p. 126)

The outcome of the Personal communication revealed that “Arms were procured during the conflict in Liberia through counter trading (trade by barter) in timber, rubber and diamond with countries such as Libya, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, and Guinea” (personal communication, June 2015). In similar vein, “the merchants and agents in Libya, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea used highly secretive arms dealers to arms (supply/transfer arms to) various warring factions in Liberia” (personal communication, June 2015). The defense contractors/arms vendors used in this transaction were given as indicated below (see box 2).

Box 2: Arms Contractor/Vendors in the Context of the Liberia Conflict
Saudi Businessmen = Unnamed
Aduan Khashogi = Japanese
Dale Stoffel = American
Dr. Moosa Bin Shansher = Bangladeshi
R. Wolfgang and M. Michael= Austrian
Lockheed Martin Company= United States-based
Vicotor Anatolyevich Bout = Russia
Cerberus Risk Solution = South Africa
Eyal Mesika = Israeli

Source: personal communication; Abuja, June 2015.

Dynamics of Arms Transfers and Proliferations during the Liberian Civil War

At the outset of the Liberian Civil War, NPFL forces elicited arms and training from Libya and Burkina Faso in exchange for removing Doe’s US-client regime from power. Libya was reportedly ‘the NPFL’s principal arms supplier’, while Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire served as transit points for arms as well as offering advisors and fighters. According to one report, three shipments of Kalashnikov rifles, RPG launchers and ammunition were transported from Bulgaria to Côte d’Ivoire by air in November 1989. The arms and ammunition were allegedly purchased by Libya through a German arms dealer and Swiss fiduciary company. This support helped make the NPFL the best-equipped rebel faction during the first Liberian civil war (Holtom, 2007).

Within the sub-Saharan Africa, the government of Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Libya were motivated by a mixture of political and personal reasons for removing Doe from power, but they also benefited financially from supplying Taylor’s forces with arms and ammunition. Although wealthy Americo-Liberian émigrés helped to fund military campaigns, revenues received from the illegal sales of, and extraction rights for, Liberian diamond, gold, iron ore, rubber and timber resources enabled Taylor to pay his supporters and arms dealers. In this regard, Taylor simply replaced Doe in the chain-linking

international resource and extraction companies, arms dealers and Liberia. For example, it was known that Ivorian and French extraction companies established commercial ties with Taylor in the early 1990s, while former British soldiers were apparently involved in arranging 'arms-for-logs swaps' on Taylor's behalf (Holtom, 2007; Edeko, 2011).

Anecdotal and media reports have held that the USA assisted 'Prince' Yeduo Johnson's INPFL with arms, intelligence and transportation, but these have been denied by US officials. However, a strategic decision was made by the Nigerian leadership of ECOMOG to supply the INPFL with arms and ammunition. Guinea also allegedly used its ECOMOG contingent to funnel arms and ammunition to the ULIMO and LDF anti-Taylor rebel factions. Individual ECOMOG unit commanders and troops were also accused of selling weapons to different factions. Rebel factions also seized ECOMOG heavy weapons and military equipment following the capture of ECOMOG peacekeepers, and in one case the INPFL ransomed a platoon of Nigerians for two 105-mm howitzers (Fawole, 2001; Holtom, 2007).

Information regarding the scale of the arms transfers that circumvented the various arms embargoes imposed on Liberia since 1992 remains limited. Some data on the origins of the arms and ammunition held by Taylor's forces and rebel factions can be discerned from the findings of the disarmament programs that took place in Liberia between 22 November 1996 and 29 January 1997 and from December 2003–March 2005. The collection process is undertaken in 1996–97 only recovered a fraction of the arms and ammunition transferred to Liberia's warring factions during the period between 1989 and 1996. The weapons surrendered were on the whole small arms and light weapons (SALWS), with more than half of the assault rifles collected western-rifles and only a quarter being Kalashnikov rifles. Arms and ammunition from China, Czechoslovakia and the UK were also collected. UNMIL's DDR program had collected 28 314 weapons, 33 604 pieces of heavy munitions and 6 486 136 rounds of small arms ammunition by March 2005. More than three-quarters of all weapons recovered were rifles, with Kalashnikov rifles representing the overwhelming majority of the arms collected during this collection process. UNMIL reportedly attempted to trace the origins of some weapons and also to calculate the return rate of weapons supplied from Iran and Yugoslavia in the period 2002–2003. UNMIL estimated that around half of Taylor's arsenal had been collected, in comparison with 38 percent of LURD's arsenal (Florquin & Berman, 2005; Holtom, 2007).

Quantity of weapons collected during the Liberian Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) contrasted to estimates by UN officials that there were three weapons for every former combatant. The leaders of LURD, MODEL and Taylor's forces promised that all of their weapons would be surrendered to UNMIL. However, it has been alleged that on the eve of the disarmament period most of LURD's and MODEL's mortars and heavy weapons had been returned to Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire respective-

ly. Reports also emerged stating that weapons were being smuggled into neighboring states in exchange for consumer goods. As far as can be discerned from the available data, patterns of arms transfers to rebel factions continued during the first years of the arms embargo in much the same way that they had before. Individuals, companies and supporters of Liberia's warring factions continued to source arms from Europe, in particular former Warsaw Pact and Soviet arsenals, to be exchanged for the natural resources extracted from territory held by Liberian warlords. For example, ULIMO-J used revenues from Bomi county's diamond mines to supply its forces, while the LPC relied upon exports of rubber. Neither of these factions could match the revenue streams of Taylor's NPFL, which were estimated to be worth \$75 million per year. There was one important change with regard to NPFL support following the introduction of the arms embargo. Ivorian support at the highest levels appeared to be waning by mid-1993, as President Félix Houphouët-Boigny and his successor Konan Bédié became more preoccupied with domestic problems. However, conflict goods and arms continued to cross the Liberian-Ivorian border (Weiss, 2005; Holtom, 2007).

The report of the first Panel of Experts on Liberia discussed a number of transfers to Taylor's regime in contravention of Resolution 788 (1992). The report indicated that there were 'persistent reports of ships to Harper, Greenville, Buchanan and Monrovia unloading weapons' and numerous eyewitness accounts of trucks bringing weapons from San Pedro and Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire), originating from Burkina Faso. However, because the Panel was unable to find 'irrefutable evidence' the report focused solely upon shipments delivered by air for which documentation was available. Thus, the Panel documented a number of cases in which the Guinean-registered arms brokering firm Pecos, Victor Bout's air transport companies, owners of Liberian logging companies, Leonid Minin and Gus van 69 Kouwenhoven, and forged End-Use Certifications (EUCs) were all involved in the transfer of arms and ammunition to Taylor in contravention of the arms embargo (Edeko, 2011).

In the course of the Liberian armed conflict, the foremost allegation of arms violation submitted to the sanctions committee related to 68 tons of military equipment, which had been purchased from Ukraine's state's export company, Ukretsexport, using a EUC for Burkina Faso's National Defence Department. Major-General Felix Mujakperuo, ECOMOG's commander in Sierra Leone, accused Burkina Faso's President Compaoré of complicity in the diversion of the shipment to Liberia, and its subsequent transfer to the RUF in Sierra Leone, in spring 1999. Suspicions were aroused due to the fact that the Burkinabé armed forces used NATO-standard weaponry and not the former Soviet equipment delivered from Ukraine. This shipment was reportedly the first of several destined for Taylor's forces in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone, which were arranged by Leonid Minin. Minin was the co-owner of Exotic Tropical Timber Enterprise (ETTE) – a logging company operating out of Liberia, which received preferential extraction rights in exchange for assisting with arms procurement for Taylor. When he

was arrested in Monza, Italy on 5 August 2000, Minin was in the process of overseeing a considerable delivery of small arms and ammunition, which had been ordered from the Ukrainian state-owned company Spetstehnoexport using a photocopy of a EUC signed by Côte d'Ivoire's President General Robert Gueï. On 18 December 2002, Monza court judges ruled that they could not prosecute Minin for these deals due to the fact that they lacked jurisdiction to prosecute in arms trafficking cases in which the arms did not pass through Italian territory. The prosecution appealed, but on 9 January 2004 the Corte di Cassazione declared that it was unable to prosecute (Weiss, 2005; Edeko, 2005; Holtom, 2007).

Minin facilitated the meeting between the Panel of Experts and a number of associates also involved in supplying Taylor with arms and military equipment during the arms embargo. A Finnish national, Erkki Tammivuori, apparently helped with the delivery of Konkurs, Strela and Igla launchers and missiles in May 2000. These items had apparently not been used, as training had not been provided. The Panel also received a document, which had been in Minin's possession, indicating that a payment of US\$ 500,000 had been made to one of Victor Bout's transport companies by Singapore-registered Borneo Jaya Pte. Ltd – the mother company of the Liberian-based Oriental Timber Company (OTC) (Fawole, 2001; Florquin & Berman, 2005; Holtom, 2007).

Taylor's regime had allegedly been striving to obtain Mi-8/Mi-17 transport helicopters and Mi-24/Mi-35 combat helicopters from former Soviet and Warsaw Pact inventories. The Panel of Experts saw two Mi-8/Mi-17s during their visits to Liberia in 2001, but their origins were not revealed. It was revealed that Pecos had used Guinean EUCs to acquire two Mi-24s from Kyrgyzstan in May 2000, which were bound for Taylor's forces. One of these Mi-24s was detained in Slovakia in February 2001, where it had been sent for repairs. The other Mi-24 left Slovakia in August 2000, following minor repairs. Although Liberian officials stated that they did not possess any combat helicopters, Guinean officials claimed to have shot down a Liberian helicopter gunship in 2000. The Guinean claims remain uncorroborated. Pecos also attempted to arrange for the transfer of two Mi-8s from Moldova to Liberia without a EUC, before Moldovan security services prevented the Mi-8s from leaving Moldova in March 2001 (Holtom, 2007).

Following the escalation of the Liberian crisis, LURD was formed in Freetown, Sierra Leone in July 1999. It claimed to rely upon weapons and ammunition captured from Liberian government forces. While independent experts have confirmed that LURD's armory contained weapons captured from Taylor's forces, it has been argued that Guinea used refugees, trucks and United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacekeepers to supply arms to LURD forces. Evidence of this relationship appeared in 2002, when Taylor's forces captured 81-mm mortar rounds that bore markings from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE had reportedly sent 81-mm mortar rounds as part of an aid package to Guinean in December 1998. The Guinean Ministry of Defence

(MOD) claimed that these mortar rounds had been lost in an arms depot fire in 2001 (Holtom, 2007; Edeko, 2011).

Elsewhere within the conflict sub-region, the Guinean company Katex Mines has also been accused of supplying arms to LURD. The Panel of Experts suspected Katex of arranging flights carrying Iranian produced arms and ammunition for LURD from Lviv (Ukraine) to Conakry (Guinea) via Tehran between February 2002 and August 2003, a suggestion that others have supported. The Iranian origins of mortar rounds used during the summer 2003 LURD offensive were confirmed by a number of experts, although these rounds could potentially have been taken from Taylor's forces, which are also thought to have received arms and ammunition from Iran. With the election victory of Laurent Gbagbo in Côte d'Ivoire, one of Taylor's former sponsors allegedly began supplying the anti-Taylor movement MODEL 'with uniforms, weapons and money', including Ukrainian-produced arms with US assistance (Edeko, 2011; Holtom, 2007).

In 2002, the report of the Panel of Experts' detailed six arms deliveries of surplus stocks from the Yugoslavia National Army to Liberia, via Libya, in the summer of 2002. Yugoslav authorities claimed to have received an export license from the Nigerian MOD for thousands of SALWs units, grenades and millions of cartridges and assorted ammunition, which were diverted to Taylor's forces. Libya was also reportedly involved in arranging for delivery of arms and ammunition from Iran via Benin, Libya and Sudan in the summer of 2003. The exact cargo of only one of these flights is known, as the flight that arrived in Monrovia from Tehran on 7 August, 2003 was seized by Nigerian peacekeepers. Preliminary investigations into the origin of the weapons seized revealed that the rifles were 'very similar' to China's Norinco 7.62-mm Type 56-1 rifles. It has been alleged that Liberian timber enterprises, in particular Gus van Kouwenhoven's Oriental Timber Company (OTC), played a central role in facilitating regular arms transfers to Taylor's forces from China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) between 2001 and 2003. A number of OTC arms deliveries for Taylor arrived at Buchanan and Harper ports from/via Bulgaria, China, France, Hong Kong, Libya and Nigeria. Kouwenhoven was arrested in Rotterdam on 18 March 2005 and charged with war crimes and breaking the UN arms embargo on Liberia in the period 2001–2003. In June 2005, a Dutch court in the Hague found Kouwenhoven guilty of violating the UN arms embargo, because his OTC illegally imported weapons into Liberia by sea for use by Taylor's forces and OTC militias. He was given an eight-year prison sentence, although not convicted on the war crimes count (Holtom, 2007; Edeko, 2011).

Rather curiously, a French arms dealer, notorious for being involved in transfers of arms from Bulgaria to Liberia between 1991 and 1998, allegedly re-activated his Bulgaria-Liberia arms pipeline in May 2002, supplying Kalashnikov rifles, RPG launchers and Glock pistols. With Burkina Faso and Libya again apparently involved in transferring

arms to Taylor's forces, it appeared as if the transfer patterns of the early 1990s were being repeated in the period after 2000. There were, however, significant changes in Taylor's suppliers and sponsors between these two periods. Chinese arms transfers reportedly increased dramatically at this time, and allegations were also made that Nigerian diplomats were involved in arranging for arms shipments to Liberia and Taylor-backed forces in Sierra Leone (Weiss, 2005).

The outcome of the investigation by the Panel of Experts revealed no evidence of weapons trafficking into Liberia since August 2003. However, organized, international smuggling networks remain in place and could be reactivated at any time. The 2004 Panel of Experts' report also concurred with views expressed by NGOs that arms and ammunition continued to be smuggled across Liberia's borders into neighbouring states. In 2005, the UN sanctions committee on Liberia received two requests for consignments of arms to be delivered to the NTGL. On 8 August 2005, the US Mission to the UN reportedly requested an exemption to the arms embargo to ship arms and training equipment for the new Liberian military. An exemption was granted, although one item was not permitted. The second request was submitted on 2 September 2005 by the NTGL, requesting permission to import 300 side-arms for police officers being trained in Nigeria. The sanctions committee looked favorably upon the request but sought more information on the proposed supplier. By the end of 2005, the committee had not received a request from an exporting state. It later transpired that Nigeria was to supply the Liberian police force with 50 Beretta pistols, 6,000 smoke cartridges and 3,000 hand grenades. The Panel of Experts' 2006 report also revealed that Romania had supplied the AFL with 150 Kalashnikov rifles fitted with bayonets and 69,000 rounds of 7.62x39-mm ammunition (Holtom, 2007; Edeko, 2011).

Collateral Implications of SALWs Proliferation for Liberia's National Security

It was generally acknowledged by the research respondents that the impacts and complications of SALWs proliferation in Liberia have had far-reaching implications for the country's national security. For convenience of effective presentation, the various views shared by the research respondents in relation to the implications of SALWs proliferation in Liberia are synchronized and presented under the following sub-themes:

Escalation of tension and hostilities: The free flow of small arms and light weapons in Liberia led to the escalation of civil tension and hostilities in the country. The constant supply and circulation of arms/weapons in Liberia in the 1990s provided impetus for the massive armed violence that characterized and complicated the Liberian crisis. The consequence of this development was evident in the huge humanitarian costs of the crisis, failure of peace talks and peace deals, and the general escalation of civil tension and hostilities throughout the country (personal communication, June 2015).

The proliferation of Rebels/militia groups: SALWs proliferation in the context of the Liberian crisis inspired the emergence of a multiplicity of armed groups, organized

militias and rebel movements. Prominent among these groups are the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), composed of groups that lost the 1989–96 civil war and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), which was formed in 2003 as a splinter arm of the LURD, largely representing the interest of the ethnic Krahn (Small Arms Survey, 2005). In addition to the aforementioned there were a number of militia and paramilitary groups, some of which were pro-government in orientation. These armed groups were all engaged in a fierce arm struggle that compounded and prolonged the Liberian crisis (personal communication, June 2015).

Internationalization of the Liberian crisis: SALWs proliferation, among other things, led to transnational degeneration of the Liberian crisis. At some points, the crisis led to contagious or spillover incidents in neighboring Guinea, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. These countries incidentally became proxied to the Liberian crisis, serving as sources of arms/weapons as well as bases for rebels training and recruitments. In effect, the Liberian crisis occasioned a spate of SALWs proliferation that created sapping security volatility and emergency in the whole of the Mano River Region (cf. Alemika, 2014). The free flow of small arms and light weapons in this zone during and after the Liberian crisis led to the intractability of civil strife and armed conflicts in that context in the late 1990s and 2000s (personal communication, June 2015).

Humanitarian consequences: SALWs proliferation in the context of the Liberian crisis led to dire humanitarian situation in Liberia and its neighborhood. This was exemplified in the high incidence of human fatality and morbidity that was associated with the crisis. Apart from staggering tolls of human death and injury, the crisis also resulted in gross population displacement, leading to crises of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. Besides, there were cases of rape, torture, armed victimization, and destruction of livelihood. This trend had immense critical implication for human security in Liberia and the adjoining region (personal communication, June 2015).

Incidence of armed violence and criminality: The level of SALWs proliferation that characterized the Liberian crisis was responsible for the spate of rural and urban armed violence and criminality in the country in the late 1990s and 2000s. In the aftermath of the national crisis, Liberia is still grappling with the challenge of public security in the face of high incidence and prevalence of violent crime perpetrated by the means of small arms. Organized criminal gangs in the country have free access to huge stockpiles of arms and ammunition transferred into the country during the civil conflict. This enables them to operate with brutal efficiency, with far-reaching implications for public safety in the country. Prominent patterns of arms criminality in Liberia include banditry, kidnapping, cultism and gang violence (Personal communication, June 2015).

Internal security challenge: SALWs proliferation has posed a huge internal security challenge to the government of Liberia. This is evident in terms of high public spending on public security, disarmament programme, demobilization of armed groups, and crime

control. This translates to huge real and opportunity costs in relation to the country's fiscal priorities (personal communication, June 2015).

Allied complications of SALWs proliferation: Other complications of SALWs proliferation in Liberia within the period under review included child and girl soldering, warlordism, homicides, and sundry organized crime. For instance, the phenomenon of child/girl soldering promoted the culture of arm violence and restiveness among the Liberian youth. The ripples of this development are evident in the spate of cultism and gang violence among the youth population in the urban and suburban enclaves of Liberia (personal communication, June 2015).

Conclusion

The problem of SALWs proliferation is a national security challenge in both conflict-ridden and conflict-free countries. In conflict-ridden countries, however, the issue becomes more problematic and more glaring. This is in view of the fact that conflict and SALWs proliferation are intricately interrelated. In other words, armed conflicts tend to drive the need for the proliferation of arms/weapons. Conversely, proliferation of arms/weapons tends to provide impetus for the escalation of armed conflict. In this wise, the two phenomena could be said to be mutually related and reinforcing.

As we have seen in the case of Liberia, SALWs proliferation was one of the factors that complicated and escalated the Liberian crisis. The outcome of our analysis shows that the complications of SALWs proliferation in Liberia during and after the National crisis (1989-2003) posed a threat to the country's national security. The threat is evident in the collateral impact of armed violence that characterized the Liberian Crisis as well as the wave of armed criminality that has punctuated the country's history in the aftermath of the crisis. In the light of its destructive impacts and complications vis-à-vis sustainable peace, security and stability, this study submits that SALWs proliferation has posed a threat to Liberian national security in both the conflict and post-conflict eras.

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UN SECURITY COUNCIL: The 'Frozen' Victory of the Great Powers

Sefer YILMAZ

Abstract: There exists a broad agreement that the Security Council (SC) is anachronistic, and it is in urgent need of reform. Despite various attempts which have been made to amend the current structure of the SC for the last half a century, none of these has yielded any considerable result yet. This paper will look at the SC from both change management and international relations (IR) theories perspective and argue that the structure of the SC actually reflects not just 40s' but also today's "balance of power", which will be corresponded with the "state of balance" or "equilibrium" concepts of change management, where both driving forces and the restraining forces seem to stand still in balance. This structure is so firmly 'frozen' that, no one has been able to "unfreeze" it in Lewin's words, in order to launch a successful change, up until today. It will be concluded that the failure of change initiatives of the SC and at large, the global order is only likely to be explained by taking into consideration both the assumptions of those realist theories and change management approaches together.

Keywords: International Relations, Change Management, International Organizations, IR Theories, Power Politics, Global Order.

Introduction

The contemporary international world order based upon the SC structure, still clearly reflects 40s' balance of power, even though this balance is argued to be changed considerably, if not drastically. Should this situation be regarded as a shortcoming of the international system? Should it be deemed as a success of the founders of the UN and creators of the SC, or a failure of the member states who have been unable to come to an agreement to form a new global order since then? Or both? Is the structure of the SC reflecting 40s' balance of power really outdated or does it still mirror today's power politics? What causes enabled this structure

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to last more than 70 years? The answers to these questions will be expounded in this paper through IR theories and change management approaches.

This study will start with an overview of the general characteristics of the contemporary international order in terms of international organizations. It will ponder upon the arguments regarding the instrumental characteristics of the international organizations, particularly the UN. The nature of the Security Council (SC) will be discussed by taking into consideration the historical context through which the SC is created. Permanent membership and veto power although attracting too much criticism will be regarded as reflections of the balance of power of the time, in a realistic perspective.

In the following section, the current global world order moving around the UN will be evaluated with respect to the principles of realist thoughts. It will be argued that the global order configured short after World War II (WW2) through the mechanisms of the international organizations, particularly the SC, apparently reflects the realist presumptions. It also will be contended that it is those same realist assumptions, which account for the relative stability of this structure up until today.

In the third section, among various change management approaches, some of the most related works such as Lewin's (1951) 3-step model and Field Theory, Kotter's (1995) establishing a sense of urgency, Stacey's (2003) types of order-disorder, Burnes' (2004a) felt-need and Schein's (1996) survival anxiety will be cited.

In the fourth section, the failure of the SC reform will be explained together with both change management approaches and realist assumptions. The concept of "*balance of power*", which is located at the center of international relations discipline, will be corresponded with "*state of equilibrium*" of Lewin's (1951) classical model, which lies at the roots of change management approaches. It will be argued that only taking into consideration both those realist theories and change management approaches together, it is possible to explain the unchanging nature of the SC and at large, the global order.

In the end, we will conclude that the covenant which has been made between the great powers of WW2 and the founding states of the UN seems to be valid today. The monument put up by the great powers at that time, is still standing whether it is enjoyed or not, and a new one has not been agreed upon by the member states yet. This is because of either the failures of members states who have not been able to get on the same page, or the great powers of WW2 with their matchless success, who have been able to reach an extensive compromise on the peace, after a devastating warfare, which would not be attained that easy in the years ahead.

Eventually, it will be underscored that the great powers of the WW2 have been able to render their triumph immortality, at least for quite a long time, through constructing a "frozen" world order around the UN, particularly based on the SC, which would not be defrosted that easy. Therefore, it is argued in this paper that the SC should be regarded

both the perpetual win of the realist theories after having been challenged rigorously time and time again and the permanent victory of those great powers of WW2.

Contemporary world order and realist explanations

Falk (1983) asserts that world order focuses on the way on which world nations can reduce the likelihood of international conflicts and create social and economic prosperity. This description reflects the very intention put forth in the UN Charter. The principal aims of the UN, as implied by its founding Charter are:

“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom” (UN, 1945: 2).

However, although these declarations of will produce hope for the future of international society at first glance, there exist also arguments on the opposite side contending that the current international order is intentionally designed as an instrument to strengthen the hegemony of the great powers from the very beginning. According to some, powerful states create such kind of ordering mechanisms purposely to achieve their common goals (Haggard & Simmons, 1987). Keohane (2002) was among those, who asserted that the hegemon states create ordering mechanisms, which help them achieve their goals, often with the least cost than they could do without such mechanisms. Mearsheimer (1995) was another prominent scholar who believed that international institutions like the UN and particularly the SC serve a great extent to the benefits of great powers.

According to Mazarr, Priebe, Radin and Astrid (2016), what is referred to as the “international order” is the global order shaped mostly by the United States (US), on the basis of international institutions, after the WW2. Yet, building an international order for pursuing its own goals, has argued to be a formal program of the US foreign policy since 40s (Patrick, 2009). Brooks and Wohlforth (2009) maintained that it would be much harder for the US to promote its strategic interests worldwide if it did not invest in international organizations. Hence, a report to the *National Security Council* of US on April 12, 1950, set forth the logic underlying behind the US strategy of establishing a world order based on American values. In the report, it is revealed that the US must seek to create a world society with its allies (Executive Secretary, 1950). Obama was among those who articulated this vision in the years 2000s. He forthrightly admitted that:

“In the wake of the WW2, it was America that largely built a system of international institutions that carried us through the Cold War. Leaders like Harry Truman and George Marshall knew that instead of constraining our power, these institutions magnified it” (Obama, 2007).

This debate comes up for discussion the motivations through which international organizations have been created. Did the impulse to create international organizations stem from the collective interests of the member states of those organizations or from the intentions of those powerful states who are striving to increase their significance in the balance of power. International organizations, which come to life shortly after the WW2 draw special attention at this point.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the US launched a new global order, based on a series of international organizations through which it will be able to control world politics more easily. For instance, the UN was told to have been created for maintaining peace and prosperity and the Bretton Woods system for regulating global transactions (Fontaine & Kliman, 2013). The US is argued to dominate not just the decision-making mechanisms but also the functioning ways of those organizations (Rather & Jose, 2015).

The Charter of the UN was signed in June 1945 and the UN was established as an international organization in October 1945 (Conforti, 2005). Among the participated fifty-one states, 35 states were argued to be closely related to the US in one way or another (Luck, 2005). Just this data alone can imply the balance of power prevailed at the time when the UN is created.

The need to accept the realities of power politics is argued to be reflected at the SC and the equality of the member states is told to be reflected in the General Assembly (Heywood, 2011). Wilcox (1945) argued that the SC operationalized itself by allocating permanent seats and veto to the great powers of the time. It was supposed that the most significant reason for the League's failure was its inability to enforce its decisions and the SC was regarded as the main instrument to overcome the impotency of the League of Nations with the privileges provided for its permanent five members (P5) (Hilderbrand, 1990). Therefore, while on one hand structuring world security on a similar type of institution as the League of Nations, the Charter of the UN provided the SC with significant executive power to be able to uphold the world peace (Russell, 1958).

Thus, the SC was given not just primary responsibility but also the authority for the maintenance of international peace and security. According to Article 39 of the UN charter, the SC:

"... shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security" (UN, 1945: Art. 39).

The SC is apparently the most powerful organ of the whole global order, with the authority to take coercive and binding decisions and actions to maintain and preserve international peace and security. SC's decisions have the authority of international law (Butler, 2012) through which it can impose blockades and authorize the use of armed

forces (Gould & Rablen, 2017). It has the right to act on behalf of the members of the UN:

“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf” (UN, 1945: Art. 24).

All the founders of the UN agreed in advance to accept and implement the decisions of the SC in accordance with the Charter (UN, 1945: Art.25). The members joined later to the UN are also deemed to be admitted complying with the charter provisions fully.

The Council consists of fifteen members, five of whom are permanent members while other tens are elected non-permanent members with two-year terms (UN, 1945: Art.23). Decisions are being taken at the Council with at least nine out of fifteen member’s affirmative votes in addition to “concurring votes of the P5” (UN, 1945: Art.27). Five members of the General assembly were granted privileged powers at the SC by the Charter. These five states were the US, the USSR, the UK, China and France, often referred to as the “P5” (Butler, 2012). It is argued that because of the heavy responsibility rested on their shoulders, those states provided with an exceptional position at the SC with permanent seats (UN, 1945: Art.23) and veto power (UN, 1945: Art.27) which were interpreted later, as the solid hegemony of great powers over the UN. Bosco (2009) commented that the great powers’ intention to dominate over the new organization was embodied in the veto. With this provision, the SC provided its permanent members with even greater protection (Wouters & Ruys, 2005). This power was so essential that Roosevelt’s Secretary of State Cordell Hull told the Senate in those days that “the veto provision was an absolute condition for the US’ participation in the UN” (Eban, 1995).

Thus, SC became a “*council of the victorious*” in Alger’s words (1996, p. 350). This picture was obviously the reflection of power politics prevailed at the time and was to be continued for an unprecedented period. P5, who by virtue of being the victorious powers at the end of the WW2 as military, also succeeded to allot to themselves this privileged position politically. Therefore, the SC could be regarded as a political victory of the P5, which generated much stronger and long-lasting implications for them than their military triumph.

As an extension of the above discussion about the instrumental characteristic of international institutions, several authors have argued that the SC was an instrument which is utilized to legitimate and support the policies and actions of a limited number of powerful states (Claude, 1996, Berdal, 2003, Hurd, 2007, Cronin, 2008). Supporting this hypothesis, Claude (1996) claimed that states provide political capital based on the approval of the SC for their own actions. Particularly regarding the actions of the US with respect to the UN, there is much more criticism. For instance, Luck draws at-

tention to the US's growing disposition to move alone free from the SC decisions (Luck, 2005). One step further, it is also argued that the SC is "abused to legitimize US direct or indirect military interventions around the world on a number of occasions" (Rather & Jose, 2015, p. 53).

Supporters of liberalism argued that states sharing liberal values had no reason for going to war with one another (Grewal, 2016; McGlinchey, Walters and Scheinpflug, 2017). In a liberal order, states violating international norms and agreements face considerable costs (Meiser, 2017). Moving ahead from the liberal assumptions, League of Nations was created for the purpose of maintaining peace worldwide. It was expected that under the umbrella of international institutions, which were erected on liberal principles, there would be no significant conflicts leading wars. However, things went wrong. The League which was established with those liberal ideas, could not be able to perform as expected and collapsed with the outbreak of the WW2. Therefore, this development harmed deeply the belief in liberal assumptions and later, realism emerged with an argument to explain the presence of war (McGlinchey, Walters and Scheinpflug, 2017).

Yet, on the contrary, some argued that liberalism was reborn short after the WW2 with the international order, which was structured on the premise of liberal thoughts. The nature of this global order with its international organizations and norms are argued to be structured to restrain the violent power of states (Meiser, 2017). From this point of view, the UN stands out at the center of this liberal system. To some extent, this could be deemed sensible. However, looking inside the structure and functioning of the UN and particularly its executive organ the SC, it can apparently be observed that both the structure and the functioning of the SC reflect the characteristics of balance of power, which realist thought put forth. From this point forward, we will try to assess from which certain aspects the SC corresponds with the assumptions of the realist school.

Realism posits that states struggle for survival and dominance against all others in an orderless and anarchic environment, namely international structure. In such a circumstance, there seem to be two ways of action for the states to survive: States can either rely on only themselves (Antunes & Camisao, 2017) or they can survive being a part of a hegemon authority. However, Grewal contended that there was a third way of action for the states to survive which was to establish an overarching coercive authority or global hegemon (Grewal, 2016). This recalls Hobbes's reputed social contract. Hobbes argued that humans can only escape from living in an orderless state of nature, which he perceived as a war of all against all, by constructing a civil sovereign (Hobbes, 1651b). The order comes to light through this general consent is what Hobbes defined as a "*commonwealth by institution*" or simply a "*commonwealth*" (Hobbes, 1651b).

Airaksinen and Bertman (1989) put forth that "*World Government is justified on Hobbesian principles*" despite Hobbes did not articulate such an idea of global order. This approach moves from the presumption that states in anarchical state of nature,

accepted to fall under the hegemony of an international structure with their free will, in order to gain relative security (Grewal, 2016: 670). The international structure emerged through this presumption, is argued to constrain states from taking certain violent actions one another (Waltz, 1991). This structure could easily coincide with the UN system.

According to Hobbes, what creates an instituted commonwealth is that “each of its members, in a quiet mind gives consent to its construction”, taking into consideration of advantages and disadvantages both (Hobbes, 1951b). This is what happened during the establishment of the UN. In 1945, fifty-one founding states, being totally aware of the advantages and disadvantages of the new organization, gave their consent to the establishment of the UN. The members of the UN have agreed that the SC act on their behalf and carry out the decisions of the SC in advance by signing the UN Charter. As regulated in Article 24 (1) of the UN Charter (UN, 1945: Art.25):

“In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf”.

Waltz (1979) maintains that states will be unwilling to sign any agreement that put them in a worse situation relative to others. So why those founding states agreed to a hierarchical structure, which apparently put them into a lower position *vis a vis* the P5 states? The answer of this question lies behind the historical records of the WW2. It is because, the misery experienced by humanity during the devastating battles of the WW2 led states to give assent to the establishment of a hierarchical international structure, although putting them into a lower position, for the sake of relative security (Butler, 2012). As Morgenthau (1978) argues, international organizations are merely the reflection of states’ power distribution at the time those organizations are created. Therefore, in order to be able to grasp the logic behind the creation of the hierarchical nature of the SC, it is of primary importance to understand the time when the UN was established. Because the Council had its roots in wartime, the victorious powers of that war were provided with special status (Plesch, 2008). Indeed, the P5 have not been granted this privilege based on their capabilities alone but because of their characteristics as being major victors of WW2 (Stephen, 2018).

From this point of view, “the SC might draw on a degree of relative legitimacy” (Fave, 1980, p. 955). This perceived legitimacy of the P5 derived from the war led those states to possess special rights and responsibilities in the new global order. This acknowledgment was tied to power by Brown (2004). “*The only hope for the world is the agreement of the Great Powers,*” said explicitly Winston Churchill confirming power politics (Gilbert, 1986, p. 1170). Hence, at the San Francisco conference, the naturalness of a hierarchical international system was articulated loudly by the great powers and as a result, the privileges provided to the P5 were taken for granted by the majority of the

founding states (Hurd, 2007). This brings Waltz's "jump on the bandwagon" to mind. He asserted that in hierarchic political orders, actors tend to jump on the bandwagon of a recent victor, in order to gain relative security (Waltz, 1979). It seems that the founding members of the UN preferred to jump on the bandwagon, despite their certain concerns, to feel relatively much more secure in the international structure.

Another related realistic argument articulated by Hobbes, which will be corresponded with the UN is about the concept of liberty. Hobbes argued that the insecurity experienced in the state of nature pushes individuals to transfer some of their natural liberties to the civil sovereign. This loss of natural liberty is compensated by the gain of security (Hobbes, 1651b). Bull (1977) explains states' limiting their own sovereignty with the sense of rational calculation that this renunciation will lead to secure their independence. These are the assumptions that reveal why the founding states gave their assent to the SC permanent seats and the veto power associated with those seats. States at that time, have been exhausted of successive devastating wars, wished to feel more secure at the cost of losing some of their, with Hobbes' words, natural liberties. In turn, they gained relative security and order in the international structure they live through. Hammarskjöld who was then Secretary-general¹ of the UN articulated this mindset and situation in an eloquent way:

"The United Nations was not created to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell".

Another striking argument was stated by the UK representative during the discussions of the UN Charter as:

"The unanimity of the great powers was a hard fact, but an inescapable one. The veto power was a means of preserving that unanimity, and far from being a menace to the small powers, it was their essential safeguard. Without that unanimity, all countries, large and small, would fall victims to the establishment of gigantic rival blocs which might clash in some future Armageddon. Cooperation among the great powers was the only escape from this peril, nothing was of comparable importance" (Butler, 2012, p. 29).

Indeed, there has never been experienced a war among the P5 for more than seventy years (Bosco, 2014). With respect to this relatively peaceful relationship, Hobbes explanation in the De Cive is meaningful:

"For the state of commonwealths towards each other is a natural state, i.e. a state of hostility. Even when the fighting between them stops, it should not be called Peace, but an intermission during which each watches the motion and

1 1953-1961.

aspect of its enemy and gauges its security not on the basis of agreements but by the strength and designs of the adversary” (Hobbes, 1651a).

He craftily describes the situation in which the global powers, particularly the US and Russia at the SC, deal with each other in almost every instance of political discussion. This also consists a sample of what Mearsheimer (2010: 78) depicted as “*the currency of international politics*”. He argued that “the great powers were trapped in an iron cage where they had little choice but to compete with each other for power if they hope to survive” (Mearsheimer, 2006).

As a consequence, the nature of the SC realistically reflects the balance of power of both 40s and today. It is hard to agree that the balance of power has been drastically changed since 1945 and that today prevails totally different power politics. If that argument was sound, then the structure of the SC should have been changed. The SC did not change not because the P5 vetoed the change resolutions, but it is because the member states have not been able to reach an even just one novel agreement on reform consonant with the Charter, other than they reached in 1961.

The realist thought argues that the possibility of significant change in international structure is limited (Antunes & Camisao, 2017). This relative state of equilibrium is called the “balance of power”, in real politics. What is experiencing today in terms of the failures of reform at the SC, actually reflects this realist assumption. However, this is not to say that it is totally impossible to implement a change at the SC successfully. Rather, this means that the picture in front of us is a sheer reflection of today’s balance of power. If the power politics changes, then this picture owed to the SC will also be changed.

Related Change Management Approaches

It is argued that the phenomenon of change in organizations has never been of great importance than today’s world (Kotter, 1996; Balogun & Hope Hailey, 2004). In other words, the phenomenon of change is gaining speed at a great pace and occupying every aspect of our daily lives and institutions more and more. Kanter (1999) points out this reality as “business has never been conducted on such a global collaborative scale”. Burnes (2004a) establishes that, change has become an inextricable requirement of organizations. Graetz (2000) asserts that in the face of ever-increasing developments, the primary mission for management today should be regarded as leading organizational change. Kanter, (1999) suggests that organizational change efforts to be reconsidered as doing business becomes more complex.

However, despite the emphasis underlined by a countless number of authors, it is reported that the failure rate of organizational change initiatives had reached almost up to 70 percent (Balogun & Hope Hailey, 2004; Kotter, 2008; Hughes, 2011). Many scholars have been investigating the root causes of this high rate of failure from various aspects

for years. For example, Kotter (1995) identified eight reasons, why change efforts failed, first of which was being unable to establish a sense of urgency. Armstrong (2006) supports this presumption by asserting that an awareness of the need for change is the start of the whole change process. Cummings & Worley (2003) argued that organization members do not support change initiatives “unless they are convinced against the status quo”. Stacey (2003) sets forth three types of concept regarding order and disorder for the organizations: the state of stable equilibrium, explosive instability, and bounded instability. He claims that the organizations can transform themselves in order to survive in face of ever-changing circumstances, only under the state of bounded instability.

Lewin’s (1951) three-step change model is regarded as one of the oldest approaches describing the organizational change process. He maintained that the stability of organizational behaviors was based on a “quasi-stationary equilibrium” (Burnes, 2004b). He takes this relatively stable situation as somewhat “frozen” one. He argues that this frozen equilibrium needs to be unfrozen and the old behaviors have to be discarded first before any new set of behavior can be adopted successfully. Another fundamental contribution Lewin (1946: 240) made to the literature is the concept of “Field Theory”. He puts forth that the *status quo* is maintained by certain driving and restraining forces within the field in which mutually interdependent dynamics coexist. He asserts that only with a perception of those forces, it would be possible to determine what forces need to be diminished or strengthened in order to unfreeze the equilibrium and bring about change (Burnes, 2004b).

Moving forward from Lewin’s (1951) work, Burnes (2004a) stipulates that in order to be successful in organizational change attempts, there has to be a “felt-need”, which is an individual’s inner realization that change is necessary. Regarding unfreezing, Schein (1996) brings forward that to be committed to change, members of the organization must adopt the “disconfirming information”, which leads them to feel a kind of “survival anxiety”. This is the feeling that if they are not committed to change, they will highly likely fail to meet their needs. Then he puts forth that unless sufficient “psychological safety” is created, the disconfirming information will not be able to lead the organization members to survival anxiety, and therefore, no change will take place (Schein, 1996).

Discussion and conclusion

Since its foundation, the SC has attracted countless number of criticisms. Though the Council has become a much more prominent security actor influencing the world politics considerably, it is still prone to similar criticisms as before. Some asserted that the SC did not meet the needs of the contemporary world, because of the Council’s decreasing legitimacy and effectiveness. Others pointed out to the problem of representation and democracy at the SC, which is argued to be inconsistent with the Charter and principles of the UN. However, most of the criticism leveled at the SC were regarding the

permanent membership and the veto power provided to the P5. It is contended that these privileges were, to some extent, instrumental for keeping the great powers of WW2 in line with the new organization. It is also argued that the world has changed significantly, if not drastically, and the balance of power affected the configuration of the SC is no longer alive. Those holding this view demand the SC to be updated to today's global power distribution.

However, despite various efforts which have been exerted particularly for the last three decades, proposals regarding the reform of the SC have proved fruitless. This disappointing picture led many to blame the veto power to be the major or even only impediment on the way to reform. However, this was not the case. Contrary to the conventional presumption, none of the change proposals has been able to proceed up to the approval of P5. According to Article 108 of the UN Charter, before submitted to the member governments for ratification, change initiatives need attaining a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. However, this quantity of majority has not been met yet for any of the change proposals. There does not exist any example, in which the P5 or any member of the P5 has blockaded a resolution regarding the SC reform after majority consent is provided in the General Assembly. Therefore, the assumption which accused the P5 being a major obstruction on the way to SC reform does not seem evidential.

According to change management scholars, if members of the organization believe that in the current situation the organization does not need any change, then they will not support any organizational change attempts (Kotter, 1995; Schein, 1996; Burnes, 2004b; Armstrong, 2006; Resnick, 1993). Further, there is an extensive consensus in the change literature that if those affected from organizational changes, particularly the organization members, do not make any contribution to the change process, it will be hard to succeed in change attempts (Guth & MacMillan, 1986; Schwahn & Spady, 1998; Cummings & Worley, 2003).

Cummings and Worley (2003) claim that because the future of change is uncertain and may concern people's coping abilities and competencies, members of the organization will not support change unless they are convinced against the status quo. Member states seem not to have been duly convinced against status quo so far. One reason of this picture might be that they have not trust in their competencies and coping abilities by their own, in words of Cummings and Worley (2003). Another reason may be that they have not felt enough "survival anxiety", in the words of Schein (1996), which refers to the feelings that "if they do not change, they will fail to meet their needs". For one reason or another, it is obvious that most of the member states have not supported the change initiatives so far and they gave in the current global order and acknowledged the power politics hierarchy.

Therefore, while it was the general assent of the founding states which gave birth to the SC in the very beginning of the UN for the sake of their own securities, it is still the

same consent, overt or covert, that enables the SC to survive. This is almost a similar covenant as Hobbes described between the man and the civil sovereign with “a quiet mind” (Hobbes, 1651b). If this was not the case, at least one of the change proposals which have been drafted for the last 30 years, should have gained the requisite support in the General Assembly. However, the required majority for changing the UN Charter has never been attained except the one experienced in 1961, despite various attempts have been made for the last three decades. Shepsle (1989) argues that institutional change occurs when a sufficient number of members are able to disrupt the institution. Moving this point forward, the SC has not experienced any fundamental change for the last fifty years because there were not sufficient number of members believing in change requirement and/or those members were not powerful enough to succeed in change the SC structure. Contrary, current structure of the SC reflecting the hegemony of great powers which is endorsed by the founding states, seems quite sustainable over time.

Today’s balance of power, which is reflected obviously at the SC looks like somewhat a typical kind of “stable equilibrium”. This is a situation, depicted by Stacey (2003), in which organizations have not the ability to transform themselves in order to keep pace with the ongoing demands and challenges and at last decrease. It is as if the structure of the Council has been frozen and stabilized intentionally. In Parrat’s (2014) words, the structure of the SC was an attempt to freeze world politics after the end of WW2. It seems the structure of the SC is so firmly frozen that, the very first step, in Lewin’s (1951) 3-step model, “unfreezing” has not been achieved yet. This picture also depicts the state of “inertia” or “equilibrium” of the Force-Field Analysis (Lewin, 1958). Driving forces and the restraining forces seem to stand still in the balance. Organizational readiness of change has not been provided enough yet to alter this state of equilibrium. Organizational readiness points to the situation in which members of the organization are prepared to launch organizational change. Therefore, before trying to attempt any change initiative at the SC, first of all, organizational readiness for change, in other words “felt-need” should be created among the member states (Salasin & Davis, 1977; Burnes, 2004a).

It is argued in this study, contrary to the conventional assumptions, that the SC with its peculiar nature of power politics, actually reflects the picture of not just the 40s, but it also mirrors today’s balance of power. Members of the UN do not seem ready or willing enough to change this situation. It is because of this reality, that the SC has been able to maintain its constancy up until today. This balance of power also corresponds with the “state of quasi-equilibrium” depicted in Lewin’s (1951) force-field model, where driving and restraining forces of change stand in balance. This causes an inertia which impedes the organizational change. The international structure configured after the WW2 around the SC seems to have been so firmly frozen that no one has been able to unfreeze it until now. Therefore, the very first phase of Lewin’s (1951) 3-step model, “unfreezing” has not been experienced yet.

However, this picture also reveals that how an incredible work has been done by those great powers through being able to persuade and agree the founding states of the UN on the hierarchical characteristics of the SC at that time. In this study, it is argued that, this outcome is a sheer evidence supporting the presumptions of realist theories. Member states have renounced their natural liberties, in the words of Hobbes, and powers, by transferring them to a supreme authority, namely the UN and particularly the SC, for the sake of relative security. This covenant still appears to be valid today. Therefore, the realist thought to a great extent, if not completely, still stands the most prevailing school in explaining the nature and functioning of the SC. The characteristics and continuity of the SC as well as its wartime origins, constitute very clear and strong evidence for this hypothesis. To sum up, it is argued in this paper that;

1. The structure and the functioning of the SC clearly reflect the balance of power of both 40s and to a certain extent, today.
2. This balance of power is compatible with the concept of “quasi-equilibrium” in Force-Field Theory, where driving and restraining forces of change are in balance.
3. This is the reason why none of the change initiatives of the SC has yielded any considerable result for the last 30 years.
4. It is not just the veto power the major obstacle on the way to reform. Rather, it is also those member states who have not been able to come to an agreement up until today.
5. This situation, both today and the very beginning of the UN, apparently consists of a covered assent, which Hobbes depicted more than three hundred years ago.
6. It is this general assent that resulted in the SC come to life and still survive.
7. Therefore, according to the change management literature, if the SC is to be reformed, then, first, member states should agree upon the change requirement of the SC and the way change will be implemented.
8. Thus, driving forces should outweigh restraining forces and accordingly, the current structure of the SC should start to unfreeze.
9. Only then it would be possible to change the structure of the SC successfully.
10. The victorious powers of the WW2 have been able to render their triumph immortality at least, for quite a long time through constructing and freezing a world order around the UN, particularly the SC.
11. Therefore, the SC should be regarded not just the perpetual win of the realist theories which still stands intact after having been challenged time and time again, but also the permanent victory of those great powers of WW2.

Finally, we must note that this paper should not be taken for an effort to legitimize the current global order and its concrete symbol, the SC. Contrarily, while on one hand trying to put forth a diagnostic explanation to the contemporary world order in a realistic perspective through change management approaches, this study attempts to make member states understand that the craft is not to allege the veto power or anything else as an excuse, but it is to be able to come into line with the other member states,

without a moment's delay, in order to establish a new world order, prevailing first and foremost, equity and human dignity. If those two principals are embraced honestly at the UN, the other requisites for the global peace will stand up by itself.

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